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ABSTRACT 
 
Emotions in Polybius’ Histories 
 
by 
 
Regina M. Loehr 
 
In this dissertation I investigate how emotions work in Polybius’ Histories, his account in Greek 
of Rome’s rise to supremacy.  My argument that moral and rational principles often underlie 
emotions in the Histories challenges both the Classical dichotomy between emotion and reason 
and commonplace assumptions that emotions were inherently negative.  Moreover, emotion is 
essential in Polybius’ project of history and for his historiographical theory:  Emotions play a 
crucial role in causation, critically connect moral principle to action in human behavior, and 
contribute to the educative value of history.  Emotion for Polybius is educative for his 
readership in two ways.  Emotions in the historical narrative teach the audience to observe and 
judge the characters’ reactions to emotions as correct or incorrect.  Not only does Polybius 
present the emotions of his characters, but he also uses history to inculcate a sense of correct, 
normative emotion in his audience. 
 
In Chapter 1, I identify important features of emotion drawn from the modern social sciences, 
providing a critical vocabulary through which I analyze key passages from the Histories, such as 
Philip V’s first sack of Thermum.  From an analysis of emotional features, it becomes clear that 
Polybius judges characters above all by the import, appropriateness, direction, and 
proportionality of their emotion.  In Chapter 2, I analyze how Polybius’ emotional vocabulary 
compares with that of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and David Konstan’s recent analysis in The Emotions of 
the Ancient Greeks.  In Chapter 3, I investigate emotions at work in changes of a state’s governing 
regime.  In Polybius’ theory of the cycle of constitutions, the people’s collective emotional 
reactions repeatedly spark change from a worse state form to a better one until the end of the 
cycle.  Similarly, in the downfall of Agathocles, the usurping prime minister of Egypt, the 
people’s emotions both reaffirm positive communal values and (perhaps paradoxically) lead to 
extreme violence in overthrowing Agathocles’ regime.  My analysis in Chapter 4 turns to the 
prominent role emotions play in causing war between states:  how do emotions motivate wars, 
especially in the paradigm case of the Second Punic War?  I look at the justifiability of anger as a 
cause of war and its implications for Polybius’ theory of history.  In the conclusion, after I recap 
and summarize my findings, I briefly address how the historian tries to inculcate in his readers 
the appropriate emotional response to certain situations, examining in particular Polybius’ 
remarks about pity in the Achaean War of 146 BC.  For Polybius, emotions play an important 
role in human decision-making, justifying and prompting individuals’ actions, explaining why 
states change from worse to better, linking the outbreak of wars to past events, and guiding the 
readers to develop a correct sense of emotional behavior. 
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1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 Achaeus, a rival contender for the Seleucid throne, was betrayed and caught trying to 
escape from Sardis under siege in 213 BC.  His extremities and head were cut off and his body 
impaled.  His captor, King Antiochus III, wept at Achaeus’ startling change of fortune.  
Antiochus’ army, however, felt and exhibited such joy that Achaeus’ wife, Laodike, realized that 
Achaeus was caught and despaired, surrendering Sardis shortly thereafter.  Within this narrative 
provided by the Greek historian Polybius of the 2nd century BC, Achaeus’ demise sets off chain 
reactions of emotions which stimulate concrete results, influence important decisions, and shape 
the readers’ judgment of the scene.1 
 The highly emotional story of Achaeus’ capture raises the issue of emotion in Polybius’ 
Histories.  When, where, how, and why do these emotions arise, and how does Polybius draw 
attention to them?  What motivates emotion in Polybius’ narratives?  How does it spark 
reactions, and how does it reflect a character’s qualities or a community’s values?  What 
relationship do emotions have with rationality or morality?  How do they stimulate violence?  In 
what cases does Polybius approve of emotion and why?   
 Most scholars assume that, in Polybius’ view, emotions have purely irrational and 
destructive force, although a few scholars recognize that Polybius does not treat all emotions 
negatively.2  This project takes the issue of Polybius’ usage of emotion in the Histories as its 
central critical issue.  I aim to show that references to emotion often positively shape his 
historical narrative, provide the criteria for the success and morality of characters, actions, and 
even historians, and aid the historian in guiding his readers to becoming intelligent statesmen 
and citizens of a new world centered on Rome.  Emotion has not often received central 
                                                 
1 Polyb., VIII.15-21, 36. 
2 Marincola 2013, Erskine 2015. 
2 
treatment in scholarship on historiography, but the genre of history can provide a rich source of 
reflection on ancient emotion:  history took as its subject and data set reality and actual events, 
unlike the genres of philosophy or poetry, on which current studies on ancient emotion focus.  
Of course, the historian’s rhetoric and guiding hand shape the narrative, so that his text does not 
recreate the historical people, decisions, and emotions exactly as they happened, but the value of 
history for understanding ancient views on emotions should not be so underestimated. 
Place in Scholarship 
 Currently there is a large trend in studies on ancient emotions.  These studies take 
Aristotle’s definitions of emotions in Book 2 of the Rhetoric as their starting point, beginning 
with William Fortenbaugh’s Aristotle on Emotion in 1975.3  David Konstan significantly 
contributed to emotion studies with The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks in 2006, which closely 
examines Aristotle’s definitions of each emotion and then compares these definitions to 
emotions in Classical Greek literature.  Konstan finds that Aristotle conceived of emotions as 
cognitive, i.e., involving rational thought processes, and as social.  He traces similar portrayals of 
emotion in tragedy and oratory.4  After Aristotle, studies focus on the Hellenistic philosophies of 
emotion and identify a therapeutic focus in these, following notable scholarship in the 1990s on 
Hellenistic philosophy by Martha Nussbaum and Julia Annas.5  Many scholars focus on the 
Stoics’ unique definition of emotions as judgments, along with the Epicureans’ conception of 
emotion as an unnecessary but natural desire.6   
                                                 
3 See on Aristotle and Plato on emotions, Caraone 2007, Cooper 1999a, Fortenbaugh 1975, 2008; Gross 2006, 
Konstan 2006, Koziak 2000, Lorenz 2006, Price 2009, Sokolon 2006, and Warren 2014. 
4 For examples from tragedy, see Konstan 2006, 59-65, 105-109, 247-251.  For examples from oratory, see Konstan 
2006, 65-68, 125-128, 203-210. 
5 Nussbaum 1994, 2001; Annas 1992, 1993. 
6 On the Stoics’ views on emotions, see Baltzly 2013, Bett 1998, Brennan 1998, 2003; Cooper 1999c, 2005; Gill 
2009, Graver 2007, Irwin 1998.  On Epicureans’ views on emotions, see Annas 1989, Armstrong 2003, 2008; 
Cooper 1999b, Gill 2009, Konstan 2014, Procopé 1998.  For both philosophies in general, see Algra, Barnes, 
Mansfeld, and Schofield, eds. 1999, Baltzly 2013, Brennan 2005, Cooper 2012, Inwood, ed. 2003, Konstan 2014, 
3 
 After studies on emotion in philosophy, scholars have branched out into culture and 
literature.7  Tragedy as defined and explored in Aristotle’s Poetics centers on eliciting the emotions 
of pity and fear and explores the extremities of human emotional experience.8  Rhetoric too 
features emotions, especially in its attention to pathos as one of the components of persuasion, 
seen in Aristotle’s choice to define emotions in his rhetorical treatise, for example.9  Orators 
strove to elicit particular emotions in their attempt to persuade their audiences, and both their 
speeches and rhetorical treatises reflect this goal.10  Lastly, the two volumes of Unveiling Emotions 
opened up the study of emotions in material culture.11 
 Besides studying emotion by genre, scholars have written on individual emotions.  
Douglas Cairns’ seminal study on shame opened the field for further work on individual 
affects.12  Anger, beginning with Achilles’ rage in the Iliad, holds an exceptional place in 
scholarship.13  What seem like more noticeable or mainstream emotions – anger, pity, love – 
received full treatment first, and the seemingly less typical (or noticeable) emotions, such as 
envy, spite, jealousy, have also attracted scholarly attention.14  Last of all, positive emotions, such 
as joy, hope, and gratitude, and the opposite, disgust and melancholy, have recently seen 
                                                                                                                                                       
O’Keefe 2010, and Warren, ed. 2009.  On other Hellenistic philosophies on emotions, see Aune 2008, Bett 1998, 
and Thom 2008. 
7 On ancient emotions in general, see Cairns 2008, Cairns and Fulkerson 2015, Knuuttila 2004, Konstan 2006, and 
Konstan 2013.  On emotions in literature, see Braund and Gill, eds. 1997, Braund and Most, eds. 2003, and Harder 
and Stöppelkamp, eds. 2016. 
8 See Arist., Poet.; see recently Visvardi 2015 and Harder and Stöppelkamp, eds. 2016. 
9 On Aristotle’s emotions and rhetoric, see Cooper 1994, Cooper 1999a, Fortenbaugh 1975, 2008; Frede 1996, 
Furley and Nehamas, eds. 1994, Garsten 2006, Garver 1994, Konstan 2006, 2007; Nieuwenburg 2002, Price 2009, 
Remer 2013, Rorty, ed. 1996, and Sokolon 2006. 
10 On emotion and rhetoric in general, see Garsten 2006, Gill 1984, Graver 2002, Konstan 2007, Oliver 2006, 
Remer 2013, Rorty, ed. 1996, and Wisse 1989. 
11 Chaniotis and Ducrey, eds. 2012, 2013.  See too Hamilakis 2013. 
12 Cairns 1993.  See too Konstan 2003 on shame. 
13 On anger: Armstrong 2008, Braund and Most, eds. 2003, Erskine 2015, Faraone 2003, Harris 2001, Kalimtzis 
2012, Koziak 2000, Lebow 2015, Ludwig 2009, and Lynch and Miles 1980. 
14 On anger see above, note 6.  On pity, see Konstan 2001, Lateiner 2005, Marincola 2003, and Sternberg Hall, ed. 
2005.  On envy, see Kaster 2005, Konstan 2003, Konstan and Rutter, eds. 2003, and Walcot 1978.  On regret, see 
Fulkerson 2013. 
4 
increased attention.15  Studies on emotion also focus on time periods and cultures, such as 
Classical Athens and Republican Rome.16 
 My study of emotions in Polybius is intended to contribute to both the literary and 
cultural history of emotion.  First, the genre of history provides a contrast to poetic and 
rhetorical genres since history self-consciously claims to represent what really – or likely –  
happens.17  The historian also chooses to portray emotion, although constrained by concern for 
the truth and plausibility.  History can offer a picture of how persons understand the working of 
emotions in actual events rather than abstract thought or openly fictitious or mythological 
literature.  Second, my study of emotion in Polybius not only provides a view of emotion as 
close to the proverbial man-on-the-street’s conception of emotion, but also illuminates an 
important period in the cultural history of emotion, the Hellenistic period.  Current works 
conceive of the Hellenistic period as “overemotional,” particularly in its philosophy, art, and 
(lost) “tragic” historiography.18  As I stress later, Hellenistic philosophies should not be taken as 
exemplifying common thought on emotion.  They theorize and idealize emotion for their own 
purposes.  Polybius’ history, however, provides a facet of the Hellenistic period not considered 
in the larger discussion about Hellenistic emotion:  the emotions which drove individuals and 
states to both honorable and ignoble behavior. 
 Emotions in both ancient and modern history, however, are touched on lightly.  David 
Levene addressed emotion in Tacitus’ Histories and how scholars can view both the characters’ 
                                                 
15 On positive emotions, see Caston and Kaster, eds. 2016, Fulkerson 2015.  See Lateiner and Spitharas, eds. 2017 
on ancient disgust. 
16 On Athens, see McHardy 2008, Sternberg Hall, ed. 2005, and Visvardi 2015.  On Rome, see Kaster 2005.  On 
other studies of cultural emotions, see Cairns and Fulkerson, eds. 2015, Fitzgerald, ed. 2008 and Munteanu, ed. 
2011. 
17 See Marincola 1997, 175-216, on the ancient historian’s self-presentation. 
18 See, for example, Erskine 2003, 2, on the general perception of the Hellenistic age as more degenerate than the 
Classical period.  See Fitzgerald 2008 on the prominence of emotion in Hellenistic philosophy.  See Hunter 2003, 
esp. 491-493 on emotion in Hellenistic literature.  See too Green 1990, 92-118 and Daehner and Lapatin, eds. 2015 
on realism or naturalism in Hellenistic art, which includes emotion.  
5 
emotions and the emotions which the audience feels.19  John Marincola in his article “Beyond 
Pity and Fear” challenges the contrast between history and tragedy in the Poetics and see it as 
limiting for scholarship.  He encourages going beyond these two paradigmatic emotions:  “I will 
argue, however, more strongly that we need to alter the perspective with which we approach the 
issue of the emotions in history, to break free of the bonds of pity and fear, and to examine 
instead the way in which all the emotions were used by all the ancient historians, and for what 
purposes they were used.”20  William V. Harris adds to the debate between positivistic history 
and history based on empathy, which arose prominently in discussions of how to write the 
history of the Holocaust, summarized in LaCapra’s Writing History, Writing Trauma.21  Even 
Tacitus’ famous statement at the beginning of the Annales, to read history “sine ira et studio” has 
been addressed by many scholars, but not as a testament to emotion per se (or the lack thereof) 
in history but as a discussion of bias.22   
 Moreover, historical scholarship on antiquity is not alone in marginalizing the role of 
emotions.  Few studies in history in general focus on emotion, limited mostly to the Medieval 
Ages and the French Revolution.23  Such a trend finds parallels in the study of emotions in 
international relations.24  Realism, the dominant theory in studies of international relations, with 
its focus on rationality and calculation as the basis of all human decision-making, has been 
shown by Neta Crawford to ignore the central importance the theory places on fear as a 
motivator.25  While fear represents a rational calculation of strength and represents a concern for 
                                                 
19 Levene 1997. 
20 Marincola 2003. 
21 Harris 2010.  See LaCapra 2001 for discussion of these types of history.  Harris concludes that empathy for 
subjects in ancient history does not facilitate the modern study of ancient history. 
22 See especially Luce 1989. 
23 See Febvre 1973, Harris 2010, Hunt 2006, LaCapra 2001, MacMullen 2003, Reddy 2001, and Rosenwein 2002. 
24 On emotions in politics and International Relations, see Ahäil and Gregory, eds. 2015, Crawford 2000, Flam and 
King, eds. 2005, Goodwin and Polletta, eds. 2001, Mercer 2005, Ross 2006, and Sasley 2011. 
25 Crawford 2000; see Eckstein 2006, 50-52, on fear in Thucydides.  See too Mercer 2005 on psychology’s effect on 
rationality. 
6 
survival, scholars still fail to recognize the potential rationality of emotion.26  Crawford draws 
attention to the fact that “theories of international politics and securities depend on assumptions 
about emotion that are rarely articulated and which may not be correct.”27  Crawford details the 
areas in which emotions play a part in international relations and their absence in scholarship.28  
The collection Emotion, Politics, and War similarly describes the state of study of emotions in 
international relations as thin.29  This volume presents itself as a step towards identifying and 
analyzing the key roles emotion plays in war.    
 One reason why emotion is absent in studies on in ancient history is the privileging of 
seemingly “pragmatic” historians, who seem to fit most closely of the ancient historians with the 
ideal of objective, scientific, Rankean history.  In this view, Thucydides provides the ancient 
precedent both for objective historiography and for Realism.  He was perceived to promote cold 
calculation, expediency, and rationality to the detriment of “subjective” factors such as morality 
and emotion.  Polybius follows Thucydides, in this account of historiography.  Polybius’ 
bureaucratic style of writing, meticulous attention to detail, careful examination of sources, 
emphasis on rationality (λογισμός), and both practical and reasoned digressions all contribute to 
this reputation.  The postmodern study of “rhetorical” historiography challenges the seemingly 
straightforward and pragmatic nature of ancient historians’ approaches and emphasizes the 
literary construction of their texts.30  These two extremes of believing ancient historians’ claims 
                                                 
26 See Crawford 2000, 120-129, for a detailed discussion of Realist scholars who have made statements about 
emotions without drawing attention to the emotion itself. 
27 Crawford 2000, 116. 
28 Crawford 2000, 130-154. 
29 Ahäil and Gregory, eds. 2015.  See especially the Introduction by Crawford. 
30 See Woodman 1988 and White 1973 for seminal works in this field.  See Grethlein 2013, Dench 2009, and 
Marincola 2009 more recently.  See too Hau 2016 for a recent reappraisal of the Greek historians and their moral 
purpose. 
7 
to relate the truth and events “as they really happened” and of seeing the ancient histories as 
“purely” literary constructs still spark debate in the field of ancient historiography.31 
 This debate affects the study of emotion in ancient historiography.  Even in 
historiographical scholarship which deemphasizes the truth claims of the ancient historians, 
emotions do not feature.  Nevertheless, emotion provides the opportunity to study the choices a 
historian makes in crafting his narrative, for no external source can prove the existence of 
emotion in a historical event.  Even eye-witness accounts rely on interpretations of outward 
expressions which can only be inferred as emotive.32  Thus, the ancient historian chooses to 
include emotion in his narrative and makes an interpretive move rather than a report of fact.  
Nonetheless, historians did not have the freedom to create emotions entirely from nothing; their 
own claims to portray events as truly as they can constrain them to incorporate emotions in 
understandable and plausible ways.  Polybius himself criticizes a Roman historian, Fabius Pictor, 
for misrepresenting emotion and thus warns his and Fabius’ readers not to trust Fabius’ histories 
too readily.33  Because ancient historians endeavored to portray the events as plausible, as 
opposed to outright fictitious and mythologically-based literature, their portrayals of emotion 
should be close to what their contemporaries (and also the man-on-the-street) would recognize 
as the ancient Greek equivalents of “anger”, “pity”, “fear”, and so forth. 
 One subgenre of ancient historiography did supposedly highlight emotions – “tragic” 
historiography from the Hellenistic period.34  In particular, Duris of Samos and Phylarchus 
(apparently) engaged in a sensationalized, overwrought version of history which Polybius first 
among many criticized and actively pushed back against with his own style of history.  Polybius 
                                                 
31 See recently Batstone 2009 and Lendon 2009, which are paired in the Cambridge Companion to Roman Historians.  
Both Batstone and Lendon see and portray the issue as one of polar opposites, although most scholarship tends to 
fall in between the extreme views.  See Marincola 2001, 3-8, for a summary of the issue. 
32 See Woodman 1988, Ch. 1 on how different perspectives can create varying interpretations of events in history. 
33 Polyb., III.8.9.  See Chapter 4. 
34 On “tragic history” in general, see above all Schepens and Bolansée, eds. 2005, and Bringman 1997, Dreyer 2000, 
Eckstein 2013, Gowing 2010, Marincola 2003, 2011, 2013; Rutherford 2007, Sacks 1981, and Wiemer 2013. 
8 
criticizes Phylarchus for including the details of wailing women and children at the fall of a city 
so as to invoke sympathy and sadness for the characters.35  He rebukes those who 
sensationalized the fall of Agathocles of Egypt, narrating beyond what was proper for the genre 
of history and beyond what this particular character and scene merited.36  Partly from this very 
criticism of others’ style, Polybius represents a pragmatic historian.  Because the “tragic” 
historiography of the Hellenistic period forsook the Thucydidean, pragmatic model of history, it 
has been assessed as a lesser, more degenerate form of history.37  Recently, however, John 
Marincola and others have criticized the existence of a genre of “tragic” history and refined the 
terms of criticism.38 
 One might think that the historian who criticizes the overemotional styles of other 
historians and their dramatization of certain events may shun any emotional usage or element in 
his own work.  In fact, in reading Walbank’s A Historical Commentary on Polybius one would hardly 
know Polybius described or used any emotions.39  Polybius does use and portray emotions, 
however, just as often as his historiographical predecessors Herodotus, Thucydides, and 
Xenophon.40  Polybius’ usage of emotion may seem to challenge his reputation as a pragmatic 
                                                 
35 Polyb., II.56-58.  See too Walbank 1960, 216-234. 
36 Polyb., XV.36. 
37 See Marincola 2001, 110-112, on this trend. 
38 See especially Marincola 2013; Baron 2013 and Eckstein 2013. 
39 I investigate 47 passages throughout this dissertation in some depth (with at least two sentences) which involve 
emotions.  Walbank in his Historical Commentary on Polybius mentions emotion in only 11 of these, completely 
omitting any discussion of emotion in 36 passages.  Of the eleven, he focuses on how to translate the phrase with 
the emotion in four, compares the passage with emotion to another passage in three (and none of the referred 
sections address the emotion), and in one cites emotion merely in a discussion of Polybius’ sources.  The three 
remaining passages, in which Walbank actually discusses the emotion as such, involve the “wrath of the Barcids” in 
two passages, and Phylarchus’ tragic historiography in the last passage.  It seems fair to say that emotion as such did 
not interest Walbank. 
40 A basic search reveals that Thucydides alone portrays emotions more frequently than Polybius.  For the number 
of occurrences of emotions of anger, hatred, resentment, indignation, pity, and fear:  Herodotus – 137, Thucydides 
– 413, Xenophon – 202, and Polybius – 516.  Since Polybius’ extant text is at least 42% larger than any of the other 
historians, I measure these frequencies in relation to the size of their text.  The amount of the terminology for 
emotion, per total word count comes to these percentages:  Herodotus uses these emotional terms .074% of his 
total words, Thucydides uses these emotion terms .274% of the time, Xenophon uses these emotion terms .163% 
of the time, and Polybius uses these emotion terms .162% of the time.  However, this statistical comparison of their 
usages does not take into account the possibility of differing terminologies for emotions.   
9 
historian, as opposed to “tragic” historiography associated with emotion.41  Studying how 
Polybius portrays and uses emotion in his own historical narrative calls these categorizations into 
question:  Polybius uses emotions for his “pragmatic” goals of teaching statesmen honorable 
behavior. 
 Scholars have assumed that for Polybius emotion fell on the wrong side of a dichotomy 
with reason.  Emotion, it is said, characterizes the barbarian, the woman, the common person, 
the mercenary:  that is, emotion represents the opposite of the good aristocratic man.  Arthur M. 
Eckstein changed the field of Polybian studies with his monograph Moral Vision in the Histories of 
Polybius.42  Eckstein argues that Polybius did not present an amoral, Machiavellian perspective on 
history but rather morality and a concern for aristocratic ethos pervade and characterize his 
Histories.  “Hyperemotionality” played a part in Eckstein’s characterization of those of whom 
Polybius disapproved.  Eckstein states that “[e]very multitude is unstable in character, and filled 
with totally lawless desire, unreasoning anger, and violent passion.”43  Indeed, “uncontrolled 
emotion was to him the most prevalent – and dangerous – characteristic of the masses and their 
                                                                                                                                                       
    Moreover, comparison of fairly regularized terms throughout ancient Greek, such as ὀργή and its cognates, the 
terms for fear, φόβος, δέος and their cognates, and pity ἔλεος, reveal differing usages (and presumably emphases) 
for these emotions between the historians:  Herodotus rarely uses these emotional terms in comparison to the 
others:  he represents anger 16 times (80% fewer occurrences than Polybius), fear 78 times (68% fewer times than 
Polybius), and does not cite pity.  Thucydides, however, frequently uses fear 317 times (28% more occurrences than 
Polybius, which is notable as Polybius’ text is a little over twice the size of Thucydides’ text), uses anger prominently 
60 times (only 25% fewer occurrences than Polybius), but uses pity only once.  Xenophon provides a balance 
between Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ emotional usages:  He uses anger 28 times, fear 153 times, but pity only once.  
Moreover, Xenophon’s overall number of emotional usages is closely parallel to Polybius’ overall number of 
emotional terms at .162% and .163% of their total word count, respectively.  To make further conclusions or 
generalizations about these historians’ usage of emotional terms is not warranted from such statistical evidence, 
however.  Further analysis needs to be grounded in contextualizing these terms in the passages, particularly when 
not every usage may correspond to what we would call emotion. 
41 Ramsay MacMullen in Feelings in History, 2003, represents a dissenting voice to this statement.  He endeavors to 
show the close connection between emotion and motivation implicit in Thucydides and Roman Republican 
historians, such as Nikolaos.  MacMullen ties this significance to the scientific understandings of emotion. 
42 Eckstein 1995. 
43 Eckstein 1995, 136. 
10 
conduct.”44  Barbarians “always acted out of blind passion,” and women are characteristic of 
“hyperemotionality.”45 
   I disagree and argue that Eckstein was incorrect to assume that emotion was inherently 
negative in Polybius.  In arguing that “honor – both in the public sphere and as an inner feeling 
– was to Polybius more important” than a standard of success (by any means), Eckstein himself 
employs emotional language.46  In particular, in his second chapter, Eckstein argues that 
Polybius’ own feelings and emphasis on emotions demonstrate his deep concern for morality, 
although Eckstein never explicitly acknowledges the role of emotion itself in this connection.  
So, Eckstein tells us that “Polybius expresses bitter anger,” and mentions “Polybius’ angry 
criticism” and “an idea about which he felt very strongly.”47  These emotional phrases seemingly 
do not register as ‘emotional’ but ‘moral’ to Eckstein.  Thus Eckstein employs emotion and 
describes Polybius as feeling emotions to exemplify Polybius’ morality but does not characterize 
Polybius, although he shows emotion, in any way similar to his description of “hyperemotional” 
masses, barbarians, and women. 
 Craige Champion in his monograph Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories examines the 
trajectory of the decline of Roman culture in the Histories.  Similarly to Eckstein, Champion 
analyzes the language of barbarology and ochlocracy (rule of the mob) as a paradigm by which 
to evaluate groups of people in the Histories.  Champion shows how Polybius portrayed the 
Aetolians, Gauls, and Illyrians as barbaric, and shows the connotations associated with this:  
irrational, impulsive, uncivilized, passionate, and so forth.48  Champion does not assume that 
emotion in general is as inherently negative as Eckstein does throughout his work.  He does, 
                                                 
44 Eckstein 1995, 131. 
45 Eckstein 1995, 123, 152. 
46 Eckstein 1995, 9. 
47 Eckstein 1995, 52, 24, 22. 
48 Champion 2004a, 30-66. 
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however, use an emotional term, thumos, as the shorthand for all language of barbarology, which 
thus implies that he assumed emotion on some level was part and parcel of this negative 
characterization.   
 I disagree with the assumption that emotion was necessarily a negative element.  This 
assumption takes into account neither the various manifestations of emotion nor its variable 
motivations and results.  I accept Eckstein’s identification of Polybius’ moral vision and 
aristocratic ethos.  Likewise, Champion’s argument about the politics of cultural indeterminacy 
with which Polybius complicates the portrayal of the Romans as at times sharing in barbaric 
thumos and at times in Hellenic logismos, reason, informs my analysis of Polybius’ text.  That is, I 
take what Eckstein describes as Polybius’ aristocratic ethos and Champion’s descriptive category 
of logismos as the frame or model by which Polybius judges emotional behavior.  I differ from 
them by analyzing emotions themselves rather than understanding emotions as naturally 
irrational. 
 Last of all, the study of emotions in Polybius’ Histories is intrinsically important.  
Emotions pervade Polybius’ Histories.  They influence individuals’ and groups’ decisions, 
motivate uprisings and coups, spark wars, and reflect characters’ moral values.  In explanatory 
passages, they justify and exemplify normative human behavior.  In sum, in Polybius’ text 
emotions form a vital part of the process of history, and they serve as useful and significant 
material for the historian for making sense of events.  Polybius’ use of emotion and his view of 
how important emotion is for history justify studying emotions in his text in and of itself.    
Fundamentals of Emotion 
 Defining emotion is a notoriously difficult task:  “The question ‘What is an emotion?’ 
has haunted philosophers and psychologists for many years.”49  The ambiguity of emotion is 
                                                 
49 Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 1.  See also Deigh 2009, Cowie 2009, and de Sousa 2009 for explorations into defining emotion. 
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closely tied to the imprecision of thought and expression of emotion.  The prevalence of 
emotion in popular thought hinders a constrictive and concise theoretical definition which 
encompasses all the nuances of this term – despite many attempts by philosophers.50  The rigor 
of thinking about emotions in the modern social sciences provides a way into investigating 
emotions in ancient history.  The social sciences provide clear terminology and dissect the 
components of emotion in order to clarify how it works.  The goal of studies of emotion in the 
social sciences, that is, to investigate how emotions actually work in lived experience and thus 
provide a normative view of human emotion, thus falls closer to the purpose of history than do 
ancient philosophies.  Moreover, the modern social sciences illuminate how emotions can 
coalesce with morality and rationality.  This is important because it means that emotion can be 
more than just inherently negative.  In this section, I introduce fundamental terms for discussing 
emotions in a precise way and examine selections from Polybius’ Histories to demonstrate the 
salience of these features and style of analysis.  I aim to illustrate the usefulness of studies of 
emotion in the modern social sciences for an analysis of ancient historiography. 
 Emotions generally share basic features:  someone feels them, someone or something 
stimulates them, they are about something one cares about, and they cause some expression or 
result.  Studies of modern emotion use the terms subject, object, import, and result to describe 
these factors.51  The subject feels the emotion; they experience it, it is theirs.  For example, when 
Polybius narrates that the Achaeans grow indignant (ἠγανάκτει) with Aratus after he 
disastrously mismanaged their campaign against the Aetolians at Caphyae, the Achaeans are the 
subject of the emotion.52  They feel indignation.  The object of an emotion is the person or thing 
                                                 
50 For major studies on the (differing) nature of emotions, see Ekman and Davidson, eds. 1994, Goldie 2000, Helm 
2001, Prinz 2007, Solomon, ed. 2004, Ben-Ze’ev 2000.  For an introduction to the study of modern emotions, see 
Deonna and Teroni 2012, de Sousa 2014, and Goldie, ed. 2009. 
51 Helm 2009, 1-15 and de Sousa 2014, Section 3. 
52 Polyb., IV.14.2. 
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for or against whom the subject feels their emotion.53  The subject directs their emotion towards 
the object with the result that the objects ‘receive’ the emotion, so to speak.  In our example, 
Aratus is the object of the Achaeans’ indignation, for they grow indignant at him.  Objects 
frequently stimulate the emotion in the subjects, with the result that the objects seem to cause 
the emotion and so have more agency in the situation.  However, the emotion’s subjects and 
objects do not necessarily correspond with grammatical or active subjects and objects.  In terms 
purely of who has the emotion, those who feel it have actual agency in how they (re)act to their 
emotion; hence, they are regarded as the subjects.  Moreover, emotions tend to lead to further 
action.54  They stimulate subjects to make decisions and to act in ways they otherwise would 
probably not have acted.  The Achaeans’ indignation leads them to be sharply opposed to 
Aratus, which motivates his rivals to accuse him, leading to further actions.55 
 Within this discussion and example, an important feature of emotions, intentionality, 
stands out.  Emotions display intentionality in that they have objects.56  The emotion is directed 
towards a person a thing.  Intentionality is a characteristic of emotion which can distinguish it 
from other psychological and affective states, such as feelings, moods, dispositions, and 
sensations.57  In the Histories, this distinction between emotion with intentionality and other 
affective states without intentionality holds true.  Positive emotions, such as joy or gladness, 
however, seem objectless and do not lead to future action, distinguishing these emotions from 
                                                 
53 For examples of nonhuman objects, see III.112.2, III.46.11, XV.12.4, XVIII.37.7. 
54 See Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 1-15, and Greenspan 2000, 475ff. on the crucial role of emotion as a motivator for action. 
55 Polyb., IV.14.1-2. 
56 Intentionality in modern studies of emotion does not refer to intending to have or create an emotion.  See below 
for characters’ intentions to create emotion. 
57 See below for further details.  The affects of shock (κατάπληξις/ἔκπληξις), confidence (θάρσος), and hope 
(ἐλπίς) which dominate the military narrative seem generally to indicate a disposition or more succinctly a mood 
rather than occurrent emotions.  See Goldie 2000, 16-27, de Sousa 2014, Section 3, and Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 4 on 
limiting emotions to feelings with intentionality.  See for the occurrences and uses of shock, Mauersberger 2.1.375, 
1.3.1323-1327, 1.2.732-734, 1.2.946-947.  See for shock, 1.3.1136-1137, 1.3.1156-1157.  See Chapter 2 for ἐλπίς. 
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the major emotions of Polybius’ text.58  In our example, the Achaeans’ indignation has 
intentionality because they direct it against an object, Aratus.  However, as the passage 
continues, they redirect their indignation.  Aratus sways the Achaeans to pardon him, which 
caused them to redirect their indignation to his rivals, who tried to capitalize on the Achaeans’ 
indignation by accusing Aratus.59  Thus, the intentionality of the Achaeans’ indignation changes:  
Aratus ceases to be the object of their emotion and his rivals become the objects.  In this 
situation, the Achaeans either found their emotion misdirected at Aratus or found the rivals’ 
actions more egregious than Aratus’ in relation to the Achaeans’ values, the import of their 
indignation.60  Misdirection of emotions does not occur nearly as frequently as correctly directed 
emotions, which makes the Achaeans’ indignation and Aratus’ role as object particularly 
important here.  Polybius uses the misdirection of emotion to reflect positively on the character 
of Aratus.  As the object of a negative emotion, indignation, Aratus calmly appealed to the 
Achaeans’ values and engineered the transference of indignation to his own rivals, proving 
himself an emotionally competent statesman. 
 Import in modern studies describes what the emotion is about.61  It motivates someone 
to feel the emotion.  In our example, Aratus’ strategic failure and consequent loss of the lives of 
Achaeans constitute the import of the Achaeans’ indignation.  Moreover, Polybius lists four 
faults Aratus committed in his recent political and military leadership, making explicit why the 
Achaeans grew indignant at Aratus:  he took office too early, released the army while the 
Aetolians were in Achaea, engaged them while unprepared, and conducted the battle poorly.62  
Polybius assumes that the Achaeans valued the lives of their troops, their military aims against 
                                                 
58 See Chapter 2. 
59 Polyb., IV.14.7-8. 
60 Their original motivations for their emotions were still correct; the justifications used for evaluating the emotion 
changed. 
61 See Helm 2001, 60-122 for this terminology. Ben-Ze’ev 2000, on the other hand, prefers the terminology of 
‘concern’, while Helm 2009, 4ff. adds ‘focus’ as a definition for import. 
62 Polyb., IV.14.2-6. 
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the Aetolians, and honorable standards of behavior in warfare.  Aratus failed to provide any of 
these, and this stirred the Achaeans’ indignation.  The Achaeans’ value of life, victory, and honor 
make up the implicit imports of their indignation against Aratus, the object, but his political 
failures also make up the explicit import.  Polybius rarely defines the import of an emotion so 
explicitly, and, compared to the other features discussed, it is difficult to identify clearly because 
import represents a value of the subject rather than a concrete person, thing, or event.  Causes as 
identified in history are closely related to import, for causes represent an agent’s reason to act, 
just as import represents the subject’s reason to feel.63 
 The import of an emotion represents the basis for the emotion’s justification and 
appropriateness in that it is usually a moral value that the subject holds:  subjects feel an emotion 
for a reason.64  For example, near the beginning of the Social War, Philip V makes a surprise 
attack on the Aetolian capital of Thermum.65  Philip’s plan to make a surprise attack on 
Thermum receives a favorable evaluation from Polybius:  Aratus, one of Polybius’ most 
positively portrayed characters, approves and promotes Philip’s plan, while Leontius, who we 
know is complicit in a scheme to foil all of Philip’s actions, argues against it.66  Thus, Polybius 
portrays the project to attack Thermum as the best and most prudent choice by a general.  After 
Philip takes Thermum and has his men heap up all the extra moveable property, Polybius 
remarks that up to this point all was done nobly and justly (καλῶς καὶ δικαίως).67  However, he 
censures the next action, 
 “for, taking thought for what the Aetolians did in Dium and Dodona, they burnt 
the stoas and destroyed the rest of the dedications, which were luxurious in their 
ornamentation and of which some were crafted with much care and expense.  
But not only did they destroy the roofs with fire, but they also razed them to the 
                                                 
63 See Chapter 4 for emotion and causation. 
64 See Chapter 3 for how Polybius thought emotions had reasons behind them. 
65 Polyb., V.6-12. 
66 Polyb., V.6-8.  See Walbank, HCP 1.546-549 on Philip at Thermum. 
67 Polyb., V.9.1. 
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foundation.  And they overthrew also the statues, not less than 2,000, and they 
also destroyed many statues, except those which had dedications to the gods or 
were in the gods’ images.”68 
 
  Although Polybius describes Philip’s religious restraint with these statues, Philip seems to have 
gone too far.  Polybius specifies that Philip was driven by anger (ὀργή) in his judgment and 
criticism of Philip’s behavior, placed later.69 
 Philip cared about the sanctuaries at Dium and Dodona, thought that the Aetolians acted 
wrongfully, and thought he had justly and appropriately punished them through his reciprocal 
destruction at Thermum.70  The import of the emotion, Philip’s valuing of religion and the 
religious centers of Dium and Dodona, and the event which provokes his anger, namely the 
Aetolians’ actions against Philip’s interests, are deeply intertwined.  Polybius frequently mentions 
both why subjects feel an emotion and what provokes subjects to feel emotion, but he does not 
distinguish these factors separately as import and motivation.  Polybius does not consistently 
mention both aspects and often assumes his reader already knows why an action motivates a 
particular emotion.  For Philip’s anger, Polybius does not specify why Philip cares about Dium 
and Dodona; the moral principle, or import, is assumed.  However, for an analysis of the 
workings of ancient Greek emotions, the identification of import as an underlying value which 
motivates the emotion is an important distinction from the identification of the event which 
                                                 
68 Polyb., V.9.2-3.  λαβόντες γὰρ ἔννοιαν τῶν ἐν Δίῳ καὶ Δωδώνῃ πεπραγμένων τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς τάς τε στοὰς 
ἐνεπίμπρασιν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἀναθημάτων διέφθειρον, ὄντα πολυτελῆ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς καὶ πολλᾶς 
ἐπιμελείας ἔνια τετευχότα καὶ δαπάνης.  οὐ μόνον δὲ τῷ πυρὶ κατελυμήναιτο τὰς ὀροφάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
κατέσκαψαν εἰς ἔδαφος.  ἀνέτρεψαν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀνδριάντας, ὄντας οὐκ ἐλάττους δισχιλίων ·  πολλοὺς δὲ 
καὶ διέφθειραν, πλὴν ὅσοι θέων ἐπιγραφὰς ἢ τύπους εἶχον. 
69 Polyb., V.12.1.  δῆλον γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ὡς εἰκὸς ἦν αὑτῶν μὲν καταγινώσκειν, τὸν δὲ Φίλιππον ἀποδέχεσθαι 
καὶ θαυμάζειν, ὡς βασιλικῶς καὶ μεγαλοψύχως αὐτοῦ ·  χρωμένου τῇ τε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς 
αὐτοὺς ὀργῇ. 
70 Polyb., V.9.6. 
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sparks the emotion.  The import explains why a character felt an emotion; the motivating event 
explains when and under what circumstances the subject felt an emotion.71 
 Emotions can be appropriate to their import and the event which stimulates the emotion.72  
If the emotion accords with the import, it is appropriate.  To turn back to our previous example, 
Aratus argued that the Achaeans’ response and scale of indignation constituted an inappropriate 
response:  the Achaeans should not have felt such indignation.73  Polybius, on the other hand, 
shows that Philip V rightfully felt anger against the Aetolians for their previous desecrations, and 
– had he stopped his destruction with the moveable property – he would have acted correctly as 
a result of his appropriate anger.74  
 Closely related to appropriateness is the concept of proportionality in modern social 
sciences.  Both appropriateness and proportionality measure whether an emotion is correctly 
aligned with moral values.  The appropriateness of an emotion refers to whether the emotion 
itself is a correct response to the event which stimulates the subject’s emotion, whereas 
proportionality refers to whether the action resulting from the emotion correlates to the emotion.  
In other words, appropriateness looks back from the emotion to motivation and proportionality 
looks ahead to the result of the emotion.  These terms differ only minutely, but this distinction 
allows for a nuanced reading and appraisal of emotions and their subjects in the Histories.  In the 
case of Philip V’s destruction of Thermum, Polybius finds Philip’s response to his anger 
disproportionate.75  Philip went too far in his anger by destroying sacred structures; thus his 
reaction was disproportional.  Nevertheless, the narrator does not characterize Philip’s anger 
itself as inappropriate:  he rightly grew angry at the Aetolians’ destruction at Dium and 
                                                 
71 This is parallel to Polybius’ distinction of looking back to causes of wars as separate from the event (ἀρχή) which 
begins them, III.6-7.  See Chapter 4. 
72 For interpretations of appropriateness in emotions, see D’Arms and Jacobson 2000, 65-90, Deigh 2009, 1-15. 
73 Cf. Polyb., XI.28, where Scipio Africanus argues away the causes for the mutineers’ indignation. 
74 Polyb., V.9.1.  Cf. V.12.1. 
75 Polyb., V.9.7.  ἐμοὶ δὲ τἀναντία δοκεῖ τούτων. 
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Dodona.76  Presumably destroying only the secular structures would have marked a proportional 
response for his anger.  In this passage, we can evaluate the difference between appropriateness 
and proportionality.77  Philip overreacted to his appropriate anger.78 
 Misdirection occurs when the subject directs their emotional response towards the 
wrong object.  Philip V both responded disproportionately and misdirected his anger and its 
resulting action.  He acted disproportionately by destroying too much.  He grew angry at the 
Aetolians, the correct objects of his anger, but misdirected his response to another object, the 
(property of the) gods.  Both of these features center on the same action:  he destroyed the gods’ 
belongings.  In this case, Philip’s misdirection and disproportional response mutually reaffirm 
each other.79   
 Polybius’ final remarks, nevertheless, both clarify his purpose and at the same time 
complicate this application to Philip V.  Polybius says, “for committing the same fault as the 
Aetolians’ impieties, and because of his passion (θυμός), healing evil with evil, Philip thought 
that he did nothing wrong.”80  Philip often blamed the Aetolians Scopas and Dorimachus for 
their lack of restraint and unscrupulousness (ἀσέλγεια, παρανομία), often bringing up their 
impiety (ἀσέβεια) against the divine.  But he himself, doing the very same, did not think that he 
                                                 
76 Polyb., V.9.1:  Καὶ ἕως μὲν τούτου πάντα κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ἐπράττετο ·  
τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα πῶς χρὴ λέγειν οὐκ οἶδα. 
77 Scipio Africanus, speaking to his mutinous troops in Spain, argued that they felt indignation inappropriately, 
going through each potential motive for their indignation and how it was unjustified, XI.28.  This is discussed 
further in Chapter 2. 
78 Polybius emphasizes the wrongness of Philip’s actions at Thermum, V.9-12. 
79 Orators in the Histories make this interconnection between misdirection and disproportionality the foundation of 
their arguments.  In particular, speakers who attempt to assuage the Romans’ anger towards various Greek 
communities argue that the Romans react with disproportional anger.  See Erskine 2015 for an analysis of this 
strategy.  See Walbank 1965 and Wooten 1974 on the rhetoric of the speeches in Polybius.   
80 Polyb., V.11.1. 
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would create the same reputation as they had among his audience.81  Thus, Philip erred because 
he committed the same wrongs as the Aetolians with his tit-for-tat strategy.82 
 Polybius explains why he condemns Philip by an appeal to proper conduct within war.  
He specifies that according to the laws and rights of war, generals can take away and destroy 
enemies’ forts, harbors, cities, soldiers, ships, produce, and anything else like these which, when 
lost, would weaken the enemy and which would enhance one’s own strength when gained.83  
Destroying what does not weaken the enemy or strengthen oneself is clearly the work of a mad 
passion (θυμοῦ λυττῶντος).84  Polybius explains further that good men wage war not to 
eliminate the enemy but to correct him, and thus a good man should direct his attention and 
actions against wrongdoers, not innocents.85  These sentiments reflect Polybius’ philosophy on 
the correct method of making war, and thus demonstrate that Philip did not meet Polybius’ 
(personal) standards.  Philip destroyed more than would aid him in the war.86   
 Polybius makes one last point to prove that Philip V’s actions were not beneficial, both 
practically and morally.  He remarks that one could recognize Philip’s mistake if one takes the 
Aetolians’ perspective and thinks about how they would be disposed if he had acted differently.  
Polybius states emphatically that he thinks they would have had the best and most humane 
opinion of him (βελτίστην καὶ φιλανθρωποτάτην [διάληψιν]), knowing what they did at 
                                                 
81 Polyb., V.11.1-2. 
82 Philip had no moral issue with his behavior, Polybius specifies, which implies that such a realist strategy was a 
viable and accepted view at the time.  See Eckstein 2006 on the prevailing realist atmosphere in the interstate 
relations of the Hellenistic period. 
83 Polyb., V.11.3.  Cf. Plat., Rep. 5.470A-471A.  See Walbank, HCP 1.549. 
84 Polyb., V.11.4.  Dorimachus’ actions at IV.67.1-4 fall into this category:  they go beyond what Polybius 
determined necessary in war. 
85 Polyb., V.11.5.  Cf. Seneca’s Stoic purpose of correction in De Ira.  See too Cic., De Off. 1.35. 
86 While it is clear that Philip destroyed too much, Polybius’ comment that one should not harm the innocent does 
not particularly apply to Philip’s case.  Polybius does not narrate that he killed or enslaved any inhabitants.  In 
targeting civic buildings, he presumably could have harmed the innocent, except that he harmed the public buildings 
of the Aetolian League which had declared war against him.  Polybius’ stringent distinctions between civilian and 
military targets find parallels with modern just war theory.  See Lazar 2016, Parts 4.1-4.3, and Walzer 2015, 
especially Part 3. 
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Dodona and Dium and realizing Philip could have done anything he wanted at Thermum, 
rightly.87  In this counterfactual example, Philip would have chosen to do nothing similar to 
them because of his mildness and magnanimity.  Polybius concludes his criticism of Philip by 
stating, “for it is clear from these [arguments] that they were likely to blame themselves on the 
one hand, but on the other to approve of Philip and wonder at his magnanimity and kingliness 
when he showed piety to the divine and anger towards them (χρωμένου τῇ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον 
εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀργῇ).”88  In this concluding statement Polybius makes clear 
that Philip’s anger was an appropriate response.  If he had directed it correctly – towards the 
Aetolians (πρὸς αὐτοὺς) instead of the divine (πρὸς τὸ θεῖον) -  his anger would have also 
been proportional too, as the correct response against the Aetolians.  Thus, in the end, it 
becomes apparent that anger as such was not Philip’s mistake:  he misdirected a disproportionate 
response, committing a twofold error.   
 One categorization commonly utilized in discussions of emotion concerns rationality and 
irrationality, and this is a central concern in Chapter 3.89  This dichotomy between rationality and 
irrationality has pervaded scholarship on Polybius until recently.90  However, in Polybius’ text 
emotions do not fall directly and automatically onto one side or the other.  Rather, analysis of 
                                                 
87 It is remarkable that Polybius argues – optimistically – that the Aetolians would think like this, reflecting and 
changing their view.  Polybius, in his imagined scenario, attributes to them three important factors:  that they 
recognized their own faults at Dium and Dodona, that they would have recognized the correct direction of Philip’s 
anger towards them but also his restraint, and that they would have fundamentally changed their opinion of Philip 
because of this.  In short, Polybius assumes the Aetolians would have seen and respected the same ethical logic as 
Polybius.  Polybius’ own account of the Aetolians’ behavior and their set of values contradicts this view.  Within 
this scenario, they celebrated Scopas’ destruction at Dium as the work of a noble hero, IV.62.4.  The Aetolians are 
one of the last peoples to whom one would expect Polybius to attribute rational reflection and recognition of his 
ethical standards; see Champion 2011.  This paradox – rational and reflecting Aetolians – either marks an 
inconsistency in his thought or strengthens Polybius’ point:  even the Aetolians could have recognized Philip’s 
restraint, and so his actions reflect even more poorly on himself for failing to see this.  Moreover, Polybius’ 
argument about what the Aetolians “clearly” (δῆλον) would have thought demonstrates that Polybius assumed that 
all people were capable of such rational reflection and even thought that people were more disposed to reach his 
ethical and rational conclusion than any other conclusion. 
88 Polyb., V.12.1. 
89 See Greenspan 1988 and 2000 for good discussions of reason’s relationship to emotion. 
90 Eckstein 1989 and 1995, 22, 24, 52, 57, 73. 
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emotions and their motivations, appropriateness, and proportionality provide a foundation for 
the categorization of emotion.  In fact, Polybius seldom explicitly distinguishes emotion as 
rational or irrational.91 
 With most instances of emotion, Polybius simply narrates its occurrence, but sometimes 
Polybius narrates a character’s intention to cause or create emotion in another character.  Their 
success in this intent often contributes to a favorable portrayal of the one who intends to create 
emotion.  Hannibal intends to and succeeds in creating emotion in others most of all in the 
surviving text of the Histories.92  Characters who try to manipulate others’ emotions and fail, on 
the other hand, suffer and generally are portrayed in a negative light.  For example, the new and 
young tyrant of Syracuse in 215 B.C., Hieronymus, immediately takes steps to reverse his 
predecessor Hiero’s policy of steadfast dedication to Syracuse’s alliance with Rome and against 
Carthage.  Instead, Hieronymus chooses to support Carthage and, in his choices, causes 
indignation to the Romans.  Polybius makes clear that Hieronymus chose poorly in his reply to 
the Roman embassy which came to him as a courtesy to preserve their alliance.93  Hieronymus’ 
causing the Romans indignation aligns with his other negative traits and incompetence, leading 
to his swift demise, as Polybius is quick to tell us. 
 Generally, people feel emotions on their own account and for others.  Here I shall call 
emotions felt on one’s own behalf personal.  For example, the powerful Seleucid courtier 
                                                 
91 Of the emotions of anger, hatred, indignation, resentment, and pity, examples of explicitly rational emotions:  
ὀργή II.56.13 (someone), XXI.31.7 (Romans in Athenian’s speech), XXX.31.12 (Romans in Astymedes’ speech); 
μῖσος IX.39.1 (Of hating folly, in Lyciscus’ speech); δυσαρέστησις III.26.6 (someone).  Explicitly irrational 
emotions:  ὀργή V.49.3 (Hermeias), VI.56.11 (people); δυσαρέστησις VII.5.6 (Hieronymus).  Rationality will form 
a major topic of Chapter 3. 
92 For example, Hannibal often intends to create emotions, contemplates using others’ emotions, and creates 
emotions:  III.13.6, III.17.5, III.34.4, III.51.13, III.52.6, III.54.7, III.60.10, III.60.13, III.61.4, III.61.5, III.62-63, 
III.69.3, III.78.5, III.89.1, III.90.12, III.94.7, III.101.4, III.111.3, III.111.5, VI.58.9-10, IX.4.7, IX.6.1, IX.22.5, 
XI.3.6, XV.19.3, XV.19.6.  Scipio Africanus seems to succeed also. 
93 Polyb., VII.5.6. 
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Hermeias grew angry at his rival Epigenes for speaking up against his plans.94  Hermeias grew 
angry on his own behalf.  By contrast, external observers feel pity for Achaeus, a rival to 
Antiochus III for the Seleucid throne, after he was captured and killed despite his best efforts.95  
These observers feel an emotion on the behalf of another person, Achaeus.  These observers 
also hate Achaeus’ betrayers – not because the betrayers harmed the observers themselves, as 
would be the case with a personal emotion – but because the betrayers harmed Achaeus, with 
whom the observers sympathize.  These emotions, the observers’ pity and hate, are reflective, 
for, implicitly, the subjects reflect upon another’s situation and at least consider how they would 
feel in the other’s situation.96 
In fact, Polybius narrates this type of reflective emoting when he describes how 
Antiochus III, Achaeus’ enemy, reacts when Achaeus is brought to him bound.97  Antiochus, 
Polybius says, remained silent for a long time then burst into tears.  For he reflected on the 
vicissitudes of fortune and how Achaeus just before had been at the prime of his life in his 
power and fortune, but now was reduced to nothing.98  Antiochus’ reflection leads him to react 
with raw emotion – an outburst of tears.  This reflection and emotive response by Antiochus is 
employed by Polybius to enhance his character.  He shows wisdom not customary in a young 
king, and his reflection on fortune hearkens back to Herodotus’ narrative of Solon’s advice to 
Croesus and Croesus’ subsequent reversal of fortune.99  Antiochus, on witnessing such a reversal 
                                                 
94 Polyb., V.49.3. 
95 Polyb., VIII.36.9. 
96 The process of reflection happens almost instantaneously.  Damasio 1994, and Greenspan 1988, both discuss the 
temporality of emotional processes.  See Stueber 2017 for an overview on modern views of empathy.  See Chapter 3 
for an analysis of the reflective process of emotions in Polybius’ Histories. 
97 Polyb., VIII.20. 
98 Polyb., VIII.20.9-10.  παρεισελθόντων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸν Καμβύλον καὶ καθισάντων τὸν Ἀχαιὸν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν 
δεδεμένον, εἰς τοιαύτην ἀφασίαν ἦλθε διὰ τὸ παράδοξον ὥστε πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἀποσιωπῆσαι, τὸ δὲ 
τελευταῖον συμπαθὴς γενέσθαι καὶ δακρῦσαι. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔπαθεν ὁρῶν, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τὸ δυσφύλακτον καὶ 
παράλογον τῶν ἐκ τῆς τύχης συμβαινόντων. 
99 Herod., I.29-33 and I.86-87.  Cf. Scipio Aemilianus’ tears at the fall of Carthage:  Polyb. XXXVIII.20-22 (from 
App., Pun.132). 
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at Croesus’ former capital, Sardis, shows himself to have good moral character and to be a 
thoughtful student of history through his reflective emotion.100 
 The categories of personal and reflective are not mutually exclusive.  Reflective emotions 
often reflect back to the subject, and so are also personal emotions; altruistic emotions do not 
feature in Polybius’ text, and Polybius narrates how emotions are often inherently reflective, 
even when they seem to be directed wholly on another’s behalf.101  Similarly, subjects can feel 
emotions for a community rather than only for an individual.  Often they feel for their own 
group, making these communal emotions an extension of personal emotion.102  Reflective 
emotional processes share striking similarities to Polybius’ theory of the learning process and 
profit of history, i.e., to reflect on the experiences of people of the past and apply their situations 
to oneself in order to learn the best judgment and response.103 
 Emotions are experienced concurrently throughout the Histories as one would expect in a 
portrayal of reality, although theories of emotion have difficulty addressing the nuances of 
combined emotion.  Most often the same subject feels similar and related emotions, such as 
anger and hatred.104  One subject can feel multiple emotions simultaneously.  For example, after 
the Achaean Callicrates returned from an embassy to Rome, Polybius says that anger and hatred 
were made manifest against him.105  In this example, the Achaeans feel complementary 
                                                 
100 This characterization of Antiochus as a thoughtful and reflective king does not persist throughout the Histories.  
By the time of his war against Rome, Polybius chastises Antiochus for his poor life choices.  In general, Polybius 
treats Antiochus III and Philip V fairly even-handedly throughout the Histories, praising and chastising them as their 
behavior dictates. 
101 See especially IX.10.9 for this process explicitly.  See too IV.6, VIII.36, XV.17.1-2.  These examples will all be 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3.  Pity comes closest to an altruistic emotion in the Histories, but 
Polybius explicitly describes the process of pity as reflective back on one’s own circumstances.  See Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 
3 for their nonexistence; see for the existence of altruistic emotion, Konstan 2006, 85 and Tappolet 2009. 
102 Kelly, Iannone, and McCarty 2014. 
103 Polyb. III.31.  See Chapter 4. 
104 Polyb., I.82.9, VI.7.8, IX.10.10, XV.17.2, XV.30.1.  See the discussions of each of these emotions in Chapter 2 
on their differences. 
105 Polyb, XXX.29.1. 
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emotions, as anger and hatred are both negative feelings, at the same time.106  Later in the same 
section, Polybius states that such was the indignation (προσκοπή) and hatred (μῖσος) against 
Callicrates that children in the street called him a traitor.107  Anger, hatred, and indignation 
together characterize the intensity of the Achaeans’ reaction to Callicrates.  These similar 
emotions combine and are directed against the same object. 
 In other passages, seemingly opposite emotions occur simultaneously in response to the 
same event.108  Studies on modern emotion call this feature of emotions multidimensionality.109  
Let us move back to the example of the capture of the Seleucid rival Achaeus.110  The observers 
who felt pity for him and hatred for his betrayers felt multidimensional emotions.  Not only did 
they experience multiple emotions simultaneously, but they felt very different kinds of emotions 
with different objects.  Likewise, after the Romans conquer Syracuse, Polybius describes how 
observers feel when conquerors overstep the bounds of propriety in taking spoils.111  He says 
that instead of feeling happy for the conquerors, observers pity the conquered.112  Polybius 
explains that they feel resentment (φθόνος) for the conquerors, pity the conquered through self-
pity and reflection, and grow to resent, hate and be angry with the conquerors.113  This 
digression provides us with one of the densest emotional passages of the Histories and thus a 
prime example of multidimensionality.114  The observers feel five emotions in response to what 
they see:  pity (ἔλεος), resentment (φθόνος), self-pity (σφᾶς αὐτούς ἐλεεῖν), hatred (μῖσος), 
                                                 
106 See Chapter 2 for the distinctions between anger and hatred. 
107 Polyb., XXX.29.7. 
108 See Ben-Ze’ev 2000 for modern scholarship on the combinations of emotions. 
109 See de Sousa 2014, Section 4, on multidimensionality. 
110 Polyb., VIII.36.9. 
111 Polyb., IX.10.1-12. 
112 Polyb., IX.10.7.  Cf. Polybius’ reception of Philip V at Thermum, above. 
113 Polyb., IX.10.10. 
114 Examples of multidimensionality with select emotions (ὀργή, μῖσος, αἰσχύνη, all indignation, φθόνος, ἔλεος, 
and θυμός):  8 emotions: IX.10; 7 emotions: VI.6; 6 emotions: XV.25; 5 emotions: VI.7, XV.17, XXI.31, XXX.29; 
4 emotions: VI.9, XI.28, XXX.31; 3 emotions: I.57, II.56, XXVII.7, XXXVIII.1; 2 emotions: I.31, I.82, II.8, III.7, 
III.31, IV.4, V.11, VIII.8, VIII.36, II.59, VII.5, IV.14, XV.30, XXIII.15, XXIV.7, XXXVIII.16. 
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and anger (ὀργή).  Some of these emotions, like reflective self-pity and pity, feed into each 
other.  In sum, however, they present the complexity and depth of an observer’s reaction to and 
judgment of the situation Polybius describes. 
 Emotions share many affinities with other cognitive and affective phenomena.  
Categories in English such as moods, dispositions, feelings, sensations, desires, and beliefs all 
overlap in features with emotions.  All studies of modern social sciences meet the problem of 
defining an emotion versus a mood or other cognitive state, and variations of definitions and 
categorizations abound.115  Terms which I have chosen not to discuss fall into different narrative 
patterns and have structurally different effects in Polybius’ text.116  Polybius does not define the 
difference between emotions and dispositions, moods, feelings, or sensations – unsurprisingly, 
for he writes narrative history, not philosophy.  In English, these affective phenomena lack the 
intentionality of emotion.117  Emotion seems to have a more prominent cognitive element than 
moods, feelings, or dispositions, in that emotions involve values, thinking, and rationality rather 
than purely bodily affect, as Damasio has persuasively shown in neuroscience.118  Polybius 
qualifies desires and beliefs with their own distinct terminology, ἐπιθυμίαι and δόξαι 
respectively.  Beliefs and desires share intentionality with emotions, but they do not share the 
                                                 
115 For example, compare Ekman’s classification of basic emotions by facial expression, 1994, to Greenspan’s 
rationally-based emotion, 1988.  See especially Deonna and Teroni 2012 and de Sousa 2014, Section 2-6, for 
introduction and bibliography. 
116 Likewise, what we think of as moods, dispositions, and other cognitive states differ structurally from our general 
thoughts about emotions in English.  Limiting my discussion to emotion, as circumscribed by intentionality and the 
rest of the features discussed, allows coherent and meaningful discussion and analysis of Polybius’ use of 
terminology which naturally falls into this category of emotion.  The lack of clear distinctions further blurs the 
categorization of terms in ancient Greek.  Scholarship on modern emotions works to define and explore these 
categories and their intersections.  See de Sousa 2014, Section 1, for an overview of this topic and bibliography.  For 
this project, I briefly note these categories and how they differ from the conception of emotion in order to limit this 
study in a meaningful way.   
117 Goldie 2000, 141-175, de Sousa 2014, Section 3, and Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 8-9. 
118 Damasio 1994.  I address a few terms from the Histories which fall between these categories in Chapter 2.   
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same motivations or results, and they lack the affective element of emotion.119  While desires 
share the basic attributes (subject, object, import) and other implicit characteristics, such as a 
combination of physical and cognitive reactions or factors, they work differently from emotions 
in the Histories.  Desires can create emotions, but they themselves often lack the kind of 
motivation based on values, which emotions have.120  In Chapter 3 we examine examples of the 
differences between the categories of desires and emotions. 
 The Stoics and Epicureans, Polybius’ philosophical contemporaries, conceptualized 
emotions as judgments and as desires, respectively.  The Hellenistic philosophies of emotion 
respond to Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of emotion.121  They are designed to provide an 
explanation for how emotions work within the soul and how they should (not) affect the ideal 
sage’s state.  Emotions, for the Hellenistic philosophers in general, stimulate interest in how they 
fit into different parts of the soul, how they affect rational thought, and how they need a therapy 
to be moderated or eliminated.122  Polybius, on the other hand, does not address where emotions 
are seated in a person, whether the ‘spirited’ part of the soul like Plato, or with more cognitive 
placement, as Aristotle.123  Occasionally Polybius will mention that someone felt an emotion τῇ 
ψύχῃ.124  However, these instances do not seem to provide conclusive evidence for any 
particular theory of the seat of emotions for Polybius.  Rather, these specifications seem to add 
emphasis to the depth of feeling. 
                                                 
119 See Deonna, and Teroni 2012, for further on these differences and de Sousa 2014, Section 10 on the Stoic 
foundation for the convergence of belief and emotion.  Polybius differs from the Stoics in this and other matters, as 
discussed below. 
120 Helm 2009, especially pages 2-3. 
121 See Fitzgerald 2008, 29-47, on the history of emotion in Hellenistic philosophy and a list of known (but lost) 
works on the passions particularly.  See Fortenbaugh 2008, for Aristotle’s effect on Hellenistic philosophy of 
emotion.  For the history of emotion generally, see Knuutila 2004, and Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (eds.)  1998.  
I do not address the Cynics’ and Skeptics’ (lack of) theory of emotion; see Aune 2008 and Bett 2008 for these.  
Plato’s views on emotion are less systematic than Aristotle’s; see the Philebus for his fullest discussion.  Aristotle’s 
fullest discussion of emotion comes in Book 2 of his Rhetoric. 
122 Nussbaum 1994. 
123 Lorenz 2006. 
124 Polyb. I.87.1, II.23.7, III.116.13, IV.54.3, V.74.3, IX.21.1, XIV.6.8, XVIII.41.4. 
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 The Stoics in particular concerned themselves with the internal step-by-step process of 
emotions.125  They thought that first an appearance or perception appeared, to which one 
crucially had to assent.  This internal step of assent held the most important – and controversial 
– role in the Stoics’ general theory. 126  Assent marked the transition between the pre-emotion 
feeling and emotion proper.  Sages never assented to these feelings and so remained free from 
emotions and their impulses and troubles.  Sages practiced and habituated themselves to 
withholding assent when pre-emotions arose.127  In contrast to Polybius and ordinary language, 
Stoics subordinate all emotions to conscious rational judgment. 
 The emotions in Polybius’ Histories do not conform to this internal model, mostly 
because the narrative lacks attention to internal decisions.  Instead, Polybius only notes the result 
of any internal process of coming to have an emotion.  This leaves this most noted and 
important focus of the Stoic philosophy of emotion out of the Histories, the conscious rational 
consent to an emotion, and so it makes any definite conclusion on Polybius’ convergence or 
divergence with this Stoic theory ultimately unknowable.  Nevertheless, the rationality which lies 
behind emotions in Polybius’ Histories represents a similar strand of thought, that rationality and 
emotions worked together.  However, the Stoics aimed to eliminate emotions, as irrational 
disturbances, from the life of the sage.  The sage would recognize an emotion and not assent to 
it, thus correctly identifying it as irrational and unnecessary.  In a few passages in the Histories, 
some characters show greater explicit control over their emotions, which may imply some form 
of control comparable to Stoic assent.128 
                                                 
125 See Baltzly 2013, Section 5. 
126 Brennan 1998, Knuuttila 2004, Cooper 1999c. 
127 See Knuuttila 2004, and Cooper 1999c for discussion of Stoic theory of this emotional process. 
128 See for example, Polyb. XX.10.7.  Polybius does not present any attempt to master emotion rationally, per se, to 
my knowledge. 
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 Stoics also categorized emotions four ways:  according to temporality and according to 
preference.  Pleasure (ἡδόνη) is the present preferred emotion, desire (ἐπιθυμία) is the future 
preferred emotion, fear (φόβος) is the future unpreferred emotion, and pain (λύπη) is the 
present unpreferred emotion.129  These classifications can be helpful for analyzing some 
emotions in the Histories, but they do not map onto Polybius’ narrative use of emotions.  Instead, 
the Histories’ emotions function in much more diverse ways than these four basic emotions, as 
we shall see in Chapter 2. 
 Epicureanism, on the other hand, treats emotions as one form of desire, alongside 
pleasures and pains.130  Emotions can draw away from the Epicureans’ goal, ἀταραξία, freedom 
from disturbance.  Thus, they can be detrimental to life quality.131  For the sage Epicurean, only 
necessary and natural desires are needed, but they can also enjoy in moderation natural but 
unnecessary desires.  Emotions are subsumed usually into the category of natural but 
unnecessary desires.132  As with Stoic classifications, the emotions in Polybius’ Histories could be 
analyzed through an Epicurean lens, to see if the characters feel these emotions for the right 
amount and reason (i.e., to vary the sage’s state of pleasure), but this does not come intrinsically 
to Polybius’ narrative, for Polybius evaluates one’s emotion based on its accordance with his 
moral standard of aristocratic behavior and Hellenic values, whereas Epicureans evaluate 
emotion based on whether it creates a change in pleasure or else disturbs one’s freedom from 
distress. 
 Where Polybius’ theory of emotions shows the greatest correspondence with the 
Hellenistic philosophies comes in their focus on therapy.  The Hellenistic philosophies in general 
                                                 
129 Brennan 1998, Gill 2009, Knuuttila 2004. 
130 See Annas 1989, Cooper 1999b, Procopé 1998, Konstan 2014 on Epicurean beliefs of emotion. 
131 In general, Epicureans do not dissect internal emotional functions as the Stoics do, but they evaluate emotion by 
how it affects their pleasure and pain. 
132 See especially, Cooper 1999b, and Procopé 1998, for discussion of this aspect of Epicureanism. 
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strove to provide their adherents with strategies to live their lives the best they could with 
respect to the individual school’s highest good, and this includes moderating or regulating 
emotions in some way or another.133  Polybius specifically aimed to teach and lead his target 
audience of future statesmen to successful careers in the political world as he knew it.  This 
included moderating or recognizing emotions as well.134  Philip V, as we have seen, did not 
moderate his emotion of anger, whereas we saw Aratus recognize and moderate the Achaeans’ 
indignation. 
Studies of modern emotions commonly distinguish emotions from dispositions and 
moods through duration.  Emotions are characterized by their brevity, as occurring in the 
moment, whereas dispositions and moods last much longer than emotions.135  Ancient Greek 
does not seem to distinguish these affective states as thoroughly as modern psychology.  In 
other ancient Greek accounts, emotions can lead to and create dispositions.136  Polybius 
describes emotion in terms of nouns and verbs much more than with adjectives.137  This exhibits 
a tendency to think of emotions and affective states not as descriptive of an inborn tendency but 
as particular to events or moments.  This aligns more with the modern conception of emotions 
as occurrent rather than dispositional, but the emotions Polybius describes sometimes extend far 
beyond the particular moment or occurrence, such as the (in)famous ‘wrath of the Barcids’, 
which extended from the end of the First Punic War in 241 B.C. to the beginning of the Second 
                                                 
133 Nussbaum 1994, Annas 1992. 
134 See III.31, with discussion in Chapter 4. 
135 See Deonna and Teroni 2012, 104-109 for more discussion on this distinction.   
136 This is seen in Theophrastus’ Characters or in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
137 Out of 274 total occurrences of anger, hatred, resentment, indignation, and pity, Polybius uses verbal forms 
50.7% of the time, nouns 46.7% of the time, and adjectives and adverbs 2.6% of the time.  All seven occurrences of 
adjectives or adverbs are forms of pity.   
Compare these statistics to forms of fear, which occurs slightly less than the combined total of the above emotions.  
Of this emotion, Polybius uses a verb 45.9% of the time, nouns 46.5% of the time, and adjectives or adverbs 7.6% 
of the time.   
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Punic War in 218 B.C.138  Emotions for Polybius do not serve to describe a person’s inherent 
character so much as a function in a specific event.  When Polybius describes the anger of Philip 
V, for example, he never calls Philip “prone to anger” or implies that Philip’s disposition in and 
of itself is angry, although Philip feels instances of anger more than any other individual in the 
Histories.  Philip’s response to his moments of anger – by reacting disproportionately, for 
instance – characterizes his behavior and character at that time, but Polybius certainly attested to 
the ability for character to change, not least in Philip V’s case.139  Subjects feel emotion not 
because they necessarily have an inherent disposition to feel such an emotion but because they 
react to an event, and this reactive emotion can remain latent for a duration of time until a later 
situation awakens the residual emotion.140 
 Polybius does not limit which characters feel emotion.  Both individuals and groups feel 
emotion.141  Arthur Eckstein in Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius states that emotion typically 
characterizes barbarians, women, and the masses.142  In my detailed study of the emotions of 
anger, hatred, indignation, resentment, and pity, these groups do not feel emotions more often 
than their opposites, i.e., aristocrats, generals, citizens, politicians, Greeks, the civilized.  The 
Aetolians, Illyrians, and Gauls combined – stereotyped as irrational and barbarous – feel 
emotion less often than either the Achaeans or the Romans.143  These stereotypical “barbarian” 
peoples thus do not display more emotional dispositions than the representatives of civilization, 
                                                 
138 Polyb., III.9.6-III.10.6.  See Chapter 4 for a full discussion. 
139 Polyb., V.13.  See too McGing 2013. 
140 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  See too, von Scheve 2013. 
141 See especially de Sousa 2014, Section 11, for recent bibliography on studies of collective emotion.  In Chapter 3 I 
address collective emotion in detail. 
142 Eckstein 1995, 119.  On barbarian emotion, 123-124, on the masses’ emotions, 131-132, on emotions of women, 
152. 
143 Aetolian, Illyrian, and Gallic emotion – 17 occurrences, Achaean – 23, Roman – 44. 
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the Achaeans and the Romans.144  Likewise, individuals in positions of power feel emotion just 
as much as those of lower status.145  The measure of emotion and its effects does not conform 
to traditional Polybian categories of identity.  Polybius judges characters in their emotion in why 
they feel the emotion, how they exhibit it, and how they react to it.  Thus, the stereotypical 
“barbarian” peoples may feel anger similarly to the representatives of civilization, but they 
display barbaric behavior when they feel emotion inappropriately, misdirect their response, or 
respond disproportionately. 
 Polybius does not limit emotion to adult humans.  Hannibal’s elephants, for example, 
become afraid as they cross the Rhone River on their journey to Italy.146  Polybius provides little 
explanation for the elephants’ fear.  Modern evolutionary theory of emotions, which stems from 
Darwin’s work on emotions and now centers around Paul Ekman’s studies on facial expression 
of emotion, categorizes fear as a basic emotion.147  Ekman and others categorize six basic 
emotions which each share similar facial expressions from humans around the world, regardless 
of culture.148  The Stoics’ theory of affects, or προπάθη, shares similarities with modern 
evolutionary theory of basic emotions (πάθη).149  For Stoics, propositional thinking was 
necessary for the assent needed for emotion proper.  Only adult human brains were capable of 
such propositional thinking.  However, Stoics thought that children and animals were capable of 
                                                 
144 Champion 2004a draws out the complexity of the Romans’ portrayal in the Histories, as in a spectrum between 
barbarian and Greek, but the Romans also often contrast the Illyrians, Celts, and Aetolians throughout the 
narrative. 
145 Because of how rarely women even appear in the Histories, it is difficult to compare their emotion to men’s with 
statistics.  Out of 274 occurrences of anger, hatred, resentment, indignation, and pity, women feel emotion only 
three times:  thus, they feel only 1.0% of the emotions mentioned. 
The people, whether τὸ πλῆθος, οἱ πολλοί, ὁ δῆμος, or πάντες, do feel emotion rather often, 33 times of the 
stated 274 occurrences.  See Walbank 1995, for the uses of these terms. 
146 Polyb., III.46.11, and XV.12.4, where elephants flee the battle because of fear.  See Konstan 2006, 22, 26, and 
129 on Aristotle’s willingness to attribute fear as an emotion to animals as well, particularly due to their basic nature. 
147 For accounts of this evolutionary theory of emotions, see De Sousa 2014, Section 4, Ben-Ze’ev 2000, 104-112, 
and Ekman and Davidson, eds. 1994, especially Part 1. 
148 Konstan 2006, 1-40, especially 7-16, as well as Fierke 2015, 46, complicates Ekman’s universalism by pointing 
out the Anglocentric identification of emotions with the English terms “fear”, “anger”, etc.  See especially 
Wierzbicka 1999 on the importance of language in understanding emotion. 
149 See below for a fuller discussion of Polybius’ relation to Stoic theories of emotion. 
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feeling affects, such as fear.  They reconciled these two factors – children’s and animals’ lack of 
propositional thinking with the fact that they still felt and exhibited “emotions” in ordinary 
language – by denying fear the status of a proper emotion, which required assent.150  Polybius’ 
portrayal of the elephants’ fear can be reconciled with Stoic theory by reference to the emotion’s 
import:  the elephants have no underlying value or rationale for their fear, as Polybius makes 
clear when some elephants fall into the river with no harm to themselves.151  Polybius’ narration 
of the elephants’ fear enables us to take a crucial look into the applicability of Stoic philosophy 
in the Hellenistic world, but at the same time it shows us the distinction between philosophy and 
historiography.  Polybius narrates emotion whereas the Stoics observed, theorized, and 
expounded upon the same phenomenon and classified it as affect rather than emotion proper.  
Where Polybius described in a few sentences how elephants typically or actually (were thought 
to) have felt fear, philosophers interpreted and analyzed such assumptions and observations of 
actuality to develop theories distinguishing and justifying the place and role of emotion in human 
life.  Polybius uses ordinary language, rather than engaging in philosophy.152 
 The question of whether emotions are constructed by culture and society or whether all 
humans feel the same basic emotions divides current studies in emotions.153  Does Polybius 
portray emotions as constructs exclusively belonging to one’s culture, so that “Gallic anger” 
differed from “Roman anger,” or do all of the characters in his Histories feel the same human 
repertoire of emotions?  I argue that Polybius portrays emotions as universal.  He does not 
characterize any emotion as a fixed trait of any group, despite scholarly claims that barbarians 
                                                 
150 For this type of Stoic distinction, see Armstrong 2008, Brennan 1998, and Gill 2009. 
151 Polyb., II.46.11-12.  The elephants’ fear could have been based in a concern that they would come to harm, but 
Polybius’ quick dismissal and straightforward narrative seems to dismiss this rationale for the elephants. 
152 Likewise, Polybius does not seem to extrapolate human behavior from animals’ behavior.  See VI.5 and Chapter 
3 for one analogy based in animal behavior. 
153 See de Sousa 2014, sections 7-8, on the major theories.  See Fierke 2015, 46-49, for an exceptional 
summarization and reconciliation of these views, which I find parallel to Polybius’ view of emotion. 
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and other non-aristocratic elite group felt emotions more.154  However, Polybius saw emotions 
as occurrent:  they happen rather than define or describe.  This may suggest something about 
Polybius’ basic way of thinking about emotions.  In English, the phrases “the angry man” and 
“the man who is angry” have slightly different connotations:  the first can apply to the man’s 
disposition as a habitually angry person.  The latter, “the man who is angry”, applies to the 
moment:  the man is angry now, at this particular time.  So too, Polybius’ use of emotional 
nouns and verbs shows his underlying understanding that emotions apply to a situation rather 
than describe and depict a habitual identity.155 
 Moreover, Polybius’ theorizing passages attest to his belief in common, universal human 
behavior and emotion.  He often explains an emotion or judgment (often both) through a 
generalizing τις.156  Whenever he expounds in depth on general human behavior, including 
emotion, he writes on a universal level.  At the beginning of his Book Six, Polybius lays out his 
theory of how humans first form a community and how a state in nature would change 
governmental forms.157  This, alongside his other explanatory passages on emotions, assumes 
that all people naturally behave in the same way regardless of culture.  When external factors, 
such as climate, geography, and culture influence people, their progress and state forms differ, 
and presumably the import for and reaction to emotions and result differ too.158  That is, the 
values underlying emotion can be different and largely determined by culture. 
 There is one major argument against Polybius’ universality.  Polybius, it is agreed, wrote 
for an audience of Greeks and Romans, and more specifically, for Greek and Roman elite 
                                                 
154 In fact, if any one group were to be pointed out as emotional, it would be the Romans, against all assumptions 
and trends previous scholars, such as Eckstein 1995, have identified. 
155 So Polybius narrates Philip V’s anger instead of describing him as angry, mentioned above.  
156 Polyb., I.14.4 (twice), II.7.3, III.26.6, XXXVIII.1 (twice).  See Chapter 5.  
157 Polyb., VI.4-9. 
158 Thus, people feel emotions for different specific reasons and react differently based on culture, but the script or 
expression of emotion remains the same.  See Kaster 2005, especially his Introduction, on the analysis of scripts and 
their potential to elucidate the workings of emotion. 
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statesmen.159  Whenever he uses generalizing terminology, such as his generalizing τις-statements 
or passive periphrastic constructions (‘one must’), he may conceivably refer only to this inclusive 
target audience.  I would respond, however, that we can never distinguish this intent on 
Polybius’ part from the text itself without making large assumptions.  For example, Polybius 
does not – and perhaps cannot – distinguish in ancient Greek how the Aetolians feel indignation 
differently from the indignation of Antiochus III’s court against Hermeias or from the Achaians’ 
or Roman indignation.160  Polybius’ universal theorizing, such as the rise and development of 
human community, cannot only refer to his all male, aristocratic target audience, for he describes 
the typical, universal behavior of children, parents, rulers, subjects, and aristocrats.  In sum, we 
can conclude that Polybius portrays emotions as universal. 
 This is not to say that, for Polybius, culture had little to do with emotional behavior – 
quite the contrary.  Like Polybius’ political theory of the development and degeneration of 
human communities, so too the emotional behavior of humans is a universally applicable 
foundation, which variables such as culture, environment, and other influences can affect.161  
While all characters in the Histories feel emotions with similar types of motivation, expression, 
and resulting action, culture shapes the characters’ responses.  In other words, characters may 
follow the same basic emotional script but react differently because of the import particular to 
their culture.   
 For example, the Epirotes and Philip V became indignant with the Aetolians, who had 
attacked the Messenians despite being officially at peace and in alliance with them.162  Polybius 
says, “they immediately felt indignation at what the Aetolians did, but they were not very 
                                                 
159 See Eckstein 1995, Ch. 1 and Champion 2004a, Introduction on Polybius’ audience. 
160 Polyb., V.107.6, V.56.4, IV.76.5 and XI.28. 
161 Polyb., VI.9.3, VI.10.2-5. 
162 Polyb., IV.16.1-2.  When I refer to the Epirotes for the sake of simplicity in discussing this passage, I mean to 
included Philip V as well. 
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surprised at it because it was nothing out of the ordinary, since they were used to the fact that 
the Aetolians did this kind of thing.”163  For this reason they were not too angry (διόπερ οὐδ᾽ 
ὠργίσθησαν ἐπὶ πλεῖον), and so they decided to remain at peace with the Aetolians.164  This 
implies that normally humans would be surprised and act upon their indignation at the Aetolians 
for such behavior.  Exceptionally, the Epirotes do not act purely because of cultural factors:  the 
Aetolians’ habitual injustice has changed the Epirotes’ natural urge to act upon indignation.  
Their failure to act upon their natural indignation reflects poorly on both the Aetolians and the 
Epirotes.  The Aetolians, as usual, behave contrary to established and accepted norms for 
behavior, which Polybius censures throughout the text, and have worn down their neighbors’ 
natural inclination to reject and censure such behavior.165  Although the Epirotes felt 
indignation, their cultural norms shape their (lack of) reaction to it.   
 Polybius next states that the Aetolians not only are unique in their uninhibited urge to 
plunder but even grow indignant at others who call them to account for such behavior.166  
Aetolian cultural standards underlie their indignation, which normally would not be felt by the 
Aetolians but by their victims.  Culture changes the import for the Aetolian indignation, but the 
emotion of indignation itself is not ostensibly different from the universal form of indignation:  
the Aetolians grow indignant because what they valued and thought right, plundering, was 
threatened. 
                                                 
163 Polyb., IV.16.2.  ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πεπραγμένοις παραυτίκα μὲν ἠγανάκτησαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ 
πλεῖον ἐθαύμασαν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράδοξον, τῶν εἰθισμένων δέ τι πεποιηκέναι τοὺς Αἰτωλούς. 
164 Polyb., IV.16.3. 
165 See especially Champion 2004a, 129-135, 140-143. 
166 Polyb., IV.16.4.  Αἰτωλοὶ γοῦν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ χρώμενοι, καὶ λῃστεύοντες συνεχῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ 
πολέμους ἀνεπαγγέλτους φέροντες πολλοῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἀπολογίας ἔτι κατηξίουν τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
προσεχλεύαζον, εἴ τις αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαιοδοσίας προκαλοῖτο περὶ τῶν γεγονότων ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία τῶν 
μελλόντων.  Cf. V.107.6. 
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 Culturally-specific values underlie emotions beyond the Aetolians’, who often represent 
the foil to what Polybius considered normal.167  At the end of the Second Punic War, Hannibal 
pulls down a speaker who was arguing to the council for the Carthaginians to continue the war 
after the battle of Zama.168  The Carthaginian senators grow angry with Hannibal, who then 
explains his actions and apologizes for his incompetence in cultural norms at home since he 
lived most of his life abroad and at war.  The Carthaginian senators grew angry precisely on the 
basis of cultural standards.  However, Hannibal as a Carthaginian should have shared such 
cultural standards.  He did not because he lived a different lifestyle, away from his own native 
culture and home.  Hannibal’s misunderstanding stemmed not from a disjuncture in the emotion 
of anger itself or because he was not Carthaginian but from the cultural import in terms of his 
life.  Hannibal’s cultural disjuncture with his own people highlights the degree to which Polybius 
did not subscribe to cultural relativism:  lifestyle and behavior influenced the Carthaginians’ 
anger and Hannibal’s mistake, rather than inborn national tendencies.  Moreover, Hannibal 
successfully explained his behavior and mitigated the Carthaginians’ anger, demonstrating his 
excellence in emotional intelligence.169 
Conclusion 
In this section, we identified features of emotion, providing a critical vocabulary through 
which we analyzed key passages from the Histories, such as Philip V’s first sack of Thermum.  
From an analysis of emotional features, it is clear that Polybius established parameters for 
judgment of characters by reference to the appropriateness, direction, and proportionality of 
emotion.  Using the specific terminology of emotion in the modern social sciences provides 
                                                 
167 Champion 2011. 
168 Polyb., XV.19.3. 
169 Scipio Africanus also demonstrates excellent emotional intelligence; see, for example, X.18, XI.28.  I use the term 
“emotional intelligence” deliberately, for Hannibal utilizes the skills which modern handbooks on emotional 
intelligence promote:  awareness and active engagement in negotiating emotions.  See esp. Goleman 1995, 
Bradberry and Greaves, 2009. 
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direction to the study of ancient emotions, particularly in the ancient historians, whose portrayal 
of emotion both has to be plausible and is a choice by the historian to affect the flow of events. 
 In the next chapter, we shall see how Polybius uses each of his emotional terms to affect 
his narrative, and we shall contextualize this usage in the ancient world by comparison with 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric.  I also survey the individual emotions in the Histories and compare them to 
the analysis in David Konstan’s The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks.  In Chapter Three, I investigate 
emotions at work in changes of a state’s governing regime.  In Polybius’ theory of the cycle of 
constitutions, the people’s collective emotional reactions repeatedly spark change from a worse 
state form to a better one until the end of the cycle, and in the downfall of the usurping prime 
minister Agathocles of Egypt, the people’s emotions both reaffirm positive communal values 
and paradoxically lead to extreme violence in overthrowing Agathocles’ regime.  My analysis in 
Chapter Four turns to external changes:  how do emotions motivate wars, especially the Second 
Punic War?  I look at the justifiability of anger as a cause of war and its implications for 
Polybius’ theory of history.  In the conclusion, I recap and summarize my findings and touch on 
the historian’s treatment of emotion as a persuasive, historiographical tool rather than on 
characters’ emotions within the historical narrative, briefly examining Polybius’ arguments about 
pity in the Achaean War of 146 BC. 
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Chapter 2 
Polybius’ Emotions in Context 
 In this chapter I seek to contextualize Polybius’ use of emotions.  This is a twofold task.  
I survey and analyze Polybius’ usage of emotions within the Histories.  In this part of my analysis, 
I show that emotions play important and nuanced roles within the narrative of the Histories.  
Polybius’ text includes a variety of emotions, which have their own specific usages but which 
also fall into several categories of related emotions.  These categories are negative, anticipatory, 
positive, and reflective emotions.  I organize this chapter around these categories to illustrate 
Polybius’ understanding and portrayal of emotion. 
 The other part of my analysis contextualizes Polybius’ use of emotion externally, in 
comparison with the emotions defined by Aristotle, as analyzed by David Konstan.  In his work 
The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, Konstan discusses the nature of emotions and establishes 
Aristotle’s view on πάθη and their nature.170  Konstan bases his work on the list of emotions 
Aristotle provides, and he uses this to compare and contrast ancient Greek emotions with 
modern conceptions of emotions.171  This chapter and dissertation differs fundamentally from 
Konstan’s project in that Polybius provides no definition of what counts as an emotion.  
Therefore, I had to choose what counts as an emotion.  My list differs from Aristotle’s and 
Konstan’s, addressing other emotive vocabulary, such as δυσαρέστησις, or words often 
translated with modern emotions, such as ἔλπις.172  My analyses of the individual emotions in 
Polybius clarify these choices and the nuances for each of these categories of emotions and 
compare Polybius’ usages of emotions with Aristotle’s.  The difference in emotions not only 
                                                 
170 Konstan 2006.  Fortenbaugh 1975 is the seminal work on ancient emotion, which investigates Aristotle’s Rhetoric.  
See too Cooper 1999a, for the rhetorical context’s importance for Aristotle’s theory. 
171 Konstan 2006., 15. 
172 I omit discussion only of λυπή, which Konstan addresses although Aristotle does not specifically include it in his 
list. 
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shows a difference in focus between Aristotle and Polybius, the philosopher and the historian, 
but also complicates our understanding of ancient Greek emotion and its workings.  Polybius’ 
historical text from the Hellenistic period broadens the range of ancient emotional vocabulary 
and presents a unique data set for understanding how emotions work, through the historian’s 
description of reality. 
 Konstan’s work The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks also finds points of convergence with 
the emotions in Polybius’ Histories.  Throughout, Konstan emphasizes the competitive, social 
context for emotions and their importance in creating, maintaining, and changing people’s 
reputations and place in society.  He often allows room for variety in an emotion’s function in 
Classical literature beyond Aristotle’s definitions in the Rhetoric.  Konstan emphasizes and 
explores the important cognitive and cultural factors of emotions in ancient Greek.  However, 
Aristotle’s description of emotion and Konstan’s Homeric, tragic, oratorical, or Roman elegiac 
examples differ from the patterns in Polybius’ Hellenistic text.   
 Konstan deliberately avoids the Hellenistic world because he sees its emotions as 
fundamentally different from those of the Classical period in two important features:  
individualism and the court.  He writes,  
“If the Hellenistic period was characterized, as many scholars have claimed, by a 
novel spirit of individualism, it may have been accompanied by a new interest in 
private sensibilities, in which emotions were imagined as detached from external 
causes and reducible – at least according to philosophers – to an ineliminable 
disturbance of the soul.  What is more, in the suspicious atmosphere of court 
society, where people tend to assume a demeanour comfortable to the pleasure 
of the ruler, there is a new premium placed on identifying an inner emotional 
state from the close examination of outer signs.”173 
 
Konstan thus rationalizes the turn to individualism and inner emotive states, which he briefly 
discusses in Hellenistic art and philosophy and focalizes through the political lens of a 
monarchical court.  Although Polybius’ world was originally dominated by the Hellenistic 
                                                 
173 Konstan 2006, 31. 
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monarchs and later by the Roman state, which functioned in the Greek world much like a 
Hellenistic monarch, Polybius himself grew up and lived in a Greek city-state, which was part of 
federations of city-states.174  Moreover, his Histories describe many different types of states, not 
just court societies.  His usage of emotions reflects this background.  If court society entailed the 
internalization and dissimulation of feelings, Polybius’ text does not represent this on the whole.  
Sometimes he does represent the emotions of those at court as faked, but his narrative does not 
portray this as the dominant understanding of emotion.175  Moreover, unlike art and philosophy, 
Polybius portrays characters’ feelings in relation to external events, which greatly affect and are 
affected by these feelings.  Internalized emotion had little to do with Polybius’ historiographic 
purpose; reactive, socially-embedded emotions, on the other hand, did.  While “[d]emonstrating 
a connection between Aristotle’s cognitive approach to the pathê and a cultural tendency in 
classical, as opposed to Hellenistic, Greece to regard emotion as a reaction rather than an inner 
state to be disclosed” formed one of Konstan’s goals, it is one of my goals in this chapter to 
demonstrate the evaluative, social, and often moral role of emotions in Polybius’ Hellenistic text, 
thus nuancing our understanding of emotions in the Hellenistic world and the history of ancient 
Greek emotions.176 
Emotion 
 The word which philosophers used to describe emotion, πάθος, seldom occurs in the 
extant Histories.  The six times Polybius does use this term in the extant text it denotes 
generalized experience, occurrence, or feature.177  Polybius uses πάθος to describe natural 
                                                 
174 See especially Gruen 1984, on Rome and its correlations with the Hellenistic world. 
175 Polyb., IV.87.4, V.26.13, XV.17.1-2.  Compare the “court” society depicted in Tacitus’ Annales, which emphasize 
secrecy, dissimulation, and constant fear, as compared to Polybius’ politically-diverse world. 
176 Konstan 2006, 31. 
177 Polyb., III.53.2, III.86.6, X.4.7, XI.29.9, XXXIV.3.10, XXXVIII.1.4.  Cf. Polybius’ widespread usage of παθεῖν, 
“to experience.”  See Mauersberger 2.1.187-189. 
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features such as the conditions in the Strait of Messina or the regular character of the sea.178  It 
also denotes general suffering, as from illness, ambush, loss, or the destruction of war.179  The 
scant use of this term by Polybius highlights the divergence of the purpose of history from 
philosophy.  Whereas the field of philosophy burgeoned with works entitled Περὶ Παθῶν in the 
Hellenistic period and beyond, Polybius’ Hellenistic history ignores the specialized theories and 
definition of πάθη altogether.180  Although Hellenistic philosophy diverges from Classical 
philosophy in its focus on common or popular issues, particularly in a therapeutic manner, 
philosophy in the Hellenistic period continued to diverge from commonplace or popular 
conceptions of emotion.181 
 Polybius uses πάθος clearly in the sense of emotion once.  When Scipio Africanus 
wanted to run for aedile, although he was too young, he told his mother, who was religious, that 
he dreamed twice that he and his brother were aediles together.182  She wished for that, 
overcome by womanly feeling (τῆς παθούσης τὸ γυναικεῖον πάθος).183  This statement 
conveys what we typically associate with emotion:  Scipio’s mother is overcome by emotion at 
such a prospect.  Polybius characterizes this feeling as typical of a woman.  Moreover, Polybius’ 
portrayal of Scipio’s mother corresponds with his characterization of the Roman people in their 
superstition.  Both put great importance in religiosity.184  This example of πάθος also puts 
emotion on the other side of a dichotomy with reason.  Those who unquestioningly believe in 
dreams and divine inspiration, and who subscribe to religion in short do not partake in Polybius’ 
                                                 
178 Polyb., ΧΧΧΙV.3.10, and XI.29.9. 
179 Polyb., III.53.2, III.86.6, XXXVIII.1.4. 
180 Fitzgerald 2008, 1-26, discusses the works on emotions in Hellenistic and Imperial Greek thought. 
181 I am not claiming that the literary genre of historiography does indeed reflect and embody everyday concepts and 
vocabulary completely accurately; far from it, for history was literature for the elite.  I am arguing that 
historiography portrays everyday, popular concepts and vocabulary more than philosophy does. 
182 Polyb., X.4.  See Walbank, HCP 2.199-200 on the historical inaccuracy of Polybius’ anecdote.  Cf. Liv., 25.2.6-8. 
183 Polyb., X.4.7. 
184 The mother’s religiosity:  X.4.4; the Roman People’s:  X.5.5-8, VI.56.6-15, where Polybius approves religion as of 
utmost importance for the coherence of the Roman state. 
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rationalist view.  Polybius explains that Scipio rationally and cleverly planned this tale and 
manipulated his mother’s and the people’s beliefs, as did the ancient Romans who set up the 
state’s religious practices in order to contain and control the masses.185  People who subscribe to 
such religiosity, like Scipio’s mother, may be susceptible to “τὸ γυναικεῖον πάθος.”  This 
includes the masses, and so this passage and its πάθος support Eckstein’s observations about 
Polybius’ portrayal of women and of the masses as irrational, subject to emotion, and 
uneducated.186  However, it is important to recall that this is the sole usage of πάθος as an 
emotion. 
1.  Negative Feelings 
 The first cognitive category of emotions in Polybius’ Histories that I shall address are 
emotions with negative affect.  These emotions – passion, anger, hatred, indignation, 
resentment, jealousy, and shame – are not always or inherently negative in a moral or rational 
sense, although none feel good.187  One often feels indignation, for example, because one 
perceives that an injustice has occurred.  Anger, hatred, indignation, resentment, and shame all 
are often connected to a subject’s sense of morality and values.  Nevertheless, these individual 
emotions each have unique connotations and features. 
Passion/Spirit 
 I begin with the term θυμός, which relates to emotion but which I would not classify as 
an emotion, for reasons we shall see below.  Aristotle does not address θυμός as an emotion.  In 
Classical philosophy, θυμός more often denoted a part of the soul rather than an emotion.188  
                                                 
185 Polyb., VI.56.9-12, X.5.6-7. 
186 Eckstein 1995, 150-157 (women), 129-140 (masses). 
187 “Negative” can refer both to affect and to morality.  Whenever I refer to “negative emotions”, I mean the first 
category, emotions with negative affect, which feel bad, but which are not necessarily negative in a moral sense.  I 
will make clear when I refer to emotions which contradict morality. 
188 See Koziak 2000 for a history of θυμός in Archaic and Classical Greek. 
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For Plato, for example, the θυμός constituted the middle part of a person’s soul, which could 
either be drawn down to base desires through the appetitive part of the soul, or it could be 
drawn to enlightened values by the rational part of the soul.189  Aristotle follows Plato in 
specifying θυμός as part of the soul, with his own divergences.190  Although neither Aristotle in 
the Rhetoric nor Konstan characterize θυμός as an emotion, θυμός is treated often as the 
paradigmatic emotion in Polybian scholarship.191  
  Craige Champion, in Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories, analyzes Polybius’ contrast 
between Hellenic logismos and barbaric thumos.192  What follows is necessarily a simplification of 
Champion’s analysis.  Characters exhibit Hellenic logismos when they act rationally and nobly, and 
they demonstrate barbaric thumos when they behave irrationally, impulsively, and driven by 
personal desires.  Champion argues that some characters demonstrate Hellenic logismos much 
more frequently than barbaric thumos, and vice versa.  While certain groups demonstrate a 
dispositional inclination to one side or the other, all characters are capable of either, and some, 
most notably the Romans, follow a trajectory from one type of behavior to the other throughout 
the Histories. 
 Champion provides an appendix on Polybius’ uses of λογισμός and its cognates, but he 
does not provide a parallel appendix for Polybius’ usage of θυμός, nor does he define this term 
within Polybius’ text.193  However, Champion’s understanding of thumos becomes clear from 
analysis of his text.  Champion takes two passages as central to his conception of thumos.  The 
                                                 
189 See Lorenz 2006 on the soul’s divisions. 
190 See Koziak 2000, 81-99, for Aristotle on θυμός.  See too Sokolon 2006. 
191 Θυμός does not appear even in Konstan’s index.  See Eckstein 1989, esp. 7, 11-12.  Erskine 2015 too treats 
θυμός as emotion and synonymous with ὀργή in his discussion of Polybian anger. 
192 Champion 2004a.   
193 He does provide an appendix on ochlocracy and the language of barbarology, but this does not include θυμός 
even in the list of negative traits, 241-244.  I use “thumos” to refer to Champion’s use of this term rather than to 
refer to an occurrence of the term in Polybius’ text. 
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Celts’ decision to fight the Romans at II.35.3 followed their θυμός rather than λογισμός.194  
Next, the people in a state with a degenerative mixed constitution follow forceful θυμός (and 
irrational ὀργή) in pressing for more power, driven by their personal greed.195  The first passage 
exemplifies the preference of θυμός over λογισμός by barbarians, and the second shows the 
irrationality, violence, and greed which accompany θυμός in the masses, particularly within a 
degenerative, ochlocratic state.196  Through these and more passages, Champion correlates thumos 
with irrationality, irresolution, impulsiveness, courage, passion, violence, personal ambition, 
aggression, and desires.  He describes thumos as barbaric, shortsighted, unreflecting, mindless, 
intemperate, rash, vainglorious, and grasping.  Although Champion does not conflate all these 
terms at once to describe a passage, these terms provide an idea of what thumos represents to 
Champion, who constructs a network of associations rather than a definition.  For Champion, 
thumos represents a gambit of negative characteristics, behaviors, and vices which Polybius used 
repeatedly to characterize actors.  Champion’s characterization fits broadly with my analysis of 
Polybius’ text.  In this section, I aim to synthesize Polybius’ usage of θυμός to fill out 
Champion’s analysis, addressing some subtleties and nuances within Polybius’ own usage which 
do not fit comfortably within Champion’s generalization. 
 Θυμός in Polybius’ Histories is akin to English “passion.”  It is something one has or 
which can come over one, one can arouse in another, and it does not necessitate an object.  In 
English, “passion” is often thought of as irrational, violent, unpredictable, and impulsive.  In 
other works in ancient Greek, it stands in as a general term for all emotion, much as passion is 
                                                 
194 Champion 2004a, 117, 139. 
195 Polyb., VI.56.11.  Champion 2004a, 89, 118, 121, 185, 202, 232. 
196 Champion, however, takes this statement out of context by claiming “every multitude is for Polybius full of 
lawless desires, unreasoned passions, and violent,” citing this passage as evidence, 89.  I analyze this passage, its 
context, and its emotions in further detail in Chapter 3. 
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sometimes used as a synonym for emotion in English.197  However, Polybius does not use 
θυμός exactly in this sense.  “Passion” in English does not function as an emotion in the same 
way as hatred, anger, or indignation, for instance, but indicates some more general 
overwhelming by the senses.  So too θυμός functions differently from the emotions, such as 
μῖσος, ὀργή, or δυσαρέστησις.  The way characters act upon θυμός differs from the more 
typical emotional reactions.198  It is irrational, contrasted to rationality, or is outright mad.199  
Polybius matches θυμός with βία several times.200  Sometimes θυμός motivates characters to 
act unexpectedly or impulsively.201   
 Of the emotions, anger (ὀργή) coexists with θυμός most frequently, but they are not 
synonymous.202  Ὀργή can contribute to and exemplify one’s θυμός, but only five times are they 
correlated.203  Of these five passages, three involve Philip V’s actions at Thermum, which we 
discussed in part earlier.  However, in this context Polybius only directly unites ὀργή and θυμός 
in a parallel construction, ὀργὴ καὶ θυμός, once.  The other instances help illuminate the 
differences between these two terms. 
 In discussing a second raid on Thermum, Polybius narrates that “Philip V then worked 
out his passion wrongly (κακῶς δὲ τότε χρώμενος τῷ θυμῷ):  for dishonoring the divine 
when angry (ὀργιζόμενον) at men is a sign of complete insanity.”204  Θυμός characterizes Philip 
                                                 
197 See Koziak 2000, Lynch and Miles 1980. 
198  Θυμός provides the cause for action just as often as it has a cause itself.For instances with a clear cause, see 
Polyb., III.29.1, IV.7.8, V.10.3, V.16.4, XV.4.11.   
199 Polyb., II.21.2, II.30.4, II.35.3, III.15.9, III.81.9, V.11.4, VI.7.3, VI.56.11, VIII.8.1, XVI.1.2. 
200 Polyb., VI.44.9, VI.56.11. 
201 See II.30.4, V.11.4, V.76.3, XX.6.11 for unexpectedness.  See II.19.10, II.21.2, II.30.4, III.82.2, V.16.4, V.76.3, 
XVIII.37.7, XX.6.11 for impulsiveness. 
202 Polyb., III.10.5, VI.56.11, VI.57.8, XI.7.2, XVI.1.2, XVI.28.8.  See Erskine 2015 also for a discussion of their 
similarities and differences, although he concludes, against my analysis, that they are nearly synonymous. 
203 Polyb., VI.56.11, XI.7.2-3, XVI.1.2, XVI.28.8, XXXVIII.18.10. 
204 Polyb., XI.7.2-3.  κακῶς δὲ τότε χρώμενος τῷ θυμῷ ·  τὸ γὰρ ἀνθρώποις ὀργιζόμενον εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβεῖν 
τῆς πάσης ἀλογιστίας ἐστὶ σημεῖον. 
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V’s response, which Polybius equates with madness.  Anger occurs temporally before Philip’s 
use of θυμός:  he grows angry at men before he acts with thumotic madness, a response to that 
very anger.  As we discussed previously, Philip’s motivations for his anger were not irrational or 
inappropriate.  We noted that he errs in choosing to avenge sacrilege with sacrilege, a moral 
failure.  Similarly, here Philip has grown angry (ὀργιζόμενον) at the Aetolians, but his incorrect 
response is characterized by θυμός.  Θυμός and not ὀργή provides the negative, irrational, and 
thus condemned force to Philip’s behavior, and thus Polybius criticizes Philip’s θυμός by 
correlation with madness. 
 Later in the Histories, Polybius says, “Philip V, rejoicing as if gratifying his mad passion 
(χαριζόμενος γὰρ οἷον εἰ λυττῶντι τῷ θυμῷ), directed his anger (ὀργή) more against the 
gods than against men.”205  This passage again condemns the same behavior as before – a 
misdirected and thus disproportionate response to anger.  Philip uses his anger incorrectly, a sign 
of his mad θυμός.  Again θυμός guides Philip to act wrongfully and irrationally on his anger.  
Thus, θυμός holds negative and irrational connotations which anger, ὀργή, does not inherently 
hold. 
 However, Polybius does use θυμός in the context of war without these inherently 
negative connotations.  Most notably, Hamilcar’s θυμός drives him to seek to prepare a new war 
with the Romans after the unsatisfactory ending of the First Punic War.206  His θυμός motivates 
Hamilcar to expand Carthaginian power in Spain and arose because Hamilcar had acted as a 
good leader, undefeated in Sicily.  Hannibal likewise is lifted up in his θυμός to continue his 
                                                 
205 Polyb., XVI.1.2.  χαριζόμενος γὰρ οἷον εἰ λυττῶντι τῷ θυμῷ, τὸ πλεῖον τῆς ὀργῆς οὐκ εἰς τοὺς 
ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς διετίθετο. 
206 Polyb., III.9.6-7. 
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operations within the Second Punic War, and Scipio Africanus at the end of the Second Punic 
War uses his θυμός and sharpness as favorable qualities of a general.207   
 Θυμός does not act like the other emotions and thus should not be taken to represent 
Polybius’ views on emotion in general.  It serves more as a disposition, character trait, or even 
mood than an emotion.208  Polybius directly contrasts using θυμός with using reason several 
times.209  Other emotions do not fall into the rationality-irrationality divide, but θυμός generally 
denotes irrationality. 
Anger 210 
 Aristotle claims that one feels anger, ὀργή, because of a perceived slight either from 
one’s equal or from an inferior.211  Thus, ὀργή is immediate and personal.212  Konstan notes that 
Aristotle’s definition is remarkable, at least in comparison to the idea of anger in English.  It is 
reducible to a desire for revenge and provoked by a slight.213   Konstan notes the restrictiveness 
of slighting as the only cause of anger.  He traces examples of injustice as a potential cause as 
well.214  Slighting, according to Konstan’s analysis of Aristotle, can only provoke ὀργή in 
superiors; inferiors do not feel ὀργή when slighted because their status leaves them no room for 
retaliation, a crucial component of Aristotelian ὀργή:  “[f]or Aristotle, what counts as 
                                                 
207 Polyb., III.34.7 (Hannibal), XV.4.11 (Scipio Africanus); see too XVIII.37.7 (Flamininus spoke θυμικώτερον).  
Each of these examples features a strong general whom Polybius portrays favorably throughout the text, while 
Flamininus is an exception, and each occurs in a military setting.  Other passages show a lack of directly resultant 
negative outcomes, but these do not necessarily mean that θυμός is rational. 
208 See II.21.2, II.33.2, II.35.3, III.9.6, III.15.9, XV.33.10, and XX.11.5 (as a false characterization at this point) for 
examples of θυμός as characterization. 
209 Polyb., II.35.3, VI.7.3, VIII.8.1. 
210 For all the emotions, my analysis includes all forms of the emotional term, but I shall refer to each emotion in 
the text by the noun form for consistency, unless Polybius never uses such a form (for example, ἀγανάκτησις). 
211 Arist., Rhet. 2.1378a.30-32.  Konstan 2006, 41-75. 
212 Konstan 2006, 47. 
213 Konstan 2006, 43-46. 
214 Konstan 2006, 65. 
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belittlement depends on status:  if your position is inferior, it is no insult to be reminded of it.”215  
Konstan postulates that Aristotle so limited his definition of anger to make room for his unique 
use of indignation, τὸ νέμεσαν.216   
 However, Polybius’ usage differs from Aristotle’s limitations.  Inferiors, for example, 
grow angry at superiors in the Histories regularly; their lower social or defeated status does not 
lead them to endure passively others wronging them.217  When Polybius discusses the improper 
conduct of removing works of art by conquerors, for example, observers with no clear social 
status markers grow angry and hate those who are successful conquerors.218  In this example, 
Polybius comments that these observers pity the defeated precisely because their defeat reminds 
the observers of their own defeats and misfortunes.  This would place them in an inferior 
position relative to the conquerors, as they assume the place of the conquered.  More explicitly, 
the defeated Carthaginians grow angry at Rome for taking Sardinia after the First Punic War.219  
While the Carthaginians presumably grow angry because they think that Sardinia is theirs, they 
clearly are inferior to Rome in power and thus cannot take steps to prohibit Rome or to avenge 
themselves immediately. 
 Aristotle’s focus on individuals eliminates the complications which attributing emotions 
to a group entails.  While he does not explore the nuances of how collective emotion works on a 
psychological level, Polybius in his attribution of emotions to states acknowledges the 
importance of emotion beyond interpersonal relations.  Aristotle, in describing individuals’ 
emotions, relies heavily on the concept of status and hierarchy in society.  No such set system of 
status exists for groups in Polybius’ Histories in the same way as it does for the individual.  Not 
                                                 
215 Konstan 2006, 55. 
216 Konstan 2006, 68. 
217 Polyb. I.67.5-6, II.8.12-13, III.7.1, III.9.7, III.10.5, III.78.5, IV.4.4, IV.4.7, VI.4.9, VI.56.11, IX.10.10, 
XV.25.20(13), XV.25.25(18), XV.27.1, XV.30.1, XVI.1.2, XVI.1.4, (possibly XXX.29.1 – impersonally formulated). 
218 Polyb., IX.10.10. 
219 Polyb., III.10.5. 
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only formal states in the Histories feel anger beyond Aristotle’s definition, but also non-political 
groups:  the women of Alexandria grow angry at Ptolemy V’s first regents, mercenaries grow 
angry at their employees, and the common people grow angry at their rulers.220   
 In the Histories, characters eventually retaliate, such as the Aetolians, who worked to 
provoke the war between the Romans and Antiochus III, and Hannibal and the Carthaginians, 
beginning the Second Punic War.221  As one of the most potent emotions in the Histories, ὀργή 
shapes the narrative dramatically.  In fact, ὀργή, along with its common companion μῖσος, acts 
as a catalyst for important regime changes and for the causes, pretexts, and outbreaks of wars.222  
 Appropriate and rational ὀργή, as well as irrational ὀργή, occur.  A desire for revenge 
may motivate ὀργή sometimes, but it does not seem to be the only motivation for ὀργή.  Ὀργή 
in both positively- and negatively-portrayed subjects seems to arise from witnessing another take 
advantage of a situation and breach social protocol, usually drastically.223  Traditionally good 
characters, or those who best exemplify Eckstein’s aristocratic ethos and Champion’s Hellenic 
logismos, such as the Achaeans and the Romans, grow angry and are the objects of others’ anger.  
Of the groups who grow angry, the Romans feel anger the most of all, with Romans growing 
angry twenty times.224  Moreover, they cause anger in others second most frequently, only 
behind the Aetolians, who cause anger ten times, with nine attestations in the extant text.  This 
statistical preponderance of Roman anger, however, does not mean that the Romans were more 
                                                 
220 Polyb., XV.30.1; I.67.5-6, I.70.4, I.82.9; VI.4.9, VI.7.8, VI.56.11, VI.57.8.  All of these examples involve those 
whom Eckstein characterizes as irrational, barbaric, and a threat to social order.  While some of these instances 
demonstrate this (such as the mercenary examples), the rest of these challenge the lack of moral social order and 
aim to rectify this disjuncture.  See Chapter 3 for this latter analysis and Chapter 4 for the former. 
221 Polyb., III.3.3, III.7.1. 
222 Regimes are changed clearly three times, wars break out through ὀργή six times; three times (III.7.1, III.78.5, 
IV.49.4) Polybius explicitly gave ὀργή as the causation for the war.  See Chapter 4. 
223 Cf. Konstan 2006, 65ff., with injustice as a cause of anger in Classical literature, beyond Aristotle’s limitations. 
224 This includes the group Romans, individual Romans, and the Senate.  Six times anger is attributed to the Romans 
in speeches. 
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irascible and therefore more aggressive by nature.225  Polybius structured his history around the 
Romans, so it is likely that they as the main characters frequently are associated with anger or 
any emotion.226  Even though the statistical evidence of Roman anger should not be 
overstressed, this predominance does reflect on the Romans.  Roman anger increases in the later 
books and does correlate with Champion’s observations of Roman decline.227  Romans grow 
angry exceptionally often and are the objects of anger rather often. 
 On the other hand, groups whom scholars associate with anger do not have strong 
records of growing angry:  Aetolian anger is mentioned four times, Illyrian anger three times, 
and Gallic anger only twice.228  These groups represent the traditionally negative, barbaric 
irrationality which Polybius abhors.  Anger in itself, then, does not form a key component of 
their irrationality.229 
 Philip V, the individual who by far feels the most anger in the Histories, demonstrates the 
possibility of both negative and positive anger.230  As noted above, Polybius faults Philip V in his 
anger at Thermum not for feeling anger, but for his wrong response.  Philip continued such 
behavior throughout the Histories, misdirecting his anger and reacting disproportionately, often 
wronging the gods and destroying places overzealously.231  After the end of the Second 
                                                 
225 See Eckstein 2006 for an argument against Roman exceptionalism, contra Harris 1979, who argued for 
exceptional Roman aggression.  See too Harris 2010, 15, who takes Polybius as evidence for the Romans’ 
emotionally-driven aggressiveness. 
226 In addition, two of the preserved four groups of Constantinian excerpts are the embassies to and from the 
Romans, making them central to the narrative more than any other single group.  See Moore 1965 on the 
manuscript tradition. 
227 See Erskine 2015 for an analysis of this later Roman anger. 
228 All of these instances are addressed in Chapter 4. 
229 Interestingly the Aetolians provoke or receive anger most often.  Their inability to mitigate others’ anger and give 
due weight and consideration to others’ values does reflect poorly on them, and their prime status as objects of 
anger can attest to their characteristic short-sightedness and lack of diplomacy.  Polyb., IV.16.3, IV.29.7, V.12.1, 
XX.10.7, XXI.25.11, XXI.29.29, XXI.31.3 (twice), XXI.31.7, XXI.31.8. 
230 Philip V feels anger eight times:  V.12.1, V.15.9, XI.7.3, XVI.1.2, XVI.1.4, XV.28.8, XVIII.36.4, XXII.13.2.  
Hermeias as an individual feels the most anger after Philip V, with three instances.  Collectives more often feel 
anger, with the collective Romans (sixteen times) and the people (eight times) feeling anger more than or as often as 
Philip V. 
231 Polyb., V.12.1, XI.7.3, XVI.1.2, XVI.1.4, XXII.13.2. 
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Macedonian War, Amynander, the king of Athamania, Macedon’s neighbor to the southwest, 
and an ally of Rome, requested that the Romans to stay in Greece.  For, he says, when they will 
have left, Philip would vent his anger on him.232  Philip had a reputation for overworking his 
anger even among his contemporaries.   
 However, Philip acts positively on his anger during the Social War in Greece and 
imprisons his companions, Megaleas and Krinion, who, we as the external audience know, were 
part of Apelles’ internal plot to ruin Philip’s affairs.233  By stopping them, the young and (mostly) 
noble Philip took a great step towards eradicating this coup.234  Later in the Histories, Polybius 
takes a surprising turn by praising Philip in a war against Attalus and Rhodes, just after he 
praised them and criticized Philip.  Polybius self-consciously defends his turn, reminding his 
readers that a good historian must distribute praise and blame as characters’ behaviors merit.235  
For, he continues, Philip, although having suffered defeat, immediately and vehemently changed 
to meet the circumstance, and succeeded in opposing Attalus and the Rhodians, most of all 
acting on his anger and passion (τὸ πλεῖον ὀργῇ καὶ θυμῷ).236  Polybius praises this 
determination and perseverance in the face of harsh circumstances.  Thus, Philip’s ὀργή (and 
even, it seems, θυμός) could have positive results – provided he react correctly. 
Hatred 
 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguishes hatred (μῖσος) from anger (ὀργή) in a series of 
statements.  First, anger is felt against individuals, hatred against groups of people.  Second, 
anger can be curable, hatred is inexorable.  Third, an angry person wants to hurt his object, while 
a hater wants to cause his object evil, and the angry person wants to see his revenge while the 
                                                 
232 Polyb., XVIII.36.4. 
233 Polyb., V.15.9. 
234 On young Philip V, see McGing 2013. 
235 Polyb., XVI.28.5. 
236 Polyb., XVI.28.8. 
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other is not concerned with revenge.  Fourth, anger necessitates pain for the subject where 
hatred does not.  Lastly, an angry person can come to pity his object, for all he wants is to see his 
object suffer, while the hater cannot come to this state, for he wants his object not to exist.237 
 In this list, two features stand out:  the specificity and temporality of these two emotions.  
For Aristotle, anger requires specificity of object, motivation, and result.  Anger must be directed 
at a specific individual, must be a response to a specific slight, and thus must require a 
specifically equal or proportional response or vengeance.  In terms of temporality, anger differs 
from hatred in its limited time frame from the moment of motivation to the fulfillment of a 
proportional response.  This view justifies Aristotle’s comment that an angry person can come 
to pity his object, for the anger only lasts until a proportional reaction occurs.  Hatred, according 
to Aristotle, lacks both specificity and temporality in these senses.   
 For Polybius, μῖσος does not differ so starkly from anger.  Ὀργή sometimes stimulates 
μῖσος, and it is correlated often with μῖσος in the Histories.238  Polybius’ portrayal of hatred 
differs from Aristotle’s and Konstan’s claim that μῖσος arises only against groups, not 
individuals as such.239  Konstan observes that μῖσος can be directed against an individual (contra 
Aristotle), a type, or a collective, and this holds true in the Histories.240  Konstan argues that ὀργή 
occurs specifically against a person while μῖσος can occur against someone as a member of a 
group not for any other reason than that they share attributes the subject identified in another 
member of that group.241  Polybius does not observe such specifications. 242  Instead, Polybius’ 
                                                 
237 Arist., Rhet. 2.4, 1382a1-14, analyzed by Konstan 2006, 185-200. 
238 Ὀργή as motivation for μῖσος:  IX.10.10, XV.30.1.  Ὀργή as parallel with μῖσος:  I.82.9, VI.7.8, XV.17.2. 
239 Polybius’s passage on traitors is the best example of μῖσος against a type of people:  XVIII.15.13; see also V.98.7, 
XV.17.2 (with ὀργή), XVI.14.9. 
240 Konstan 2006, 186-191, rationalizes Aristotle on hating only groups. 
241 Konstan 2006, 186-191. 
242 Most often in the Histories, positively-portrayed characters hate.  27 out of 37 are arguably positively-portrayed 
characters, and 19 out of the 27 are victims of injustice or suffering or are observers and sympathizers with these 
who suffer unjustly. 
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usage reflects assumptions inherent in ordinary language.  Both ὀργή and μῖσος are felt against 
individuals and groups.243  Moreover, Polybius seldom omits the motivating cause for μῖσος.244   
 In commenting on Philip V’s destruction at Thermum, Polybius provides the gnomic 
statement that “it is a sign of a tyrant that he is hated by his subjects and that his subjects hate 
him.”245  This statement most closely matches Aristotle’s distinctions and Konstan’s discussion 
of μῖσος, in that Polybius makes a statement about a generalized tyrant.  This statement is meant 
to apply to all tyrants.  Hatred also helps Polybius explain kinds of behavior in his digressions on 
traitors, fake sufferers (usually courtiers), conquerors, and the good man.246  However, Polybius 
does not make such sweeping or generalizing statements about hatred often.  Within the 
narrative, Polybius portrays hatred as the motivation of characters’ behaviors.  Hannibal kills all 
men in their prime on his campaign in Picenum because of his natural hatred of the Romans, 
those in Antiochus III’s court help against the courtier Hermeias because of their hatred of him, 
the Sidetai choose not to help the besieged Pednelissans because of their hatred of the 
Aspendians (who do help), and the Megarians ally with the Achaean League because they hate 
the Boeotian state.247 
                                                 
243 It is felt more often against groups than against individuals, but as stated above, Polybius does not leave out why 
characters feel hatred.  Examples against individuals:  V.11.6, V.56.9, VIII.8.1, XV.23.7, XV.25.11(8), XV.25.23(16), 
XXII.8.8, XXX.29.1, XXXII.6.6.  Hatred against groups:  I.14.4, I.82.9, III.86.11, V.11.6, V.73.4, V.98.7, VI.7.8, 
VI.9.1, VI.43.4, VII.3.2, VIII.36.9, IX.10.10, IX.29.12, IX.39.1, XV.17.2, XV.27.3, XVIII.15.13, XX.6.7, XXX.29.2, 
XXX.29.7, XXXIII.20.1, XXXVIII.3.4. 
     More distinctly, individuals feel hatred far less than groups do:  I.14.4, III.86.11, V.11.6, IX.39.1. 
244 Polybius omits specifying the motivation for anger nine times (out of 37 occurrences):  I.14.4, I.82.9, III.3.20, 
III.86.11, V.11.6, VII.3.2, XV.25.11(8), XVI.14.9, XVIII.15.13. 
245 Polyb., V.11.6. 
246 Polyb., I.14.4 (good man), V.98.7 and XVIII.15.13 (traitors), IX.10.10 (conquerors), and XV.17.2 (false 
sufferers). 
247 Polyb., III.86.11, V.56.9, V.73.4, XX.6.7. 
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 Hatred, μῖσος, in the Histories occurs most often of the emotions in a multidimensional 
context.248  Hatred appears alongside anger (ὀργή, never θυμός), indignation (δυσαρεστεῖν, 
ἀγανακτεῖν, and προσκόπτειν), or ill-will (φθόνος).  Hatred is set in contrast with loving 
(φιλεῖν and συναγαπᾶν) or pity (ἔλεος).  Thus, μῖσος seems to exemplify the combined force 
of negative emotion, and in this sense agrees with Aristotle’s definition of μῖσος as general.249  
Different types of hatred exist:  μῖσος, the most dynamic type which I focused upon most, 
ἀπέχθεια, which shares a more neutral, less potent, and more calculated meaning of “enmity” 
than “hatred” and comes up more often in terms of state rivalries and alliances, and lastly 
ἔχθρα, which seems to pertain more exclusively to rivalry than hatred.250 
Indignation 
 Konstan begins his discussion of indignation by noting that the term which Aristotle 
defines, τὸ νέμεσαν, “was not commonly conceived of as an independent emotion in Aristotle’s 
time.”251  Konstan traces the usage of τὸ νέμεσαν in ancient Greek literature:  it was archaic by 
Aristotle’s time, increasingly referred to the divine in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, but 
increased in usage by later authors such as Diodorus Siculus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
Plutarch, and Second Sophistic authors.252  Aristotle defined τὸ νέμεσαν as a pair with φθόνος.  
While φθόνος was felt when one’s equal achieved something better regardless of merit, τὸ 
νέμεσαν was felt when another appeared to succeed undeservedly.253  Polybius uses τὸ 
                                                 
248 14 of 37 instances of hatred occur with other emotions:  with ὀργή:  I.82.9, VI.7.8, IX.10.10, XV.17.2, XV.30.1, 
XXX.29.1; with indignation:  VI.78, VIII.8.1, XV.25.23(16), XV.27.3, XXX.29.7; with φθόνος:  VI.7.8, VI.9.1, 
IX.10.10; against love:  I.14.4, XVI.14.9, XXXIII.20.1; against ἔλεος:  VIII.36.9, XV.17.2. 
249 See more on hatred as a combination in Chapter 3. 
250 See for a detailed list and usages of ἀπέχθεια and ἔχθρα and their cognates, Mauersberger 1.1.165, and 
1.2.1067-1069, respectively. 
251 Konstan 2006, 111.  For full discussion of indignation, see 111-128. 
252 Konstan 2003, 77-78. 
253 Konstan 2006, 112-113. 
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νέμεσαν not in Aristotle’s restricted sense but as a manifestation of divine displeasure, which 
fits Konstan’s observations from Classical and Hellenistic literature.254   While Konstan translates 
Aristotle’s use of τὸ νέμεσαν as “indignation”, Aristotle’s definition cuts off many connotations 
and usages of the modern concept(s) of indignation.  Because Konstan addressed Aristotle’s 
theory of emotions in the Rhetoric, he did not investigate the concept of indignation in ancient 
Greek beyond τὸ νέμεσαν.255  Polybius, however, in his Histories portrays indignation with a 
variety of terms.  
 Throughout the Histories, indignation sparks dynamic change rather than providing the 
last thrust, as anger and hatred tend to do.  Indignation seems to mark the first level of offense 
taken at transgression of social and moral standards.  Several words denote “indignation” to 
different degrees:  δυσαρεστεῖν, ἀγανακτεῖν, προσκόπτειν.  These Greek terms, which all 
convey a sense of indignation generally, are reflective, like sympathy.  They shade from being 
dissatisfied and taking offense to nearly feeling disgust, and occur in important theoretical 
passages but also with many diverse usages in narrative episodes. 
 Characters feel righteous indignation (ἀγανακτεῖν) when someone oversteps their 
bounds, often harming or at least insulting the subjects of indignation in the process.256  Most 
often characters take what belongs to another for themselves, causing their victims to feel 
indignant, ἀγανακτεῖν.  In the Mercenary War, the Carthaginians took for themselves supply 
ships and crews who were destined for the Romans, causing the Romans to feel indignation 
(ἀγανακτεῖν).257  Reciprocally, the Romans took Sardinia at the end of the same war, causing 
                                                 
254 Polybius uses νέμεσαν twice, in the context of justice and the divine:  XII.23.3., XXVII.8.4. 
255 Konstan’s 2003 article on nemesis and phthonos, though not focused on Aristotle’s use, still addresses only these 
terms. 
256 See Polyb., I.83.7, I.88.9, II.46.4, II.59.2, IV.3.11, IV.14.2, IV.16.2, VIII.8.1, VIII.24.3, XV.27.3, XVIII.35.6, 
XX.10.7, XXIV.7.5, XIV.7.7, XXV.5.1, XXXII.13.4, XXXVIII.9.3. 
257 Polyb., I.83.7. 
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the Carthaginians to feel indignant (ἀγανακτεῖν).258  Sometimes characters do not grow 
indignant over material goods and physical loss but over (perceived) insults.  The Roman Senate 
became indignant (ἀγανακτεῖν) with the treachery and deception of the Dalmatians and at the 
Achaeans’ disrespect to Roman envoys, both late in the Histories.259  To feel indignant together 
with others, συναγανακτεῖν, always demonstrates positive character.  All four instances in the 
Histories concern characters who grow indignant on behalf of those who have suffered.260  
Συναγανακτεῖν denotes a sense of sympathy, a strong feeling of sympathetic and moral 
indignation on behalf of another. 
 The meaning of προσκοπή falls between taking offense, resentment, or disgust.261  This 
emotion, προσκοπή, clearly marks a deeper level of indignation than δυσαρέστησις, for several 
times Polybius states “οὐ μόνον δυσαρεστεῖν . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόπτειν.”262  Polybius uses 
προσκοπή to portray the depth and vehemence of a character’s indignation, which carries 
similar connotations as resentment and disgust.263  Often paired with μῖσος, προσκοπή seems 
to last for a long duration.264  The active usage of προσκοπή emphasizes the causation of the 
emotion, rather than the subjects’ feeling and experience of it.  Isocrates, according to Polybius, 
caused the Greeks offense at his talkative and accusatory nature.265  Conversely, Polybius 
explains his choice of varying his proper name with first person pronouns by stating that he 
                                                 
258 Polyb., I.88.9. 
259 Polyb., XXXII.13.4 and XXXVIII.9.3, respectively. 
260 Polyb., II.59.5 (readers – intended by Phylarchus), IV.7.3 (Achaeans), IV.76.5 (Achaeans), VI.6.6 (observers). 
261 Polyb., I.31.7, V.7.5, V.49.5, VI.6.2, VI.6.6, VI.6.8, VI.7.8, VII.5.6, IX.26.8, XXIV.12.3, XXVII.7.10, 
XXVIII.7.11, XXX.29.7, XXXI.10.4, XXXII.2.5, XXXIII.12.5, XXXVI.12.2, XXXVIII.4.4, XXXIX.1.3. 
262 Ibid., I.31.7, VI.6.2, VI.6.6, VII.5.6. 
263 It is challenging to identify something as disgust within Polybius’ text.  I think that προσκοπή comes closest to 
this feeling of the vocabulary of the Histories because it conveys such a deep-seated negative feeling.  Like disgust, it 
is socially and culturally specific to keeping oneself and one’s state clean of immoral or offensive influences.  See 
Ahmed 2004, 82-100, for a nuanced interpretation of the cultural work of disgust.  See Lateiner and Spatharas, eds. 
2017, for ancient notions and examples of disgust. 
264 Polyb., VI.7.8, XXX.29.7. 
265 Polyb., XXXII.2.5. 
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does not want to cause any offense in his readers.266  However, προσκοπή, outside of this active 
sense of causing offense, can also mean to take offense at someone or something.  In his 
character assessment of Hannibal, Polybius explains that because Hannibal had to abandon 
some places which he had promised to protect, some people resented (or were disgusted with) 
his impiety (προσκόπτοντες οἱ μὲν ἀσέβειαν), while others condemned his savagery.267 
 The term δυσαρεστεῖν and its cognates occur much more frequently in the Histories 
than ἀγανακτεῖν or προσκόπτειν.  To analyze a range of this term δυσαρεστεῖν, I shall 
address its varied usages in Book Three.  In this book, Polybius uses δυσαρεστεῖν three times:  
III.8.9, III.26.6, and III.112.2.  In the last example of the Book, III.112.2, δυσαρεστεῖν 
describes Lucius Aemilius’ feeling towards the suitability of the land near Cannae for battle 
against Hannibal.  Just as with emotional vocabulary in English, so too emotional vocabulary in 
Greek does not always convey a strong sense of emotion.268  A translation of “indignation,” let 
alone “resentment” or “disgust”, would not convey the correct sense here, whereas 
“dissatisfaction” would.269  In this passage, δυσαρεστεῖν denotes Aemilius’ disappointment and 
dissatisfaction with the topography rather than a moral reaction of disapprobation, as 
δυσαρεστεῖν would usually entail.  However, Polybius chose δυσαρεστεῖν instead of another 
term for dissatisfaction.270  Aemilius’ reaction of δυσαρεστεῖν shows his thoughtfulness and 
accords with the correct judgment about the topography, thus strengthening his characterization 
                                                 
266 Polyb., XXXVI.12.2. 
267 Polyb., IX.26.8.  I prefer “resentment” to “disgust” because it is difficult to distinguish the viscerality of 
“disgust” from the text.  Ahmed 2004, 82-100, argues for the effect of disgust as something which invades oneself.  
Polybius’ usage of προσκοπή seems to come closest to this threatening of one’s integrity. 
268 Compare the saying in English, “what a pity,” which often expresses not a feeling of pity but perhaps a slight 
disappointment. 
269 This passage is fairly unique in that it concerns an inanimate object as the object of the emotion. 
270 Polybius could have used δυσχεραίνειν or βάρεως φέρειν, for example.  For these as frequent senses of 
dissatisfaction (and not an emotional, moral response) in Polybius, see Mauersberger, 1.2.593, and 1.1.315 (under 
B.), respectively. 
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as a sensible general.  His sense of δυσαρεστεῖν coincides with his rationale that the Romans 
should not do battle against Hannibal in this spot, which turned out – counterfactually – to be 
the correct attitude. 
 The other two passages involve in some way or another the beginnings and causes of 
wars (1st and 2nd Punic Wars).  First, III.8.9, concerns the beginning of the Second Punic War.  
Here Polybius is arguing against other writers’ depictions of the causes and outbreak of the war, 
taking Fabius Pictor’s account into detail.271  He draws out how Fabius’ account contradicts 
itself:  for, he says, Pictor attested that the Carthaginians felt indignant with Hannibal 
(δυσαρεστεῖν), but that their deeds, in Pictor’s same account, did not accord with this 
evaluation and emotional response against Hannibal.  Polybius’ criticism stems from this 
contradiction between feeling and action.  To make his criticism have force, the congruence 
between these must be strong.  For Polybius, it must seem natural and almost necessary that 
after one feels δυσαρεστεῖν, they act upon such a feeling.  However, in Pictor’s account, says 
Polybius, the Carthaginians grew indignant, δυσαρεστεῖν, at Hannibal’s actions in Spain but did 
not act at all in accordance with such feelings:  thus, they were not indignant with Hannibal in 
the first place. 
 The other passage, III.26.6, deals with the beginnings of the First Punic War.  This 
occurs in a digression wherein Polybius comments on and critiques Hannibal’s, the 
Carthaginians’, and the Romans’ pretexts and arguments for the start of the Second Punic War.  
Within the example, Polybius is concerned mainly with justice and what was right, appealing to 
most (right-thinking) people’s sensibilities.  Polybius states that those who consider that the 
Romans allied with the Mamertines, who had broken treaties, and that the Romans had thus 
                                                 
271 See Walbank, HCP 1.310-311 for an analysis of Fabius’ version. 
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acted contrary to their own response to the Rhegian betrayers and allies of the Mamertines, 
would grow indignant (δυσαρεστεῖν) at the Romans’ crossing to Sicily. 
 As a final example of the nuances of δυσαρεστεῖν, let us investigate how Scipio 
Africanus uses and shapes a sense of δυσαρεστεῖν in his speech to his mutinying soldiers in 
Spain. 272  In this speech, Scipio Africanus establishes a series of reasons for revolt and then 
eliminates them.  That soldiers feel indignant or are dissatisfied (δυσαρεστεῖν) with present 
affairs is the second of Scipio’s list of three reasons, and it is the reason for which Scipio thinks 
his soldiers revolted.273  He then focuses on the reason why the soldiers feel indignation.  He 
states that they are indignant that he did not provide their food allowance.  But, he counters, he 
did pay them what they were owed while he was their leader.  Perhaps it is over past debts from 
Rome?274  Scipio elides answering this claim directly but rather shifts his attention to the correct 
response to this indignation.  If past arrears from Rome motivated the soldiers to grow 
indignant and thus to revolt, Scipio asks if it would not have been better to call on and speak 
with him about it or at least to gather their friends to aid them in their claim, rather than to 
revolt from their country and home.275  At this point, Scipio demonstrates the moral superiority 
of this choice, talking to him, over revolting through comparison with mercenaries, emphasis on 
the high stakes of citizen fighters, such as his audience, and analogy with parricide in response to 
a debt.276  Scipio concludes this portion of his speech by asking again what they were indignant 
at.  He takes their choice not to speak with him as evidence that they had no reason or claim to 
indignation at all.277 
                                                 
272 Polyb., XI.28-29.  Cf. Livy’s version of Scipio’s speech, Liv. 28.27.2-28.29.8. 
273 Polyb., XI.28.1-3. 
274 Polyb., XI.28.4-5. 
275 Polyb., XI.28.6. 
276 Polyb., XI.28.7-10. 
277 Polyb., XI.28.11. 
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 In this speech, the use of δυσαρεστεῖν means something between “dissatisfaction” and 
“indignation”.  Scipio focuses his attention on the motivations for the soldiers’ feeling and on 
their response to it.  Scipio’s interest in why the soldiers feel indignation (δυσαρεστεῖν) reflects 
the significance of an emotion’s import and rationality.  By skipping directly from motivation to 
the impropriety of revolting, Scipio challenges the import of the soldiers’ indignation.  He 
contrasts mercenaries fighting for pay with citizens fighting for their families and country.278  
This contrast challenges the mutineers’ concern over owed pay and implies that they should care 
more about their families and country, i.e., what should be the true import for any emotion they 
have.  In this shifting of import, Scipio directly points out that they responded 
disproportionately to their indignation.  They chose to revolt when conversation with him would 
have been a proportional response.  Moreover, by shifting the import, Scipio denies their claim 
to feel indignation appropriately; they should not have felt indignation based on such motivating 
factors as pay instead of the safety of their loved ones.  Scipio directly eliminates indignation 
from the picture when he says that the mutineers really had no reason.  Scipio’s speech centers 
on the convergence of rationality and indignation.  He takes their disproportionate response and 
avoidance of the easier, proportionate response as evidence for a lack of reason for indignation.  
Thus, Scipio’s speech highlights important factors for δυσαρεστεῖν.  Motivation, import, and 
response are essential for this emotion, as well as for ἀγανακτεῖν and προσκόπτειν.  Unlike 
ἀγανακτεῖν and προσκόπτειν, δυσαρεστεῖν represents a lighter version of “indignation,” as 
etymologically ‘dis-pleasure’ (δυσ-αρεστεῖν), and thus closer to dissatisfaction and thus easier to 
assuage.  However, it still carries the moral implications of indignation, which, in this passage, 
                                                 
278 See VI.52.3-8 for Polybius’ similar arguments about the superiority of the Roman politeia over Carthage’s. 
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Scipio argued did not exist for the mutineers, and thus they should not have felt indignation 
proper. 
Resentment 
 Konstan relates φθόνος, which he translates as “envy”, to his form of “indignation”, τὸ 
νέμεσαν.279  Together they represent the opposite of pity.  Aristotle defines φθόνος as pain at 
an equal doing better.  Konstan qualifies Aristotle’s stance, stating that “phthonos is the only one 
[emotion] that he treats as unqualifiedly negative,” for the subject only feels this emotion because 
the object is doing better, not because the object does not deserve better.280  However, Konstan 
situates Aristotle’s approach to φθόνος in his interpretation of φθόνος in Classical Athenian 
democracy.  According to Konstan, φθόνος did not carry entirely negative overtones in the 
context of Classical Athenian democracy, but rather it functioned to regulate the behavior of the 
rich and powerful, thus embodying “a natural response to a systemic inequality” through its use 
in social movement.281  He rationalizes Aristotle’s hostility through his suspicion of egalitarian 
democracy and states, “it was thus natural that he should have regarded phthonos as a vice 
endemic to democracy, one that is excited by the prosperity of those we deem our equals.”282 
 Φθόνος has a complex function in the Histories which does not neatly fit into Konstan’s 
classification.  It shares similarities with Konstan’s examples of Archaic usage, meaning 
something more like ‘begrudge’ than Konstan’s emotionless ‘deny’ or ‘refuse.’283  However, it is 
not merely an egalitarian and democratic emotion, as Konstan claims for it during the Classical 
                                                 
279 Konstan 2006, 111-128.  Forms of indignation occur with φθόνος at II.46.2 and VI.7.8. 
280 Konstan 2006, 113. 
281 Konstan 2003, 80-86, gives a fuller exposition of this democratic context, but is reiterated at Konstan 2006, 119-
127, in comparison with Aristotle’s view. 
282 Konstan 2006, 127. 
283 Konstan 2006, 118-122. 
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period and for Aristotle’s particular understanding.284  Konstan describes φθόνος as completely 
negative and well-suited for the mob.285  Neither of these observations works straightforwardly 
in Polybius’ Histories. 
 Moreover, φθόνος does not carry the same connotations as “envy” in the Histories, 
which is a common translation.  As mentioned above, it describes someone holding grudges, or 
begrudging someone something, or it can indicate a sense of offense created by someone’s 
attempt to overreach their social status in some manner.286  Lower classes, social peers, and 
superiors feel φθόνος in the Histories.  In several passages, φθόνος provides intriguing cases of 
multidimensionality, combining variously with indignation, anger, hatred, and even pity.287  
Φθόνος most often represents resentment of others’ improper use of power, success, wealth, or 
other resources. 
 In a few generalizing statements, Polybius describes φθόνος in terms similar to the sense 
of “envy” in English.  “For φθόνος from wealth gives birth to plots and causes the greatest 
changes in physical and mental health.”288  Polybius likewise explains that “brilliant and 
extraordinary deeds give birth to deep φθόνος and sharp slanders.”289  Φθόνος seems thus to 
provide a check against reaching too far and overstepping the bounds of human achievement, 
similar to Konstan’s observations of Classical Athenian φθόνος.  The better one does, the more 
difficult it becomes to succeed and fare well because of φθόνος. 
                                                 
284 Konstan 2006, 119, 125ff. 
285 Konstan 2006, 127. 
286 For a meaning of ‘begrudge,’ see Polyb. V.42.8, VI.58.5, XI.6.8, XI.34.3.  For a meaning more of ‘offense,’ see 
I.36.3, II.45.1, II.46.2, V.41.3, V.46.8, V.50.7, VI.7.5, VI.7.8, VI.9.1, VI.9.11, VII.8.4, IX.10.6, IX.10.7, IX.10.10, 
IX.10.12, IX.29.11, XIII.2.5, XVIII.41.4, XXIII.12.8, XXVIII.7.5, XXXIX.8.2. 
287 Polyb., II.46.2, VI.7.8, VI.9.1, VI.9.11, IX.10.6, IX.10.10, IX.29.11. 
288 Polyb., XVIII.41.4. 
289 Polyb., I.36.3. 
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 In these passages and in fact most instances of the emotion φθόνος in the Histories, 
Polybius focuses on the object of φθόνος, not the subjects.  This marks a great divergence from 
the modern notion of “envy” in English.  Through its connotations as one of the “Seven Deadly 
Sins” of Christianity, envy in English symbolizes a fault on the part of the subject, the one 
envying; it is the one who envies who sins.  Polybius does not focus on the subject who feels 
φθόνος.  In five passages he mentions individuals or the Aetolians as a people when they feel 
φθόνος, and in these passages feeling φθόνος reflects these characters’ negative traits.290  
However, in the remaining seventeen instances of φθόνος and φθονεῖν, all attention falls upon 
the object of φθόνος.  In this majority of instances of φθόνος, the subject is not stressed or 
even mentioned explicitly, and in these, a negative reading of the subjects of φθόνος often 
contradicts the meaning of the passage. 
 The most notable passage concerning φθόνος is Polybius’ description of how observers 
react to conquerors when they overstep the bounds of propriety in despoiling the defeated.  The 
Romans’ conquest of Syracuse forms the context and inspiration for this theorizing digression.291  
Polybius explains that it is agreed that one would call it a fault to abandon conquerors’ customs 
and to imitate the losers’, stimulating the resentment (φθόνος) which follows such behavior and 
which most of all scares those in superior positions.  For, he continues, an observer does not 
deem happy (μακαρίζει) those who take others’ property, since he feels resentment (φθόνος), 
and some pity arises in him for those who lost their property.292   
                                                 
290 Polyb., II.45.1 and II.46.2 (Aetolians), V.41.3 (Hermeias), IX.29.11 (Antigonus Doson, in Chlaeneas’ speech), 
and XIII.2.5 (Scopas). 
291 Polyb., IX.10.  This passage is often discussed in terms of the Roman triumph and the degenerative importation 
of Hellenic luxury into Rome:  see Beard 2007, 178-181; Champion 2013, 146; Davies 2013, 327; Eckstein 1995, 
229-230, 245-246; Gruen 1984, 308, 345-346; Gruen 1992, 94-98; Gruen 2013, 260; McGing 2010, 41, 159-160; 
Walbank HCP II.134-136. 
292 Polyb., IX.10.6-7. 
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  This emotion, φθόνος, tends to arise against those who have or want more than they 
should.293  Here, the victors have and take more than they should.  Polybius took it for granted 
that people – the normative “man on the street” – automatically and naturally feel φθόνος in 
response to victors overreaching the bounds of propriety, despite their legitimate power.  In this 
moment, Polybius appeals to an abstract sense of morality, which forms the base for this 
φθόνος.  Polybius strengthens his generalized “resentment following such actions” (τὸν 
ἐξακολουθοῦντα τοῖς τοιούτοις φθόνον) as a resentment “which is most frightening of all for 
superiority” (ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ φοβερώτατον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς).  The emotion φθόνος most 
potently afflicts those who are in a superior position.  This usage and analysis shares clear 
similarities with Konstan’s analysis of Classical φθόνος.  However, Konstan stresses the 
egalitarian and democratic nature of this emotion, while in this passage, as elsewhere in the 
Histories, φθόνος is felt by those who have no claim to equality.  Again, this emphasizes the 
object of the emotion much more than the subject:  the subject’s social status matters hardly at 
all, but the object is focalized and criticized for not understanding their status.   
 This usage is paralleled in other passages of the Histories:  the kings in the anacyclosis 
acted following reason in accordance with their subjects’ good, but the hereditary tyrants did not 
act in accordance with how their power was originally acquired by the kings.294  This stirred up 
φθόνος along with many other negative emotions.295  Likewise, the most recent Syracusan tyrant 
Hieronymus failed to act according to the principles his predecessor Hiero II – who had 
                                                 
293 The subjects feeling the emotion evaluate what constitutes “more than they should”.  Throughout the Histories, 
this is evenly divided between correct and incorrect evaluation:  three times characters feel φθόνος against others in 
accordance with Polybius’ portrayal and thoughts on these figures, and four times characters wrongly feel φθόνος 
against characters whom Polybius sympathizes with and defends.  Together with Polybius’ portrayal:  V.41.3 (of 
Hermeias), V.46.8 (of Molon), XIII.2.5 (of Scopas); Against Polybius’ appraisal:  II.45.1 (Aitolians), II.46.2 
(Aitolians), IX.29.11 (Antigonus Doson in Chlaineas’ speech), XXVIII.7.5 (some Achaians).  
294 Polyb., VI.7.7. 
295 Polyb., VI.7.8. 
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exceptionally avoided all φθόνος – had established along with his power in Syracuse and 
Sicily.296  Hieronymus fell due to his failure to adhere to Hiero’s principles.297  Like Hiero, those 
who act worthily of their status, adhering to original principles, avoid φθόνος and receive praise 
from Polybius.  His hero, Philopoemen, exceptionally stands outside of φθόνος, strong 
evidence for Polybius of Philopoemen’s great character.298  The passage at IX.10 over victors fits 
this pattern.  By not following their original, successful principles, the conquerors forfeit their 
just claim to higher status because they emulate unworthy customs.  Thus, they attract φθόνος. 
Jealousy 
 Konstan includes ‘jealousy,’ ζηλοτυπία, although Aristotle does not address this 
terminology.299  Polybius, likewise, rarely uses ζηλοτυπία, and when he does it does not denote 
English “jealousy” so much as rivalry.300  Konstan discusses the Stoics’ emphasis on ζηλοτυπία 
as jealousy at another having what another has.301  Konstan then turns to Polybius and discusses 
his attitude to courtiers.  Konstan takes Polybius’ general disparagement of courtiers and their 
new kind of slander, invented to further their rivalries and greed (ζηλοτυπία καὶ πλεονέξια) as 
part of the turn towards court culture.302  In this context, ζηλοτυπία means something close to 
“invidious rivalry”, as Konstan observes.  Despite Polybius’ distaste for courtiers in general and 
criticism of them, the court did not form a central concern for him, let alone the emotions 
specific to it, such as ζηλοτυπία.303 
                                                 
296 Polyb., VII.8.4.  However, Hieronymus does not explicitly in the extant text invoke φθόνος. 
297 Polyb., VII.7-8. 
298 Polyb., XXIII.12.8.  Attalus also exceptionally avoids φθόνος, XVIII.41.4. 
299 Konstan 2006, 219-258. 
300 Polyb., IV.87.4, XVI.22.6, XXIX.7.2.  
301 Konstan 2006, 223-224. 
302 Polyb., IV.87.4; Konstan 2006, 225. 
303 Of course, this statement is not definitive given the fragmentary preservation of Polybius’ text.  However, the 
majority of the extant text, especially the books surviving complete, 1-5, does not give court society and its emotion 
a central role in the Histories. 
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Shame 
 Shame, αἶδος or αἰσχύνη, is a felt sensation, according to Aristotle in Konstan’s 
analysis.304  However, αἰσχύνη rarely entails a felt component in Polybius’ Histories.305  It does 
correspond with Konstan’s observation that it constitutes an outward-oriented judgment; that is, 
external observers’ judgment forms the crucial motivating factor for the subject’s feeling 
shame.306  Αἰσχύνη completely concerns social reputation and virtue in the Histories, but 
Polybius does not focus on it as an emotion felt by the subject when perceiving an impression of 
others’ negative judgment.  Instead, Polybius engages in teaching his audience in what context it 
would be appropriate and socially responsible to feel shame.  Often the narrator or external 
observers note the shame which follows such actions.307  The subject does not internalize the 
feeling of shame, but rather Polybius wants the audience to feel shame themselves should they 
pursue the same course of action.308  In the Histories, αἰσχύνη and αἰσχρός denote shame.  
These terms have high moral content, and whenever they are used, they are meant to chastise 
bad behavior and inculcate good morals.  Appropriateness features prominently in this emotion, 
and in fact shame might be described better as the emotion of inappropriateness.   
 Should αἰσχύνη be called an emotion?  Αἰσχύνη is more of a moral judgment than an 
emotion.  Αἰσχύνη, as a moral judgment, comes from the perspective of an observer or the 
                                                 
304 Konstan 2006, 90-109.  Polybius never uses the term αἶδος.  Konstan discusses this term briefly as an Archaic 
Greek term for shame, 93-98.  See Cairns 1993 for a detailed analysis of this term. 
305 Examples of internalized shame in Polybius’ Histories:  VIII.12.6 (Aratus), IX.18.9 (Philip V); focalized through 
others:  II.46.1 (Aetolians), VI.46.3 (Cretans); lack of internalized shame:  VI.56.2 (Carthaginians), IX.3.6 
(Aetolians), XII.13.3 (Timaeus), XV.20.1 (Philip V and Antiochus III); negated, for a positive result:  IV.20.11 
(Achaeans), XII.13.11 (Demetrius of Phaleron). 
306 Konstan 2006, 90.  See Ahmed 2004, 101-121, for a detailed analysis of the process of shame, which finds 
parallels for Polybius’ usage. 
307 For some examples, see III.20.7, III.116.13, IV.31.7-8, IV.58.11, V.58.5, VI.44.6, VIII.9.9, VIII.10.2, VIII.11.1, 
VIII.11.8, IX.18.9, XI.2.7, XI.2.11, XI.5.3, XI.5.7, XI.12.3, XII.13.1, XII.13.3, XIV.5.10, XV.10.3, XVI.20.1.  For a 
full list of αἰσχύνη, its cognates, and its uses, see Mauersberger, 1.1.29-31, 1.1.98, 1.3.1301, and 2.1.15. 
308 In several cases, such as III.81.6, III.84.6, XVIII.53.4, those who would have to internalize the feeling of shame 
are dead. 
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narrator, and it reflects back to the observer’s own values and standards.  As with many of the 
emotions, with αἰσχύνη the ones eliciting the judgment of αἰσχύνη do not recognize their own 
shame.  In fact, their ignorance often motivates identification of αἰσχύνη by the narrator or 
observer.  Since αἰσχύνη in this form lacks any feeling, it works more as a moral or a judgment 
than an emotion.  Who would feel this shame, after all?  The narrator or observer would not.  
The characters viewed are oblivious to their αἰσχύνη, even though they should have felt it.  In 
these cases, no true subject experiencing and feeling the emotion exists. 
 However, in four cases, internalized shame with strong feeling occurs.309  Polybius 
centers directly upon the issue of emotional, felt shame versus detached judgmental αἰσχύνη in 
describing Aratus’s dying by poison at Philip V’s orders.  As Philip unsuccessfully attacked 
Messene, Polybius says, he showed great lack of restraint against those closest to him (εἰς δὲ 
τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους τῶν φίλων τὴν μεγίστην ἀσέλγειαν ἐναπεδείξατο).310  For, through 
a slow-acting poison, Philip killed Aratus, who felt that Philip’s attack of Messene was wrong 
(δυσαρεστηθέντα τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πεπραγμένοις ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ).311  To add to the scale of 
Philip’s wrongdoing, Aratus knew that Philip was poisoning him.312  Polybius sums up that “thus 
modesty is a great and noble thing,” when Aratus, although the victim, felt ashamed at what was 
happening, rather than the perpetrator, Philip (μᾶλλον ὁ παθὼν τοῦ πράξαντος ᾐσχύνετο τὸ 
γεγονός).313  This charged statement lays bare the usual working and understanding of shame:  
                                                 
309 Polyb., II.46.1, VIII.12.6, XII.13.11, XV.23.5.  This is out of 43 occurrences of shame vocabulary.  Half of these 
four instances, XII.13.11 and XV.23.5, are negative statements, indicating that the character did not feel shame, thus 
reducing the number of occurrences of the felt emotion of shame even further. 
310 Polyb., VIII.12.1. 
311 Polyb., VIII.12.2-3. 
312 Polyb., VIII.12.4-5. 
313 Polyb., VIII.12.6.  οὕτως ἐστὶ μέγα τι καὶ καλὸν χρῆμα μετριότης, ὥστε μᾶλλον ὁ παθὼν τοῦ πράξαντος 
ᾐσχύνετο τὸ γεγονός, . . ..  Aratus in some ways feels shame on behalf of Philip, much as in English usage one 
feels embarassment for someone.  This ‘feeling for’ someone else reflects the subject’s sense of morality, here 
Aratus’ superior sense of morality by comparison to Philip V’s lack. 
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the perpetrator of a wrong should feel shame, not the victim.  Clearly Polybius thought that 
Philip should have felt shame.  His actions met with disapprobation by the narrator and by 
observers, yet Philip clearly did not experience internalized, reflective shame.  Aratus, on the 
other hand, felt the emotion of shame, even though his actions did not merit disapprobation – 
rather the opposite:  he stuck by Philip and aided in so many great exploits, which fact further 
highlights Philip’s shamelessness.314  Aratus’ shame thus exalts the nobility and virtue of his 
character, to Philip’s discredit.315 
2.  Anticipatory Emotions 
 Fear and hope feature throughout the narrative of the Histories.  Stoics classified fear and 
hope together as the two future-oriented emotions, incorporating either negative or positive 
affect.  In Polybius’ Histories, these two emotions, along with the affective states of courage and 
shock, occur often within the narrative of military events.  They both affect characters’ military 
and political decisions.  As opposed to the negative emotions above, fear and hope do not share 
a strong connection to moral evaluation. 
Fear 
 Fear to Aristotle represented pain at some future event.316  For one to fear something 
however, the threat has to be close, for people do not fear something that is remote.317  Konstan 
clarifies that fear acts as a response to a danger, especially to an enemy in a position to do one 
harm.318  For Aristotle and Konstan, fear represents the most universal of all emotions, for even 
                                                 
314 Polyb., VIII.12.6-7. 
315 This is particularly the case as this passage begins Polybius’ death notice of Aratus.  See Pomeroy 1986 on 
Polybius’ death notices in general, although he does not address Aratus at length, in part because this passage does 
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316 See Konstan 2006, 129-155, for his full analysis of fear. 
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animals feel it.  However, for humans, Aristotle also found that fear led people on the whole to 
become more deliberative, not irrational.319 
 Polybius’ usage of fear, whether φόβος or δέος, corresponds to Aristotle’s description 
of fear.320  All the fear words (φόβος, δεδιότες, etc.) are intentional:  the subject feels fear of 
someone or some situation.  Φόβερος goes the opposite way, but is also intentional:  the subject 
causes fear in an object.  Fear can be a tactic (“scare tactics” literally), a motivator for positive or 
negative ends, a sign of strength, youth, desperation, or inexperience.  Characters intend to 
create fear most often of the emotions, and the vocabulary for fear reflects this type of usage, 
with both active and passive forms.321   
 Marie-Rose Guelfucci in her article “La peur dans l’oeuvre de Polybe” synthesizes 
Polybius’ usage of fear in the Histories.322  She argues that Polybius utilizes fear for a political 
purpose:  good generals manage fear, while bad ones do not.  Guelfucci focuses most on Roman 
generals, although other leaders manage fear also.  For example, Hannibal deliberately instills 
fear (φόβος) in others.323  Hasdrubal also, at Cannae, utilizes the Numidian cavalry due to its 
excellence in causing φόβος to those fleeing, an action which Polybius praises.324  Demetrius of 
Pharos also recognizes the Romans’ fear of Carthage and tries to use it to his advantage, thus 
showing good generalship in understanding his enemy.325  Moreover, Guelfucci notes the 
prominent use of fear in Book 6 of the Histories.  Fear imposes restraint on the different 
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components of the Roman mixed constitution, deterring the People, Senate, or consuls from 
overstepping their allotted powers.  Fear also compels the Roman soldiers to maintain their 
renowned discipline.  In sum, Guelfucci persuasively draws out the political importance of fear 
in Polybius’ account of Roman institutions and in the Histories as a whole. 
 After the battle of Trebia early in the Second Punic War, the defeated general, Tiberius 
Gracchus, sent a deceptive report to Rome.326  However, the news trickled into the city that the 
Romans had lost, and Polybius describes the extensive preparations that they began.327  For, 
Polybius explains, the Romans become most fearsome (φοβερώτατοι) when a true fear 
(ἀληθινὸς φόβος) surrounds them.328  Here, the ἀληθινὸς φόβος does not have a stated 
import.  One has to read in ‘for survival’ or something similar from the context.  A system of 
fear exists here:  the Romans both cause fear and feel fear.  Not only that, they cause fear because 
they feel fear.  Moreover, the object of φοβερώτατοι is left unstated.  Such a generalizing 
statement comes closest to Polybius using emotion to depict a group’s identity or disposition.  
The context, however, warns against reading this too generally:  Polybius is explaining why the 
Romans immediately began such extensive preparations. 
 Fearing (δεδιότες) saves the Carthaginians at one point in their crossing of the Alps, says 
Polybius.329  He states that they would have all been destroyed if they were not afraid.  Because 
they feared the treachery of some inhabitants in the Alps, the Carthaginians prepared for a 
surprise attack, placing the heavy infantry in the rear, which the Gallic tribe indeed attacked.  
Fear motivates the Carthaginians here to make strategic decisions, saving, as Polybius attests, 
                                                 
326 Polyb., III.75.1. 
327 Polyb., III.75.2-7. 
328 Polyb., III.75.8. 
329 Polyb., III.53.1.  ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ ἂν ἄρδην ἀπολέσθαι συνέβη τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν, εἰ μὴ δεδότες ἀκμὴν ἐπὶ ποσὸν . . .   
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their whole force.330  Fear, even though not planned here, can cause beneficial results.  However, 
it is not necessary for anyone, even a good general, to recognize, let alone control, the fear for it 
to have positive effects, as seen here.  Interestingly, Polybius does not mention τύχη even 
though this type of situation would fall under its jurisdiction, as what happened was not 
controlled by people.331  Lastly, Polybius emphasizes repeatedly the fear Romans feel about their 
catastrophe at Cannae.332  This suits his narrative purpose in marking Cannae as an extraordinary 
event.333  It dramatizes the desperation of the situation and helps to justify his decision to discuss 
Rome’s constitutional strengths. 
Hope 
 Ἐλπίς is perhaps the most difficult emotional term to identify and characterize in 
Polybius’ Histories.  Though often translated as “hope,” ἐλπίς, or more often ἐλπίδες, share 
meanings with hope, expectation, plans, fortunes, and prospects, in a very real, material sense 
and cover the nuances between these terms.   
 For the Stoics, hope, as the preferred future emotion, represented the opposite of fear.334  
In a recent article, Laurel Fulkerson analyzed the working of ἐλπίς within Plutarch’s texts, 
focusing on the Lives.335  Fulkerson notes the wide ground that this term covers in Plutarch’s 
corpus, between “hope” and “expectation,” comparable to Polybius’ usage.  She rationalizes the 
convergence of these meanings by postulating that “my best guess about what is likely to happen 
                                                 
330 Gulefucci 1986, 232ff., notes that δείδειν leads to a better appraisal of the situation more often than φοβεῖν. 
331 See especially Walbank 2011 on Fortune. 
332 Polyb., III.107.15, III.112.6, III.118.5-6. 
333 See recently McGing 2010, 17-50, on Polybius’ structure and how it relates to his content.  
334 I do not discuss the Stoics’ present ‘emotions’ of pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (λύπη).  Konstan does not address 
ἡδονή either.  See Mauersberger, 1.3.1110 for Polybius’ usage of this term.  Aristotle uses λύπη to denote pain, and 
Polybius’ rare use of this terminology follows suit.  Konstan redefines λύπη as grief, which does not find traction in 
Polybius’ text.  See Mauersberger, 1.4.1498-1499 for Polybius’ usage of this term. 
335 Fulkerson 2015, 67-86.  Neither Konstan nor Aristotle address the potential emotion, ἐλπίς.  See however, 
Caston and Kaster, eds. 2016, for recent scholarship on hope in Classical literature. 
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is, very regularly, likely to be also the thing I would most like to happen.”336  In this optimistic 
interpretation, the two senses of “expectation” and “hope” thus inform each other.  A word in 
English which comes close to covering this nuance is “prospect,” which implies waiting on or 
expecting something positive in the future.  In her analysis of Plutarch’s corpus, Fulkerson 
found that Plutarch used ἐλπίς three to four times more frequently in the Lives than in the 
Moralia.337  This trend, which Fulkerson ties to a correlation between ἐλπίς and action, finds 
backing in Polybius’ usage, for he mentions ἐλπίς more often than ὀργή, μῖσος, φθόνος, 
δυσαρέστησις, τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν, προσκοπή, and ἔλεος combined.338  Moreover, Polybius tends 
to mention ἐλπίς in narrative military contexts rather than the digressions or explanations in 
which we often see the other emotions. 
 States trust in the ἐλπίδες of themselves or their allies and share the same ἐλπίδες as 
their allies, where the English word and feeling of “hopes” does not fit as well as “expectations” 
or “goals”.339  Their ἐλπίδες are not anything ethereal or insubstantial; rather, they are the 
foreseeable outcome and future result of the state’s actions.  “Fortunes” makes a better 
translation here.  It conveys in English both the risk and chance involved and also the future 
orientation.  “Fortunes” seems to refer to more material concerns than “hopes” do.  Another 
potential translation might be “chances” or “prospects,” as when a commander or state chooses 
                                                 
336 Fulkerson 2015, 68. 
337 Fulkerson 2015, 70. 
338 Polybius uses a form of ἐλπίς or ἐλπίζειν over 375 times, whereas the emotions of anger, hate, indignation, 
resentment, and pity occur a total of 274 times.  For a full list of ἐλπίς and ἐλπίζειν, their uses, and their cognates, 
see Mauersberger 1.2.756-761, 1.2.1017-1018, 1.3.1354; and for its negated or opposite forms 1.1.119, 1.1.162-163, 
1.2.589.  In my lists of passages and statistics for this terminology, I make no claim of comprehensiveness due to 
the large amount of material and thus greater room for error.  I intend instead to provide as near a complete list of 
passages and usages as I can to show the representativeness for this term. 
339 For examples which refer specifically to the ἐλπίδες found in alliances, which has a material sense of “fortunes” 
or “resources”, see I.44.6, I.55.1, I.62.4, I.82.3, I.82.6, I.83.1, IV.17.8, IV.51.8, IV.55.4, IV.60.8, V.51.11, maybe 
V.74.8, VII.3.8, VIII.15.8, IX.32.3, IX.32.11, IX.37.5, IX.39.6, X.37.5, XI.20.6, XIII.2.1, XIV.7.7, XV.24.4 (twice), 
XXI.11.12, XXI.41.4, XXII.4.1, XXVII.3.3, XXVIII.2.3, XXIX.3.5, XXIX.7.8, XXIX.8.3, XXX.5.8, XXX.5.16, 
XXX.20.4, XXXI.14.4, XXXVI.9.10, XXXVIII.7.9. 
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to follow a line of action based on the prospect or chance of a better outcome.340  These 
examples come close to an unemotional meaning of “expectation”.341  Ἐλπίδες of salvation (τῆς 
σωτερίας) come closer to our conception of hope as an emotion.342 
 Perhaps part of the difficulty with distinguishing “hope” as an emotion from 
“expectation” or some other such translation arises from its calculated nature in the narrative.  
Feeling appears to play no role or a very small one in ἐλπίς.343  Calculations dominate everything 
about ἐλπίς in Polybius’ Histories, a fact we may not find comfortable in English usage, as we 
usually hope when we cannot (or choose not to) reason out and make decisions to change our 
lives accordingly.  We hope when we have no control.  We have difficulty with the connotations 
of ἐλπίς from our own preconceptions of the dichotomy between reason versus emotion. 
 A good example of the ambiguity ἐλπίδες have in meaning between expectation and 
hope comes in Scipio Africanus’ speech to his mutinying troops in Spain, in which we analyzed 
his deconstruction of δυσαρεστεῖν.344  After Scipio eliminated indignation as a valid reason for 
why the soldiers revolt, he turned to the third in his list of general reasons soldiers revolt – to 
strive for greater and nobler prospects (μειζόνων . . . καὶ καλλιόνων ἐλπίδων).  Scipio 
challenges the soldiers to think of when Rome had more benefits, prosperity, and more 
prospects (ἐλπίδες) for the soldiers.345  He brings up a counterargument, couched in the words 
of a despondent person (τις τῶν ἀπηλπικότων), that Rome’s enemies have more profits and 
greater and steadier prospects (μείζόυς καὶ βεβαιότατ’ἐλπίδες).346  Scipio responds by asking 
                                                 
340 Examples from Book I:  I.20.1, I.21.5, I.27.12, I.36.5, I.37.6, I.49.10, I.61.5, I.66.12, I.71.3, I.87.1. 
341 For “expectation” as the best meaning in Book I:  I.44.4, I.53.12, I.66.5. 
342 See for this specific phrase, ἐλπίδες τῆς σωτερίας, II.35.1, III.96.3, III.109.11, IV.86.5, VI.58.9, VI.58.11, 
VIII.17.9, VIII.19.2, XI.1.8, XI.17.5, XVIII.25.4, XXII.8.12, XXIX.19.8, XXX.32.8, XXXVIII.7.8. 
343 Of Book I, the occurrences of ἐλπίς with the most “hope” connotations are I.56.9 and I.67.1. 
344 Polyb., XI.28-29. 
345 Polyb., XI.29.1. 
346 Polyb., XI.29.2. 
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who these enemies are.  He states that Andobales and Mandonius, two native leaders in Spain, 
had revolted from the Carthaginians before and now are traitors to their Roman alliance.  He 
snidely comments on how noble it would be to trust them and thus betray one’s country.347  
Moreover, Scipio tells the soldiers that they have no power comparable to the Romans.  The 
mutineers do not have ἐλπίδες even of conquering Spain, with or without Andobales.348  As 
with his refutation of the soldiers’ indignation, Scipio ends by questioning the existence of their 
ἐλπίδες at all.349 
 Throughout this passage, ἐλπίδες can be translated as “prospects”, “hopes”, 
“expectations”, or even “plans”.  There is little resemblance to emotion.  Instead, as throughout 
the narrative in general, ἐλπίδες function as a part of calculation.  Thus, the Romans, according 
to Scipio, can say they have better prospects (ἐλπίδες) than their enemies, in an objective sense.  
Scipio denies any grounds for the soldiers’ ἐλπίδες, again using the features of emotion to deny 
the soldiers any rationale for their revolt. 
 What we tend to think of as “hopeful” in English, i.e., a positive outlook and wish for 
the future, fits the usage of εὔελπις by Polybius much better than ἐλπίς.  In the Histories, 
characters become εὐέλπιδες over events they did not expect to happen so positively, and they 
modify their behavior to try to take advantage of their positive turn of affairs.  In negotiations to 
end the war between the Aetolians and the Romans, Polybius says that the Aetolians all became 
εὐέλπιδες at the outset, with the Roman commanders seeming willing to negotiate terms.350  
However, their hopefulness leads to greater disappointment, for the Romans do not offer any 
                                                 
347 Polyb., XI.29.3-4. 
348 Polyb., XI.29.5. 
349 Polyb., XI.29.6. 
350 Polyb., XXI.4.11. 
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better terms than those already offered.351  Their hopefulness, then, only leads them to a deeper 
disappointment than they would have experienced.  Later in the Histories, the Achaeans become 
εὐέλπιδες at what seems to be a favorable state of affairs for them with the Romans, and so 
they send another embassy to ask the Romans to release those Achaeans detained after the Third 
Macedonian War, of whom Polybius was one.  The Romans deny this request.  While I doubt 
that Polybius disapproved of the Achaeans’ embassy, especially since Polybius himself pressed 
for the release, he still portrayed actions based on feeling εὐέλπιδες as likely to fail.352 
3.  Positive Emotions 
 Positive emotions, though frequent in the Histories, play a very small part in the dynamics 
of the narrative.353  They do not motivate or produce change.  These emotions function more as 
dispositions or sentiments than emotions, as they lack some major characteristics of typical 
emotions such as intentionality or result.  They do function, however, to provide passages with 
description and to enhance the continuity of the narrative.  Characters who feel positive 
emotions choose to continue their plans and actions.  Thus, positive emotions influence the 
narrative, but in a manner opposite to typical emotions.354 
 The feeling of ἀσμενίζω/ἀσμένως is a lighter disposition which does not drastically 
affect the turn of events.355  People continue upon their path or plans when they are ἄσμενοι.  It 
is a sentiment or description fit for a child.356 
 Joy, χαρά, occurs solely as a result:  it does not motivate further action.357  For example, 
the Greeks at the Isthmian Games nearly kill Flamininus in expressing their joy.358  This comes 
                                                 
351 Cf. XXI.2. 
352 See Erskine 2012 and Henderson 2001 on Polybius’ situation as a detainee. 
353 Polybius is unusual compared to Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon for his large use of the terminology for 
positive emotions.  Of the terms covered below, these three historians combined use terms for these emotions 93 
total times.  Polybius cites the same terms 342 times. 
354 See Caston and Kaster, eds. 2016 for new scholarship on positive emotions in particular. 
355 See Mauersberger 1.1.241 for a full list of usages. 
356 Polyb., III.11.7. 
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the closest example in the Histories to joy as a motivation for future action, but in this passage, 
joy merely motivates expression of the emotion itself:  danger to Flamininus was a side effect, 
clearly unintended, of the emotion.359  Joy as a result always follows something directly, but it 
does not directly lead to future action.  It is wholly concerned with the recent past and present.360   
 At the end of the Second Punic War, Polybius describes the return of Scipio Africanus 
to Rome and explains why he received great pomp and goodwill appropriately:  “for the Romans 
never hoped to expel Hannibal from Italy nor to relieve the danger over themselves and their 
relatives; but at that time seeming already not only to be securely free from all fear and trouble 
but also seeming to rule over their enemies, they did not cease from joy.”361  Here we observe 
several aspects of positive emotion.  It comes at the successful termination of a negative state of 
being (φόβου καὶ περιστάσεως).  It is a response to the unexpected (οὐδέποτε . . . 
ἐλπίσαντες).  Lastly, this positive emotion clearly represents a result.  The only actions to come 
from the joy are intended solely as expressions of emotion, not as actions with further, 
pragmatic consequences.  This may seem intuitive that people in a positive emotional state do 
not want to change their positive state of affairs, but it deserves mention in contrast to the other 
emotions studied. 
                                                                                                                                                       
357 As seen in all of these passages, where joy is purely a result:  I.20.1, I.34.12, I.36.1, I.44.4, I.44.6, II.4.6, II.50.5, 
III.62.9, III.70.1, III.74.10, III.87.5, III.96.6, III.103.1, V.2.6, V.14.10, V.15.1, VI.58.13, VIII.17.2, VIII.24.11, 
VIII.29.11, X.5.4, X.14.1, X.17.8, XI.3.5, XI.33.7, XV.4.8, XV.5.13, XV.22.1, XV.32.4 (twice), XVI.23.4, XVI.25.4, 
XVIII.24.6, XVIII.45.1, XVIII.46.11, XX.8.2, XX.12.3.  See Mauersberger, 3.2.1011-1012, 3.2.1007-1009, 2.1.314-
315, and 3.2.776 for joy and its cognates. 
358 Polyb., XVIII.46.11. 
359 Eckstein 1995, 131, uses this passage as an example that all emotion is disruptive. 
360 Perhaps this simplicity attests to its status in Stoic theory as a pre-emotion, and as such one which sages could 
feel appropriately. 
361 Polyb., XVI.23.4.   Οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἂν ἐλπίσαντες Ἀννίβαν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐξ Ἰταλίας οὐδ’ ἀποτρίψασθαι τὸν 
ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων κίνδυνον, τότε δοκοῦντες ἤδη βεβαίως οὐ μόνον ἐκτὸς γεγονέναι πάντος 
φόβου καὶ περιστάσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὐ κατέλιπον χαρᾶς.  
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 Konstan argues that, for Aristotle, χάρις denoted “gratitude”.362  Konstan, interpreting 
Aristotle, finds that χάρις needed to occur directly in response to an action to be an emotion, as 
opposed to a favor.  Konstan finds that Aristotle postulates a specific definition for χάρις which 
suits his own theoretical and rhetorical purposes, but which does not find many parallels within 
literature.363  Polybius uses χάρις not in a restricted sense as Aristotle advocates, but as a term 
which often denotes a concrete favor, thanks, grace, as well as gratitude.364  This term, χάρις, 
functions as a calculated, not felt, sentiment in Polybius’ Histories.  “Thanks” can often serve as a 
fitting translation, but again the reciprocity and calculated, pragmatic nature of χάρις renders it, 
much like ἔλπις, as not much of an emotion.365 
Gentleness 
 Aristotle defines πρᾳότης as the opposite of anger.  Konstan translates πρᾳότης as 
“satisfaction” because it thus represents the feeling one experiences after revenge, which 
Aristotelian ὀργή necessitates.366  This definition and its translation into English as “satisfaction” 
relies on the dichotomy Aristotle establishes between opposite emotions and relies on the 
specificity of his definition of ὀργή.  Konstan discusses how this specific concept is found – and 
not found – in Classical literature.  Konstan notes that in ancient Greek literature no uniform 
definition prevailed, ranging from concepts of gentleness, calm, satisfaction, self-importance, 
and even confidence.  Konstan demonstrates that Aristotle made a forced argument and 
                                                 
362 Arist., Rhet. 2.1385a16-b10.  Konstan 2006, 156-184. 
363 Konstan 2006, 165. 
364 Clearly distinct examples of favor:  I.31.6, IV.38.10, IV.51.2, VI.11a.7, IX.29.7, XI.6.3, XII.8.1, XII.25e.3, 
XV.8.12, XV.21.7, XV.23.2, XV.25.31(23), XVI.14.8, XVI.21.9. XVI.21.12, XX.5.12; gratitude/thanks:  II.6.4, 
II.58.5, III.109.12, III.111.3, V.40.2, V.56.4, V.88.4, V.104.1, VI.6.2, VI.8.2, IX.30.6, IX.35.1, X.34.5, XX.5.11; 
kindness/grace:  II.11.5.  See Mauersberger, 3.2.1007-1009, 1016-1022 for full examples of the usage of χάρις and 
its cognates. 
365 A translation closer to the English conception of “thanks,” which can be heartfelt or calculated and polite, is the 
term εὐχαριστία in Polybius.  See Mauersberger, 1.2.1049 for this term and its cognates. 
366 Konstan 2006, 77-89. 
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characterized πρᾳότης with the sense “satisfaction” has in English in order to match πρᾳότης 
as the opposite of ὀργή.367  Instead, Konstan sees πρᾳότης function in Classical literature as a 
quality which leads to Polybian φιλανθρωπία and Roman clementia.368  Polybius’ usage of 
πρᾳότης does not contrast with ὀργή, although it does contrast with behavior guided by 
θυμός.369  This term generally denotes a positive trait, demonstrating mildness and clemency.    
Πρᾳότης functions more like a dispositional trait than an emotion.370 
 Polybius’ narrative of the release of Iberian hostages from the Carthaginians to the 
Romans’ credit displays the nuances of πρᾳότης.371  After Hannibal departed for his Italian 
campaign, he left Bostar in charge of the Carthaginian forces at Saguntum, where he also left 
hostages taken from the Iberian leaders who did not have sons to accompany him to Italy.372  An 
Iberian ally serving with Bostar, Abilux, was wealthy, of good repute, and loyal to Carthage, but 
he saw the Roman successes in Spain and considered their prospects (ἐλπίδες) better than those 
of the Carthaginians.  Polybius comments that Abilux contemplated his betrayal of the 
Carthaginians with an Iberian and barbarian rationale (συλλογισμὸν Ἰβηρικὸν καὶ 
βαρβαρικόν).373  Because  he thinks he will become influential with the Romans if he betrays 
the Carthaginians, Abilux plots to release the Carthaginians’ Iberian hostages to the credit of 
Rome.  Abilux observes that Bostar is naturally mild (πρᾷος τῇ φύσει), and so he argues to 
Bostar that he should release the Iberian hostages because the Romans are drawing near and 
because such a release would gain the Carthaginians much-needed goodwill from the Iberians, to 
                                                 
367 Konstan 2006, 77-83. 
368 Konstan 2006, 88. 
369 Polyb., V.11.3.  Philip II did not act τῷ θυμῷ but used the opportunity of his victory at Chaeronea to display his 
πρᾳότης and μεγαλοψυχία. 
370 See Mauersberger, 2.2.659-660. 
371 Polyb., III.98-99. 
372 Polyb., III.98.1-2. 
373 Polyb., III.98.3. 
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which Bostar agrees.374  At this point, Abilux crosses to the Roman camp and makes the same 
argument:  that if Abilux betrayed the Iberian hostages, the Romans would benefit and gain the 
goodwill of the Iberians and a good reputation.375  The Romans agree, and after Abilux receives 
the hostages from Bostar, he goes to the Roman camp, receives rewards from them, and then 
proceeds to the Iberian cities, releasing the hostages in Rome’s name and praising the Romans’ 
mildness and magnanimity (πρᾳότης καὶ μεγαλοψυχία).376  When the Carthaginians hear of 
Abilux’s treachery, Bostar barely escapes with his life, being judged to have acted more naively 
(παιδικώτερον) than a man of his age should.377 
 Throughout this narrative, Abilux both controls events and forms the focus for the 
passage.  Abilux decides to betray the captives for Rome, sees that Bostar is mild and acts on it, 
and frames the Carthaginians’ and Romans’ decisions with his speeches.  Polybius explicitly calls 
Abilux’s rationale, treachery, barbaric.  This shows his disapproval, and Abilux’s behavior both 
in becoming a traitor and double-crossing for his own benefit finds other parallels disapproved 
by Polybius.378  Thus, Polybius implies that Abilux’s considerations and plan should not be 
emulated, though Abilux seems to have profited at the time.  Next, Polybius frames Bostar’s 
mild disposition through Abilux’s perspective:  Abilux sees that Bostar is πρᾷος by nature.  This 
usage of πρᾳότης seems more like a disposition than an emotion, for it implies Bostar is 
habitually and inherently mild.  Moreover, Abilux judges he can take advantage of Bostar beccause 
he is πρᾷος – naive – by nature.  Abilux indeed succeeds in deceiving Bostar, which costs 
Bostar dearly:  Polybius tells us that the Carthaginians blamed Bostar so much that he almost 
lost his life.  Clearly, having a mild (πρᾷος) disposition can have negative effects. 
                                                 
374 Polyb., III.98.5-11. 
375 Polyb., III.99.1-6. 
376 Polyb., III.99.7. 
377 Polyb., III.99.8. 
378 Cf. Polybius’ portrayal of Bolis the Cretan, who betrays Achaeus, VIII.15-20.  See too XVIII.13-15. 
80 
 Despite this, Abilux speaks of πρᾳότης as a positive and desirable trait.  He boasts of 
the Romans’ πρᾳότης καὶ μεγαλοψυχία to the Iberians, showing that πρᾳότης was actually 
the goal of this episode – both the Carthaginians and the Romans wanted to release the hostages 
to gain such a reputation.379  Moreover, both Bostar and the Romans react in the same way to 
Abilux’s similar speeches.  Since Bostar’s mild disposition led him to trust Abilux, the Romans 
too could be said to share this quality in their trust of Abilux.  Thus, they both can be 
characterized as πρᾳότης in a sense:  they both acquiesce to Abilux’s arguments and, because of 
their desire to show πρᾳότης, are both susceptible to whatever outcome he decides. 
 Thus, πρᾳότης has a complicated role in this passage.  Bostar fails and suffers for his 
πρᾳότης, but the Romans benefit for their identical decision and their πρᾳότης.  In Polybius’ 
text, πρᾳότης is a desirable and positive trait, but, when one like Abilux takes advantage of it, it 
can lead to negative results.  The Romans, in their mildness, thus present themselves as a 
potential target through this desirable and honorable trait. 
Love 
 While Konstan includes φιλία in his description of emotions, Polybius did not treat 
φιλία as an emotion but as a marker of alliance, or as with a friendly disposition status.380  
Konstan does not address ἔρως, which could have provided a useful contrast to Polybius’ rare 
but charged uses of this terminology.381 
 Polybius treats ἔρως as an impediment to a statesman.  Whenever he mentions the 
emotion ἔρως or uses the verb ἐρᾶν, it is a sign of undue bias for a historian or a sign of 
                                                 
379 See Polyb., V.11.3 for a parallel case of these two terms linked together as positive traits. 
380 Konstan 2006, 169-184.  See for Polybius’ use, Mauersberger 3.2.917 and 918-923. 
381 Polyb., I.14.2, II.43.3, V.28.5, V.28.8, V.34.10, VII.11.8, VIII.10.4 (in quotation), XII.26.4 (in quotation), XX.8.2, 
XXIII.5.9, XXXI.23.4-5. 
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depravity and extreme unsuitability for a monarch or citizen.382  Men who fall in love (ἔρασθαι) 
simultaneously lack good judgment.383  Polybius often links ἔρως with drinking and music.384  
Polybius commonly correlates love with drinking to provide evidence of the subject’s bad 
disposition and character.  In this case, the emotion itself becomes inherently negative:  Polybius 
uses ἔρως as evidence for why an individual deserves censure or repudiation. 
 The most common form of love is ἐρώμενος, the beloved in a homoerotic relationship.  
Polybius mentions ἐρώμενοι five times.  In all but one of these, the ἐρώμενος reflects the bad 
habits and character of their lovers.  For example, Apelles, the crooked and scheming courtier of 
Philip V, finally faces punishment for his plots against Philip and his allies.385  Polybius says that 
Philip imprisoned Apelles, his son, and his ἐρώμενος, and that a few days later these lost their 
lives, as they deserved.  Clearly, the ἐρώμενος was implicated and punished just for his 
association with Apelles.386  Likewise, Polybius extols Scipio Aemilianus’ moderation and 
prudence as a youth when most young Roman men were engrossed with ἐρώμενοι or hetairai, 
paying even a whole talent for an ἐρώμενος.387  Associations with an ἐρώμενος reflected poorly 
on a character. 
 In all these common usages, the ἐρώμενος is never named.  However, in an exceptional 
usage, Polybius calls Philip V the ἐρώμενος of the Greeks when he was young because of his 
eager promotion of their interests.388  Polybius qualifies this phrase, saying that it is extravagant 
(ὑπερβόλικον) but also most pertinent (οἰκειότατ’) to describe Philip V this way.  Unlike his 
                                                 
382 Polyb., I.14.2, V.34.10 (Ptolemy IV), VIII.10.4 (Sardanapalus), XXIII.5.9 (Deinocrates of Messene). 
383 Polyb., XII.26.4, XX.8.2. 
384 Polyb., V.34.10, VIII.10.4, XX.8.2, XXIII.5.9, XXXI.25.4-5. 
385 Polyb., V.28.5-8. 
386 Polybius does not specify whether he participated actively in the coup. 
387 Polyb., XXXI.25.4-5. 
388 Polyb., VII.11.8. 
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other uses of ἐρώμενος, Polybius uses this phrase as a political metaphor to describe as clearly 
as possible the intensity of the Greeks’ affections for Philip V, and he has to turn to an erotic 
relationship as a hyperbolic but fitting analogy. 
 However, this emotional relationship carries additional connotations of power and 
character.  As seen in the other Polybian examples, the ἐρώμενος has little power or agency and 
is dependent on his lover for political status.  Apelles’ ἐρώμενος, for example, has no other 
identity except his relationship to Apelles, and in this role he is held accountable for and 
complicit with Apelles’ deeds.  By calling Philip the ἐρώμενος of the Greeks, Polybius implicitly 
transfers this dependence and potentially places him in a position of lower status than them.  
Polybius is explicit in using this term as a metaphor; however, that does not necessarily negate 
the connotations implicit in the term.  Polybius’ other examples of ἐρώμενοι, such as Scipio 
Aemilianus’ avoidance of them, imply that this relationship between the Greeks and Philip 
reflects poorly on their dispositions or characters:  the Greeks, being too caught up with 
affection for Philip, may have made mistaken choices due to their infatuation.   
 This interpretation of this passage contradicts the usual reading.389  In context, these 
negative connotations counter Polybius’ main point that Philip’s character changed over time 
from better to worse, under different influences.  Philip as the ἐρώμενος of the Greeks was at 
his best:  he heeded the advice of Aratus, Polybius’ hero of the Achaean League, and he took 
great pains to defend the Greeks and promote their interests against the threats of Aetolians and 
Sparta.390  After this, Philip’s character turned for the worse, and he lost the Greeks’ affection.  
In this context, the negative connotations of ἐρώμενος and ἔρως in general contradict Polybius’ 
                                                 
389 For example, Eckstein 1995, 226-227 uses this passage as indicative of Polybius’ idealization for a monarch, in 
accordance with Hellenistic norms of kingship.  McGing 2010, 161, calls Philip V here “hugely successful.” 
390 Aratus has his faults and Polybius does not hide these, but here Polybius is introducing Aratus in a highly 
favorable and exemplary way. 
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larger point.  In calling Philip the Greeks’ ἐρώμενος, he emphasized the esteem and goodwill of 
the Greeks for Philip, which enhanced Philip’s character.  However, understanding the 
connotations of such erotic terminology and relationship highlights the flawed and shaky 
foundation of this relationship and both foreshadows the later degeneration of Philip’s character 
and casts the Greeks’ relationship with Philip in a critical light.391 
 Polybius provides a contrasting political metaphor of ἔρως.  In introducing Aratus, the 
Achaean League hero, Polybius says that from the beginning Aratus was an ἐραστής of the 
Achaeans’ policy (προαίρεσις).392  This represents the only usage of the term ἐραστής, the 
lover in a pederastic relationship, in the Histories.  Once again Polybius relies upon the intensity 
and strength of the emotional relationship to elucidate Aratus’ political stance.  In this passage, 
Polybius does not qualify his term as a metaphor or analogy; Aratus simply is (γεγόναι) an 
ἐραστής of the political policy.  The direct nature of this relation emphasizes the strength of 
Aratus’ ardor for the Achaean League.  He acts as an ἐραστής would act to promote the 
interests of his beloved.  As with the metaphor of Philip as an ἐρώμενος, this usage carries 
political connotations.  Aratus holds a position of superiority over the Achaean League as its 
ἐραστής.  Polybius’ politicized usage of ἐραστής here recalls Thucydides’ politicization of ἔρως 
in the Funeral Oration of Pericles in Book 2 of his history.  Pericles encourages the citizens of 
Athens to become ἐραστεῖς of their city, doing whatever needs to be done to win her 
approval.393  Aratus in Polybius’ text seems to fulfill this Periclean ideal, which, however, 
provided a failed model in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War.394 
                                                 
391 In fact, the following sections look forward to Philip’s change of character to the worse and the influence of bad 
advisors. 
392 Polyb., II.43.3. 
393 Thuc., 2.43.1.  Walbank in his Historical Commentary on Polybius does not note this parallel. 
394 See Ludwig 2009, 296-298 on Thucydides’ model of failed political love.  See also Sissa 2009, 287-292 for 
political love in Thucydides. 
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4.  Reflective Emotions 
 Reflective emotions, in the restricted sense I am using this term, describe emotions 
which necessitate reflection on another’s condition.  This reflection elicits a response of fellow-
feeling.  This includes empathy, sympathy, and pity, each of which involve differing degrees of 
reflection and fellow-feeling.  While the Greek terms on which the words “empathy” and 
“sympathy” are based do not necessarily correspond to the modern concepts, Polybius does 
describe reflective emotional processes which relate to the modern emotions. 
Sympathy and Empathy 
 Empathy for Polybius is denoted by the term συμπάθεια.395  The difference between 
empathy and sympathy is a disputed matter.396  In the Histories, συμπάθεια and its cognates 
(συμπαθής, συμπαθεῖν) cover the ground between both of the English concepts of sympathy 
and empathy.  Antiochus III feels what we would call empathy when he sees his rival Achaeus 
bound and helpless in front of him and reflects on the frailty of human prosperity.  Antiochus 
III’s tears exhibit his emotional state of empathy.397  In describing Roman customs which 
preserve virtue, Polybius states that the performance and similarity of those dressed as the 
deceased at Roman funerals infuse empathy (συμπάθεια) into the whole audience, so much so 
that the family’s loss seems to become a public loss.398  This instance of συμπάθεια creates a 
correspondence of feeling and the public’s identification with the family.  This passage 
emphasizes that family and the public are the same here, which is the defining feature of 
empathy in modern studies. 
                                                 
395 The Greek root for English “empathy,” ἐμπαθεία, emphasizes the zeal or impassioned nature of an action in 
Polybius and is used only once, XXXI.24.9, when Scipio Africanus expresses how much he wants Polybius to 
accompany and advise him like his older brother. 
396 See Lamm and Silani 2014 for recent discussion in modern social sciences and Stueber 2017 for its use in 
modern philosophy.  See Pinker 2011, 571-593, for a recent assessment of the history of the term and concept of 
empathy.  For discussion based in ancient emotion, see Konstan 2001. 
397 Polyb., VIII.20.9.  Other instances of empathy:  II.56.7, XXVII.9.5.  
398 Polyb., VI.53.3. 
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 Otherwise, συμπάθεια can range towards the English concept of sympathy.399  
Agathocles of Egypt thinks that he has made his mercenaries συμπαθεῖς to none of his 
predecessors in the Alexandrian court because he alone enlisted and paid them and because he 
got rid of his previous rivals in one way or another.400  Phylarchus, a Hellenistic historian whom 
Polybius criticizes, endeavored so much to make his readers sympathetic to his characters that 
he provided extreme details of suffering unnecessarily.401  In both of these examples, Agathocles 
and Phylarchus intended to create emotion in others for themselves and, Polybius implies, failed.  
In both circumstances, the intent to create sympathy reflects poorly on these characters.402  
However, one could inculcate sympathy to good effect.  Polybius states explicitly that Scipio 
Africanus was naturally talented at making those he called upon to be sympathetic or good-
willed to him and his endeavors.403  
 A form of empathy, perspective taking, appears in the Histories when Scipio Aemilianus 
famously sheds tears when viewing the fall of Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War in 146 
BC.404  Polybius relates that Scipio Aemilianus, although the conquering general, cried and 
quoted Homer on the destruction of Troy but referring to his own city, Rome.  Scipio’s 
reflection on the fall of Carthage, similar to Antiochus III’s reflection on his rival Achaeus’ fall 
from the height of prosperity to ignominious capture, mark Scipio as a good student of history:  
he reflected on the past fall of Troy, related it to the present circumstance of Carthage, and 
applied it to his own city of Rome in the future.405  Such perspective taking is part of the process 
                                                 
399 Again, I should stress the lack of clear, agreed distinctions between the two terms in English. 
400 Polyb., XV.25.18. 
401 Polyb., II.56.7.  See Eckstein 2013 and Levene 1997 for further discussion.  See too, Chapter 3. 
402 Cf. XV.17.1-2 on the importance of genuineness to create emotion. 
403 Polyb., X.14.10.  This example seems to have less emotional depth than the other examples. 
404 Polyb., XXXVIII.22, which is actually preserved in Appian’s Punic Wars, 132.  See Maibom, ed. 2017 on 
definitions and components of empathy.  See especially Maibom 2017a and 2017b on defining perspective taking 
versus other forms of empathy. 
405 See Spaulding 2017 for a discussion of the cognitive forms of empathy. 
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of empathy, as defined in modern studies.  Scipio’s emotional reaction of crying further 
exemplifies his empathetic concern. 
Pity 
 Aristotle and Polybius share views on pity, ἔλεος.  Aristotle defines pity as a pain elicited 
from observing genuine suffering.406  He specifies that the subject must be able to relate to the 
one pitied; the same misfortune must present a potential threat on some level to the subject.  
Thus, Aristotle thinks that those who have lost everything cannot feel pity, for they do not 
(think that they) have anything to lose.  Likewise, those at the height of prosperity cannot feel 
pity because they think that nothing bad could happen to them.  Moreover, one cannot pity 
those close to one, for then, Konstan interprets, the affect fades from pity to a self-oriented 
form of sympathy.407    Konstan summarizes Aristotle’s conception well:  “to experience pity one 
has to recognize a resemblance with the sufferer, but at the same time not find oneself in 
precisely the same circumstances.”408 
 For Polybius, pity (ἔλεος) correlates closely with Aristotle’s parameters.  External 
observers most often feel pity in the Histories, which aligns with Aristotle’s call for distance 
between subject and object.409  Polybius’ focalization of pity through an external observer allows 
the audience, also in the position of external observers, to recognize the similarity between 
themselves and the sufferers.  That is, the observers see the one pitied and, because Polybius 
establishes them as pitiable, reflect in such a way as to understand how and why the character is 
pitied.   
                                                 
406 Arist., Rhet. 2.1385b11-20.  Konstan 2006, 201. 
407 Konstan 2006, 211-213. 
408 Konstan 2006, 202. 
409 17 out of 39 instances of pity come from an external observer.   
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 Ἔλεος is a complex emotion in the Histories, for it is characterized by different and 
potentially contradictory processes, or scripts.410  Polybius does not resolve the ambiguity of 
ἔλεος, pity.  Ἔλεος has positive repercussions but also can denote shameful conduct.  It is 
related to ὀργή, μῖσος, αἰσχύνη, and φθόνος.411  Polybius juxtaposes ἔλεος with ὀργή, 
especially in discussing writers’ aims:  they want to arouse ἔλεος or ὀργή, but according to 
Polybius, they cannot arouse ἔλεος logically (εὔλόγως) or ὀργή appropriately (καθηκόντως) 
by their “tragic” means, for these writers do not examine or narrate history’s causes.412  The 
writers clearly have distance from the events they depict, aligning with Aristotle’s observations 
about pity.  Polybius faults the writers for misunderstanding the rationality behind emotion.  
They fail to understand that pity – and anger too – arise for a reason, and so the narration of an 
event needs to address this reason in some way in order to elicit the emotion.  Artificial 
construction of details alone will not elicit emotion properly. 
 Like δυσαρεστεῖν, ἔλεος occurs in response to an external situation and another’s 
condition, which then is reflected back to oneself.  The feeling resulting from applying another’s 
condition to one’s own situation becomes pity. 413  By comparison, ὀργή occurs as a personal 
feeling, oriented through oneself, and concerning only oneself or one’s community.  Recall that, 
in his discussion of impropriety by conquerors, Polybius explicitly lays out this process:  “But 
whenever their prosperity increases and the victor gathers to himself all the others’ property, and 
he calls in some way those deprived to a display of these things, the evil is doubled.  For no 
                                                 
410 See Kaster 2005, 8-10. 
411 ὀργή – II.56.13, IX.10.9-10, XV.17.2;  μῖσος – VIII.36.9, IX.10.9-10, XV.17.2;  αἰσχύνη – XIV.5.10, XI.10.3.  
φθόνος – IX.10.7. (With a judgment of happiness or blessedness, μακαρίζειν – III.62-63.) 
412 Polyb., II.56.13.  On “tragic” historiography, see Marincola 2013, Eckstein 2013, and Schepens and Bollansée, 
eds. 2005. 
413 Not altruistic emotion, but emotion stimulated by another person’s circumstances. 
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longer do the viewers pity the others, but they pity themselves, remembering their own 
misfortunes.”414  Pitying, in this theory, requires self-reflection. 
 Polybius qualifies when pity makes an appropriate response.  First, when people suffer 
from no fault of their own, intelligent people pity and pardon them.  Otherwise, if some people 
brought on their own disaster through folly, intelligent people blame and reproach them.415  
Polybius distinguishes pity as a response only to undeserved suffering, as opposed to meritted 
suffering.  Later Polybius strengthens this assessment when speaking of courtiers.  He specifies 
that we are moved by pity when we observe someone genuinely overcome by the magnitude of 
his troubles.  However, when someone fakes such suffering in order to elicit pity, which 
Polybius often sees courtiers do, we only grow angry and hate him.416  Again Polybius 
distinguishes pity as appropriate only in response to genuine suffering.  However, those who 
deserve reproach and blame for suffering because of their own folly differ from those who fake 
their display of suffering:  the latter do not necessarily suffer.  They err not in the cause of their 
suffering but in their display.  These parameters constrain how appropriate a response pity is.  
Others respond with pity only to undeserved suffering, displayed genuinely. 
 Polybius’ discussion of the Abydenes’ decision to commit mass suicide at the threat of 
Philip V’s capture of their city illustrates this point.417  For, Polybius says, one would blame 
Fortune over the Abydenes’ misfortune, because Fortune immediately (παραυτίκα) straightens 
the downfall of those in misfortune, as if pitying them (οἷον ἐλεήσασα), by granting victory 
together with safety to the hopeless.  However, for the Abydenes, Fortune had the opposite 
                                                 
414 Polyb., IX.10.8-9.  Ἐπὰν δὲ καὶ προβαίνῃ τὰ τῆς εὐκαιρίας καὶ πάντα συνάγῃ πρὸς αὑτὸν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, 
καὶ ταῦτα συγκαλῇ τρόπον τινὰ τοὺς ἐστερημένους ἐπὶ θέαν, διπλάσιον γίνεται τὸ κακόν.  Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοὺς 
πέλας ἐλεεῖν συμβαίνει τοὺς θεωμένους, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἀναμιμνησκομένους τῶν οἰκείων 
συμπτωμάτων. 
415 Polyb., II.7.1-3. 
416 Polyb., XV.17.1-2. 
417 Polyb., XVI.32. 
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disposition.418  Fortune should have pitied the Abydenes because they did nothing to deserve 
Philip V’s attack and siege.  Moreover, they took steps to fight against him nobly, and they as a 
whole decided on the honorable (and thus more preferable) course of mass suicide as opposed 
to shameful surrender.419  Pity as a response to undeserved and unexaggerated suffering was 
appropriate for the Abydenes’ situation, although such pity from Fortune failed to materialize in 
this particular situation. 
 However, in a different process, pity can also carry connotations of shame.  While 
shame and pity seem to entail opposite judgments of the object – reproach and sympathy – 
Polybius uses both to describe the same action, namely, men throwing away their weapons and 
fleeing while being killed.420  Near the end of the Second Punic War, when Scipio Africanus has 
set fire to the Carthaginian camp unexpectedly in the night, all the rest of the Carthaginian men 
and animals in the camp died wretchedly (ἀτυχῶς) and pitifully (ἐλεείνως) from the fire.421  
Some of these men dying pitifully also died shamefully (αἰσχρῶς) and full of reproach 
(ἐπονειδίστως), trying to escape the fire and being killed, though defenseless, by the enemy.422  
The objects do not act nobly, but the situation and misfortune surrounding them genuinely 
overwhelm them as to cause pity.  Living well and honorably to the end – a common Polybian 
theme involving discussion of αἰσχύνη – has import with the audience and narrator, and so 
they judge that those men die shamefully in throwing away their arms.423   
                                                 
418 Polyb., XVI.32.5.  See too, Polyb., XV.5.10. 
419 Later some Abydenes change their minds, supplicating and surrendering to Philip V, XVI.33.4-5. 
420 Polyb., XIV.5.10-11, XV.10.3. 
421 Polyb., XIV.5.10. 
422 Polyb., XIV.5.10-11. αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ μυριάδες ἀνδρῶν, ἵππων, ὑποζυγίων, ἀτυχῶς μὲν καὶ ἐλεεινῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ 
πυρὸς ἀπώλλυντο:  αἰσχρῶς δὲ καὶ ἐπονειδίστως ἔνιοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς βίαν φεύγοντες, ὑπὸ τῶν 
πολεμίων διεφθείροντο, χωρὶς οὐ μόνον τῶν ὅπλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἱματίων, γυμνοὶ φονευόμενοι. 
423 This interpretation seems extremely harsh, even for Polybius, who tends to promote pardon for those caught by 
circumstances, such as the Carthaginian soldiers were.  For this sentiment, see VIII.36 (on Achaeus). 
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 Moreover, for an aristocratic male, invoking pity did not receive social approbation.  
Scipio Africanus tells his troops before the battle of Zama at the end of the Second Punic War 
that those who flee battle have the most shameful and most pitiable life left.424  Scipio leaves no 
room for distinction between these two termsof shame and pity.  Falling prey to such 
circumstances in the first place, and thus becoming pitiable, was considered shameful and 
dishonorable.  Not suffering unforeseen, utterly destructive, and inescapable misfortune also 
holds import for the audience and narrator, so they also pity those men who have no options 
but to die one way or another.  These sentiments create the multidimensional emotional 
response of shame and pity. 
 The Celtic duel displayed for the Carthaginian army before their first encounter with 
Romans in Italy provides a narrative of ἔλεος in action.425  Hannibal devises the Celtic duel to 
have more impact than a mere speech would, and through his speech he leads his soldiers to 
internalize the reflective process of pity.  Polybius is explicit that Hannibal planned this 
emotional demonstration:  Hannibal kept these Celtic prisoners and deliberately malnourished 
and maltreated them for this purpose.426  Before his first encounter with the Romans in Italy and 
after his journey across the Alps, Hannibal orchestrated a duel between Celtic prisoners to 
encourage his soldiers.  He set up a lottery for the Celts to see which prisoners would fight, and 
he set out splendid arms for them to win.  After the duel, Polybius narrates that the Celts either 
deemed happy (μακαρίζειν) the ones winning and the ones dying, and that they pitied (ἤλεον) 
those continuing to live in such wretched conditions (i.e., themselves).427  Here emotion 
functions as a judgment:  the Celts express their approval and disapproval of others through 
                                                 
424 Polyb., XV.10.3. 
425 Polyb., III.62-63.  Cf. Liv., 21.40-44. 
426 Polyb., III.62. 
427 Polyb., III.62.9-10. 
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emotion.  Next, Polybius notes that the Carthaginians feel the same way (τὸ παραπλήσιον).428  
The observers do not pity the one who dies, but only the ones who live, especially in their 
maltreated state.429   
 Now Hannibal, having established the situation as he intended, gives a speech identifying 
these reactions and applying them as appropriate to their current condition facing battle with the 
Romans.430  He says that Fortune brought the Carthaginians to the same predicament as the 
Celtic prisoners:  they could win or die, or they could become prisoners taken alive.431  The 
rewards for winning against Rome were higher, for they would become the most fortunate 
(μακαριωτάτους) of all people.  Dying while fighting over the noblest hope would be to 
experience no evil, but to survive would be, like the Celtic prisoners, to suffer every evil and 
misfortune.432  Hannibal rationalizes the Carthaginians’ choice, noting the impossibility of 
returning home alive after defeat.  For, he says, just as all deemed happy (ἐμακάριζον) both the 
winner and the one dying, and as they all pitied (ἤλεον) the living, they should consider that the 
same outcome lies before them in their own lives.  Therefore, they should go forth to the 
contest to win or die trying.  Hannibal relates his soldiers – if they choose to survive defeat – to 
the abused Celtic prisoners, whose lives are so miserable that they all wished to be freed from it 
by death. 
 In Hannibal’s speech, the emotion is not just external or reflective; the audience who felt 
those emotions are now in the situation of the other, and they are judged based on their own 
behavior.  Thus, Hannibal himself puts his audience in the situation of those winning, dying, or 
living in misery, and they are made to feel for themselves what spurred them to deem happy, 
                                                 
428 Polyb., III.62.11. 
429 One may criticize Hannibal (and Polybius) of trying to create a “tragic” scene in the manner of Phylarchus.  See 
II.56-61. 
430 Polyb., III.63. 
431 Polyb, III.63.1-4. 
432 Polyb., III.63.4-6. 
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μακαρίζειν, and feel pity, ἐλέειν, for the others.  Since they are no longer just exterior judges 
or bystanders of the situation, the emotions differ slightly:  Hannibal describes them as the 
happiest themselves, μακαριωτάτους, (instead of deeming others happy) or as without any 
hope, οὐδὲ . . . ἐλπίσαι, which then may be the opposite, internalized, felt form of ἔλεος:  
others pity those who are in a situation without any hope left for them.  This passage 
demonstrates the emotional mastery by Hannibal (and Polybius for his framing and narrative of 
it):  Hannibal mimics the process of sympathetic emotion with his rhetoric, and carefully 
planned through his choice to stage the duel in the first place.  This, then, is truly successful 
emotional rhetoric. 
 Polybius’ text, as we now have it, ends with the Achaean War, which began and ended in 
146 BC with the destruction of Corinth, dissolution of the Achaean League, and establishment 
of a new, Roman-sanctioned constitution.433  Pity features in Polybius’ prelude to his narration 
of the war itself.  Polybius argues that the Greeks in the Achaean War suffered more than any 
previous Greek disaster and that they both brought it upon themselves and deserved the blame 
(or at least those responsible deserved blame).  Polybius contrasts the Greek disaster with the 
concurrent fall of Carthage in the Third Punic War, in which the Romans destroyed the city and 
the Carthaginian people themselves.434  Polybius states that the suffering of the Carthaginians 
was thought to be the greatest (μεγίστου πάθους), but he asserts that someone might consider 
the Greek experience not less but even greater than the Carthaginian disaster.435  For, he 
explains, the Carthaginians gave posterity some last place for a defense of their resistance, but 
                                                 
433 Book XXXIX apparently covered the reconstruction period of Greece, after their loss, including Polybius’ 
prominent role in aiding and persuading the Greeks to accept the Roman terms.  See Morstein-Marx 1995 on the 
debated role of Rome in the Achaeans’ governance after the war. 
434 Polyb., XXXVIII.1.6. 
435 Polyb., XXXVIII.1.4.  δοκοῦντος γοῦν μεγίστου πάθους γεγονέναι τοῦ περὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐκ 
ἔλαττον ἄν τις ἡγήσαιτο, κατὰ δέ τι μεῖζον τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλαδα τότε συμβάν. 
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the Greeks gave no reasonable starting point for those who wish to help them.436  Moreover, the 
Carthaginians, being destroyed entirely in their downfall, had no experience of their future ills, 
but the Greeks looking on their own disaster pass on to future generations an unjustifiable 
misfortune.437  
 Polybius lists what to him, and plausibly his audience, thought were the worst Greek 
disasters – Xerxes’ invasion and destruction of Athens, Athens’ loss to Sparta after the 
Peloponnesian Wars, Sparta’s loss to the Thebans after the Battle of Leuctra in 371 BC, the 
Spartans’ expulsion of the Mantineans, Alexander’s destruction of Thebes, and Macedon’s 
“enslavement” of Chalcis, Corinth, and other cities by the Antigonids.438  In these cases, 
Polybius emphasizes the light punishment or (relatively) quick recovery of the sufferers,  and he 
stresses the blame that fell on the victors, or at least the lack of blame for the sufferers.  
Moreover, Polybius highlights the advantage of others’ pity for overcoming these misfortunes.  
He concludes that these all suffered misfortunes but did not bring disaster on themselves.439 
 Polybius emphasizes injustice (αδίκως) and undeserved suffering (τὰς τῶν παραλόγως 
ἠτυχηκότων περιπετείας) in judgments of pity, whereas he clearly thought that the Greeks 
brought on their own disaster, but Polybius also stresses that those who survive are pitiable, like 
Hannibal’s Celtic prisoners.440  The Greeks thus are more pitiable not only because they suffered 
more genuinely or undeservedly, but also because they ‘chose’ to survive, similar to the Celtic 
prisoners.  That is, the Greeks’ situation becomes more pitiable because of its inherent 
shamefulness.  These two conflicting ideas demonstrate the complexity of pity in the Achaean 
                                                 
436 Polyb., XXXVIII.1.5. 
437 Polyb., XXXVIII.1.6-7. 
438 Polyb., XXXVIII.2.1-3.4. 
439 Polyb., XXXVIII.3.6-7. Unfortunately, the sections in which Polybius explicitly justifies how and why the Greeks’ 
loss in the Achaean War was the worst disaster are lacunose, XXXVIII.3.9-13.  See Walbank, HCP 3.688. 
440 Polybius consistently characterizes their decisions and conduct as thoughtless, ignorant, unreflecting, mistaken, 
and mad.  For some examples, see XXXVIII.3.8-13, XXXVIII.10.12, XXXVIII.11.6, XXXVIII.18.7-8. 
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War:  Polybius’ statement aligns with the model of pity from genuine, undeserved suffering, as 
shown in II.7.1-3 and XV.17.1-2, while Polybius’ argument that the Greeks brought their own 
disaster and deserve more pity as survivors aligns with the second model of pity, denoting a 
shameful state of suffering, seen with the Celtic prisoners in III.62-63.  Both types of pity arise 
in Polybius’ argument about the Achaean War. 
Conclusion 
 The categorizations of emotions into groups, and not dichotomies, helps illuminate 
patterns in the processes of emotions in Polybius’ text.   The negative emotions often involve 
moral evaluation, and they are not necessarily negatively judged.  The anticipatory emotions of 
fear and hope connect common narrative events, especially military affairs.  These emotions help 
explain behavior but not evaluate it on a moral level.  Likewise, the positive emotions work in 
common ways throughout the narrative, denoting the fruition and result of an action.  Lastly, the 
reflective emotions which denote concepts of empathy, sympathy, and pity function similarly to 
the negative emotions in their role in moral evaluation.  Reflective emotions also work to draw 
the audience, observer, and subject of the emotion in to understand and relate to another in a 
different situation.  Such a process teaches the audience which characters and in which situations 
pity (and sympathy) deserve to be felt. 
 Moreover, Polybius complicates Aristotle’s 4th century definitions of emotions.  Polybius’ 
overall usage of emotions shows a sensitivity to their social role:  characters feel emotions in 
response to events and with regard to what they value.  Polybius does not use certain concepts at 
all, such as αἶδος or τὸ νέμεσαν, uses terms without emotional senses, such as φιλία, λύπη, or 
πάθος, and rarely mentions other terms, such as ζηλοτυπία.  On the other hand, Konstan does 
not address terms which Polybius does use, sometimes prominently, in an emotional sense, such 
as θυμός, προσκοπή, ἀγανακτεῖν, δυσαρέστησις, ἔλπις, χαρά, ἔρως, or συμπάθεια.  
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Nevertheless, Aristotle and Polybius use similar terminology as well.  They agree in most points 
in their usage of αἰσχύνη, φόβος, and ἔλεος.  They both use ὀργή, μῖσος, φθόνος, χάρις, and 
πρᾳότης, but their usages differ.  Aristotle’s specificity in his definitions, such as for ὀργή and 
πρᾳότης, does not find parallels in Polybius’ more varied use.  Likewise, Aristotle’s structuring 
of pairs of opposite emotions does not find a parallel in Polybius’ usage, whose use of emotions 
falls into similar categories rather than precise dichotomies. 
 These differences in terminology highlight two factors:  genre and time.  First, Aristotle 
established his list of emotions in a philosophical treatise on the art of rhetoric.  He set them as a 
guide for which emotions an orator should try to elicit in certain situations.  This philosophical-
rhetorical purpose differs greatly from Polybius’ dual historiographical purpose of portraying 
events realistically and of educating future statesmen about typical human behavior through past 
events.  Polybius recorded each instance of emotion as he thought suitable and plausible within 
the historical narrative.  Second, the difference in time and context between Aristotle and 
Polybius influences their usage of terminology.  Aristotle, already archaic in his usage of some 
terms, addressed terms which suited his audience in the late Classical period.  Polybius, however, 
wrote in the second century B.C, when the ordinary usages and nuances of terms probably 
differed from Classical uses.441  Konstan’s analysis of Aristotle in the context of Classical Greek 
literature provided a basis for comparison for Polybius’ use of terminology and concepts in his 
Hellenistic history.  Comparison helps to ground Polybius’ use of emotions in a Hellenistic 
context - as compared to a purely cross-cultural analysis in comparison with emotions in 
English.   
 The survey highlights the frequency and usages of emotional terms in the Histories, and 
provides a basis for examining the key role of emotions in significant passages.  Through such 
                                                 
441 See Dubuisson 1985 on the particulars of Polybius’ language and grammatical constructs. 
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an overview one can observe the variation of usages of emotion and their importance for 
portraying events and characters in specific ways.  It should be clear that, for Polybius, all 
emotions do not fall solely on the irrational, impulsive, and negative side of a dichotomy with 
reason and civilized virtues.  Relatedly, a whole range of characters feel the same kinds of 
emotions, not just stereotypes of “hyperemotional” barbarians, women, and masses.  All 
characters in the Histories are subject to feeling emotion; how they react to emotion differentiates 
them.  Polybius’ favorites, such as the sensible statesmen and generals Aratus, Hannibal, and 
Scipio Africanus, show emotional intelligence in both senses of the popular phrase:  they most 
often show emotional awareness of their own emotions, by reacting appropriately and sensibly 
to their own emotion, and they both navigate and manipulate others’ emotions for their own 
benefit.442  Characters who do not demonstrate such emotional awareness (usually of their own 
emotions, let alone those of others), such as Philip V,  receive Polybius’ disapprobation.  
Collective groups often feel emotion too, a fact that neither Aristotle nor Konstan addresses at 
length, and a topic which we shall address in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
442 See Goleman 1995, and Bradberry and Greaves 2009, for accounts of the popular concept of “emotional 
intelligence.” 
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Chapter 3 
The People’s Moral Emotions:  Internal State Change 
 This chapter moves to an investigation of combined hate, anger, and indignation from 
our investigation of the individual emotions.  These emotions together demonstrate that 
emotions can be rational, through their close connection with morality.   
 Rationality has traditionally been juxtaposed with emotion, both in ancient philosophy 
and in modern preconceptions.  Ancient philosophies often identify emotion with a lesser part 
of the soul than the rational part.  Plato’s theory of a tripartite soul places the emotions within 
the middle part, which can either follow reason or desire.443  This theory of the place of emotion 
at least acknowledges that emotions could align with rationality.  However, as we shall see, Plato 
does not correlate emotion with reason or with positive results in his constitutional theory.  
Likewise, the Hellenistic philosophies of Epicureanism and Stoicism took emotion to be an 
element to control or repress, whereas reason represented the highest element of a human.444  
While this brief summary necessarily overlooks many significant details of these theories, the 
dichotomy between reason and emotion has loomed large in both ancient thought and in 
scholarship on the ancient world. 
 Only in the last few decades have scholars explored and elucidated the close connections 
between emotion and reason.  Namely, Patricia Greenspan’s 1988 work, Reason and Emotion, 
provides a philosophical defense of how emotions are rationally justified.  The highly influential 
work of Antonio Damasio, especially his 1994 book, Descartes’ Error, provides neuroscientific 
evidence for the importance of emotion on reason and vice versa.  More recently, scholars have 
                                                 
443 See Knuuttila 2004, especially Ch. 1.1-1.3, on Plato’s division of the soul and how it affects his theory on 
emotions. 
444 For the study of emotion in Hellenistic philosophy (and their relations to Plato and Aristotle), see the essays in 
three edited volumes:  Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen 1998, Cooper 1999, and Fitzgerald 2008. 
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debated the exact moral nature of emotions.445  I show that these modern topics of emotion and 
rationality and of emotion and morality find an ancient analog in Polybius’ Histories.446   
 Polybius’ reputation for pragmatism can obscure the implications of his thought, 
especially regarding emotion, but we should not let his genre of history constrain our exploration 
of this issue.  In writing history instead of philosophy, Polybius provides us with a unique 
perspective on emotion:  how emotion works or seems to work in typical human behavior.  In 
his theory of typical human behavior and state formation, Polybius presents human emotion as 
working together with reason to distinguish humans from animals, developing coextensively 
with a sense of morality, and creating a sense of community out of formerly unrelated 
individuals.  In his narrative, Polybius provides a glimpse into how rational and moral emotions 
shape the course of historical events. 
 For this chapter, I focus on the three emotions of indignation (δυσαρέστησις, τὸ 
ἀγανακτεῖν, προσκοπή), hatred (μῖσος), and anger (ὀργή).  These three emotions combine to 
exemplify rational and moral values, and they are important in three other ways.  First, 
indignation, hatred, and anger combine significantly.  These emotions appear most frequently 
together of all the emotions in the Histories.  In the passage of the cycle of constitutions in VI.5-9 
and 57, anger, hate and indignation occur 14 times, while in the discussion of Agathocles’ 
downfall in XV.25-33, they occur 13 times.  This makes up 12.8% of the total number of 
occurrences of these three types of emotion throughout the entire Histories.  For comparison, 
                                                 
445 See, for example, D’Arms and Jacobson 2000, Helm 2001, and Prinz 2007. 
446 It is paradoxical because Polybius did not self-consciously fashion a coherent theory of how emotions work.  He 
recorded his view of normative human behavior, including emotions.  His work is not a philosophical treatise or 
sociological study, as the modern studies which parallel his observations are. 
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any other combination of any of these three emotions with any other emotion whatsoever 
through the rest of the Histories makes 8.8% of the total occurrences of these three emotions.447   
 Second, their combination causes internal change in states.  Polybius sets up his theory 
of human behavior and state formation as a theory of how states change and explicitly decline, 
internally, without external influences.  These three emotions both identify decline and motivate 
change.  Third, these combined emotions are felt by a collective.  In my first chapter, I 
mentioned that Polybius does not seem to portray group or collective emotion differently from 
how individuals feel emotion.  Unlike modern studies on emotion, Polybius seems unconcerned 
about how exactly a group can feel the same exact emotion, much as he seems unconcerned 
about how a group entity can intend, or have a common mind.448  However, in Polybius’ theory 
and narrative, who exactly constitutes the collective group is important:  the people (whether ὁ 
δῆμος, οἱ πολλοί, τὸ πλῆθος, or even πάντες).  The people feel anger, hate, and indignation, 
which have rational and moral foundations.  Through their collective emotions, as we shall see, 
the people are not inherently condemned as worthless for politics or denigrated as irrational.449  
Rather, as a community, they value social morality over self-interest.  Nevertheless, the ruling 
                                                 
447 Per emotion, these two passages in VI and XV make up 8.5% of the total occurrences of anger, 20.5% of the 
total occurrences of hatred, and 13.4% of the total occurrences of indignation.  I.e., 12.8% of the anger, hate, and 
indignation in the Histories occur in VI.5-9 and 57 and XV.25-33, while 8.8% of the anger, hate, and indignation in 
the rest of the Histories occur with another emotion.)  Thus, VI.5-9 and 57 and XV.25-33 present a majority of the 
combined anger, hatred, and indignation of the work (59.2% of the combined anger, hatred, and indignation with 
any emotion.   
    The passages with the closest amount of anger, hatred, and/or indignation combined are:  5 occurrences:  
XXX.29 (on Callicrates), and V.42-50 (on Hermeias); 4 occurrences:  I.67-69 (mercenaries in Mercenary War) – only 
anger, XI.28 (Scipio’s speech to the mutineers) – only indignation; and XXI.29-31 (Embassy to ask off Roman 
anger against Aetolians) – only anger; 3 occurrences:  IX.10 (on Syracuse) – plus pity and ill will, XV.17 (on eliciting 
pity) – plus pity, XXXI.31 (Astymedes’ speech to the Roman Senate) – only anger.  Through this comparison to the 
next highest groupings of anger, hatred, and/or indignation, the 14 occurrences in VI.5-9 and the 13 occurrences in 
XV.25-33 are remarkable.  The length of these two passages may explain the great difference between them and the 
next highest occurrences (5), but nevertheless, no other passage even in extension comes close.  See Erskine 2015 
addresses XXI.29-31 and XXX.31on Roman anger. 
448 These are some of the most recent issues in modern emotion studies.  For studies directly on collective emotions, 
see Konzelmann Ziv 2009, Salmela 2012, and von Scheve and Salmela, eds. 2014.  On issues of group responsibility, 
intentionality, guilt, and mind, see Gilbert 2000; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, eds. 2001; Flam and King, eds. 2005; 
Tollefsen 2006; Tuomela 2007; Schmid 2009; Smiley 2011; Schweikard and Schmid, 2013; von Scheve 2013. 
449 As is the general observation in Polybian studies.  See especially Eckstein 1995, 129-140, and Walbank 1995. 
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power can corrupt this communal unity and cause the people too to degenerate.  Lastly, these 
communal, combined emotions create positive change within the state.  The people preserve 
social morality, seen in their negative emotional reactions to rulers’ excesses, and tend to act as a 
catalyst for positive social and political change. 
 In this chapter, I analyze two major passages of internal state change caused by 
emotions.  The first is Polybius’ famous cycle of constitutions, or anacyclosis, in Book VI.  Here 
two different but intimately linked processes of collective emotion are at work:  humans develop 
morals and a sense of community first through emotions, and then these same emotions and the 
social values they uphold create the dynamic changes of the anacyclosis itself.  The second major 
passage comes in Book XV with the downfall of Agathocles’ regime in Ptolemaic Egypt.  This 
passage provides a crucial historical narrative by which we can view the emotional processes 
found in the anacyclosis at work. 
Part I:  Anacyclosis 
 Polybius highlights Book VI as the much-awaited discussion of the politeia, or political 
system, of Rome in the context of Greek political theory.  While this fragmentary Book contains 
much on Roman institutions such as military camps, funeral orations, and religious scruples, 
along with comparison to other states’ constitutions, the extant text begins with a theory of how 
states change from one constitution to another and revolve back in a cyclical manner, called the 
anacyclosis.450  Polybius’ anacyclosis provides a theoretical model for internal changes of politeia 
in a hermetically sealed state.  For the state Polybius sets up in VI.5-9 has no neighbors, no 
foreign relations, nor any other external influences and factors to manage.  It only has internal 
                                                 
450 This discussion is referred to specifically at III.2.6, III.118.12, and V.111.10.  Some recent works at least partially 
on the sixth book include:  Eckstein 1995, esp. ch. 7-8; Hahm 1995; Blöser 1998; Walbank 1995, 1998; Lintott 1999, 
23-26, 218; Williams 2000; Champion 2004a; Candau Morón 2005; Zecchini 2006; McGing 2010, 171-177; 
Baronowski 2011, esp. ch. 8-9; Longley 2012; Erskine 2013; Seager 2013; Thornton 2013.   
Scholarship on the anacyclosis specifically:  Ryffel 1949; Cole 1964; Podes 1991; Hahm 1995; Blöser 1998; Walbank 
1998; Williams 2000. 
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factors, and thus Polybius is able to illuminate the changes inherent in it by nature, as Polybius 
explains with an analogy to rust and woodworms:   
“For just as rust is an inborn evil to iron, and woodworms and termites to wood, 
even if the iron and wood should escape from all external evils, they are 
destroyed through the rust and woodworms inherent in their natures, so in the 
same way some evil is born in each of the state forms and pursues it:  tyranny for 
kingship, oligarchy for aristocracy, and animalistic ochlocracy for democracy.  It 
is impossible for all this not to change in this way over time.”451 
 
 Within the anacyclosis Polybius provides two key emotional processes.  The first traces 
how emotions stimulate the formation of social norms and the human community itself.  The 
second provides theoretical examples of how Polybius envisioned the process of dynamic 
change between different rules and state forms within an isolated state.  These changes hinge 
upon the people’s emotions.  According to Polybius, since social morality underlies both the 
people’s emotional reactions and demonstrates rationality, the people’s anger, hatred, and 
indignation paradoxically align with rationality, a point which sets Polybius’ political theory apart 
from his Greek philosophical predecessors on constitutional change.  In addition, the people’s 
emotional reactions trigger changes of state forms.  They signal the degeneration to a worse state 
form, stimulate the destruction of that worse form, and both cause and direct the creation of a 
better state form. 
 Modern scholars have often disparaged Polybius’ theory.452  Polybius, according to most 
of these views, could not reconcile a cyclical pattern, a biological pattern, and the theory of the 
                                                 
451 Polyb., VI.10-3-5.  Καθάπερ γὰρ σιδήρῳ μὲν ἰός, ξύλοις δὲ θρῖπες καὶ τερηδόνες συμϕυεῖς εἰσι λῦμαι, δι' 
ὧν, κἂν πάσας τὰς ἔξωθεν  διαϕύγωσι βλάβας, ὑπ' αὐτῶν ϕθείρονται τῶν συγγενομένων, τὸν αὐτὸν 
τρόπον καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν συγγεννᾶται κατὰ ϕύσιν ἑκάστῃ καὶ παρέπεταί τις κακία, βασιλείᾳ μὲν ὁ 
μοναρχικὸς λεγόμενος τρόπος,  ἀριστοκρατίᾳ δ' ὁ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, δημοκρατίᾳ δ' ὁ θηριώδης καὶ 
χειροκρατικός, εἰς οὓς οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ οὐ πάντα τὰ προειρημένα σὺν χρόνῳ ποιεῖσθαι  τὰς μεταστάσεις 
κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον. 
452 Brink and Walbank 1954, 97:  “It is in many respects a failure.”  Von Fritz 1954, 67:  “The cycle theory . . . 
presented by Polybius is anything but profound.  It is a gross oversimplification.”  Cole 1964, 456; Momigliano 
1969, 27:  this section “is a big digression.”   
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more stable mixed constitution.453  David Hahm, however, has offered the most recent 
substantial contribution to the analysis of the anacyclosis.454  Particularly, he identified heredity 
as what begins the process of decline.455  While Hahm persuasively analyzes the beginning 
impetus for change to the worse, he stops short of analyzing the rest of the process of state 
change in such detail.456  My analysis, in seeking to lay out how the people’s rational emotions 
change the state for the better, supplements Hahm’s observations. 
 Two different cycles exist in the anacyclosis:  the larger overall cycle progresses through 
all seven forms (namely, primitive monarchy, kingship, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, 
democracy, ochlocracy, and back to primitive monarchy), and the inner three cycles cycle from 
good to bad within the types of rule:  rule by one, by few, or by all.457   
 Polybius begins the anacyclosis narrative with a clean slate of the world and human race, 
after some massive disaster.458  Humans first gather into herds like animals and follow a bold, 
courageous, and strong leader, called by scholars the primitive monarch.459  When humans have 
congregated, the development of social values occurs.   After this system of social behavioral 
standards develops, the primitive monarch begins to take heed in his leadership of the society’s 
                                                 
453 Walbank 1943, 74; Brink and Walbank, 102, 115.  Frank Walbank in particular focuses on what he identifies as 
the two questions of Book Six:  how Rome was so successful and how states decline.  He concludes that Polybius 
was uninterested in decline.  See also Walbank 1980, 50; Alonso-Núñez 1986, 22. 
454 Hahm 1995. 
455 Hahm 1995., 22-28.  While Hahm analyzes this aspect of the anacyclosis in greater detail, Ryffel 1949, 190-195, 
places great importance in the generational aspect of the anacyclosis as well. 
456 After a crisis of inheritance, the rulers turn to desires, which Williams, esp. 131-136, describes as a sign and 
symptom of wealth.  According to her, wealth underlies all moral degeneration, even where Polybius does not 
mention wealth at all. 
457 Erskine 2013, 240, calls the anacyclosis a “chaotic cycle” in contrast to the “stability and clear divisions of 
responsibilities” in the Roman constitution.  See Hahm 1995, 13-15, for a logical explanation of this cyclical and 
biological system. 
458 Polyb., VI.5.5-6.  Ryffel, 191-192, notes the strong parallelisms with Plato in the beginning of human society 
from disaster to herds to civilization.  Particularly, cf. Pl., Protag. 320c8-322d5.  However, in the Protagoras, the myth 
notably attributes the development of justice to Zeus, rather than to natural human development and reason, as 
Polybius does. 
459 Polyb., VI.5.7-9; Walbank, e.g., uses the term ‘primitive monarch’ for this leader consistently.  Polybius does not 
give him a title but describes that the strongest and most daring takes the lead (τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν ), 
VI.5.7. 
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new moral standards.460  As this happens, the aims, benefits, and morals coalesce between the 
ruler and the people, which distinguishes kingship from primitive monarchy:  “Kingship comes 
into being surreptitiously from monarchy whenever reason (logismos) takes over the leadership in 
place of bravery and strength.”461  The kings rule by rational thought instead of brute force and 
use their power to improve public affairs.462 
 Through the three inner cycles of constitutions, the processes of dynamic change occur 
in very similar ways.  The good forms – kingship, aristocracy, and democracy – are governed for 
the good of the subjects.463  The constitutions begin to change to the worse forms – that is, 
tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy, respectively – when new rulers without experience inherit 
power.464  Heredity and bad upbringing often emerge in Aristotle and Plato’s works as causal 
factors for decline, especially in tyranny.465  Aristotle notes how easy it was to despise hereditary 
kingships and therefore how much easier it was for faction to develop.466  Plato attributes to new 
rulers the need to differentiate their lives from their fathers’.467  Heredity in Polybius’ narrative 
also accounts for the beginning of dynamic change.468  Then the rulers turn to fulfilling their 
personal desires.  Desires contribute largely to the downfall of rulers and state forms in Greek 
                                                 
460 Polyb., VI.6.10. 
461 Polyb., VI.6.12.  “βασιλεὺς ἐκ μονάρχου λανθάνει γενόμενος, ὅταν παρὰ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἰσχύος 
μεταλάβῃ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ὁ λογισμός.”  Hahm 1995, 19; 2000, 468.  βασιλεία is a change in relations to a “shared 
conception of ‘what is just and admirable’.” 
462 Polyb., VI.7.1-5.  VI.7.3:  The people “ποιοῦνται μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ βασιλείων 
οὐκέτι κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς καὶ θυμικὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς τῆς γνώμης καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαφοράς.” 
463 Polyb., VI.7.4, 8.3, 9.4. 
464 Polyb., VI.7.6, 8.4, 9.5.  Hahm 1995, 22-28. 
465 On heredity, see Arist., Pol. 4.1292 a39f., 1313 a10-1316 a16, who states that power from heredity is easiest to 
despise, and so quickest to be overthrown.  See Champion 2004a, 88-89; Hahm 1995, 22-28; McGing 2010, 173.  
On bad upbringing as a key to bad rule, see Plato, Leg. 3.694d, 695e. 
466 Arist., Pol. 5.1313 a10f.  Polybius writes a narrative of decline into tyranny, not a philosophical treatise with fuller 
explanation of a theory like Aristotle or Plato, much to modern scholars’ discontent (von Fritz, Cole, Alonso-
Núñez).  In doing so Polybius gives the causal chain of events, often without explanation.  See Hahm 2000, 462, 
with detailed references to scholarship on philosophical sources. 
467 Pl., Rep. 8.545-546, 550d-551a, 555-557, 562e-563b. 
468 Hahm 1995, 22-28.  
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philosophy.469  They represent abandonment of the public welfare for private advantage.470  In 
tyranny and oligarchy, the people react with hatred, anger, indignation, and resentment to the 
bad rulers’ private indulgences.  This reaction destroys the bad constitutional form and 
establishes a good form of a new type of rule:  aristocracy after tyranny and democracy after 
oligarchy.  The last state in the cycle, that of democracy’s perversion into ochlocracy, or mob 
rule, leads to the complete dissolution of the state.471  After that, the people rediscover a 
primitive monarch, and presumably the larger cycle restarts.472 
The Emotions in the Development of Social Norms 
 In the development of human society emotion acts as the catalyst for human distinction 
from the ways of the animal flocks.473  Emotion creates the first identification of individuals with 
others, stimulating group formation.  Through emotion, humans form a set of social norms, 
which define and solidify group identity into a community and later a state. 
 Polybius gives three examples of how morals develop:  that of a disrespectful child, a 
harmed benefactor, and a rewarded public protector.474  In all three, Polybius focalizes the 
narrative through the bystanders.  The moral conceptions of τὸ καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, what is 
good and just, develop in the people through these examples, for Polybius begins by stating:  
                                                 
469 For the role of desires as central to the downfall of the ruler, see Pl. Plt., 301 b10; Rep. 8.562d-e; Leg. 3.691A, 
695b, 701b; Arist. Pol., 5.1310 b40f. 
470 Polyb., VI.7.3.  See Arist., Pol. 3.7.1279 b3-b10, Eth. Nic. 8.1160 b2-11, on how a tyrants looks to his own good, 
but a king looks to his subjects’ good.  See too, Champion 2004a, 88-99; Hahm 1995, 16ff. 
471 The term ‘ochlocracy’ is generally used by scholars to refer to the degenerate form of democracy in the 
anacyclosis.  Polybius does not use the term ὀχλοκρατία in this section itself, but he does call degenerate 
democracy ochlocracy in the summary at VI.4.6 and .10, as well as the degenerate mixed constitution this at VI.57.9.  
In this section, at VI.9.7, Polybius says that the state turned “εἰς βίαν καὶ χειροκρατίαν.”  For the purpose of 
clarity, I use the term “ochlocracy” to refer to the degenerate form of democracy in the anacyclosis. 
472 Polyb., VI.9.9. 
473 Polyb., VI.6.1-9 and VI.5.4-10, respectively. 
474 Hahm 1995, 20, reduces these examples to an ethics based on reciprocity of benefit. 
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“And then for the first time a notion of good and justice came to humans, and likewise a notion 
of their opposites.”475   
 Polybius continues his explanation:   
“For, whenever a child who has reached its prime does not show gratitude nor 
gives protection to those by whom it was brought up, but on the contrary 
undertakes in some way to speak badly or act badly against them, it seems clear 
that those who live near, witnessing the parents’ care and sufferings on behalf of 
their children and their attention and nourishing of them, take offense and are 
indignant (δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ προσκόπτειν).”476   
 
In this passage Polybius focuses on the negative emotional reactions of indignation and offense 
(δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ προσκόπτειν).  So far, people have behaved like beasts:  they follow a strong 
leader for their own protection, and they are naturally inclined to have sex.  Now they recognize 
harm to someone else and think that it is not right.  Emotion, indignation at harm to another, is 
the mechanism by which humans recognize and are impelled to pursue what is good and just in 
society.  Whereas they may have thought it wrong for themselves to suffer harm before, now 
they extend this moral notion of right and wrong to others.  For Polybius, emotion both reflects 
and gives birth to a concept of justice.477  The child’s lack of respect stimulate the bystanders to 
judge good and bad treatment implicitly based on what Hahm calls a “reciprocity of benefit;” 
that is, the bystanders expect the children to give reciprocal gratitude in return for the parents’ 
care of them.478   
 Polybius then explains the bystanders’ reaction:   
                                                 
475 Polyb., VI.5.10.  “καὶ τότε πρώτως ἔννοια γίνεται τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις.”  von Fritz, 55, calls τὸ καλὸν καὶ δικαίον “enlightened self-interest.” 
476 Polyb., VI.6.2-3. “ὁπότε τις τῶν ἐκτραφέντων εἰς ἡλικίαν ἱκόμενος μὴ νέμοι χάριν μηδ’ ἀμύναι τούτοις οἷς 
ἐκτρέφοιτ’, ἀλλά που τἀναντία κακῶς λέγειν ἢ δρᾶν τούτους ἐγχειροίη, δῆλον ὡς δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ 
προσκόπτειν εἰκὸς τοὺς συνόντας καὶ συνιδόντας τὴν γεγενημένην ἐκ τῶν γεννησάντων ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ 
κακοπάθειαν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν τούτων θεραπείαν καὶ τροφήν.” 
477 The observers theoretically already have some sense of justice – that harming one’s benefactor is inherently wrong, 
but Polybius does not draw back to this level; he goes back only to the level of emotion to explain why people do 
not like others to harm their benefactor.  In this explanation, grounded in human behavior and narrative, Polybius 
neatly avoids the philosophical complexities of a notion of justice. 
478 Hahm 1995, 21. 
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“For, since humankind differs from the other animals in that they alone partake 
in thought and rationality (νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ), it is clear that they probably do 
not pass over the aforementioned difference [in treatment], just as among the 
other animals, but that they take notice of what happened and take offense 
(δυσαρεστεῖσθαι) at those present, foreseeing and considering that a very 
similar thing would happen to each of them.”479 
 
Polybius correlates rationality (λογισμός) with humans’ ability for reflection and predictive 
application to their own potential situations.480  Because the bystanders can reflect and reapply a 
situation to themselves, humans are developing social and moral sensibilities.  For Polybius, this 
rational ability to reflect governs their reactions of sympathy and indignation.   
 The second example leads to the development of duty and a sense of justice.   
“And indeed whenever one man, who received assistance or aid from another in 
terrible situations failed to give thanks to his rescuer, but even undertook to 
harm this man at some time, it seems clear that those who saw this would take 
offense and be indignant (δυσαρεστεῖσθαι καὶ προσκόπτειν) with such a man, 
feeling sympathy (συναγανακτοῦντας) for their neighbor, and considering 
something similar in their own cases.”481   
 
Once again, onlookers reflect on the situation, apply it in their minds to themselves, and feel 
indignation (δυσαρεστεῖσθαι καὶ προσκόπτειν) and sympathy (συναγανακτοῦντας).  Even 
these reflective and sympathetic emotions are at heart personal, and not altruistic.  Emotions 
distinguish what one cares about or what one values, and therefore demarcate personal 
valuation.  However, by feeling emotions for others in the same group, these individuals greatly 
                                                 
479 Polyb., VI.6.4.  “Τοῦ γὰρ γένους τῶν ανθρώπων ταύτῃ διαφέροντος τὼν ἄλλων ζῴων ᾗ μόνοις αὐτοῖς 
μέτεστι νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ, φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς παρατρέχειν αὐτοὺς τὴν προειρημένην διαφορὰν καθάπερ 
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ἀλλ΄ ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον καὶ δυσαρεστεῖσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι, προορωμένους 
τὸ μέλλον καὶ συλλογιζομένους ὅτι τὸ παραπλήσιον ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν συγκυρήσει.”  Polybius’ verb of 
“considering,” συλλογιζομένους, demonstrates the rational nature of humans, as a cognate of λογισμός.  See 
Champion 2004a, 258. 
480 This correlates with Champion’s observations that the most frequent usage of λογισμός in the Histories is what 
he defines as “reasoned reflection and consideration,” 2004a, 256-257.  Throughout, my use of the term ‘rationality’ 
aligns with both Polybius’ and Champion’s observations of this term, especially in the above definition and usage.   
481 Polyb., VI.6.6.  “καὶ μὴν ὅταν που πάλιν ἅτερος ὑπὸ θατέρου τυχὼν ἐπικουρίας ἢ βοηθείας ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς 
μὴ νέμῃ τῷ σώσαντι χάριν ἀλλά ποτε καὶ βλάπτειν ἐγχειρῇ τοῦτον, φανερὸν ὡς εἰκὸς τῷ τοιούτῳ 
δυσαρεστεῖσθαι καὶ προσκόπτειν τοὺς εἰδότας, συναγανακτοῦντας μὲν τῷ πέλας, ἀναφέροντας δ’ ἐφ’ 
αὑτοὺς τὸ παραπλήσιον.” 
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increase their self-identification with the others as a group and contribute greatly to the actual 
formation of this community, even if such a group did not exist before their shared emotions.482   
 Polybius explains the significance of this example next:  “From these [circumstances] 
some notion of the meaning of duty (τοῦ καθήκοντος) comes about for everyone:  this is the 
foundation of justice.”483  Community and the common good play a larger role through this 
example, as both are benefited.  At this point Polybius is stressing the development of a sense of 
community rather than power-oriented reciprocity, so it is more important that the savior here 
and in the next example decide to help others, taking into their consideration the good of the 
community over their own personal good.484  The development of the social values of duty and 
justice represent a greater cognizance of the common good and the importance of the wider 
community:  people care about others. 
 Third, Polybius gives an example of an experience actually acted upon by bystanders.   
“Likewise in turn, whenever someone gives protection for everyone in terrible 
situations, and he withstands and halts the attacks of the fiercest animals, on the 
one hand it is likely that such a man meets with signs of goodwill and honor 
from the multitude, but on the other that one who does the opposite to him 
meets with condemnation and indignation.”485 
 
In this example, the people create through their reactions a system by which they decide whom 
to punish or reward.486  This takes one step closer to a political state, with a system of rewards 
                                                 
482 As found in modern studies of emotion:  Helm 2014; Kelly, Iannone, and McCarthy 2014, 180-181; Krueger 
2014, 156-159. 
483 Polyb., VI.6.7.  “Ἐξ ὧν ὑπογίνεταί τις ἔννοια παρ’ ἑκάστῳ τῆς τοῦ καθήκοντος δυνάμεως καὶ θεωρίας · 
ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος δικαιοσύνης.” 
484 In all other examples, the two people or groups exist in a relationship based on an imbalance in power:  one of 
them is obligated to show gratitude to the more powerful.   
485 Polyb., VI.6.8.  “Ὁμοίως πάλιν, ὅταν ἀμύνῃ μέν τις πρὸ πάντων ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, ὑφιστῆται δὲ καὶ μένῃ τὰς 
ἐπιφορὰς τῶν ἀλκιμωτάτων ζῴων, εἰκὸς μὲν τὸν τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπισημασίας τυγχάνειν 
εὐνοϊκῆς καὶ προστατικῆς, τὸν δὲ τἀναντία τούτῳ πράττοντα καταγνώσεως καὶ προσκοπῆς.” 
486 See also Polyb., VI.14.4, where he stresses the importance of rewards and punishments for a state in his 
discussion of the people’s role in the Roman politieia:  “for in the state the People (ὁ δῆμος) alone has control over 
honor and punishment:  by only these are dynasties, states, and in a word the whole of human activity held 
together.”.  Τιμῆς γάρ ἐστι καὶ τιμωρίας ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ μόνος ὁ δῆμος κύριος, οἷς συνέχονται μόνοις καὶ 
δυναστεῖαι καὶ πολιτεῖαι καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶς ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος. 
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and punishments.487  In the anacyclosis’ proto-state, the people choose willingly to support the 
primitive monarch, thus moving beyond the realm of power as only brute force.  Polybius 
qualifies this example:  “From this in turn, a certain reasonable theory of shame, good conduct, 
and of the difference between them formed in the people, and the one was followed with 
eagerness and imitation because of its advantage, and the other was shunned.”488  Communal 
interest becomes the measure for imitation and likewise for reward.  What is beneficial, τὸ 
συμφέρον, determines the system of social behavior – what behavior to imitate or shun.   
 The good of the community in this example is privileged over the good of the individual, 
at least in the sense of personal safety and self-interest (personal gain).  Through this example 
Polybius describes the development of a crucial cultural virtue:  putting the good of the country 
– here the community of other humans – above one’s own personal concerns.  Moreover, we 
see communal good encompassing personal benefit:  those who behave this way receive praise 
and honor, certainly forms of personal benefit.489  Since they receive this praise and honor for 
prioritizing the common good, their personal benefit falls within the common good.  That is, they 
                                                 
487 Walbank 1972, 26, says τὸ πλῆθος, as used in this episode, VI.6.8, exemplifies the political public of a 
democratic state.  Walbank 1995, 203, writes “the people – οἱ πολλοί, ὁ ὄχλος, or ὁ δῆμος – do not normally 
assume the initiative.”  He adds, 214, “[t]hey are there to be played on, easily swayed, liable to lawless passions, 
irrational rage and violent anger.”  However, while Walbank here focuses on the role of the Roman people 
specifically and gives examples of terms other than τὸ πλῆθος, his comments nonetheless may be (or not, see 
below) pertinent to the anacyclosis.  In this passage, these comments describe the exact opposite of the situation of 
people Polybius describes, who take heed, follow reason, take action, but do not overreact in their distribution of 
merits. 
    Compare where Walbank 1998, 49, comments concerning the anacyclosis itself:  “In each case it is the people 
who overthrow the corrupt rulers and then hand over power” and adds that “the social base is always ‘the people’ 
and the circumstances leading to the violent change are of a moral nature, namely corruption in the rulers, which 
arises naturally” (p. 281).  Thus he notes the social and moral importance of the people, although he does not 
identify or analyze how it is their emotions which paradoxically reflect morality and rationality.  
488 Polyb., VI.6.9.  “Ἐξ οὗ πάλιν εὔλογον ὑπογίνεσθαί τινα θεωρίαν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχροῦ καὶ καλοῦ 
καὶ τῆς τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφορᾶς, καὶ τὸ μὲν ζήλου καὶ μιμήσεως τυγχάνειν διὰ τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δὲ 
φυγῆς.” 
489 See Morstein-Marx 2009, 117-122, on this pattern within Roman Republican culture.  On p. 122  his discussion 
of the bene meritus in Roman terms parallels Polybius’ description of the savior in this passage:  the phrases “bene 
meritus in rem publicam (“one who has served the state well”) and bene meritus de re publica (“one who has earned the 
gratitude of the state”) . . . refer to the same kind of man and the same kind of actions, but the former stresses his 
services to the community and the latter emphasizes the debt the community owes him as a consequence of those 
very actions.”  So too the protector receives praise and serves the state all at once, though the Polybian terminology 
does not reflect this as subtly as the Latin. 
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cannot achieve this particular valued kind of personal gain without aiding the community’s 
interests.  We see this form of meritocratic and patriotic virtue throughout the Histories, but 
Polybius singles out how Romans perfected the institutionalization of this form of virtue.490 
 Although τὸ συμφέρον is often opposed to τὸ καλὸν, a meaning of “expediency” or 
pure self-interest rather than moral right is out of place here in Polybius’ theory, for the example 
to be emulated for its ‘advantage’ involves great personal risk – coming head to head with the 
attacks of the fiercest beasts on others’ behalf.  Τὸ συμφέρον makes much more sense as 
“beneficial” on a wider, more communal scale of advantage.  The common good triumphs over 
pure self-interest.  Τὸ συμφέρον contributes to the communal benefit of the community by 
safeguarding its interests, which include the interest of its individual members.491  Those 
reflecting back onto their own situations do so at this point as a member of the community:  
they are considering what would happen to them in such a situation if the group did not uphold 
and reaffirm its values and standards.492   
 These values, the public good and the system of acceptable social behavior, constitute 
the development of moral principles in the people.  What is more, these principles and social 
standards are the indications of humans’ rationality (νοῦς καὶ λογισμός).493  Indignation or 
sympathy towards others demonstrates that the people possess and use their notions of what is 
right and just.  Through reacting emotionally in adherence with their social values, humans 
                                                 
490 See Polyb., VI.52-55 on the Roman funeral and the example of Horatius Cocles.  Polybius tells how Horatius 
Cocles, a young Roman nobleman, faced enemy attacks in order to preserve the state and disallow them to cross the 
bridge into Rome.  Horatius dies facing the enemy “counting the safety of his country and the glory to come about 
this exploit of his of more importance than his present and remaining life.”  Polyb., VI.55.3.  περὶ πλείονος 
ποιησάμενος τὴν τῆς πατρίδος ἀσφάλειαν καὶ τὴν ἐσομένην μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτὸν εὔκλειαν τῆς 
παρούσης ζωῆς καὶ τοῦ καταλειπομένου βίου. 
491 See Tuomela 2007 on an important analysis of how communal interest is built off of the interest of individuals.  
Communal interest encompasses to a large degree individuals’ self-interest.  At VI.54.4-6 Polybius specifically 
praises the Romans for inculcating such a strong desire to consider the common good as (and above) one’s own 
interest.  See Gilbert 2000, for a different view of group responsibility, plural subject theory. 
492 This aligns with the theory of Salmela 2012, 39:  collective emotion is formed when one believes others also care 
and share the same concerns, which can be overlapping private concerns. 
493 Polyb., VI.2.3. 
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develop a sense of community.  Likewise, the authority of the primitive monarch changes to 
align with the community’s values.  As the people value rational and moral conduct, so too the 
primitive monarch adapts his behavior from rule by brute force to rule in accordance with 
communal values, or else he loses his position as monarch.494  Through this alignment with the 
people’s rationally-based social norms, the primitive monarch becomes a king. 
 Through these three successive examples, Polybius explains how a system of social 
norms and conceptions of moral principles develops.  These examples are designed to describe 
how the community of people and the new state diverge from the ways of animal flocks.495  It is 
humans’ possession of rationality, the ability to reflect and predictively apply another person’s 
situation to oneself, that distinguishes humans from animals and which promotes the good of 
the community over purely personal interest at the expense of others. 
 Polybius’ ancient theory of the beginning of human society and its development of moral 
standards finds a parallel in modern philosophical theory.  Bennett Helm’s 2014 article 
“Emotional Communities of Respect” provides a useful, modern parallel for how emotions 
form a community and its norms.496  Helm’s theory contends that “reactive emotions play a 
fundamental role in constituting distinctively human communities in part because they constitute 
our respecting each other and our reverence for the community itself, such that I respect you and 
revere the community only as one of us.”497  In addition, these reactive emotions are rational 
emotions.498  In Helm’s view, emotions have import for the subject; that is, they are “about” 
                                                 
494 Polyb., VI.7.1-3. 
495 Polyb., VI.6.4. 
496 Helm 2014, 47-60.  I chose this theory of collective emotion in particular because it is highly appropriate to 
Polybius’ own method of narration, is more easily understandable and generally applicable, and does not rely on 
highly specialized terminology.  Salmela 2012 provides a comparable model and theory of collective emotion which 
does not fulfill these standards but which would be beneficial to compare to Polybius’ ‘theory.’ 
497 Helm 2014, 48. 
498 Helm 2014, 51-53. 
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something the subject cares about.499  Emotions are rational and intelligible responses based on 
the emotion’s import.500 
 Reactive emotions occur in a social dimension as “normally responses to how we or 
other members of a community treat each other.”501  Helm gives resentment, gratitude, guilt, 
approbation, and indignation as stereotypical examples of reactive emotions.  All of these 
reactive emotions ensure that community members take responsibility for their actions and are 
expressed to call attention to one’s respect (as either transgressed in the case of resentment, or 
highlighted, as with gratitude).  Thus, according to Helm, reactive emotions “are bound up with 
seemingly moral notions like respect and dignity” for members of a community bound by 
norms.502  As Helm explains, 
“it should be clear that resentment and other reactive emotions, as ways of 
holding others accountable to the norms of the community, simultaneously 
involve a commitment to the standing of the perpetrator as responsible to those 
norms.  Moreover, they also involve a commitment to the dignity of witnesses as 
members of the community insofar as they call on witnesses to respond with 
appropriate vicarious reactive emotions, a call that is rationally connected to 
further reactive emotions such as resentment when witnesses fail to respond, or 
gratitude when they do in notable ways.  In short, we cannot dissociate your 
commitment to your own dignity as a member of the community to your 
commitment to that of all other community members.”503 
 
Therefore, membership in a community is created by reactive emotions.  Helm’s account of 
reactive emotions, communal respect, and rationality parallels Polybius’ theory of the 
anacyclosis. 
 The same social norms and moral priorities that developed at the beginning of the 
community in Polybius’ anacyclosis play a large role in the characterization of and transition 
                                                 
499 Helm 2014, 49. 
500 Helm 2014, 49-50. 
501 Helm 2014, 48. 
502 Helm 2014, 51. 
503 Helm 2014, 54. 
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between state forms.  These behavioral standards regulate the people’s emotional reactions 
against tyranny and oligarchy, but not against ochlocracy. 
Tyranny 
 After kings ruled, using and demonstrating their rationality and in accordance with their 
subjects’ good, their descendants turned away from these principles:   
“But when they took up their rule from inheritance, they found everything safe 
and secure already, and provisions more than sufficient for their nourishment.  
Then indeed, they follow their desires because of the abundance of resources and 
suppose that leaders must have different clothing from their subjects, have 
different and elaborate enjoyment and preparations of their food, and be 
unopposed in their sexual practices and intercourse, however improper.”504  
 
In the transition into tyranny, the rulers “follow their personal desires” (ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις 
ἑπόμενοι).  Personal indulgence contradicts the norms of the social behavioral system:  personal 
satisfaction instead of attention to the public good would not receive marks of honor from their 
subjects, the community, as happens with the kings.505 
 The next step brings in the subjects’ perspective.506  Φθόνος, προσκοπή, μῖσος, and 
ὀργή arise from the rulers’ indulgence of their private, physical desires to the community’s 
detriment.507  “When resentment and indignation arose against some rulers and when against 
others hatred and inimical anger were kindled, tyranny came about from kingship, and the 
                                                 
504 Polyb., VI.7.6-7.  “Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐκ διαδοχῆς καὶ κατὰ γένος τὰς ἀρχὰς παραλαμβάνοντες ἕτοιμα μὲν εἶχον ἤδη 
τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, ἕτοιμα δὲ καὶ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν τὰ πρὸς τὴν τροφήν, τότε δὴ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις 
ἑπόμενοι διὰ τὴν περιουσίαν ἐξάλλους μὲν ἐσθῆτας ὑπέλαβον δεῖν ἔχειν τοὺς ἡγουμένους τῶν 
ὑποταττομένων, ἐξάλλους δὲ καὶ ποικίλας τὰς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἀπολαύσεις καὶ παρασκευάς, 
ἀναντιρρήτους δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείας καὶ συνουσίας.” 
505 Polyb., VI.7.3.  In terms of Helm’s theory, the tyrants self-consciously separate themselves from the community, 
and so also separate from its values. 
506 Polyb., VI.7.8. 
507 Cf. Pl., Rep. 8.569, who emphasizes the tyrant’s cruelty, and narrative passages in Polybius’ Histories on the 
emphasis on a tyrant’s cruelty:  X.26, XIII.6-8.  In the larger narrative, Polybius more often emphasizes the cruelty 
of advisors and demagogues:  XIII.4, XV.24a-36, XVI.21-22, XXIII.5, XXVIII.3-5, XXXII.5-6. 
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beginning of its downfall emerged along with the formation of a plot against the leaders.”508  
Only when the subjects have shown that they disagree with the rulers’ actions does a change of 
constitutional form occur.509  Thus, Polybius’ state crucially consists of both the ruler and the 
ruled, and good governance depends on the whole community’s coherence.510 
 While the tyrants turn to private indulgence (ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἑπόμενοι), the subjects’ 
emotional reactions of hate, anger, indignation, and ill will lead them to public action (ἐγεννᾶτο 
καὶ σύστασις ἐπιβουλῆς).511  However, the tyrants’ desires to have different standards of 
clothing, food, and sex were not based on the rational reflection characteristic of the moral 
principles of the human community.512  They implicitly did not consider the effects of their 
actions on others – like the disrespectful child and the harmful or cowardly men.513  The people’s 
response of φθόνος, προσκοπή, μῖσος, and ὀργή, on the other hand, was based on rational 
social behavioral standards.514  They felt φθόνος, προσκοπή, and μῖσος for the tyrants, and 
function analogously to the bystanders in the original community, who felt resentment and 
                                                 
508 Polyb., VI.7.8.  “Ἐφ’ οἷς μὲν φθόνου γενομένου καὶ προσκοπῆς, ἐφ’ οἷς δὲ μίσους ἐκκαιομένου καὶ 
δυσμενικῆς ὀργῆς, ἐγένετο μὲν ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας τυραννίς, ἀρχὴ δὲ καταλύσεως ἐγεννᾶτο καὶ σύστασις 
ἐπιβουλῆς τοῖς ἡγουμένοις·”  Polybius’ use of the plural for tyranny is somewhat perplexing, but I take it to refer 
to plural states in general at this universal stage of development. 
509 By comparison, in oligarchy (VI.8.5-6), Polybius reverses his narration of the change for the worse from his 
narration of tyranny.  Here he first narrates the change to oligarchy then the popular emotional reactions.  Both 
changes (oligarchy and tyranny) are narrated with μέν . . . δέ clauses.  By correlating these events in such a clause, 
Polybius shows how very closely connected they are. 
510 Hahm 2000, 467. 
511 Polyb., VI.7.7-8.  On these both as psychological explanations, see Walbank 1972, 40-43, 58-59, 157-159; Podes; 
and Hahm 2000, 467.  For other, similar examples of psychological explanations, see Pl., Rep. 8.555d9-e2; Arist., Pol. 
5.1312 b17-19.  See Hahm 2009, for psychological motivations throughout Greek philosophy on constitutions. 
512 The tyrants desired fancy clothes, sumptuous food, and sex based purely on their own self-interest.  As such, 
their desires were rational in accomplishing their own goals, but their logic does not fall within λογισμός or γνώμη 
developed in the bystanders, that is, in line with the communal sense of morality, as Polybius has been emphasizing.  
Polyb., VI.6.11-7.5. 
513 Polyb., VI.6.2-3, 6.6. 
514 Cf. some narrative sections where several of these emotions arise in subjects against others, usually in positions 
of greater authority:  Ibid., IX.10 (the siege of Syracuse), XV.25-30 (Agathocles), XVIII.15 (traitors), XXX.29 
(Callicrates), XXXVIII.4-11 (Greece’s downfall). 
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indignation.515  The negative emotions here arose from feelings of moral indignation.  The 
subjects act upon those emotions to fulfill a beneficial, practical purpose:  they remove a bad 
ruler and reestablish the state led by those who heeded social behavioral standards.  The 
subjects, therefore, serve as a foundational source of rational social and moral values, based on 
fair treatment, in their reactions.  The people’s emotions themselves stem from the ruler’s 
transgression of their sense of morality, τὸ καλὸν.  Since that system and morality exemplifies 
the application of human reason towards the social good, the reactions against the tyrants align 
with and demonstrate rationality.516 In this way, emotions and rationality align.517   
 Self-interest can also clearly be at play in the people’s reactions of φθόνος, προσκοπή, 
μῖσος, and ὀργή.  However, their self-interest coalesces with the social and moral standards.518  
Like the earlier bystanders, they may reflect upon the others’ negative situations and have 
absolutely no wish to be in the same place themselves.  However, they do not fully follow their 
own self-interest to the degree of individual, personal indulgence as the rulers do, without 
concern for others.  This moderation is explained and motivated by social morality.519  The 
superiority of collective benefit over self-interest distinguishes the people as a reserve of social 
morality and as the deciding factor in constitutional change. 
 In addition, Polybius identifies the change into tyranny at the same time as the beginning 
of its destruction (ἀρχὴ δὲ καταλύσεως ἐγεννᾶτο καὶ σύστασις ἐπιβουλῆς τοῖς 
                                                 
515 The people – or at least some members of this community – are not merely bystanders or observers of the 
tyrants’ depredations but suffer personally as well.  However, the importance of bystanders, or witnesses is crucial; 
see Helm 2014, 51-59. 
516  This view contrasts with the dichotomy of emotion versus rationality found in other Greek philosophical texts 
on constitutional change. 
517 See Greenspan 2000, on how emotions function in rational plans and for rational effects by focusing on rational, 
moral indignation in certain moments, not necessarily consciously.  Damasio 1994, focuses on the neurological 
connection between emotional reactions and the ability to reason.  Contra Hahm 1995, esp. 16. 
518 Greenspan 1988 gives a detailed exposition of how exactly this works.  See also Tuomela 2007. 
519 As Helm’s theory of the community of respect demonstrates. 
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ἡγουμένοις).520  Emotions of hatred and resentment symbolize both the completion of the 
change to the worse, when the people recognize the lack of social morality in the rulers, and they 
stimulate the demise of that worse constitution through plots.   
 Emotional reactions lead to the creation of the new, better state form of aristocracy:  
“The form of aristocracy in turn took up a beginning and birth:  for the people, as if giving 
thanks to those who destroyed the monarchs, used these men as leaders and handed over their 
affairs to them.”521   These leaders follow the social and moral principles and use their power for 
the benefit of the whole community:  “The new aristocrats first enthusiastically did nothing 
more energetically than managing the common good (τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος), and they 
undertook everything carefully and diligently, both the private and public affairs of the 
crowd.”522  Without the people’s preservation of social rules and moral principles through their 
emotional reactions, a better state form would not have come about.  Although the aristocratic 
elite lead the revolt against the tyrants, the people react, provide the decisive impetus, and 
choose to turn over their affairs to them.523 
 The aristocracy and people both provide good examples of positive reactive emotions at 
work here:  they reaffirm the community’s social norms through their personal reactive 
emotions.  The people give gratitude to the aristocrats for their leadership in the actions taken in 
                                                 
520 Polyb., VI.7.8.  Walbank, HCP I.656, notes this. 
521 Polyb., VI.8.1-2. “τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας αὖθις ἀρχὴν ἐλάμβανε καὶ γένεσιν · τοῖς γὰρ καταλύσασι τοὺς 
μονάρχους οἱονεὶ χάριν ἐκ χειρὸς ἀποδιδόντες οἱ πολλοὶ τούτοις ἐχρῶντο προστάταις καὶ τούτοις 
ἐπέτρεπον περὶ σφῶν.” 
522 Polyb., VI.8.3.  “Οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀσμενίζοντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν οὐδὲν προυργιαίτερον ἐποιοῦντο τοῦ 
κοινῇ συμφέροντος, καὶ κηδεμονικῶς καὶ φυλακτικῶς ἕκαστα χειρίζοντες, καὶ τὰ κατ’ ἰδίαν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ 
τοῦ πλήθους.”   
    Joy here may be a good example of contagious emotion.  Here it is definitely reciprocal, felt in response to the 
people’s choice of them as leaders.  Joy in particular is one of the most contagious emotions, so it would make sense 
if the leaders and people all shared the affect of joy in the positive state form of aristocracy, as juxtaposed to the 
negative atmospheres of tyranny. 
523 It is logical that the next form must be aristocracy in Polybius’ narrative.  They exhibit courage and leadership 
just as the first monarch and king did.  They rule with rationality.  So, they are the next best element as leaders 
(προστάτας) for the people who would not be satisfied with a monarch any longer:  “τὸ μὲν τῆς βασιλείας καὶ 
μοναρχίας εἶδος ἄρδην ἀνῄρετο” (VI.8.1). 
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response to their own negative emotional reactions.  The aristocracy, likewise, feel glad at this 
honor.  Both positive emotions reaffirm the community in its adherence to their social norms.524 
Oligarchy 
 After the aristocrats hand power over to their descendants, the turn into oligarchy 
involves a turn to various private desires, as with the tyrants.525  Next, Polybius mentions the 
people’s reactions of φθόνος, μῖσος, and ὀργή.526  These reactions against oligarchs and tyrants 
mirror the reactions of προσκοπή and κατάγνωσις in the bystanders earlier:  their negative 
emotions originate in the people’s social behavioral standards, as both the tyrants’ and the 
oligarchs’ passions and the disrespectful and harmful examples oppose the public good through 
the outrageous treatment of others.527  Emotional reactions serve as a spark for rational, strategic 
planning and the overthrow of the oligarchs.528 
 In VI.9.2, Polybius describes what happens to the oligarchs and implicitly also the tyrants 
(οὓς μὲν φονεύσαντες, <οὓς δὲ φυγαδεύσαντες,>).529  The earlier passions and reactions lead 
up organically to violence in the overthrow of the rulers.  The (sanctioned) violence can be seen 
                                                 
524 Compare Helm 2014, 54 (quoted above). 
525 Polyb., VI.8.5-6.  “ὁρμήσαντες οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαργυρίαν ἄδικον, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ μέθας καὶ τὰς ἅμα 
ταύταις ἀπλήστους εὐωχίας, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν γυναικῶν ὕβρεις καὶ παίδων ἁρπαγάς, ταχὺ δὲ 
κατεσκεύασαν ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσι πάλιν τὰ παραπλήσια τοῖς ἄρτι ῥηθεῖσιν · διὸ καὶ παραπλήσιον συνέβαινε 
τὸ τέλος αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι τῆς καταστροφῆς τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τυράννους ἀτυχήμασι.”  Specifically, some oligarchs 
turn to greed and unjust love of money (πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαργυρίαν ἄδικον), a desire which did not occur in 
tyranny, but one which Plato and Aristotle closely connected with oligarchy.  Williams 2000, 131-148, esp. 132-133, 
states that this causes all degeneration.  Both Aristotle and Plato cite greed as a common factor in oligarchies:  Pl., 
Rep. 8.547b2-3, 8.550d-551a, 8.555c-e; Arist., Pol. 5.1302a38-b3, states that faction underlies all constitutional 
change.  With the new oligarchic rulers, excess characterizes all of their desires (ἀπλήστους).  They are all aimed 
towards self-indulgence rather than justification of their right to rule. Cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. 8.1160 b12-16, on self-
oriented rule.  Perhaps the oligarchs jostled for position with each other, which could not happen in tyranny. 
526 Polyb., VI.9.1, VI.4.9. 
527 Polyb.,  VI.6.3, VI.6.5, VI.6.6.  Ryffel, 193, connects the two reactions in the people against tyranny and oligarchy 
and ties them loosely to morality, but he does not link these reactions with the development of social values and the 
emotions at the beginning of the community. 
528 See Greenspan 1988, 7-14 and part II, on emotions as adaptive, that is, as the foundation for rational planning.  
See Greenspan 2000, esp. 469-475, on how emotions fit into longer term rational plans without losing their force in 
the moment. 
529 Added by Casaubon.  Printed in all recent editions.  This phrase provides a correlative δὲ to the μὲν clause.   
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to represent a more natural state where strength and might play the most important roles.530  The 
paradox in this stage comes from the fact that the violence stems from and backs the people’s 
reactions, which are based in their social sensibilities.  So, the demise of the worse constitutions 
starts with offended social values but concludes with force and political (and for some, personal) 
annihilation.  Bestial traits, such as strength and violence resurface for the overthrow of the 
worse form, and so do not belong solely on the other side of a dichotomy with reason.531  The 
processes of dynamic change, with social values backing emotions and the violence which 
results, shows this nuance.532 
 The people’s reactions create democracy out of oligarchy.  The people decide to take 
over affairs themselves (τὴν δὲ τῶν κοινῶν πρόνοιαν καὶ πίστιν εἰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς 
ἀνέλαβον).533  The people do not tolerate transgressions of their moral principles, whether 
considered unjust (τὴν ἀδικίαν) or from other oligarchic abuses.  Thus the people step up to 
establish a better state. 
Ochlocracy 
 
 Democracy begins on the premise that all the people would rule and keep in mind the 
public good, found in the accepted social behavioral standards preserved in the people thus far.  
In democracy, the people no longer represent the ruled subjects, but are themselves rulers.  
However, throughout democracy’s degeneration into ochlocracy, Polybius identifies two groups 
                                                 
530 Cf. Polyb., VI.5.7-9, VI.6.12. 
531 Such as seen in Pl., Plt. 301b10ff., 301a; Rep. 8.556b9-c1; Arist., Pol. 4.1292a32.  
532 Violence in constitutional change:  Hdt., 3.82; Pl., Rep. 8.566a, 8.557a2-5:  Δημοκρατία δή, οἶμαι, γίγνεται 
ὅταν οἱ πένητες νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἑτέρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐκβάλωσι. 
533 Polyb., VI.9.3. 
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of rulers:  those whom I shall call the ambitious people (ζητοῦσι πλέον ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν·  
μάλιστα δ’ εἰς τοῦτ’ ἐμπίπτουσιν οἱ ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπερέχοντες) and the crowds.534   
 This symbolizes a split in the collective group.  Even though the people, formerly the 
ruled or subjects in the state, now rule and share power, a dichotomy splits them into a more 
active group of politicians, who seek recognition and power, and the multitude.  Considerations 
of social norms and group benefit are also shattered:  reflection back to oneself as part of the 
community – and therefore to uphold the social norms for potential future personal benefit – no 
longer applies because that in-group (as defined by its norms) no longer exists as such.  Now, 
multiple groups with divergent (self-)interests, needs, and norms exist.535 
 Also, the state forms of democracy and ochlocracy do not feature the language of 
emotion in Polybius’ narrative.  However, I consider it imperative to include an analysis of this 
cycle’s dynamic change to contrast and so emphasize the critical importance of the emotions in 
the rest of the anacyclosis.  Ochlocracy brings into perspective just how much the emotions and 
their underlying values truly matter to the human community. 
 After power has been inherited and personal desire for more power has arisen, the 
ambitious group begins the degeneration into ochlocracy.536  Polybius specifies that the richer 
group (οἱ ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπερέχοντες) especially falls into wanting more than the rest (ζητοῦσι 
πλέον ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν), but he does not completely exclude the crowds by his specification 
“especially” (μάλιστα).  That fits into the sequence of this decline, for those with more already 
                                                 
534 Polyb., VI.9.5.  I alter my vocabulary for “τὸ πλῆθος” and “οἱ πολλοί” among “people,” “ruled,” or “subjects” 
to clarify the difference between the ruling groups and to emphasize the people’s new role as rulers as opposed to 
the ruled.  See Walbank 1998, esp. 203-204, on these words in the anacyclosis. 
535 See Kelly, Iannone, McCarthy 2014, 181-183, who note that intragroup differences may lead to further 
cooperation, but which also may lead to a split of common interest and thus hinder group productivity. 
536 Polyb., VI.9.5. 
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have an advantage in surpassing others.537  However, they do not convince the people that they 
should have more (μὴ δύνωνται δι’ αὑτῶν), as the level of decline is only beginning. 
 The ambitious people destroy their affairs by “enticing and corrupting the crowds in 
every way” (δελεάζοντες καὶ λυμαινόμενοι τὰ πλήθη κατὰ πάντα τρόπον), particularly 
through bribery.538  The crowds represent both those whose decisions matter in the government 
and those whom the government should benefit, as remarked upon in the transition to 
democracy (τὴν δὲ τῶν κοινῶν πρόνοιαν καὶ πίστιν εἰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀνέλαβον).539  The 
ambitious people corrupt (λυμαινόμενοι) the collective whom all public affairs concern, and so 
they contribute directly to the decline of democracy into ochlocracy. 
 In the next section, VI.9.7, the need for fame (διὰ τὴν ἄφρονα δοξοφαγίαν) of the 
ambitious rulers conditions the others to taking bribes (δωροδόκους καὶ δωροφάγους 
κατασκευάσωσι τοὺς πολλοὺς).540  The people (τοὺς πολλοὺς) seem merely the objects of 
the ambitious people’s efforts.  Plato, in an extended bee analogy, likens the poorer sections of 
democracy to the complacent drone bees, always reliant on their poor and ambitious friends’ 
efforts.541  Polybius’ model follows this to a degree.  The more ambitious ochlocrats condition 
the crowd to take a more passive role in the state, but they still do not possess full ruling power, 
and so they perpetuate ochlocracy. The people still do share in power to rule the state, despite 
their complacency, and so the ambitious politicians never can assume full, autocratic power.  
Ochlocracy continues because the people still hold nominal authority to rule as democrats. 
                                                 
537 See Williams, esp. 131-136, on the prevalence of this vice. 
538 Polyb., VI.9.6.  In the summary of the anacyclosis, Polybius mentions that ochlocracy comes about “Ἐκ δὲ τῆς 
τούτου πάλιν ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας” (VI.4.10).  These two vices (ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας) exemplify 
different factors than “τὸ φιλαρχεῖν” specifically.  However, they function more as terms characterizing the whole 
process of ochlocracy elaborated in VI.9.5-9. 
539 Polyb., VI.9.3.  Cf. VI.8.3. 
540 This helps to qualify how the ambitious people ruin their own affairs, VI.9.6.  On the word δοξοφαγία, see 
Walbank, HCP I.657.  This is the only usage in the extant Histories of Polybius. 
541 On complacency as characteristic of the crowds, see Pl., Rep. 8.564; Arist., Pol. 5.1303a13.  On ambition as 
characteristic of demagogues, see Pl. Plt., 301 b10f., Arist. Pol., 5.1312 a21. 
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 Nevertheless, the crowds degenerate through their own actions too.  They no longer 
represent subjects who preserve social rules and moral principles, as the people did in tyranny 
and oligarchy.  The crowd becomes accustomed to taking bribes (δωροδόκους καὶ 
δωροφάγους κατασκευάσωσι τοὺς πολλοὺς).  Instead of reacting emotionally to the 
ambitious people’s efforts to further their own personal interests (διὰ τὴν ἄφρονα 
δοξοφαγίαν), the people also fall prey to pursuit of personal gain, coopted by the ambitious 
group.  No indignation or hatred arises.  Because the crowds share in ruling power, they have 
lost their role as a reservoir of social morality and source of resistance.  Power corrupts the 
people, destroying their sense of community and hence any constraint against their pursuit of 
self-interest. 
   Polybius further expands on the significance of personal gain at public cost. In VI.9.8, 
the people live on others’ property (τὰ ἀλλότρια).  In the other worse constitutional forms, this 
stage would involve the subjects, but now no group represents the ruled, whose emotions 
brought correction to the state, and all forsake social values.542  Most importantly, the crowd 
takes action as sovereign power in its degenerate, complacent state.  This condition recalls the 
negative examples at the beginning of social values, which formed from people’s ability to put 
themselves in others’ places and to feel moral indignation at any mistreatment of others.543  The 
crowds live parasitically for their own private welfare at others’ expense, shown by their 
consumption of τὰ ἀλλότρια and living ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πέλας.  They represent those who 
mistreat others without reflection, and do not represent the ruled people or bystanders, who had 
decisively brought about the change for the better in earlier cycles. 
                                                 
542 Here may be an instance of the importance of the imbalance in power relationships.  No reciprocity or gratitude 
is due to a more powerful party; therefore, the state degenerates into ochlocracy. 
543 Polyb., VI.5.10-6.9. 
121 
 During these processes Polybius notes the change from democracy to ochlocracy.544  
Democracy is destroyed (καταλύεται) and is changed into force and violent rule (μεθίσταται 
δ’ εἰς βίαν καὶ χειροκρατίαν ἡ δημοκρατία).545  The moment of constitutional change 
happens almost imperceptibly.546  Instead of the rulers’ irresponsible turn to private desires and 
resulting emotional indignation from the ruled, the change into ochlocracy involves pursuit of 
personal ambition in both ruling groups.  Ochlocracy, contrary to tyranny and oligarchy, lacks 
any resistance from a ruled people who heed rationality and social standards and who are 
uncorrupted by the temptations of rule.  The ruled people, who had assiduously remained a 
repository of the social values which formed the basis for a community, no longer exist as such.  
The people do not reflect on their treatment of others and apply the others’ situation to 
themselves, thus forsaking rationality.547  They, as rulers of the ochlocratic state, become 
codependent and complicit with the ambitious people’s efforts to seek personal gain at public 
expense. 
 After they have chosen a leader, the people end or complete the rule of violence (τότε 
δὴ χειροκρατίαν ἀποτελεῖ).    This marks its peak, as the people’s emotions do for tyranny, 
except here the worse form continues on its trajectory, due to a lack of reactive emotions.  The 
anacyclosis narrative reverts further to bestialization when the people choose a leader 
(προστάτην) with the same characteristics of the primitive monarch and animal leaders 
(μεγαλόφρονα καὶ τολμηρόν).548  Polybius’ statement about this man’s penury 
(ἐκκλειόμενον δὲ διὰ πενίαν) echoes Plato’s description of the end of democracy into 
                                                 
544 Polyb., VI.9.7. 
545 καταλύεται most often describes monarchs throughout the narrative, so this usage with democracy is unique.  
See Mauersberger, Vol. 1.4, 1312-1313. 
546 See particularly Cole 1964, 462, and Walbank 1998, 218.  Zecchini 2006, 23, identifies in passing two 
‘intermediate’ stages between the larger stages of democracy and dissolution:  “demagogia e ochlocrazia.” 
547 Contra Polyb., VI.5.10-6.9. 
548 Polyb., VI.9.8; Cf. VI.5.7-9:  “τὸν τῇ σωματικῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ τῇ ψυχικῇ τόλμῃ διαφέροντα.” 
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tyranny.549  The leader can be seen as a demagogue, which both Plato and Aristotle identify as a 
factor in constitutional change.550  The ἐκκλειόμενος is mentioned as someone the masses 
choose, and he never actually functions as a subject in Polybius’ narrative.  Polybius sets up this 
figure as the last step in a checklist of actions taken by the people before ochlocracy is 
completed.  Polybius distinguishes the steps in the process clearly:  the people take the 
ἐκκλειόμενος as a leader, then indeed ochlocracy is completed, and then the people murder, 
and banish until, after they have turned to beasts, they find again a master and monarch.  There 
are many temporal markers (τότε δὴ . . . καὶ τότε . . . ἕως) between the choice of the 
ἐκκλειόμενος of ochlocracy and the discovery of the new monarch.551   
 With the characteristics of this ochlocratic, excluded leader, social rationality clearly has 
no place in ochlocracy.552  The crowd reverts to choosing a leader like the primitive monarch, 
before social values and rationality played a role in human life.  The ambitious people do not use 
                                                 
549 See Pl., Rep. 8.562e-563b on the demagogue’s transition into a tyrant.  In Polybius’ text, this man’s exclusion, 
“ἐκκλειόμενον δὲ διὰ πενίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τιμίων,” complicates ochlocracy, since theoretically everyone is 
entitled to some place of rule, although the rich have a head start on laying hold of public resources.  Choosing or 
following a leader in general took place also in the downfall of tyranny and oligarchy, except that the incensed 
subjects followed the leader, not the sovereign body.  Thus, this does not represent a new entire step; rather, new 
details and meaning are added in the case of ochlocracy. 
550 For the demagogue as bringer of state change, see Pl. Rep., 8.562e-563b, 567-569; Arist. Pol., 4.1297a1f., 5.1304 
b19f., 5.1305 b22, 5.1306 b22f., 5.1310 b16f. 
551 Thomas Cole, 462, interprets this figure, the ἐκκλειόμενος, as one existing within ochlocracy and also as the 
source of the slaughters, exiles, and land distributions.  His agency in these last actions terminates the independent 
rule of the people.  This interpretation anticipates the end of cheirocratia and transposes agency for actions done later, 
with the people (τὸ πλῆθος) still as the grammatical subject, back to the ἐκκλειόμενος.  F.W. Walbank 1995, 218, 
interprets the end of ochlocracy thus:   “Polybius does not say, though he perhaps implies, that this monarch, who 
in order to close the cycle has to correspond to the original leader of the primitive horde is the bold and ambitious 
poor man who has initiated the rule of violence.” Walbank assumes that the ἐκκλειόμενος controls the transition 
from democracy to cheirocratia.  Cole and Walbank see the ἐκκλειόμενος figure as a major agent in either the 
beginning or the completion of cheirocratia.  Polybius does not state either of these options so clearly.  Walbank’s 
assumption that this figure does have a say in instituting the slaughters, banishments, and land redistributions seems 
very likely, but this figure cannot also be the primitive monarch.  Polybius would not have used a verb of finding or 
discovering if the same man who had been the leader before were to be the new leader. 
552 My description and definition throughout falls closer to Max Weber’s concept of “value-rationality,” which 
promotes action based in some belief or value, as opposed to his concept of “instrumental rationality,” which 
promotes action in service of our own desires.  Weber specifies that value-rational action is done consciously for its 
own sake, which I do not think that Polybius’ text also depicts:  the people may show value-rationality through their 
social rationality, but whether they self-consciously act for these particular reasons is dubious.  See Kim 2012 for an 
overview of Weber’s thoughts rationality, and see Swedberg 2005, 126-127 and 287-288, for clear definitions and 
citations of Weber’s distinctions between value- and instrumental rationality. 
123 
reason or heed social values in their mindless hunger for distinction (τὴν ἄφρονα 
δοξοφαγίαν), the crowds forsake social rationality in not caring how they treat others and 
private property, and the leader is chosen only for his more natural and animal-like traits 
(μεγαλόφρονα καὶ τολμηρόν), not in combination with adherence to social rules and moral 
principles.553 
 The lack of rationality and social morality – and of the reactive emotions to reaffirm 
these, upheld in the ruled people of earlier state forms – leads to complete destruction of the 
political state, society, and semblance of human characteristics (ἀποτεθηριωμένον).  This 
implies that the semblance of an organized human community ends altogether.554  In noting this 
end of the state, Polybius shows that ochlocracy differs significantly from tyranny and oligarchy.  
There are no ruled people to act upon their social values, revolt, and overthrow the worse 
constitutional form.  Clearly, the ruled people’s role as a reserve of social morality and their 
rational emotional reactions constitute a crucial factor in determining and ensuring good 
governance in the anacyclosis. 
 As is now clear from the preceding analysis, in Polybius’ narrative, emotion is given no 
place in the state form of ochlocracy.  Collective emotion as rehabilitative for a state only works 
with the people uncorrupted by power.  However, I have included its analysis because it serves 
as a crucial comparison for the other cycles.  Ochlocracy and its demise defines the importance 
of the people as the reserve of social morality.  Only those uncorrupted by power and rule 
preserve a sense of morality and demonstrate this through the reactive emotions of indignation, 
hatred, and anger. 
                                                 
553 Contrast the new aristocrats, who share traits of boldness but who crucially rule for the common good, VI.8.3.  
Cf., also, the new democrats, VI.9.2. 
554 Walbank, HCP I.658, notes this cyclic return to the beginning of the cycle.  Ryffel 1949, 196, seems to my 
knowledge to have first noted this return to the beginning of the cycle, particularly in terms of bestialization. 
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The Collapse of the Mixed Constitution  
 Lastly of this part, I examine the decline of the mixed constitution.555  In our extant text, 
Polybius compares the Roman politeia’s exemplary institutions – such as the funeral oration, 
Roman superstition, and faithfulness in oaths and finance.556  VI.57 concludes Polybius’ entire 
Book Six “digression” (παρέκβασις) and covers the natural decline of a balanced politeia.557  
Here, Polybius does not name the mixed constitution, nor does he directly mention the Romans, 
though they are the target case, as understood through context.  While this section does not fall 
within the anacyclosis, the end of the mixed constitution follows a very similar process of moral 
degeneration leading to political demise, as found in ochlocracy and provides an addendum to 
Polybius’ anacyclosis, as the exposition of how states naturally change.558   
 Other scholars have noted the similarities between this passage and the passage 
concerning ochlocracy.559  These are very important:  a decline starting from heredity, desires 
and ambitions for private gain, and lack of rational judgment.560  Scholars have not specifically 
noted the absence of a ruled subject group who emotionally reacted against the rulers, according 
to their social values.   
 In the mixed constitution of VI.57 everyone has a share in ruling the state, just as in 
democracy and ochlocracy.561  While many issues could arise over how the power was actually 
                                                 
555 Polyb., VI.57. 
556 Polyb. VI.43-52, for comparison of constitutions (including Crete, Thebes, Athens, Carthage, and Sparta; 
Polybius brings up Plato to dismiss such a comparison between real lived states and theory).  See VI.53-56 for 
examples of virtuous Roman institutions, such as funeral orations, the valor of Horatius Cocles, superstition, and 
faithful oath-taking.  See Moore 1967 on the fragments of Book VI; see below for my approach on reading a 
fragmentary passage. 
557 Polyb., VI.57.1. 
558 Alonso-Núñez, 20, points out that Rome’s ability to be everlasting is unclear – VI.57 implies that it is not, while 
VI.18 implies it is.  VI.57’s decline and parallels to ochlocracy certainly outweigh the ambiguity, I think.  The 
comment of Walbank 1943, 76, “In short, when he was considering the mixed constitution Polybius was not 
concerned with the question of ultimate deterioration,” is hard to understand in light of VI.57’s obvious interest in 
the decline of the mixed constitution. 
559 Champion 2004a, 89-95; Cole, 480-481; Baronowski, 156; Longley, 75-78. 
560 Champion 2004a, 89-96, 186-193; Hahm 1995, 42-45; 2000, 475-476; 2009, 191-197; Williams 136. 
561 Polyb., VI.9.3. 
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wielded in these states, in Polybius’ theoretical construction the participation of all in a ruling 
position has a crucial effect on the process of decline.  As noted with ochlocracy before, the 
social reaction to the rulers’ indulgence of private desires is missing, since the subject people are 
also absent.  In the ‘pure’ mixed constitution, every group shares in power, so when a segment 
utterly disregards the balances established, civil strife, anarchy, and dissolution follow, as with 
ochlocracy.562   
 The process of change found in ochlocracy continues to recur in VI.57, as the people 
develop excessive desires for offices and other honors due to their ‘inherited’ prosperity from 
their forefathers’ conquests and world supremacy:   
“For whenever the state, having come through many great dangers and after 
these has come to arrogant and unceasing power, it is clear that, since happiness 
dwells in it to a large extent, their lives become more luxurious, and the men 
become more competitive than necessary in offices and other pursuits.”563  
 
Private gain leads to both ambition and complacency, and so the mixed state will eventually end 
from internal faction between its groups:  “As these tendencies continue, the love of power and 
shame from lack of repute will begin the change to the worse, and in addition to these, 
ostentatiousness and extravagance will begin in their lives.”564  The qualities here mirror the want 
for more and private gain found in ochlocracy.565 
 Then, the people both react against and in accordance with those who want more than 
their share of power:  “The people will make a start of the change to worse whenever they will 
                                                 
562 Lintott, 218, makes the interesting remark that stasis is embodied in Rome’s constitution, much like ochlocracy. 
563 Polyb., VI.57.5.  “Ὁταν γὰρ πολλοὺς καὶ μεγάλους κινδύνους διωσαμένη πολιτεία μετὰ ταῦτα εἰς 
ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον ἀφίκηται, φανερὸν ὡς εἰσοικιζομένης εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς 
εὐδαιμονίας συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν βίους γίνεσθαι πολυτελεστέρους, τοὺς δ’ ἄνδρας φιλονεικοτέρους τοῦ 
δέοντος περί τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιβολάς.”  Polybius expounds more on the private desires and want 
for more power in VI.57.6-7.  See Hahm 2000, 476. 
564 Polyb., VI.57.6.  “Ὧν προβαινόντων ἐπὶ πλέον ἄρξει μὲν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς ἡ φιλαρχία καὶ τὸ 
τῆς ἀδοξίας ὄνειδος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ περὶ τοὺς βίους ἀλαζονεία καὶ πολυτέλεια.”  See too Hahm 2009, 196-
197. 
565 The terminology here is close to what Williams 2000 discusses and traces.  These terms fall closer to desires than 
emotions.  See Deonna and Teroni, 28-40 for modern distinctions between these categories; see Champion 2004a, 
241-244 on the classifications of these terms within Polybius. 
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seem to be injured by [some ambitious people] because of their greediness, and flattered by 
[other ambitious people], they are puffed up by flattery from the ambitious politicians’ love of 
power.”566  The people focus on their own personal interest in this passage.  First, they, like the 
crowds of ochlocracy, do not reward the ambitious people in their greed.  The people of the 
mixed constitution consider themselves wronged, and so would not deliberately reward others 
for that, as though they were following social behavioral standards.  At the same time the people 
are flattered by others of the ambitious people (κολακευόμενος διὰ τὴν φιλαρχίαν), 
prioritizing their own personal gain, and hence abandoning their moral principles.567  The 
ambitious people rely on the people for more offices, and the people rely on the ambitious ones 
to flatter them and fulfill their private needs. 
 As with the turn into ochlocracy, the collective splits into separate in- and out-groups.  
With this split, the shared collective norms (and emotions to reinforce and give valuation to 
them) also become disjointed.  The ambitious people and the regular people prioritize differently 
and diverge in both their valuations and self-interest as member of the unified social group.568 
 After this, like oligarchy, excessive private desires invade public policy and through anger 
overturn the balance:  “For then, having been provoked, and considering everything with 
passion, the people no longer will want to obey nor to have an equal share with the leaders but 
will want to have everything and the majority share itself.”569  Here the people grow angry 
(ἐξοργισθείς), but they do so without recourse to morality, instead using only their passionate 
spirit (θυμῷ πάντα βουλευόμενος), unlike the people under oligarchy or tyranny.  These 
people of the degenerating mixed constitution were injured then flattered because of the 
                                                 
566 Polyb., VI.57.7.  “λήψεται δὲ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς ὁ δῆμος, ὅταν ὑφ’ ὧν μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι δόξῃ διὰ 
τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὑφ΄ ὧν δὲ χαυνωθῇ κολακευόμενος διὰ τὴν φιλαρχίαν.” 
567 For the people’s turn to personal gain, see VI.57.8. 
568 As analyzed also in modern studies; see Kelly, Iannone, and McCarthy 2014, 181-183. 
569 Polyb., VI.57.8.  “Τότε γὰρ ἐξοργισθείς, καὶ θυμῷ πάντα βουλευόμενος, οὐκέτι θελήσει πειθαρχεῖν οὐδ’ 
ἴσον ἔχειν τοῖς προεστῶσιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτός.” 
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ambitious politicians’ greediness, but they go on to want the most for themselves (ἀλλὰ 
[θελήσει ἔχειν] πᾶν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτός) – the same vice they grew furious at!  This type 
of anger, reliant on irrational deliberation, leads them to pursue their own, excessive personal 
interest, contrasting the negative reactive emotions of the anacyclosis, which supported 
communal values. 
 These people feel the right emotion for the wrong reasons.  Moreover, the people 
deliberate in the wrong way, through θυμός and not λογισμός.  As we noticed in Chapter 2, 
θυμός throughout the Histories always is negative and irrational, and as such is unique among 
emotions in this work.  In Polybius, desire, ἐπιθυμία, and passion, θυμός, both carry negative 
connotations.570  Here, the people wish to take more power for themselves, which undermines 
the balanced nature of this type of politeia:  self-interest drives their emotions and deliberations, 
forsaking the communal values and the rationality which governed those. 
 Through this merging of emotional reactions with pursuit of personal gain, the change 
from the mixed constitution mirrors the dynamic changes into both democracy and ochlocracy, 
as Polybius states, “When this has happened, the state will take over the best of names, freedom 
and democracy, but it takes over the worst in deeds, ochlocracy.”571  While the occurrence of 
anger creates similarity to democracy’s origin, the social morality underlying emotions does not 
exist here in the decline of the mixed constitution.  This absence of social morality as motivation 
shifts for the mixed constitution to the model of ochlocracy.  Because the mixed constitution’s 
people lacked social behavioral standards and moral principles – and rational reactive emotions – 
                                                 
570 See Champion 2004a for further and detailed argumentation on this point.  See especially the appendix on 
Polybian language of barbarism, 241-244, which includes addressing terms of excessive personal desires, not 
emotions. 
571 Polyb., VI.57.9.  “Οὗ γενομένου τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων τὸ κάλλιστον ἡ πολιτεία μεταλήψεται, τὴν 
ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν, τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων τὸ χείριστον, τὴν ὀχλοκρατίαν.” 
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in their reasons for change, they too find themselves in a degenerate state, despite all the benefits 
of the mixed constitution.572 
 In ascribing an important role to the people and their emotions, Polybius’ description of 
constitutional change differs notably from his philosophical predecessors.573  For Polybius, 
rationality, inherent in social behavioral standards and moral principles, was exhibited by the 
ruled people in their emotional reactions to rulers’ excesses.  The people and no one else 
retained their rational capacities of reflection and predictive application of a situation to 
themselves.  When bad rulers provoked this sensibility, the people violently reacted with anger, 
hate, and indignation and actively transformed the state – until the final state of ochlocracy. 
 Plato and Aristotle, by contrast, do not appear to portray the people as a reserve of social 
values and moral judgment, nor do they portray the people’s emotions as rationally based.  The 
subjects in Plato and Aristotle’s texts on constitutional change do react resentfully against the 
rulers, but they are motivated more by personal injury and self-interest, than by consideration of 
social and moral standards. 
 Plato, in his description of constitutional changes in Book Eight of the Republic, describes 
the resentment among the people as arising from personal wants, not concern for the common 
good.  In particular, he describes the people as “Some owing debts, other having become 
injured, some suffering both, hating and plotting against those who took possession of their 
                                                 
572 Polyb., VI.57.9.  See Champion 2004a, 75, 80-82. 
573 Many commonalities exist, though:  on heredity, see Arist., Pol. 4.1292 a39f., 5.1313 a10-1316 a16.  On luxury as 
a cause of decline, Pl., Rep. 8.556 b-c; Arist., Pol. 5.1302 b3f., 1303 b33, 5.1305 b39.  On passions, Pl., Plt. 301 b10; 
Pl., Rep. 8.562d-e; Leg. 3.691A, 695B, 701B; Arist., Pol. 5.1310 b40f.  See Arist. Pol. 4.1301 b-1302 a, on the primacy 
of internal faction for constitutional change.  On reactions:  Pl. Rep., 8.555d9-e2; Arist. Pol., 5.1312 b17-19.  On 
violence in transitions, Pl., Rep. 8.557a2-5, 8.566a; Hdt., 3.82.  On ambition, see Pl., Plt. 301 b10f., Arist., Pol. 5.1312 
a21.  On demagogues in earlier Greek constitutional philosophy:  Pl., Rep. 8.562e-563b, 567-569; Arist., Pol. 
4.1297a1f., 5.1304 b19f., 5.1305 b22, 5.1306 b22f., 5.1310 b16f.  For further summary of commonalities and 
research on Polybius’ sources, see Ryffel, esp. 186, 203-220, and Cole 1964. 
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property and against the rest, they love a revolution.”574  Personal debt and dishonor, and 
especially their personal loss of property at oligarchs’ hands, cause the people to hate and plot, 
besides the fact that they generally love new revolutionary things.  The emotions here are 
personal and entirely self-interested, not the same sort of reactive emotions seen in the 
anacyclosis (and in Helm’s theory). 
 Aristotle, in Book Five of the Politics on the various causes of change of state forms, does 
not present the people as a collective foundation for rationally based social rules and moral 
principles, nor does he focus on reason as a basis for the emotions and reactions against rulers.  
The insurgents focus on their self-interest in comparison with the rulers:  “For they, both being 
dishonored and seeing other people honored, revolt.”575  He sums up revolt as stemming from 
inequality,  
“For some, desiring equality, revolt since they think that they have less though 
they are equal to those with more, and others, desiring inequality and superiority, 
suppose that they do not have more but rather have equal or less, though they 
are unequal (and of these, some are stirred up justly, and others unjustly).”576 
 
 Both earlier authors tend to attribute constitutional change to personal desires and 
individual self-interest.577  Lastly, internal stasis for Aristotle and Plato is begun within the ruling 
class or by demagogic leaders, whereas for Polybius the ruled people first react emotionally, and 
                                                 
574 Pl., Rep. 8.555d9-e2.  “οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντές τε καὶ 
ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὑτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες.” 
575 Arist., Pol. 5.1302b11-12.  “καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι καὶ ἄλλους ὁρῶντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν.”  
Cf. also 5.1302b21-23, 5.1302b25-27. 
576 Arist., Pol., 5.1302a24-29. “οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰσότητος ἐφιέμενοι στασιάζουσιν ἂν νομίζωσιν ἔλαττον ἔχειν ὄντες 
ἴσοι τοὶς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἀνισότητος καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν ὄντες ἄνισοι μὴ πλέον 
ἔχειν ἀλλ’ ἴσον ἢ ἔλαττον (τούτων δ’ ἔστι μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι δικαίως, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως).”  This perception of 
the lack of equality where it should be comes close to the emotion of φθόνος, as I discussed in Chapter 1.  See 
Konstan 2003 and Walcot 1978, esp. 30-31, on the development of the concept of equality with this emotion.  This 
emotion, φθόνος, only is named once within Polybius’ anacyclosis, in the list of emotions rising against the tyrants, 
VI.7.8. 
577 On personal desires and self-interest as a cause of decline:  Pl. Rep., 550d7-9, 551a, 555c1-5; Polit. 301b10; Leg. 
3.690e, 3.695b; Arist., Pol. 5.1302b1 ff.  Besides this, they attribute the difference in good and bad constitutions not 
to a sense of social morality in the people but to adherence to law.  While social values and laws surely have much in 
common, the language of Plato and Aristotle puts great emphasis on law where Polybius completely omits it.  On 
lawlessness specifically as the cause of decline:  Pl. Rep., 8.556a4-b4, 563d; Polit. 291e1-5, 294a, 301a-b; Leg. 3.701b; 
Arist., Pol. 4.1292a, 4.1293a32. 
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then leaders of revolt emerge from the nobler members.578  For Polybius, emotion stimulated the 
people with a reason to revolt and to bring about change for the better most of all because their 
moral sensibilities were offended.   
 The people’s reactions play a central role in Polybius’ model for internal state change, 
and they have a deciding role in how they are ruled and in how good governance is realized.  In 
contrast to Aristotle and Plato’s emphasis on class in constitutional change, Polybius 
characterized state change with social morality.  In accordance with Polybius’ practical educative 
purpose for the anacyclosis, this model could tell how personal action can affect how they are 
governed – through paying heed to social morality and acting against its transgressions.579  
Nevertheless, Polybius’ models of the anacyclosis’ inevitable end in ochlocracy and the mixed 
constitution’s eventual demise warn that ruling power corrupts even the people, to the extent 
that they can no longer fulfill their moralizing function.  Polybius argues that a public 
dispassionate about the transgressions of social behavioral standards by rulers only forsakes its 
moral duty and contributes to the decline of the state. 
 
Part II:  Agathocles’ Downfall 
 At XV.25-33, Polybius provides one of his most vivid and detailed narratives:  that of 
the courtier Agathocles’ accession to power in Alexandria and subsequent downfall in 203 BC.  
This passage falls in the category of extreme changes of fortune, a favorite theme of historians 
going back to Herodotus.  It also exhibits similar emotional processes we analyzed in the 
anacyclosis.  This passage provides a narrative parallel to the theory of Book Six through 
                                                 
578 See Polyb. VI.9.1.  On internal origins of dissent, see Pl., Rep., 8.545d1-2, 546a1-5 556e5-6; Leg. 3.683e; Arist., 
Pol. 5.1301b1 ff., 5.1304a33 ff. and passim 1304-1313 in discussions of the various types of constitutional changes. 
579 Polyb., VI.2.8-10, 3.4, 9.11. 
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emotions and their morality.  I intend to show from Polybius’ narrative of Agathocles’ regime 
just how crucial emotions are for “the business of history,” in John Marincola’s phrase.580   
 Scholarship has not focused on the emotions involved in Agathocles’ downfall.  Instead, 
scholarship has focused on how reprehensible the violence of the people is in this passage.581  
Arthur Eckstein, in his discussion of Polybius’ negative opinion of the masses in Moral Vision in 
Polybius’ Histories, uses this passage as the marker of the catastrophic involvement of the people 
in politics:  “It is not surprising, then, that Polybius deemed that the success of an angry plēthos in 
interfering with the running of the state to be the gateway to catastrophe.  The anger of the 
Alexandrian mob in 203 leads to scenes of horror as the government of Agathocles is bloodily 
overthrown.”582  He further identifies aspects from this passage which exemplify the negative 
paradigms of the greed of mercenaries, Polybius’ contempt for demagogic leaders (with 
Agathocles listed as an example), excessive drinking, and women’s emotional intrusion into 
public life.583  The Agathocles passage has been seen by others too as indicative of purely 
negative characteristics.584  All of these examples further Eckstein’s broader observations and 
purpose, but they are not considered in the context of the narrative episode.  Eckstein’s 
comments particularly on the intrusion into politics by the people and by women do not take 
into consideration the causes Polybius attributes for such “intrusion.”  In his discussion of 
human character, however, Eckstein does acknowledge causes:  “The dark situation here is 
                                                 
580 Marincola 2013, 80.   
581 McGing 2010,  28-29, 70, notes Polybius’ criticism of dwelling on unworthy characters such as Agathocles and 
on sensationalism only after ten long sections.  Dreyer 2013, 211, however, comments on Polybius’ details as 
stemming from Ptolemaic court sources, and Polybius does note that other ancient writers covered this passage’s 
contents in his historiographical commentary section, to which other scholars tend to direct their focus.  On a larger 
narratological scale, Champion 2004a, 147, classifies Agathocles as one among many failed individuals in the extant 
Books VII-XV.  All these scholars do not center their analyses on this particular passage, but rather use it as an 
example of a (negative) observation.  See also Walbank 1972, 111-112; Walbank 1990, 231; Marincola 2013, 84-85. 
582 Eckstein 1995, 132.  This stance ignores the blood-stained nature of the government which is “bloodily 
overthrown.”  Further on popular intrusion into politics, see 132-136, 247. 
583 On the greed of mercenaries, Eckstein 1995, 125-127; Polybius’ contempt of demagogic leaders (with 
Agathocles), 139; excessive drinking, 141, 286-287; and women’s emotional intrusion into public life, 152-153. 
584 Walbank 1979, 59; Eckstein 1995, 37,  esp. 136, 151-152, 246; Champion 2004a, 28; McGing 2010, 28-29. 
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exacerbated by yet another human trait:  just as people react with loyalty to kind treatment from 
the powerful (4.33.7), so they tend to react with hatred to the cruel and arrogant treatment of the 
powerful,” using Agathocles as an example for this trait.585  Eckstein’s focus both in this 
statement and throughout lies with the violent result of people’s emotions, not the causes and 
their underlying values.  Whether Polybius would approve or disapprove of the result of the 
people’s “intrusions” does not concern Eckstein in this work. 
 I emphasize the moral role of the people, who are the subjects feeling these collective 
emotions.  The people’s emotions reaffirm human society’s basic social and moral norms.  The 
reactive emotions in XV.25-33 function in the same ways as the emotions of the anacyclosis.  
Communal values cause emotions in the people.  When people perceive transgressions of others’ 
basic human rights and harm of innocent members of the community, they react emotionally, as 
do the people in Polybius’ theory of the anacyclosis.  XV.25-33 relates the violent overthrow of 
Agathocles after he usurps power as prime minister and abuses his subjects in this position.  The 
people play a major role through their emotional reactions to these transgressions and in their 
motivation to violent action sparked by these emotions. 
 Unfortunately, Polybius’ narrative is fragmentary due to its preservation only in the 
Byzantine Constantinian Excerpts and in the Excerpta Antiqua of Polybius’ manuscript 
tradition.586  The order of some of the episodes is still uncertain, and it is unknown how much of 
                                                 
585Eckstein 1995, 247. 
586 The Constantinian Excerpts, compiled from Greek historians under Roman power by the Byzantine emperor 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the 10th century, provide XV.25.1-2 and XV.20-25 in the De Virtutibus et Vitiis 
(Turonensis 980 ‘Peirescianus’), and XV.26a and XV.34.1-36.11 in the De Sententiis (Vaticanus gr. 73).  Both of these 
Constantinian selections survive each in a single manuscript, both dating to the 10th-11th centuries.  The Excerpta 
Antiqua, preserved in some manuscripts with the whole of Books I-V and in some manuscripts alone, provide 
XV.26-36.10.  Thus, the only overlap between these two traditions is the historiographical digression from XV.34-
XV.36.10.  For the best analysis of Polybius’ manuscript tradition, see Moore 1965. 
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the rest of the passage has been lost.587  For these reasons, reconstructing the complete record of 
events and the causal connections between these events is difficult.588   
 Polybius is our main source for these historical events.589  However, Agathocles is 
attested elsewhere as a courtier of Ptolemy IV (who reigned from February 221 to August 204 
BC).  Besides the accusations of Agathocles’ being Ptolemy IV’s ἐρώμενος, which Tlepolemos 
makes in Polybius’ narrative, not much can be said about Agathocles’ earlier career, except that 
he is thought to have aided Sosibios and Ptolemy IV at the battle of Raphia and that he was a 
priest of Alexander in 216/215 BC.590   
Emotions against Agathocles’ regime 
 Ptolemy IV and his sister-wife Arsinoë III died in mysterious and suspicious 
circumstances in autumn 204 BC, leaving a child, Ptolemy V, to become the next king.591  
Sosibios, who died shortly thereafter, and Agathocles were named in a forged (πεπλασμένην) 
will as the boy’s guardians.592  Polybius says that after Sosibios and Agathocles ended the funerals 
and official mourning the real nature of Arsinoë’s death came out, for when all heard that she 
died, they inquired about how it happened.  Since no one gave any other pretext, the true 
                                                 
587 See Maas 1949, 443-446, on reconstructing the order. 
588 My focus, a moral one, aligns greatly with the Constantinian Excerpts of the De Sententiis (manuscript M), which 
Champion 2004a, 26 note 46, notes contains the largest amount of Polybian moralizing and digressive passages. 
589 See Walbank, HCP II.434-437, 480-496 on the historical importance of Polybius’ narrative.  Unfortunately, no 
other extant source focuses on these events. 
590 See Walbank, HCP I.588 and HCP II.437-438 for citations and discussion.  See Maas 1945, 74, on the papyri 
concerning Agathocles and his family. 
591 Polyb., XV.25.1(3)-2(4).  This passage is the main historical source for the succession of Ptolemy V and the 
deaths of Arsinoë III and Ptolemy IV.  Polyb., XIV.12.5 creates suspicion that he recorded Ptolemy IV’s death here, 
in summer 204 BC, whereas the events of XV.25-33 were to have taken place that fall.  See Walbank, HCP II.434-
437 on the details and issues of chronology.   
    I use the numbering system used and order of the text from the latest critical edition (Budé) by Foulon and Weil, 
2003.  The Büttner-Wobst section numbers are in parentheses where they differ (as above), as this has been 
considered the standard edition.  For the manuscript tradition here, see Walbank, HCP II.22-23; Foulon and Weil 
2003, 7. 
592 Polyb., XV.25.3(5). 
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manner (τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν γεγονὸς) was stamped upon everyone’s minds.593  Arsinoë III’s 
suspected murder caused signs of mourning, interpreted as signs of emotion and especially 
hatred (μῖσος) against Agathocles. 
 Polybius does not doubt that Arsinoë was murdered, as seen in his narration of rumor 
(or lack thereof) concerning it.  This by itself does not specify murder, but later statements do.  
At XV.25.2, Polybius lists those of whom Sosibios had arranged murders (ἀρτῦσαι φόνον), and 
Arsinoë falls fifth in this list.  At XV.25.12(9), in the context of Agathocles’ arrangement of 
governmental posts, Polybius introduces Philammon as “the one in charge of the murder of 
Arsinoë” (Φιλάμμωνα τὸν ἐπιστάντα τῷ τῆς Ἀρσινόης φόνῳ).  This assumes Arsinoë’s 
murder as well enough established to back the introduction of a new character.594  Lastly, 
Polybius argues that the death of Deinon, a government official, was justified, in fact, as 
Agathocles’ most just deed.595  Deinon had known about the plot to murder Arsinoë, did 
nothing, and later spoke of his regret for not trying to save her.  Polybius’ entire tale about 
Deinon presupposes the murder of Arsinoë by Agathocles’ regime. 
 Unfortunately our extant Polybian text only relates her (and Ptolemy IV’s) funeral and 
not the narration of their deaths.  However, we have a fragment from John of Antioch, a sixth 
century Byzantine historian whose Historia mundi is also partly preserved in the Constantinian 
Excerpts.  John relates that Agathocleia, Agathocles’ sister, had Arsinoë killed after Ptolemy IV’s 
death (ἡ Ἀγαθόκλεια Ἀρσινόην διαφθείρει δόλῳ).596  John’s text specifies Agathocleia as 
                                                 
593 Polyb., XI.25.6(8).  Τοῦ γὰρ θανάτου φωτισθέντος ὁ τρόπος ἐπεζητεῖτο τῆς ἀπωλείας · οὐκ οὔσης δὲ 
προφάσεως ἄλλης οὐδεμιᾶς, τῆς ἀληθινῆς φήμης προσπεπτωκυίας, ἀκμὴν δ’ ἀμφισβητουμένης, τὸ κατ’ 
ἀλήθειαν γεγονὸς ἐν ταῖς ἑκάστων γνώμαις ἐπεσφραγίσθη. 
594 XV.33.11 echoes this phrase: τὸν Φιλάμμωνα . . . τὸν ἐπιστάντα τῷ φόνῳ τῆς βασιλίσσης.  Philammon and 
his family’s deaths only occur because Arsinoë’s friends perceived him as her assassin. 
595 Polyb., XV.26a.1. 
596 John Ant. fg. 54.  See Müller Fragmenta historicorum graecorum IV.558, along with Walbank HCP II.482.  John’s text 
also states that Ptolemy IV put aside his queen for a hetaira.  While the names do not consistently match up, it is 
clear that this refers to Arsinoë being put aside for Agathocleia. 
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initiating the murder of Arsinoë, which also implicates her in the guilt of Agathocles’ regime, and 
Polybius too presupposes the murder of Arsinoë by Agathocles and Agathocleia.  Lastly, 
Polybius fully implicates Agathocleia in the demise of Arsinoë and the rise of Agathocles 
through his offhand statement identifying her at XIV.5.  Here he is discussing the influence of 
courtesans and says of Agathocleia, “and over the king Ptolemy Philopator (IV) did not 
Agathocleia the courtesan rule – she who also overthrew the entire palace (ἡ καὶ πᾶσαν 
ἀνατρέψασα τὴν βασιλείαν)?”597  After the death of Arsinoë, the child Ptolemy V is entrusted 
to the care of Agathocleia and Agathocles’ mother, Oenanthe, reflecting Agathocleia’s further 
success in transferring power from the legitimate queen to herself.598  Agathocleia’s involvement, 
as reflected by John of Antioch and Polybius’s own hints, will hold significance for 
understanding why the people direct their emotions and violence against her and Oenanthe as 
well.599  
 The very first emotion of our passage arises at XV.25.8(10).  The people, the 
Alexandrian community, reflect upon Arsinoë III’s life and all that she undeservedly suffered:  
her orphanhood, the hubris against her while alive, and her assassination.600  This provokes tears, 
goodwill for Arsinoë, and hatred towards Agathocles’ regime.601  Because the people did not 
believe Arsinoë deserved to be murdered (or to suffer throughout her life), they hated the 
                                                 
597 Polyb., XIV.11.5.  Τοῦ δὲ Φιλοπάτορος βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου οὐκ Ἀγαθόκλεια ἡ ἑταίρα ἐκράτει ἡ καὶ 
πᾶσαν ἀνατρέψασα τὴν βασιλείαν; 
598 Polyb., XV.25.12. 
599 Agathocleia is implicated further in Agathocles’ regime directly in the anger felt at XV.25.28(25), participates in 
his plea to the troops at XV.26.1 and in his withdrawal into the palace specifically at XV.31.13. 
600 Polyb., XV.25.7(9).  ἀνανεούμενοι τινὲς μὲν τὴν ὀρϕανίαν αὐτῆς, ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῷ ζῆν ὕβριν, 
ἣν ὑπέμεινε, καὶ τὴν αἰκίαν, σὺν δὲ τούτοις τὸ περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ἀτύχημα, εἰς τοσαύτην παράστασιν 
ἐνέπιπτον καὶ δυσθυμίαν ὥστε πλήρη γενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν στεναγμοῦ, δακρύων, οἰμωγῆς ἀκαταπαύστου. 
601 Ibid., XV.25.8(10).  Ταῦτα δ’ ἦν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις οὐχ οὕτω τῆς πρὸς Ἀρσινόην εὐνοίας τεκμήρια, 
πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα μίσους.  “But these things were for those reckoning 
correctly not so much signs of goodwill towards Arsinoë but rather more [signs] of hatred towards Agathocles.”  
These two results of εὔνοια and μῖσος have different objects – Arsinoë and Agathocles.  The tears’ meaning 
depends on the onlooker, placing key significance in an internal fourth party.  So, opposite but complementary 
emotions can exist at the same time, such as pity towards one object and hatred towards another object, especially 
in a collective.   
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perpetrators.  That is, they consider it wrong that Agathocles and his group caused Arsinoë to 
suffer.  Thus we see in the very first negative reactive emotion a parallel to Helm’s theory of 
communal, third-party reactive emotion based upon moral standards.  Harm to an innocent or 
even a benefactor is unacceptable, just as we saw in the development of the community in the 
anacyclosis.602 
 Agathocles counteracts the hatred against him by paying the soldiers two months’ wages 
as an indulgence.603  However, he fails to manage the emotions against him. While emotional 
management of others is not a dominant theme in the Histories, several successful leaders do 
directly influence and change others’ emotions towards themselves.604  Aratus in the assembly of 
the Achaians completely reverses their indignation against him, as does Hannibal with the anger 
of the Carthaginians.605  These successful leaders first acknowledge the negative emotions against 
them and then work to reestablish their position in society by bringing up and calling to mind 
the moral values which underlie such emotions.  Agathocles recognizes the negative emotions 
against him but fails both to acknowledge them and to identify their underlying social and moral 
values.606  Here, Agathocles fails to recognize both the intensity of hatred against him and makes 
the wrong move:  he assumes that for others, like himself, self-interest trumps emotional 
                                                 
602 Polyb., VI.6.2-9.  See Helm 2014, 47-60.  Although Polybius mentions both reactions of goodwill and hatred of 
the tears and mourning, one has greater effect in the subsequent narrative.  Mῖσος proves more important than 
εὔνοια for the future, for this is the first of many times μῖσος is mentioned concerning Agathocles.  This hatred 
seems latent already.  It just takes some signs and right-thinking people to recognize its existence.  Reflection on the 
undeserved suffering of Arsinoë III, to the benefit of Agathocles, causes the demonstration of this μῖσος.  Those 
who reason correctly are the first to note this hatred, which plays a major role in the subsequent narrative.  From 
this, we can say that rational thinkers thus also are expected to have keen awareness and recognition of emotions as 
well as other rational arguments.  Emotional intelligence is important for Polybius’ world. 
603 Polyb., XV.25.11.  πρῶτον μὲν διμήνου τὰς δυνάμεις ὠψωνίασε πεπεισμένος τὸ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς μῖσος 
ἀμβλύνειν διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ λυσιτελὲς ὁρμῆς αὐτῶν. 
604 Polyb., XV.25.11, XV.25.23(20).  IV.14.2-8; XV.19.3, XI.28, and XI.34.3 for the best examples of individuals’ 
successful management and negotiation of others’ emotions.  See Guelfucci 1986, 227-237, on how masterful 
generals can and do manage fear consistently. 
605 Polyb., IV.14.2-8; XV.19.3. 
606 Thus, Agathocles, like the tyrants, separates himself from the community.  He fails to feel any self-reactive 
emotion, such as guilt, as per Helm 2014, 54. 
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moralism.607  The pay Agathocles distributes only blunts the potency of the negative emotions 
but does not dispel the hate towards him; he certainly does not reverse the negative feeling 
against him as we saw Aratus do.608 
 After removing the esteemed and competent men, sending out his own friends on 
embassies, and enlisting his own group of mercenaries, Agathocles, similar to the tyrants and 
oligarchs in Polybius’ anacyclosis, gets excessively drunk and rapes matrons, brides, and 
maidens.609  Moreover, he carries out all these immoral and transgressive behaviors with the 
most vile ostentation.610  Such behavior resembles the transgressions observed throughout the 
anacyclosis, harming and taking undue advantage of others for one’s own self-interest.611  
Polybius follows Agathocles’ behavior with this statement:   
“From this with much indignation of all sorts occurring, but without any care or 
aid being offered, but the opposite, with outrage, arrogance, and negligence 
added on, again the previous hatred arose up in the many (τοῖς πολλοῖς) and all 
(πάντες) remembered the previous misfortunes concerning the royal house 
because of these people.”612   
 
Agathocles clearly harms the women he rapes and their families.613  However, his actions not 
only stir indignation and hatred in these personal victims but in the many and all.  The whole 
community feels the whole spectrum of feelings of indignation (πολλῆς μὲν καὶ παντοδαπῆς 
                                                 
607 An important note of interest in this sentence is the people’s inclination towards profit.  This assimilates them to 
the people of ochlocracy (VI.9.5-8) and the degenerate mixed constitution (VI.57.6, VI.57.8).  However, these 
people do not forget entirely their reactive emotions, nor the social values which underlie them. 
608 Polyb., IV.14.8.  Agathocles’ bribery works well enough for Agathocles to resume his usual habits, which in turn 
lead to our major instance of all three negative emotions at XV.25.26(23)-XV.25.28(25). 
609 Ibid., XV.25.25(22).  αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς ἐν μέθῃ διέτριβε καὶ ταῖς τῇ μέθῃ 
παρεπομέναις ἀκρασίαις, οὐ φειδόμενος οὔτ’ ἀκμαζούσης γυναικὸς οὔτε νύμφης οὔτε παρθένου, καὶ 
πάντα ταῦτα ἔπραττε μετὰ τῆς ἐπαχθεστάτης φαντασίας. 
610 μετὰ τῆς ἐπαχθεστάτης φαντασίας. 
611 Polyb., VI.6.2, VI.6.4, VI.6.6, VI.6.8, VI.7.7, and VI.8.5. 
612 Polyb., XV.25.26(23)-27(24).  “Ὅθεν πολλῆς μὲν καὶ παντοδαπῆς γινομένης δυσαρεστήσεως, οὐδεμιᾶς δὲ 
θεραπείας οὐδὲ βοηθείας προσαγομένης, τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ προσεπαγομένης ὕβρεως, ὑπερηφανίας, 
ῥᾳθυμίας, ἀνεθυμιᾶτο πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ προϋπάρχον μῖσος καὶ πάντες ἀνενεοῦντο τὰ 
προγεγενημένα περὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀτυχήματα διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τούτους.” 
613 Agathocles’ habits of drinking and debauchery match the tyrants’ and oligarchs’; VI.7.7 and VI.8.5.  See also for 
examples of this stereotype of tyranny, Pl., Leg. 3.695B, and as a ruling class fault, Arist., Pol. 1302a38-b3, 1295b9-
11.  See Eckstein 1995, 286ff. on Agathocles as an example of drunkenness and debauchery and their role in leading 
to violence. 
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γινομένης δυσαρεστήσεως).  Such feelings of indignation react explicitly (ὅθεν) to 
Agathocles’ transgressions of communal standards of acceptable behavior.  Agathocles’ behavior 
jeopardizes the community’s integrity and common respect:  if the particular women whom 
Agathocles raped and their families as members of the community are open to such disrespect 
and undeserved suffering, then no one in the community is guaranteed respect for their basic 
human dignity and safety.614  Polybius’ narrative traces the same behaviors Helm discusses in his 
philosophy of communal emotion and the course of human behavior in his own anacyclosis:  
the basis for the community, as a union of members with the same respect and safety guaranteed 
to all through adherence to moral socially-acceptable behaviors, has been nullified through 
Agathocles’ prioritization of his self-interest and, implicitly, his claim of higher status, not 
subject to the communal codes of moral behavior.615  In this way, Agathocles transgressed the 
social norms of the community and therefore stimulated the negative reactive emotions of 
indignation and hatred. 
 In the rest of this passage, as with this episode, indignation is always directly tied to the 
moment of social transgression.616  Linking markers tie them together as explicit cause and 
effect.617  Through this backward-looking focus, indignation is concerned with social norms, 
justice, and morality.  Indignation has little explicit drive towards action.  Instead, indignation 
calls for remedy and recognition.  Polybius even notes that some aid or remedy was expected 
(οὐδεμιᾶς δὲ θεραπείας οὐδὲ βοηθείας προσαγομένης).  No “aid” comes from Agathocles.  
If Agathocles had noticed the indignation and cared about communal values, he could possibly 
have rectified the situation and restored the prevailing social values and standards of behavior.  
They expect an expression of guilt and a subsequent attempt to remedy it from Agathocles.  But 
                                                 
614 See Fierke 2015 on human dignity and emotion. 
615 Helm 2014, 54-59.  Compare the tyrants’ motives and behaviors at VI.7.6-7. 
616 Polyb., XV.25.26(23) (δυσαρέστησις), XV.27.3 (ἀγανακτεῖν), XV.32.4 (δυσαρεστεῖν). 
617 Polyb., XV.25.26(23):  ὅθεν; XV.27.3:  Ἐφ’ οἷς; XV.32.4:  τὰ μὲν γὰρ . . . τὰ δὲ πάλιν. 
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he fails to feel or show any remorse, forsaking communal values through such a failure to show 
a “self-reactive emotion” in Helm’s terminology.618  Instead, the absence of acknowledgement 
from him signifies a substantial disagreement between himself and the community.619  
Agathocles thus falls outside of the community and fails to note and abide by moral standards. 
 Not only does Agathocles disregard moral standards completely, but he adds insult to 
injury with his hubristic, predatory, and self-interested behaviors.620  With these behaviors 
Agathocles rekindles the people’s hatred (ἀνεθυμιᾶτο πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ προϋπάρχον 
μῖσος), which we first saw at XV.8(10). 
 In Polybius’ text as well as in the modern social sciences, hatred is perpetuated by 
memory of past transgressions and emotions.621  Emotional memory is a newer topic in the 
social sciences which analyze both emotion’s impact on memory accuracy and on the process of 
recalling emotions.622  In Polybius’ narrative, we see the process of emotional recollection at 
work, for the people recall their past feelings, a preexisting hatred, and this negative emotion 
resurfaces due to new but similar stimuli.623 
 At XV.25.27(24), the memory perpetuates hatred.624  This perpetuation of emotion 
through memory nearly ensures its continuance without cessation until it is appeased or 
resolved.  Those who felt hatred without any adequate result do not continuously feel hatred 
                                                 
618 On first-person or “self-reactive emotions,” see Helm 2014, 51-52.  Bring in to explain the need for guilt and 
why the lack of it is important:  it breaks with communal values. 
619 Helm 2014., 56. 
620 Polyb., XV.27(24).  τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ προσεπαγομένης ὕβρεως, ὑπερηφανίας, ῥᾳθυμίας, ἀνεθυμιᾶτο 
πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ προϋπάρχον μῖσος. 
621 Polyb., XV.7(9)-8(10), XV.25.27(24), and XV.27.3. 
622 See, for example, von Scheve 2013, Brainerd, Stein et al. 2008, and Kensinger 2007. 
623 This occurs without the complex process of rational reflection explicitly reoccurring, as per von Scheve 2013, 56-
63. 
624 Polyb., XV.25.27(24).  πάντες ἀνενεοῦντο τὰ προγεγενημένα περὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀτυχήματα διὰ τοὺς 
ἀνθρώπους τούτους.  “all remembered the previous misfortunes concerning the royal house because of these 
people.”  In the first example of how a community and its moral values develop in the anacyclosis, VI.6.2-3, the 
third-party onlookers observed a child maltreating and disrespecting its parents, reflected that they themselves 
would not like such treatment if they were in the place of the parents, having taken such pains to raise the child, and 
so felt indignation. 
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thereafter, but rather they will feel unfulfilled hatred whenever they are reminded of and 
consciously remember this emotional experience, as happens explicitly in Polybius’ passage 
here.625   
 In the episode of Agathocles’ self-interested transgressions, anger surfaces.  “But in that 
they had no public figure to take the lead worthy of mention, and through whom they would 
work out their anger towards Agathocles and Agathocleia, they kept quiet.”626  The lack of a 
leader sustains the negative emotions in the people.627  However, the people keep quiet because 
no suitable leader is present, betraying the presupposition that if he were present, the people 
could and would act on their anger. 
 The motivation of the anger is left unstated here.  We already know that the murder of 
Arsinoë, Agathocles’ rapes, and his further ostentatious display of power form the basis for 
popular indignation and hate.  Agathocles’ generalized habits of drinking, debauchery, and 
hubris give Polybius cause to mention all three negative reactive emotions of indignation, hatred, 
and anger.  Indignation comes first, directly tied to the moment of transgression, hatred comes 
next, as part of the cognitive reflection on previous similar circumstances, further intensifying 
the negative affect, and anger is narrated last in its tendency towards expectation of future 
action. 
 Anger, ὀργή, the last emotion to arise, is forward-looking and action-oriented.628  
Characters expect the subjects of the anger, the people, to act on this emotion.  Polybius notes 
                                                 
625 In Polybius’ passage, this also occurs explicitly at XV.27.3, where, through the act of hubris by Agathocles 
against Danaë, the people grew indignant more publicly and displayed their hatred clearly.  This act’s entire purpose 
was to communicate their emotion of hatred. 
626 Polyb., XV.25.28(25).  “Τῷ <δὲ> μηδὲν ἔχειν πρόσωπον ἀξιόχρεων τὸ προστησόμενον καὶ δι’ οὗ τὴν ὀργὴν 
εἰς τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ τὴν Ἀγαθόκλειαν ἀπερείσονται, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἦγον.” 
627 Cf. the anacyclosis:  VI.8.1, VI.9.1. 
628 Polyb., XV.25.23(20), XV.25.28(25), XV.27.1, XV.30.1. 
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the lack of action-fulfillment concerning anger, unlike with indignation.629  Anger, and its 
impetus towards action, can be blocked, both intentionally and unintentionally.  Anger also 
contributes directly to the hatred, which eventually does burst forth into violent action. 
 Next, Polybius tells us that Tlepolemos, then general in Pelusion, having figured out that 
Agathocles and his regime were in charge in Alexandria, instead of a council of the leading 
citizens as he had thought, begins to plot against Agathocles due to their personal hostility 
(ἔχθρα) and his confidence that he would make a better guardian for the king.  Tlepolemos’ 
own drinking parties and slander of Agathocles arouse reciprocal slander from Agathocles.630 
 At this point, there is a break in this narrative, but our text resumes with Agathocles’ 
sentimental and sensational display, overwhelmed with tears and pleading to the Macedonian 
troops, entrusting the king to their care against Tlepolemos’ alleged conspiracy.631  Here, 
Agathocles and Agathocleia fail at eliciting pity. 632  One could read an earlier fragment, XV.17, 
to explain Agathocles’ failure.  At XV.17.1-2, Polybius explains one way in which ὀργή and 
μῖσος are apt to arise together:  from faked suffering.  Polybius targets courtiers, who do not 
feel genuinely (αὐτοπαθῶς) but feign what they calculate will bring them profit.633  Agathocles 
                                                 
629 Polyb., XV.25.23(20), XV.25.28(25).  Indignation could have been assuaged by recognizing it and its causes; with 
anger the causes have less weight:  it only comes in to foreshadow a resulting action. 
630 Polyb., XV.25.29(26)-40(37). 
631 Polyb., XV.26.1-7.  The breaks are due to a change in the main manuscript traditions, transferring from the 
Constantinian Excerpts to the Excerpta Antiqua.  The order of the passages from the Constantinian Excerpts and how 
much of this passage has been lost are unknown.  See Maas 1949, 443-448. 
632 Unfortunately, we do not know what motivated Agathocles to make this failed plea due to the selectivity of the 
excerptions which provide this passage. 
633 Polyb., XV.17.1-2.  ὅταν μὲν αὐτοπαθῶς δόξῃ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων, ἔλεον 
ἐκκαλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι, καὶ συγκινεῖ πως ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ὁ ξενισμός· ἐπὰν δὲ 
ϕαίνηται γοητείας χάριν καὶ καθ' ὑπόκρισιν γίνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔλεον, ἀλλ' ὀργὴν ἐξεργάζεται καὶ 
μῖσος.  “When one seems to be overcome by feeling because of the greatness of his misfortunes, he elicits pity from 
those who see and hear him, and the novelty moves each of us in some way.  But on the contrary, whenever such 
behavior appears to happen for the sake of trickery and as an act, not pity but anger and hate are what he 
stimulates.” 
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also displays fake suffering; therefore, no pity arises.634  If XV.17.1-2 fully holds true here, ὀργή 
and μῖσος arise instead, though Polybius’ narrative at XV.26 does not specify this.  So far, tears 
have been the deepest expression of sympathy and fullness of feeling.  The city’s sympathizing 
with Arsinoë is thus quite potent, and it aligns with Book VI’s theory of how people reflect on 
others and apply the situation to themselves.635  Conversely, Agathocles’ tears involve no 
reflection, no genuine suffering, and no shared emotions, thereby lacking the same, genuine and 
sympathetic reception.  Thus Agathocles perpetuates the morally-based, negative reactive 
emotions felt by the people against himself through his own emotional mismanagement.  
Although he does occasionally recognize the negative reactions against him, he never 
acknowledges them or their underlying communal values. 
 In addition to his failed display of emotion, Agathocles ordered that Tlepolemos’ 
mother-in-law, Danaë, be shamefully dragged unveiled through the streets from the temple of 
Demeter and put under guard in order to make manifest his hostility with Tlepolemos.  This 
move backfires, for the people grow indignant (ἀγανακτεῖν) again and make public their hatred 
(μῖσος) through graffiti.636  Agathocles and his group attempt to leave, but they fail through their 
own ineffective planning, and instead they take up tyrannical power, killing some rivals, 
imprisoning others.637 
 Polybius frames the episode of Danaë’s public shaming and imprisonment with 
reference to emotions.  First, Polybius establishes the episode as an example for the anger 
against Agathocles:  “Αnd some support for extending the anger both of the many and of 
                                                 
634 Polyb., XV.26.2; XV.26.8.  The only divergence from XV.17.1-2 is that there is no explicit anger and hatred from 
this particular act.  Perhaps that is because there already is latent anger and hatred, but it is interesting that Polybius 
chose not to remark upon the arousal of these emotions again. 
635 Contrast the example of XV.25.9(6):  the city of Alexandria, reflecting over Arsinoë and her misfortunes, fell into 
such despondency that it was full of mourning and tears. 
636 Polyb., XV.27.1-3.  Compare the prominent Roman example of people expressing their intense values in the case 
of Tiberius Gracchus.  See Morstein-Marx 2012. 
637 Polyb., XV.27.4-5. 
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Tlepolemos was contributed by Agathocles.”638  Agathocles merits the anger against him, 
because of his outrage against Danaë, for by this act he transgresses all standards of decency and 
community expectations and norms.639  Polybius ends the episode with indignation and hatred.640  
As we saw above, indignation directly responds to transgression of the social and moral 
standards.641  Thus, the treatment of Danaë – transgressive, immoral, and self-interested – 
motivates communal reactions of negative emotion.  The people respond with indignation to 
Agathocles’ acts, in the same way the subjects under tyranny reacted with hatred, anger, and 
resentment.642  In this way, the people in XV.25-33 serve as a reservoir for a sense of social 
morality, much as the people within the anacyclosis did:  both communities reacted emotionally 
in direct response to transgressions of their social norms. 
 At this point Polybius introduces the story of Moiragenes, a bodyguard suspected of 
collusion with Tlepolemos.643  Agathocles, as part of his assumption of tyrannical power, 
identifies Moiragenes as a threat because of his kinship and the rumor of his aid to Tlepolemos 
and gives orders to Nikostratos to detain and question him eagerly, applying every torture.644  
Nikostratos has Moiragenes undressed and prepared for torture because he denied all allegations 
of his aid to Tlepolemos.645  Nikostratos receives a message and leaves the room without giving 
                                                 
638 Polyb., XV.27.1.  Ἐγένετο δέ τι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν <τῶν> περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα συνέργημα πρὸς τὸ τὴν ὀργὴν 
ἐπιτεῖναι τήν τε τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τὴν τοῦ Τληπολέμου. 
639 It is interesting that here Polybius does not invoke transgression against the gods, as he does in the case of Philip 
V’s despoliation of the sanctuary at Thermum, because Danaë was taken from the temple of Demeter.  See for 
example, V.12, XI.7, XVI.1, XXIII.10. 
640 Polyb., XV.27.3.  Ἐφ’ οἷς τὸ πλῆθος ἀγανακτοῦν οὐκέτι κατ’ ἰδίαν οὐδὲ δι’ ἀπορρήτων ἐποιεῖτο τοὺς 
λόγους, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν τὰς νύκτας εἰς πάντα τόπον ἐπέγραφον, οἱ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας συστρεφόμενοι κατὰ μέρη 
φανερῶς ἐξέφερον ἤδη τὸ μῖσος εἰς τοὺς προεστῶτας.  “In response, the crowd grew indignant, no longer 
privately nor did they talk secretly, but some by night wrote in every place, and others by day clearly already brought 
out their hatred towards the leaders.” 
641 Polyb., XV.25.25(23). 
642 Polyb., VI.7.8. 
643 Polyb., XV.27.6-29.3. 
644 Polyb., XV.27.6. 
645 Polyb., XV.27.7. 
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any instructions to those standing ready to whip and torture Moiragenes.646  These cronies 
eventually all drift off, leaving Moiragenes alone, who runs off through the palace, eventually to 
find the Macedonian troops and tearfully persuade them of his situation and of the need to 
capitalize on the prevalent hatred to secure his, the boy king’s, and their own safety.647  They are 
persuaded and percolate through the rest of the troops until, not four hours later, troops and 
citizens were gathered, ready for action and revolution.648 
 The Moiragenes episode is the spark that ignites all the latent negative emotion.  Even 
without explicit elicitation of emotions, Moiragenes’ episode provides the critical turning point 
in the entire passage.649  Moiragenes recognized the hatred of the people and called upon the 
elite troop corps, the Macedonians, to act upon it.  He tells them that “there was clear 
destruction for them all unless they took advantage of the opportunity in which the hatred of the 
many peaked and all were ready for Agathocles’ punishment.”650  Like Agathocles earlier, 
Moiragenes recognizes, identifies, and acts upon others’ emotion, but – unlike Agathocles – 
Moiragenes seeks to exploit rather than counteract this emotion (συνάψωνται τοῦ καιροῦ).  
From this point on, the actions resulting from the emotions, rather than the emotions 
themselves, drive the narrative. 
                                                 
646 Polyb., XV.28.3. 
647 Polyb., XV.28.4-28.9.  Cf. Agathocles’ failure to persuade these Macedonian soldiers, XV.26.3. 
648 Polyb., XV.29.1-4. 
649 Polyb., XV.27.6-29.1.  It is interesting that Polybius does not narrate Moiragenes’ own feelings.  He allows the 
narrative with its paradoxical turns to elicit such reflective emotion in the audience, including the internal audience.  
(While I do not focus on descriptive passages and how they might elicit audience emotion, this would be a good 
example of how this would work.)  Polybius doesn’t need to say that Moiragenes was afraid; he would be illogical 
not to be in this situation.  The audience senses this fear in a reflective way:  they think about what they would feel 
in like circumstances.  The audience presumably resents Agathocles, Nikostratos, and their cronies because they act 
unjustly and unjustifiably.  Moiragenes (without saying it explicitly) implores the Macedonians to become indignant 
and join in feeling resentment towards Agathocles.  His appeal and the context was conducive for eliciting 
emotions, although Polybius does not further depict these emotions or their implications for the audience of 
Macedonians.  However, this argument exemplifies another line of thought for emotional processes in ancient 
narratives. 
650 Polyb., XV.28.8.  πρόδηλον γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσι τὸν ὄλεθρον, ἐὰν μὴ συνάψωνται τοῦ καιροῦ, καθ΄ ὃν ἀκμάζει 
τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μῖσος καὶ πᾶς ἕτοιμός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν κατ’ Ἀγαθοκλέους τιμωρίαν. 
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 This story brings up several important issues.  First it demonstrates Agathocles’ 
tyrannical power:  he detains Moiragenes to be tortured based on an allegation (προσέπεσε 
διαβολὴ κατά τινος Μοιραγένους).651  Next, it brings up the issue of Moiragenes’ identity.  He 
is one of the bodyguard and related to the commander at Boubasos, Adaios.652  So he has an 
intimate position at the court, with access to the king, to protect him.  In his detention and 
stripping, his status is entirely undermined.  He was not a citizen at that moment, nor a member 
of the bodyguard or court, nor even a free man.  He was treated as a criminal or slave.  This 
indeterminacy of social status comes into greater contrast when he is left alone in the center of 
the state:  he is left perplexed because he is excluded from all roles he should have had – free 
man, citizen, bodyguard.  Yet he was left in the absolute center of the state, the inside of the 
palace.  His position is thus a paradox:  the excluded in the center of the state.653 
 His next move complicates his status.  He runs out and persuades the elite troops to take 
action.  Moiragenes becomes an unlikely leader for the movement against Agathocles.  In the 
narrative thus far, one expects that Tlepolemos will become the long-expected leader for the 
people to work out their anger and hatred against Agathocles, but in our extant narrative, it is 
Moiragenes who takes up this role and begins to act upon the people’s emotions.654  However, 
Moiragenes’ indeterminate status puts him both outside the political and within it.  He is like the 
excluded leader found in the state form of ochlocracy in the anacyclosis of Book Six, but he is 
also like the leaders of the overthrow of tyranny due to his somewhat high (former) status as a 
                                                 
651 Polyb., XV.27.6. 
652 Polyb., XV.27.6.  Walbank, HCP II.489 argues that Moiragenes was Macedonian and of the same status as the 
younger Sosibios.  See Griffith 1968 for mercenaries’ status in the Hellenistic world in general. 
653 My observations here have been inspired by Agamben 1998, 17-18. 
654 XV.25.28(25).  Τῷ <δὲ> μηδὲν ἔχειν πρόσωπον ἀξιόχρεων τὸ προστησόμενον καὶ δι’ οὗ τὴν ὀργὴν εἰς τὸν 
Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ τὴν Ἀγαθόκλειαν ἀπερείσονται, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἔτι μίαν ἐλπίδα καραδοκοῦντες τὴν 
κατὰ τὸν Τληπόλεμον καὶ ταύτῃ προσανέχοντες.  Regardless of the lost narrative of the events after XV.33, 
Moiragenes was certainly the first leader for acting upon the people’s emotions, as Tlepolemos was journeying 
towards Alexandria at that time. 
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royal bodyguard, and yet again he is like the one who leads the change into democracy by saying 
or doing something against the oligarchs.655  Moiragenes embodies traits found in the final stages 
of a degenerate state form as it begins to transition to a better form.656  Thus he lives in Polybius’ 
theoretical model and also complicates it through his more detailed, lived experience.  He fits as 
a key figure in the overthrow of a degenerate government, completed by the fruition of emotion 
into action. 
 Moiragenes’ excluded status marks him as the special figure, in a unique position for 
recognizing the issues at hand.  He can recognize the feeling of the people from an (insider) 
outside perspective:  he no longer actually belongs as a member of the community of soldiers 
and citizens, but his own experiences of formerly belonging and of uniquely suffering firsthand 
enable him to identify and call upon the troops to take action.  It is his paradoxical situation 
which bring the soldiers to believe and listen to Moiragenes.657  His status as an excluded figure – 
naked, nearly tortured, former bodyguard and citizen – determines his new role as the only one 
capable of changing the state, by activating the people’ emotions. 
 Moiragenes further demonstrates his changed and unique position by identifying the 
hatred of the people.  He sees it through his third-party perspective.  Ironically, only Agathocles 
has explicitly recognized the people’s hatred and tried to combat it in this passage.658  Here, 
Moiragenes’ recognition of hatred provides the opportunity and stimulus for action.  This marks 
                                                 
655 Polyb., VI.9.8 - ὅταν λάβῃ προστάτην μεγαλόφρονα καὶ τολμηρόν, ἐκκλειόμενον; VI.7.9 – οὐκ ἐκ τῶν 
χειρίστων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν γενναιοτάτων καὶ μεγαλοψυχοτάτων ἔτι δἐ θαρραλεωτάτων ἀνδρῶν; VI.9.1 – 
κἄπειτα θαρρήσῃ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν τι κατὰ τῶν προεστώτων.  
656 With the exception of ochlocracy, which does not get better. 
657 Polyb.,  XV.28.6.  Οἳ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἠπίστουν, τὰ δὲ πάλιν ὁρῶντες αὐτὸν γυμνὸν ἠναγκάζοντο πιστεύειν.  
Polybius expressly comments earlier on the paradoxical nature of Moiragenes’ situation, XV.28.1:  Περὶ δὲ τὸν 
Μοιραγένην ἄφατον ἦν καὶ παράλογον τὸ συμβαῖνον. 
658 Polyb., XV.25.11. 
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the climax of the entire passage.  From the beginning negative emotions have built up over 
several examples, and finally here they find an outlet into action.659   
 Thus, Moiragenes’ episode holds a pivotal, marked position in this passage.660  The 
episode hearkens back to the anacyclosis of Book Six but also deviates in its realistic 
circumstances.  This episode vivifies the crucial issue at stake of who constitutes the political.  
Agathocles has the political power to detain and torture Moiragenes, but he stands outside of 
regular society as a tyrant figure.  Moiragenes loses all status, and so, as one excluded from the 
state, is paradoxically able to create change in the political state.  On the other hand, the 
Macedonians, other troops, and citizens whom Moiragenes persuaded take up action as if they 
have a right to demand a change in the political state.  In fact, all the people’s emotions occur 
due to a sense that the values underlying their community and respect as community members 
have been transgressed, and their taking up action based on those emotions completes their 
claim to a stake in the political state.  Thus, emotions have an extended reach, justifying and 
exemplifying both their causal role in dynamic change and the people’s claim to a part in the 
political affairs and running of the state. 
 At this point, Polybius relates the story of Oenanthe, Agathocles’ mother, at the temple 
of Demeter, where she, distraught, sat alone.661  Some women who do not realize the political 
situation and gathering of the mob, try to speak comfortingly to her, but she shouts loudly at 
them, calling them monsters, wishing that they would one day taste the flesh of their children, 
and ordering her attendants to drive them away with beatings.662  Thus, the women left and 
cursed that woman to experience the same as what she threatened others, and their anger 
                                                 
659 Their violent action does not find completion until XV.33, however. 
660 The passage does not continue in the extant Histories until XVI.21-22, and even that is murky, with reference 
mostly to Tlepolemos’ military competence and courtly incompetence. 
661 Polyb., XV.29.8-30.1.  Perhaps seeking asylum?  Her behavior does not fit that of one seeking asylum, but she is 
aware of the state of affairs in the city, unlike some of the women at the temple and unlike Agathocles, and she does 
not actually leave the temple at the end of the episode:  she drives others away. 
662 Polyb., XV.29.10-13. 
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“doubled the hatred in the households (διπλάσιον ἐξεκαύθη τὸ μῖσος).”663  Agathocles gathers 
the king and Agathocleia in a closed-off part of the palace and, after failed negotiations, hands 
over the king, whom the Macedonians jubilantly take to the stadium.  At this, the mobs rejoice at 
the king’s safety and presence, but they are pained and grow indignant (δυσαρεστεῖν) at the 
escape of those guilty, who had departed to their own homes from the palace.664  Sosibios’ son, 
Sosibios, persuades the child king, already upset, to agree to handing over the guilty to the mob 
and removes the distraught boy from the riot.665 
 Up to this point, Polybius’ own narration gives positive, moral validity to the emotional 
reactions from the people.  Never in this passage are these emotions themselves condemned.  
Rather, the opposite:  the similarity of their narration to the anacyclosis, in which the people’s 
emotions stimulate dynamic change for the better consistently and exemplify human rationality, 
the sense of the good and of justice, attests to the salutary and positive values which these same 
emotions represent in this narrative.666  Furthermore, the detailed stories which Polybius 
included (and are preserved) are framed so as to elicit disapproval of Agathocles’ management of 
affairs and sympathy with his victims.667  Polybius clearly denotes his disapproval and utter 
disdain for Agathocles in XV.34-36, going so far as to call him unworthy for history and 
bringing up others who displayed worthiness for history.668  From this stark negative judgment 
of Agathocles, we could surmise that Polybius sympathized with the people’s assessment of 
                                                 
663 Polyb., XV.29.14-30.1.  Αἱ δ’ ἐπιλαβόμεναι τῆς προφάσεως ταύτης ἀπηλλάττοντο πᾶσαι, τοῖς θεοῖς 
ἀνίσχουσαι τὰς χεῖρας καὶ καταρώμεναι λαβεῖν αὐτὴν ἐκείνην πεῖραν τούτων ἃ κατὰ τῶν πέλας 
ἐπανετείνετο πράξειν.  Ἤδη δὲ κεκριμένου τοῦ καινοτομεῖν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἐπιγενομένης καθ΄ ἑκάστην 
οἰκίαν καὶ τῆς ἐκ τῶν γυναικῶν ὀργῆς, διπλάσιον ἐξεκαύθη τὸ μῖσος. 
664 Polyb., XV.32.4. 
665 Polyb., XV.32.5-9. 
666 Polybius does not designate this episode as an example of his theory in the anacyclosis in practice.  The 
similarities between the passage of Agathocles’ downfall and the cycle of constitutions lies in an intratextual 
interpretation of the language of emotions rather than any explicit intention stated by Polybius.  See Skinner 1988 
on intentionality and consistency in texts. 
667 Compare Polybius’ digressions throughout the narrative  on arousing pity, XV.17-.1-2, for example. 
668 See Walbank, HCP 2.493-495, on Polybius’ digression on Agathocles and Dionysius of Syracuse. 
149 
Agathocles as unworthy and morally-flawed.  The people preserved the same moral values of 
communal interest over self-interest, of indignation at undeserved harm to innocents, and of rule 
in harmony with the subjects. 
Violence, Emotion, and Moral Justification 
 Emotions finally break out into action, through extreme violence.  The mob indulges 
their passionate cruelty on Agathocles, Agathocleia, their flatterers, and their families.669  They 
first taste blood with Agathocles’ flatterer, Philo, who rebukes the mobs and threatens 
punishment from Agathocles, as he was unaware of the situation.  First he is reviled and pushed, 
his clothes are torn off, then he is stabbed and dragged to the middle of the stadium while still 
breathing.670  When Agathocles arrives in chains, some people run up and stab him through, 
“becoming responsible for his escaping a fitting punishment.”671  The violence continues with 
Agathocles’ associates.  Agathocles’ sister Agathocleia, her sisters, and other family and 
associates were then brought into the stadium.  Oenanthe was led naked on a horse from the 
temple of Demeter to the stadium.  All these were humiliated and killed, as some bit or stabbed 
them, or they gouged their eyes and finally tore them limb from limb.  For, Polybius explains, 
“some terrible savagery exists in the irrational passions (θυμοὺς) in the people in Egypt.”672  
Lastly, the supposed killer of Arsinoë, Philammon, is stoned to death in the street by Arsinoë’s 
friends, who also choke his son and kill his wife, naked, after dragging her into the road.673 
                                                 
669 Polyb., XV.33.  
670 Polyb., XV.33.4-5.  Τῶν δ’ ἀκουσάντων οἱ μὲν ἀπελοιδόρουν αὐτόν, οἱ δὲ προώθουν.  Ἐπιβαλομένου δ’ 
ἀμύνεσθαι ταχέως οἱ μὲν τὴν χλαμύδα περιέρρηξαν, οἱ δὲ τὰς λόγχας προσερείσαντες ἐξεκέντησαν.  Ἅμα 
δὲ τῷ τοῦτον εἰς τὸ μέσον ἑλκυσθῆναι μεθ΄ ὕβρεως ἔτι σπαίροντα καὶ γεύσασθαι τὰ πλήθη φόνου, πάντες 
ἐκαραδόκουν τὴν τῶν ἄλλων παρουσίαν. 
671 Ibid., XV.33.6.  ὃν εὐθέως εἰσιόντα προσδραμόντες τινὲς ἄφνω συνεκέντησαν ἔργον, ποιοῦντες οὐκ 
ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλ’ εὐνοούντων ·  αἴτιοι γὰρ ἐγένοντο τοῦ μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆ. 
672 Polyb. XV.33.10.  δεινὴ γάρ τις ἡ περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ὠμότης γίνεται τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀνθρώπων. 
673 Polyb., XV.33.11-12. 
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 Polybius’ narration of the people’s violence against Agathocles aligns with my analysis of 
the emotions’ moral basis.  Polybius does not condemn Agathocles’ own violent punishment but 
rather comments on its light nature:  “some ran up and suddenly stabbed him as he entered, 
doing a deed not characteristic of enemies but of good-willed friends; for they became 
responsible for his escaping a suitable destruction (τοῦ μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης 
καταστροφῆς).”674  Polybius manifestly considered that Agathocles deserved a harsher 
punishment than being violently stabbed to death.675  However, because extreme violence 
surrounds Agathocles’ death, with the dismemberment of his friend Philo and the stoning of 
Philammon’s family even by young girls, the “leniency” of Agathocles’ own death is 
overlooked.676 
 The Histories provide further examples of those who merit extreme violence in their 
punishment, like Agathocles.  Polybius challenges the narration of Phylarchus, an earlier 
Hellenistic historian, on the death of Aristomachus, the tyrant of Argos.677  According to 
Polybius, Phylarchus narrates it as such:  “Becoming Antigonus’ and the Achaians’ captive, 
Aristomachus was taken to Cenchreae and was tortured to death on the rack, suffering most 
unjustly and terribly (ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα) of all people.”678  Phylarchus continues with 
Aristomachus’ cries from the rack that night, the neighbors’ horror, disbelief, and indignation, 
and how they then ran to the house where he was.679  But Polybius counters this judgment of 
ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα that Aristomachus suffered:  “but I judge Aristomachus, even if he 
was guilty of nothing else against the Achaians, according to the manner of his life and his 
                                                 
674 Polyb., XV.33.6. 
675.  See Pinker 2011, on the (decreasing) history of violence. 
676 Even Pomeroy 1986, 411, who discusses the deaths of the villains of the Histories deemed Agathocles’ death 
appropriate. 
677 Polyb., II.59-60. 
678 Polyb., II.59.1.  “ὑποχείριον Ἀντιγόνῳ καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς γενόμενον, εἰς Κεγχρεὰς ἀπαχθῆναι καὶ 
στρεβλούμενον ἀποθανεῖν, ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα παθόντα πάντων ἀνθρώπων.” 
679 Polyb., II.59.2. 
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offenses (παρανομία) towards his country, worthy of the greatest punishment (τῆς μεγίστης 
ἄξιον κρίνω τιμωρίας).”680  After all, Aristomachus was a tyrant – the worst possible word to 
all!681  In fact, Polybius continues, “even if Aristomachus suffered the most terrible punishments, 
as Phylarchus states, in this way he did not even receive a suitable sentence for one day (ὅμως 
οὐχ ἱκανὴν ἔδωκεν δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας).”682  Now, Polybius had a specific day in mind:  the 
one on which Aristomachus had eighty Argive citizens tortured to death in front of their families 
based merely on a suspicion that they colluded with the besieging Achaian force.683  Clearly 
Polybius’ standards for “cruel and unusual” or “ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα” differ widely from 
ours, and also Phylarchus’.684 
 But Polybius is not finished yet.  He asserts:  “for this very reason it must not be thought 
terrible if [Aristomachus] faced something similar, but rather it must be considered more terrible 
if he should die untouched, having no experience of these punishments (πολὺ δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ 
μηδενὸς τούτων πεῖραν λαβὼν ἀθῷος ἀπέθανεν).”685  For Polybius, it is not morally wrong 
for Aristomachus to suffer extreme violence:  it is morally wrong for Aristomachus not to suffer 
extreme violence.  Finally, Polybius concludes that Aristomachus should not have died on the 
rack at Cenchreae in the night as Phylarchus says, but that he should have been marched around 
the Peloponnese and made an example of with his punishment (μετὰ τιμωρίας 
                                                 
680 Polyb., II.59.4.  “ἐγὼ δ’ Ἀριστόμαχον, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἕτερον ἥμαρτε, κατά γε τὴν τοῦ βίου 
προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν εἰς πατρίδα παρανομίαν τῆς μεγίστης ἄξιον κρίνω τιμωρίας.” 
681 Polyb., II.59.6.  “αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὔνομα [τύραννος] περιέχει τῆν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν καὶ πάσας περιείληφε 
τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας.” 
682 Polyb., II.59.7.  “Ἀριστόμαχος δ’ εἰ τὰς δεινοτάτας ὑπέμεινε τιμωρίας, ὡς οὗτός φησιν, ὅμως οὐχ ἱκανὴν 
ἔδωκεν δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας, . . ..” 
683 Polyb., II.59.7-10. 
684 See Walbank, HCP I.260:  “Phylarchus voices contemporary opinion better than P., who writes from the harder 
background of the second century, when the fate of Mantinea had become the common lot of captured towns.”  
See Eckstein 2013, 314-338, on the contrary.  This distinction between Polybius’ standards and ours becomes 
important in assessing the passage. 
685 Polyb., II.60.1.  “διόπερ οὐκ εἴ τινι τῶν ὁμοίων περιέπεσε δεινὸν ἡγητέον, πολὺ δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ μηδενὸς 
τούτων πεῖραν λαβὼν ἀθῷος ἀπέθανεν.” 
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παραδειγματιζόμενον), and so lost his life.686  Instead, Polybius subtly notes, he died by 
merely being drowned by the Achaian officers at Cenchreae quietly in the night.687 
 Polybius sets up Phylarchus’ account of Aristomachus’ death as a paradigm for judging 
history wrongly.  Phylarchus failed to take account of Aristomachus’ past and faults, namely 
being a tyrant.  Instead, he chose to narrate Aristomachus’ death as Polybius does for an 
innocent Achaian tortured to death by Diaeus and Damocritus in the later Achaian War.688  For 
Polybius, Phylarchus’ account is tantamount to pardoning and even forgetting Aristomachus’ 
deeds and life as a tyrant:  deploring his death presumes he lived an innocent life.  Rather, 
Polybius wants Aristomachus’ major fault of pursuing the life of a tyrant publicized 
(παραδειγματιζόμενον) through the horror of his death.  Death proportional to one’s crimes 
becomes a work of history; it provides an example to avoid for Polybius’ readers. 
 In addition, Polybius makes an example of Aristomachus for the scale of his 
punishment.  Phylarchus oversensationalizes Aristomachus’ death by appeal to the horror and 
cruelty of it.  Polybius clearly did not buy it.  Polybius approved of violence as a means of 
punishing and encouraged it in relation to the past life of the guilty:  Aristomachus deserved 
worse.689  So too Agathocles deserved a fate worse than only being led in chains and stabbed to 
death.690  In these examples, Polybius does not find the punishment cruel; he blames those 
punished.  They created an environment conducive for cruelty, violence, and violation of human 
                                                 
686 Polyb., II.60.7.  “ὃν ὑποχείριον γενόμενον οὐκ ἐν Κεγχρεαῖς ἔδει τὴν νύκτα στρεβλούμενον ἀποθανεῖν, 
ὡς Φύλαρχός φησι, περιαγόμενον δ’ εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ μετὰ τιμορίας παραδειγματιζόμενον οὕτως 
ἐκλιπεῖν τὸ ζῆν.” 
687 Polyb., II.60.8.  Polybius subtly slips in this version of Aristomachus’ death only at the end, without comment.  
By narrating this in a simple statement, he takes any emphasis away from qualms about this type of death, which 
could also be seen as cruel.  Modern scholars reflect Polybius’ offhand way of narrating the death:  for example 
McGing 2010, 74:  Aristomachus suffered “nothing more terrible than drowning;” Champion 2004a, 126:  “The 
Achaeans did no more than to drown him” (my italics). 
688 Polyb., XXXVIII.18.3.  “δήσαντες καὶ στρεβλοῦντες προσεπαρτέρουν, ἕως διέφθειραν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, 
οὐδὲν εἰπόντα τῶν ἐκείνοις προσδοκωμένων.” 
689 Polyb., II.59.3, II.59.7, II.60.1, II.60.7. 
690 Polyb., XV.33.6.  “μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆς.” 
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norms.691  Aristomachus began the violence and extreme cruelty against others when he tortured 
eighty citizens in front of their families.  Agathocles began and perpetuated an environment of 
violence and violation of universal human standards of behavior.  For this, Polybius finds his 
punishment merited and even too lenient. 
 The Histories provide further examples of Polybius’ conviction that evildoers deserve bad 
deaths.  At the conclusion of the Mercenary War, Mathos, the Libyan leader of the defeated 
mercenaries against Carthage, is led through Carthage by the young men, and his torture is 
displayed as a triumphal parade (τὸν θρίαμβον).692  Mathos received what Polybius wanted 
Aristomachus to suffer.  Polybius prefaces’ Mathos’ public torture with a approving judgment:  
“those responsible for the revolt (Mercenary War) were punished deservingly (καταξίως).”693  
 At VIII.35, Polybius lists bad generals who should have died because of their poor 
leadership.  Tiberius Gracchus, as consul and general in 212 BC in the Second Punic War, was 
killed in an ambush.  He deserved this fate because he failed to consider his role as general, and 
so he stupidly risked his life needlessly in a scouting mission.694  Likewise, Archidamos, the king 
of Sparta before Cleomenes, suspected Cleomenes’ ambitions and so fled.  But then he trusted 
Cleomenes later, despite the lack of change in circumstances.  He died for this, deservingly.695 
 The list goes on (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πλείους ἕτεροι).696  Polybius does not hesitate to cast 
judgment and often does so vituperatively.  This difference and his conception must be 
considered when evaluating his judgment on the punishment of Agathocles and his regime, 
something not always considered in scholarship.  We have seen that, according to Polybius’ 
                                                 
691 Modern studies on violence explore this issue, which is at the heart of ‘structural violence.’  See, for instance, the 
examples in Vorobej 2016, 42-54, and extended discussion, 63-144. 
692 Polyb., I.88.6.  “τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀγαγόντες οἱ νέοι τὸν θρίαμβον διὰ τῆς πόλεως πᾶσαν αἰκίαν 
ἐναπεδείξαντο τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω.” 
693 Polyb., II.88.5.  “ὥστε . . . τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς ἀποστάσεως τιμωρήσασθαι καταξίως · . . ..” 
694 Polyb., VIII.35.1-2. 
695 Polyb., VIII.35.3-5.  “πῶς οὐκ εὐλόγως ἔμελλε τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐγκυρησειν;” 
696 Polyb., VIII.35.9. 
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considerations, Agathocles deserved to be punished based on their past transgressions and own 
violence.  Polybius specifies that Agathocles was inadequately punished in his death, similarly to 
Aristomachus, whose punishment of being racked to death was insufficient in comparison to his 
crimes.697   
 When Polybius relates the deaths of the rest of Agathocles’ family and friends, Polybius 
explains (γὰρ) the violence against them with recourse to the Egyptians’ natural tendency to be 
savage or cruel (ὠμότης) instead of referring to the gravity of the Agathocleans’ crimes.698  He 
does not assert that those who suffered such extreme violence did not deserve it, nor does he 
bring in any moralistic or judgmental terminology other than the Egyptians’ cruelty (ὠμότης).  
Moreover, Polybius says that such cruelty is characteristic of the Egyptians (τῶν κατὰ τὴν 
Αἴγυπτον ἀνθρώπων), not of the people as a political group.  To be clear, Polybius does not 
condone the complete dismemberment of the Agathocleans after the mob actually tastes their 
blood by biting them (alongside stabbing them and gouging their eyes out).  Polybius’ 
acknowledgement of their cruelty judges this negatively.  As such, Polybius implies that all the 
Agathocleans did not deserve such an extreme and violent punishment as they received.  
Nevertheless, Polybius refrains from such criticism as he used against Phylarchus, and he only 
impugns the Egyptians’ tendency towards savagery and not their uprising (in itself) for punishing 
those responsible both for Arsinoë’s death and for Agathocles’ outrages.  In comparison with 
                                                 
697 Polyb., XV.33.6 – “μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆς”; II.59.7  – “ὅμως οὐκ ἱκανῆν ἔδωκεν 
δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας.”  Compare also Mathos, I.88.5 “τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς ἀποστάσεως τιμωρήσασθαι καταξίως,”  
and Deinon, XV.26a.2 “τυχὼν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τιμωρίας.” 
698 Polyb., XV.33.10.  (requoted:) δεινὴ γάρ τις ἡ περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ὠμότης γίνεται τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον 
ἀνθρώπων. 
155 
Polybius’ verdict on Aristomachus’ light punishment and his acerbic criticism of rival historians, 
this comment on the Egyptians’ savagery seems tame. 699 
   To get to the bottom of Polybius’ statement on the Egyptians’ savagery, we must 
examine this concept throughout the Histories.700  Throughout his narrative, Polybius sees 
ὠμότης as negative.  Ὠμότης, translated as savagery or cruelty, often appears alongside 
παρανομία, lawlessness.701  These two qualities specifically characterize internal wars, such as 
the Mercenary War between Carthage and its mercenaries after the First Punic War and the 
“Native War” between Egyptians and Ptolemy IV. 702  Bad rulers show ὠμότης alongside 
impiety, ἀσέβεια, and faithlessness, ἀθεσία. 703  All four of these qualities crop up together in a 
speech by Chlaineas, who maligns Philip V’s character by bringing up his ἀσέβεια, seen by his 
outrages (ὕβρεις) against the gods’ temples at Thermum, and his ὠμότης, exemplified by his 
faithlessness (ἀθεσία) and lawlessness (παρανομία) towards the Messenians.704  This passage 
contrasts ἀσέβεια and ὠμότης, where ἀσέβεια is offense towards the gods and ὠμότης a 
parallel offense against humans.  Polybius corroborates this distinction when discussing Philip V 
and Antiochus III’s plan to divide up Ptolemy V’s kingdom for themselves.705  Polybius accuses 
these two kings of acting like beasts (θηριωδῶς), adding yet another association of ὠμότης, that 
with bestialization.  Although Polybius thinks of ὠμότης as a distinctly human trait, it brings 
                                                 
699 See above for Polybius’ criticisms of cruel people and of people not punished worthily;  for broader 
representations of Polybius’ virulent criticism, see Book XII, which is entirely criticism.  See Eckstein 1995, 112-
113, 248-251, 274; Marincola 1997, 223-239; Marincola 2001, 133-140; Marincola 2013, 73-90; Pédech 1964, passim; 
Sacks 1981, Schepens and Bollansée, eds. 2005; Walbank 1962, 1-12; Walbank 1972, 33-65, esp. 34-40; on this 
renowned trend of Polybius. 
700 See Mauersberger, 3.2, 1131-1132. 
701 Polyb., I.88.3 (of the mercenaries in the Mercenary War against Carthage), IV.20.2 (of the Arcadians’ 
environment), IX.30.2 (of Philip V), XIV.12.4 (the Native War in Egypt), XV.22.3 (of Philip V), XXXII.5.5 (of the 
Epirot Charops).  See too Hau 2016 on cruelty in Polybius as compared to Diodorus Siculus. 
702 Polyb., I.88.1, XIV.12.4. 
703 Polyb., VII.7.2 (Hieronymus), IX.24.8, 26.8 (Hannibal – when circumstances changed his character), IX.30.2 
(Philip V), XV.20.4 (Philip V and Antiochus III), XVIII.17.3 (Nabis of Sparta), XXIV.15.2 (Pharnaces of Bithynia). 
704 Polyb., IX.30.2. 
705 Polyb., XV.20.3-4. 
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men closest to the level of beasts, in their lack of civilized behavior and ruthless pursuit of self-
gain.706  Moreover, Polybius praised institutions which mitigated cruelty, such as the Arcadians’ 
education based in music which countered the harsh climatic conditions of the region.707  The 
Cynaethans, continuously embroiled in internal strife and political bickering, did not adopt the 
Arcadian institution of music and surpassed all the Greeks in cruelty and lawlessness – meeting 
with destruction rightly.708 
 Polybius qualifies judgments on ὠμότης and on punishment at II.56-58.709  Here 
Polybius extensively criticizes Phylarchus’ historical narration of extreme punishment, that of the 
Mantineans after their fall to the Achaians.  First, Polybius claims that Phylarchus wished to 
make clear the ὠμότης of Antigonus Doson, Aratus, and the Achaians, and so he expounded on 
the sufferings of the Mantineans:  drawing out the women’s strident lamentations, and the young 
children and despondent elderly being led into slavery.710  Here Polybius teaches that history 
should not be like tragedy, aimed at pleasure, and so history should not be filled with incidental 
                                                 
706 Polyb., I.81.7-11. 
707 Polyb., IV.20-21, 
708 Polyb. IV.20.2:  ἄξιον βραχὺ διαπορῆσαι περὶ τῆς Κυναιθέων ἀγριότητος, πῶς ὄντες ὁμολογουμένως 
Ἀρκάδες τοσοῦτο κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς διήνεγκαν τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὠμότητι καὶ παρανομίᾳ. 
709 This passage has received much attention by scholars, focusing mostly on Polybius’ polemic and stance towards 
“tragic” historiography, as exemplified by Phylarchus, or on his excessive bias towards the Achaeans:  see Walbank 
1962, 1-12, McGing 2010, 71-74, and Marincola 2013, 74-77 for discussions on his polemic specifically and 
Walbank, HCP I.259-266 and Champion 2004a, 125-126 on Polybius’ Achaean bias here.  McGing in particular 
argues that Polybius’ description of Aristomachus “is not rational, argument-based criticism but polemic,” p. 74.  
Although Polybius is engaging on polemic on two levels – against Phylarchus and his brand of historiography and 
against Aristomachus and his tyrannical lifestyle – his argument does rest on rational argument, for it must be 
plausible on some level to be persuasive to his audience.  I would argue that his argument is based rationally on 
moral values which he espouses throughout his narrative, as seen in the examples I cite in this discussion.  While it 
may be true, as per Walbank HCP I.260, that “Phylarchus voices contemporary opinion better than P.” on the harsh 
fate of Mantinea, I focus on Polybius’ perspective on cruelty and appropriate punishment.  Polybius does endeavor 
to persuade his audience much more than he probably would have if they already agreed with his stance on the fate 
of Mantinea and on Aristomachus’ death, but this dissonance between Polybius and contemporary ideas of cruelty 
and punishment which contribute to the importance of seeing exactly what Polybius did think on this topic.  See 
Eckstein 2013, for a new perspective on this passage, with which my analysis greatly aligns. 
710 Polyb., II.56.7.  “[Phylarchus] σπουδάζων δ’ εἰς ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ συμπαθεῖς 
ποιεῖν τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἐις άγει περιπλοκὰς γυναικῶν καὶ κόμας διερριμμένας καὶ μαστῶν ἐκβολάς, πρὸς 
δὲ τούτοις δάκρυα καὶ θρήνοιυς ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀναμὶξ τέκνοις καὶ γονεῦσι γηραιοῖς ἀπαγομένων.” 
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details of no significance nor with exaggerations.  History should give the causes and motives for 
actions and events, for otherwise one cannot appropriately feel pity or anger.711  
 Polybius justifies how important causes are for judgment with a few examples.  “Who, 
for instance, does not think that it is terrible for a free man to be hit?  But if this should happen 
to one who first used violence, it is thought that he suffered justly; but if the same thing is done 
for correction and as a lesson, those striking free men are deemed worthy of both thanks and yet 
more of praise.”712  Polybius approves and grants praise to violence done for good intentions.713 
 Polybius expands on this example:  “And certainly to kill citizens is considered the 
greatest impious act and deserving of the greatest punishments; however, clearly one who kills a 
thief or adulterer is left untouched, and one who kills a traitor or tyrant meets with honors and 
distinctions among all.”714  In this second example he raises the stakes from a blow to murder.  
What the victim had done in the past determines Polybius’ proscribed judgment:  one who has 
stolen deserves his death, one who has been a tyrant deserves his death so much that it receives 
universal praise.  Polybius sums up his point thus:  “So in everything a final judgment on these 
                                                 
711 Polyb., II.56.13.  “οὐχ ὑποτιθεὶς αἰτίαν καὶ τρόπον τοῖς γινομένοις, ὧν χωρὶς οὔτ’ ἐλεεῖν εὐλόγως οὔτ’ 
ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως δυνατὸν ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων.”  See Marincola 2013, 73-90, as a recent and 
persuasive analysis of Polybius’ criticisms of Phylarchus and tragic historiography. 
712 Polyb., II. 56.14.  “ἐπεὶ τίς ἀνθρώπων οὐ δεινὸν ἡγεῖται τύπτεσθαι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους;  ἀλλ’ ὅμως, ἐὰν μὲν 
ἄρχων ἀδίκων χειρῶν πάθῃ τις τοῦτο, δικαίως κρίνεται πεπονθέναι · ἐὰν δ’ ἐπὶ διορθώσει καὶ μαθήσει 
ταὐτὸ τοῦτο γίνηται, προσέτι καὶ τιμῆς καὶ χάριτος οἱ τύπτοντες τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἀξιοῦνται.” 
713 Thus, praiseworthy violence fulfills the same higher goals – correction and teaching a lesson – Polybius sets for 
history.  The usage and Polybius’ views on violence differ greatly from common conceptions of violence today, one 
of which is the assumption that for something to count as “violence” it is inherently disapproved as such (or on 
first glance).  See Vorobej, 1-62, on the assumptions (and issues) inherent in the modern usage of “violence.” 
714 Polyb., II.56.15. “καὶ μὴν τό γε τοὺς πολίτας ἀποκτεινύναι μέγιστον ἀσέβημα τίθεται καὶ μεγίστων ἄξιον 
προστίμων · καίτοι γε προφανῶς ὁ μὲν τὸν κλέπτην ἢ μοιχὸν ἀποκτείνας ἀθῷός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τὸν προδότην ἢ 
τύραννον τιμῶν καὶ προεδρίας τυγχάνει παρὰ πᾶσιν. ”  Polybius’ examples here align closely with Vorobej’s 
modern example of the Benevolent Attacker.  However, Polybius is more concerned with the cause stimulating the 
action, whereas Vorobej focuses much more on the attacker’s intention.  See Vorobej, 10-12,14-15, 22-27, 32, and 
177. 
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cases does not rest in what results, but in the reasons and purposes of the agents and in the 
differences between these.”715  For Polybius, causes and intentions carry the most weight.716  
 Polybius returns to the Mantineans.  He lays out the context of the Mantineans’ fall to 
the Achaians, and he reverses the intended goal of Phylarchus.  Because the Mantineans 
treacherously invited the Spartans to massacre their friendly Achaian garrison, they deserved a 
far worse punishment than they received.717  In fact, all the Greeks should have praised the 
Achaians’ punishment of the Mantineans and of their ἀσέβεια.718  But the Achaians only pillaged 
their property and enslaved the Mantineans, which happens even to the innocent in war.719  
Thus, the Mantineans did not suffer any extraordinary or extreme punishment, but the norm for 
warfare in the Hellenistic Age.720 
 Polybius’ challenge to Phylarchus’ history of Mantinea’s fall provides a useful 
comparison for his own narrative of the punishment of the Agathocleans.  Polybius rebukes 
Phylarchus for lack of contextualization and attention to causes and motives, demonstrating his 
own careful attention to context and causes with Mantinea.  The Mantineans’ treachery against 
the Achaians transgressed human norms of behavior and morals, which would have created 
exceptional anger.721   
 In the Agathocles passage, the context of Agathocles’ tyrannical abuse of power, the 
undeserved murder of Arsinoë III by Philammon, and the people’s indignation, hatred, and 
anger at these unacceptable and predatory behaviors all should inform our reading and judgment 
                                                 
715 Polyb., II.56.16.  “οὕτως ἐν παντὶ τὸ τέλος κεῖται τῆς διαλήψεως ὑπὲρ τούτων οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τελουμένοις, 
ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ προαιρέσεσι τῶν πραττόντων καὶ ταῖς τούτων διαφοραῖς.” 
716 The statement at II.56.16 raises the issue of the difference between cause and final result, which I address later in 
this section. 
717 Polyb., II.57-58, culminating with Polybius’ exclamations at II.58.8-9:  “πηλίκης ὀργῆς ἐστιν ἄξιον;  τί δ’ ἂν 
παθόντες οὗτοι δίκην δόξαιεν ἁρμόξουσαν δεδωκέναι;” 
718 Polyb., II.58.10-11. 
719 Polyb., II.58.10. 
720 See Eckstein 2013, on this normality. 
721 Polyb., II.58.8. 
159 
of the guilty party’s punishment.722  The Agathocleans’ hubristic treatment of members of the 
Alexandrian community – including Agathocleia’s involvement in Arsinoë’s murder, Agathocles’ 
rapes of various women, the humiliation of Danaë being dragged through the streets, 
Oenanthe’s beating of women at the temple, and even Moiragenes’ ignominious near-torture 
experience – all stimulated indignation, increased hatred, and ignited the anger ready to burst 
into action.  These, the causes for the violence of XV.33, should inform one’s judgment on the 
punishments, according to Polybius’ own precepts of writing history and his criticism of 
Phylarchus. 
 Moreover, Polybius thought that one’s associates and circumstances can affect one’s 
natural traits, including ὠμότης, as seen in a passage on Hannibal’s complex character.723  
Polybius explains that one’s friends and close associates directly influence a person’s nature.  
Here he brings up the infamous Hannibal Monomachus, who advised Hannibal to have the 
Carthaginian army practice cannibalism in order to survive their Italian campaign.724  Although 
Hannibal never implemented this suggestion, Polybius assures us, his cruelty (ὠμότης) in Italy 
can be attributed to the influence of Monomachus.  In his narrative of the Carthaginian-
Mercenary War, Polybius states that people became like beasts and indulged their cruelty because 
of their leaders’ own transgressions and greed.725  Close or powerful people and their traits can 
affect the characteristics of others. 
 Polybius continues his discussion of how the circumstances themselves affected 
Hannibal’s character and his ὠμότης.  The way the Second Punic War progressed and the 
situations Hannibal found himself in affected his natural character, especially after the Romans 
                                                 
722 Polyb., XV.33.  Due to the fragmentary state of the text, we have to infer for the directness of some of the 
causes. 
723 Polyb., IX.22-26. 
724 Polyb., IX.24.8. 
725 Polyb., I.81.9-10.  τέλος δ' ἀποθηριωθέντες ἐξέστησαν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ϕύσεως.  . . . μέγιστα δὲ τῶν 
συνεργῶν, τὰς ἀεὶ τῶν προεστώτων ὕβρεις καὶ πλεονεξίας.   
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regained Capua during his Italian campaign.726  Because of the external circumstances of the war 
– with Italian allies constantly defecting to Rome, the need for supplies, and thus constant 
pressure to keep moving – Hannibal had to betray his own promises to Italian towns and 
inhabitants, giving them up to plunder and depredation so that Hannibal, his own army, and his 
campaign would survive.  Hannibal’s betrayal and abandonment of those who trusted him led 
some to accuse him of cruelty (ὠμότης).727  Polybius ends this discussion with the remark that, 
whatever we may think of Hannibal’s character, the Romans consistently found his character 
cruel.728 
 Polybius’ discussion of how circumstances influence character should inform our reading 
of the outbreak of violence in Alexandria.729  The Egyptians’ ὠμότης appears at a particularly 
marked moment:  it erupted when they were punishing those guilty for killing Arsinoë, for 
harming members of the community, and for flouting established human norms of acceptable 
behavior.  Circumstances prolonged Agathocles and his group’s iniquitous behavior, since they 
continued to escape retaliation and instead increased the people’s hatred, even escaping 
punishment when cornered in the palace.730  By the time the people could and did taste of blood 
and slaughter, they certainly had no inclination to show tolerance and humanity.731  Their 
violence occurred because the circumstances did not allow for an earlier, less violent outlet to 
their sense of indignation, that those who did wrong should be punished.732   
                                                 
726 Polyb., IX.26. 
727 Polyb., IX.26.2-8. 
728 Polyb., IX.26.11. 
729 Polyb., XV.33.10. 
730 Polyb., XV.31-32.  For modern parallels of how circumstances prolong and inflame the depth of negative 
emotions (especially hate), see Flam 2005, and Halperin 2014. 
731 Polyb., XV.33.1.  “Τοῦ δὲ ποιεῖν αἷμα καὶ φόνους ἐγένετό τις ἐκ ταὐτομάτου καταρχὴ τοιαύτη.”  Whereas 
they may have had this inclination, had their emotions and moral qualms been assuaged at an earlier point. 
732 Polyb., XV.32.4, demonstrates their continued, unremitted indignation:  “τὰ δὲ πάλιν δυσηρέστουν τῷ μῆ 
συνειλῆφθαι τοὺς αἰτίους μηδὲ τυγχάνειν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τιμωρίας.”  For their acts of violence, see XV.33.9. 
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 As a final note, the violent actions of the Alexandrian mob eventually do bring about a 
change of governmental personnel, alleviating their situation of being prey to Agathocles and his 
family and friends’ excessive, transgressive, and tyrannical behavior.733  Although the downfall of 
the courtier Agathocles does not constitute a change of politeia, as Egypt remains a monarchy 
under the Ptolemaic dynasty, the same processes of popular emotion spark dynamic change (of 
personnel) within the state.  With the arrival of Tlepolemos, the running of the Ptolemaic state 
still did not function as well as possible, but he did not engage in the same despotic and 
transgressive behavior as Agathocles:  he was neglectful and financially irresponsible, but he did 
not abuse the people’s human dignity.734  The violent actions taken based on their negative 
reactive emotions did effect a change for the better for the people, despite the fact that their 
motivations were grounded solely in the past: to eliminate those responsible for the earlier state 
of affairs.   
 This narrative passage of XV.25-33 and the intensive role of emotions in creating 
violence and change of regime call into question moral justification.  While excessive violence 
and cruelty do occur, the people followed through with morally based emotions. The people’s 
negative reactive emotions, based upon the community’s social standards of behavior and moral 
values, caused the violent downfall of Agathocles.  Without the emotions, this historical event 
would not have happened, according to Polybius’ narrative.  The individual emotions 
emphasized the hubris and transgression against the community’s sense of social norms, as with 
indignation, exemplified the prolonged negative affect as with hatred, and motivated future 
action, as with anger.  The combination of emotions, almost synonymous with Polybius’ use of 
μῖσος, intensifies the circumstances and passions to such a degree that excessive violence broke 
                                                 
733 I have used the word “regime” not to refer to a state form, or politeia, such as those in the anacyclosis, but to the 
members of the government associated with Agathocles.  The dynamic change in Egypt was not an institutional 
change of politeia, such as from the anacyclosis, but a change of personnel. 
734 Polyb., XVI.21-22. 
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out, challenging traditional political roles and bringing down punishment upon those whom the 
people decided needed to be punished.  An analysis of how the emotions work in this passage 
helps to elucidate a new understanding of Agathocles’ downfall, not as a paradigm of 
government gone all wrong because of the “interference” of the people, but rather as an 
exemplum of how the people’s well-justified emotions can function as a trigger for salutary – 
though violent – action and a call for social reform, the overthrow of a corrupt regime, based 
upon communal human values. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter we have examined examples of how the collective and combined 
emotions of hatred, anger, and indignation create change within a state.  In Book VI, the 
anacyclosis provided a model in which Polybius described the development of human society 
through communal emotional processes.  Rationality and morality formed in and distinguished 
humans through emotional situations.  Polybius then demonstrated the critical importance of 
these moral and rational emotions in the public sphere through the changes between bad and 
good politeiai.  Collective emotions, formed from social norms and upheld in the people 
specifically, provide the linchpin connecting and justifying the dynamic changes in the 
anacyclosis theory. 
 The narrative of Agathocles’ regime in Egypt at XV.25-33 represents the most extended, 
entirely internal change in a state in the extant Histories.  It exemplifies the processes of the 
anacyclosis, as collective emotions stimulate change for the better, but this passage adds nuance 
to the theory.  The prolonged emotions of XV.25-33 combine after repeated transgressions of 
social norms and remembrances of past wrongs.  The critical turning point from emotion to 
action is dramatized through the episode of Moiragenes and his recognition of the dynamic 
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power of collective emotion.  Lastly, Agathocles’ downfall resulting from the accumulation of 
negative emotion against him created extreme violence. 
 Moreover, this passage draws out an issue easily overlooked in the anacyclosis:  rationally 
and morally justified collective emotions cause extreme violence.  Polybius makes clear that the 
final results of the emotion-stimulated processes of dynamic change were better on the whole 
than before for either the states of aristocracy and democracy in the anacyclosis or the state in 
Egypt.  These questions, raised and addressed to some degree in this chapter, continue to arise. 
In the next chapter, I investigate emotions’ roles in external state change, namely, in war.   
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Chapter 4 
Anger as a Cause of War 
 Emotions serve various purposes before, within, and after war.  Anger most prominently 
of the emotions causes war.  To contextualize the importance of anger in causation, I briefly 
examine the role of emotions during and at the end of war to provide an emotional context for 
understanding causal anger.735   
 Indignation and hatred feature in the course and conduct of war.  Indignation motivates 
agents to enter war, change their alliances, or alter the course of their activities entirely.  The 
Achaeans and the Phigalians choose to enter in the Social War against the Aetolians from 220-
217 BC because of their indignation (συναγανακτοῦντες and δυσαρεστούμενοι).736  Similarly, 
the Megarians chose to leave the Boeotian League, twice, because they either grew indignant or 
hated the governance and politeia of the Boeotian League.737  Most notably, agents change their 
course of action because of indignation, whether it is they or some third party who grow 
indignant.738  For example, the Carthaginians in the First Punic War, after they suffered defeat 
and seemed without hope, grew indignant at the terms of the Roman treaty offered by 
Regulus.739  They decided to continue fighting rather than succumb to what they thought were 
degrading terms.  Polybius praises their decision to continue as honorable and thus implicitly 
deems the emotion praiseworthy.740  Shortly afterwards, the Carthaginians won a major victory, 
even capturing Regulus.741  Thus, indignation impacts the course of war through modifying 
                                                 
735 See Chapter 2 for the emotions which feature mostly during warfare, such as fear or shock.  This chapter’s 
survey only includes those emotions which, as we have seen in the last chapter, have unique and varied roles in 
crucial moments of the Histories. 
736 Polyb., IV.7.3, IV.79.5. 
737 Polyb., XX.6.7-9. 
738 Their own indignation:  I.31.7, V.7.5; Others’ indignation:  V.57.6, XVIII.9.1. 
739 Polyb., I.31.7.  οὐ μόνον δυσαρεστήσαντες τοῖς προτεινομένοις ἐπανῆλθον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόψαντες τῇ 
βαρύτητι τοῦ Μάρκου. 
740 Polyb., I.31.7-8. 
741 Polyb., I.32-35. 
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agents’ decisions.  Hatred explains agents’ behaviors rather than affecting the larger course of a 
war.  Hannibal’s “inborn hatred of Romans” (μῖσος ἔμφυτον πρὸς Ῥωμαίους) explains why 
he ordered his troops to kill all adults they encountered in Picenum.742  However, besides 
explaining the ulterior motives for specific behavior, hatred does not have a consistent effect 
beyond this case.743 
 Polybius uses pity as a direct marker that wars should have ended.  Pity reflects views on 
what is just.744  In a similar way, the lack of pity shows proportionality.  For example, Polybius 
states that Utica left no room for pity or pardon from the Carthaginians, for despite its steadfast 
loyalty to Carthage this city had defected to the revolutionaries in the Mercenary War most 
inopportunely.745  The proportional punishment for Utica accordingly had to be high.  Pity also 
acts to mitigate anger:  the Aetolians consciously surrendered to Rome in order to draw greater 
pity to themselves from the Romans than if they had not surrendered (although they fail in this 
attempt).746  All these examples of pity occur at the end of war.  Pity conveys a sense of justice 
that the response was (not) proportional to the sufferer’s faults, and pity denotes than an agent 
did not deserve to suffer to such an extent.747 
                                                 
742 Polyb., III.86.11.  ταῦτα δ’ ἐποίει διὰ τὸ προϋπάρχον αὐτῷ μῖσος ἔμφυτον πρὸς Ῥωμαίους. 
743 Compare for example, the people of Side’s choice not to send aid to the besieged city of Pednelissus, which was 
relieved without their aid, V.73.4.  However, Polybius mentions that the Thebans capitalized on the hatred of 
Sparta’s allies to overthrow their hegemony, VI.43.4.  This example, however, differs from the other two examples 
(of Hannibal and the people of Side) in that the Thebans’ and Spartans’ conflict did not constitute part of Polybius’ 
main historical narrative. 
744 See Chapter 2. 
745 Polyb., I.88.2.  See for similar examples, XXX.8.3; XV.1.13 and XV.17.6 (both in Roman speeches to Carthage 
near the end of the Second Punic War).  Compare the lack of pity for Agathocles in Book XV.  See Chapter 3. 
746 Polyb., XX.9.11.  Philip V works to ensure that the Romans withhold pity and prolong their anger against the 
Aetolians at XXI.31.3. 
747 See Chapter 2 for discussion of pity with shame in a context of aristocratic male honor. 
Pity also features at the end of the Achaean War between Rome and the Achaean League in 146 BC, both as a 
response to Roman anger and as a sign of ignoble behavior.  Polybius repeatedly characterizes the Greeks as 
pitiable, both from the view of the narrator and from the Achaeans’ own perspective.  Narrator:  XXXVIII.1.3 and 
7, XXXVIII.16.4 and 7, XXXVIII.17.7; Achaeans:  XXXVIII.15.9.  This pity encapsulates both senses of pity 
discussed above:  the Achaeans acted ignobly in their fight against Rome, and this pity also stresses the need to end 
hostilities.  However, it seems to me that Polybius deems this last point, the need for the end of war based on how 
much they ‘should have’ suffered, not by their actual behavior but by how he wished they had behaved.  See 
Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of the Achaean War.  
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 Anger also profoundly shapes the course of events near the ends of wars.  The Romans 
often are characterized as angry at the end of war.748  Andrew Erskine has analyzed these 
instances of Roman anger in detail, and much of my analysis follows his work.749  In particular, 
he notes how Polybius focalizes this anger through the objects’ perspective, not through the 
Romans’ (or subjects’) perspective.  Others, either the victims or third parties, see, try to appease 
(παραιτεῖν), or strive to perpetuate the Romans’ anger.750  Only one time does a Roman 
manifest his own anger by taking all towns by force, and only once does the narrator note the 
quenching of Roman anger.751  Like the Carthaginians’ indignation in the First Punic War, anger 
changes characters’ decisions.752  Roman anger perpetuates war.  This anger marks the implicit 
Roman assessment that their opponents have not suffered enough and involves the idea of 
proportionality, that the means and ends of war should be proportional to what stimulated the 
war.753  The Romans continue their anger, often beyond any substantial resistance by the enemy 
– at least in Polybius’ portrayal.754  The Romans deemed that the objects of their anger 
transgressed to a greater degree than these objects admit.  The Romans’ anger thus marks the 
absence of a proportional punishment for their objects’ wrongdoing.  Because Polybius frames 
Roman anger through a Greek perspective, however, we never see or hear this defense of anger 
explicitly from the Romans themselves as a mark of proportionality. 
                                                 
748 From Book XX on, Romans are the subjects of anger 19 of 27 occurrences in the extant text:  XX.10.7, 
XXI.25.11, XXI.29.29, XXI.31.3 (twice), XXI.31.7, XXI.31.8, XXI.34.8, XXII.5.6, XXII.10.13, XXX.4.2, 
XXX.23.2, XXX.31.12, XXX.31.13, XXX.31.17 (twice), XXXIII.7.3, XXXVIII.4.7, XXXVIIII.18.10.  The 
exceptions are:  XX.6.10 (Boeotians), XXII.11.8 (Achaeans), XXII.13.2 (Philip V), XXIII.11.2 (brothers), XXIII.15 
(twice; people and cutters of trees), XXVIII.20.5 (Antiochus IV), XXX.29.1 (Achaeans). 
749 Erskine 2015. 
750 See (θεωρεῖν):  XXX.4.2, XXX.23.2; struck by (καταπλήττειν):  XXI.34.8; appease (παραιτεῖν):  XXI.25.11, 
XXI.29.9, XXI.31.7-8, XXII.5.6, XXXVIII.4.7; perpetuate (καινοποιεῖν):  XXI.31.3.  See Erskine 2015, 113-116, 
for discussion of appeasing anger. 
751 Polyb., XV.4.4 (Scipio Africanus), and XXXVIII.18.10.  See too Erskine 2015, 123. 
752 Erskine 2015, 124. 
753 Walzer 2015, xxi-xxii, 127-133; Orend 2013, 62-63. 
754 Erskine 2015, 109-113.  With Aetolians:  XXI.25.11, XXI.29.29, XXI.31; With Rhodians:  XXX.4.2, XXX.23.2, 
XXX.31. 
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 We do see the Greek view of proportionality.  The Greeks constantly go to try to 
appease (παραιτεῖν) the anger of the Romans, showing that they thought that the offender and 
object of anger had suffered at least proportionately to their offense and that the war should 
have ended by that point.755  Polybius comments that all Greeks should endeavor to appease 
Roman anger on each other’s behalf. 756  This attests to the overall disjunction between Roman 
and Greek perspectives on proportionality, a disjunction which Erskine’s article illuminates.  
This passage implies that, on the whole, Romans had different standards for proportionality than 
Greeks, and therefore Polybius thought that Greeks should all take steps to mitigate the negative 
effects of this difference. 
 Anger features often as a cause of war.757  The prevalence Polybius gives to anger as a 
cause may surprise some who are accustomed to think of Polybius as one of the most 
‘pragmatic’ historians alongside Thucydides.758  Thucydides grants fear a large role as a motivator 
of war, and even attributes Spartan fear of growing Athenian power as the cause for the 
Peloponnesian War.759  Arthur Eckstein argues that fear plays a large role in deciding to go to 
war and secure one’s survival in an anarchic interstate system.760  Eckstein also persuasively 
demonstrates that concerns of practical survival lay at the heart of Hellenistic warfare; prestige 
contributes to this basic goal.  Scholars of Polybius have often imputed this type of realist 
worldview to Polybius himself.761  I am not arguing against this analysis of historical phenomena, 
                                                 
755 Polyb., 113-115.  Greeks et al. trying to assuage Roman anger:  XXI.25.11, XXI.29.29, XXII.5.6, XX.31 (speech 
designed to assuage Roman anger), XXXVIII.4.7. 
756 Polyb., XXXVIII.4.7, discussed by Erskine 2015, 110. 
757 See, for examples, I.67-70, I.82.9; II.8; III.3.3, III.7.1; III.9-13; III.40.8, III.78.5; IV.49. 
758 See for example, most recently, Longley 2012.  See Grethlein 2013, 224-267, for a juxtaposition of Polybius’ 
historical style with Thucydides’.  Eight wars – in addition to those mentioned previously – begin after Book Five, 
and most of their causes are not discussed or extant.  The Third Macedonian War is a notable exception, in that we 
do have a discussion of its causes at XXII.18. 
759 Thuc., 1.23.6.   
760 Eckstein 2006, 50-52, observes at least 16 instances of fear motivating characters’ decisions in Thucydides’ 
history.  See Kauppi 1991, for further details. 
761 Harris 2001, 20, Walbank 1972, 34-40. 
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but I want to highlight the importance Polybius attributes to anger as a cause, much more than 
fear, and the perceived slights which often spark this emotion.762  In the Histories, anger is often 
adduced as the pretext or the cause of war, can serve as both pretext and cause, or is 
occasionally felt in a chain reaction and thus causes war.  Most notably, Polybius includes anger 
in the causes of the Second Punic War. 
 The Second Punic War, 218-202 BC, holds an important place in scholarship, since this 
war in particular is thought to have changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean and 
hence decided the fate of Roman history.763  Why and how this war began, then, is also crucial.  
Scholarship has focused most on the issues of sources, treaties, and the timeline.  Polybius is our 
major source for the outbreak of the war, supplemented by Livy, Diodorus Siculus, Appian, and 
Zonaras’s epitome of Cassius Dio.  The narratives of the pro-Carthaginian Philinus and of the 
Roman senator Fabius Pictor, both of whom lived during this war, did not survive.764  Polybius’ 
narrative itself is fraught with historical inaccuracies – most notably (but not only) the position 
of the Ebro River in relation to Saguntum in Spain – but he nonetheless is regarded as the most 
reliable source because of his historiographical principles, access to Roman primary sources, and 
proximity in time to the war.765  Polybius provides a detailed discussion of all the Romano-
Carthaginian treaties he found in Rome which predated the Second Punic War, and these 
Romano-Carthaginian treaties feature in both ancient and modern discussions and arguments 
                                                 
762 Fear motivates characters to take action very often in the Histories, but Polybius rarely cites it as the motivating 
factor, let alone official cause (aitia), of war:  I.10.6 (Roman fear of Carthaginians), II.13.3 (Roman fear of Gauls), 
V.41.1 (Molon fears Hermeias’ cruelty), XXXVIII.10.10 (Achaeans falsely think Romans fear war in Greece).   
763 For a start to scholarship on the outbreak of the Second Punic War, see Astin 1967; Baronowski 2011, 68-75; 
Beck 2011; Champion 2004a, 118-121, and 2011; Eckstein 1989, 1995, 101-105, 144, and 175, 2010, and 2012; 
Errington 1970, 26-32; Hoffman 1972; McGing 2010, 77-78; Rich 1996; Schwarte 1983; Sumner 1972, 469-480; 
Walbank, HCP 1.292-361, and 1983; Welwei 1977.  See Rich 1996, note 1, and Beck 2011 for fuller bibliography. 
764 Other contemporary sources, e.g., Sosylus, have also been lost.  See Cornell 2013 and Frier 1999, esp. Ch. 11, on 
Fabius Pictor.  On Polybius’ use as a cover text for fragmentary historians, see Baron 2013 and Schepens and 
Bollansée, eds., 2005. 
765 See Hoyos 1998, 162-163, on the Ebro. 
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about the causation, beginning of, and responsibility for the First and Second Punic Wars.766  As 
we shall see, the causation and responsibility for the Second Punic War is never completely or 
successfully divorced from the First Punic War because of anger.  David Potter in particular 
argues persuasively that the lack of envisioned goals and outcomes for the First Punic War led to 
its unsatisfactory result and hence directly contributed to the outbreak of the Second Punic War 
about twenty years later, which parallels in many ways the connection between the First and 
Second World Wars in the twentieth century.767  Anger at the unsatisfactory result of the First 
World War with the Treaty of Versailles similarly carried over to the outbreak of the Second 
World War. 
 Scholars have seen anger as an obstacle for sensible judgment and action in Polybius.  As 
noted in Chapter 2, anger, ὀργή, and its close associate passion, θυμός, often have been seen as 
characterizing barbarians, the uncivilized and uneducated, and groups of lesser social status – the 
masses, women, and mercenaries.768  Anger thus belongs with barbaric thumos and against 
Hellenic logismos in the dichotomy Craige Champion observes.769  Hannibal’s “actions in the 
preliminaries to the [Second Punic War] demonstrate emotional, impulsive behavior, which in 
book 2 is characteristic of Illyrians and Gauls.”770  Thus emotion and impulse are indicative of 
the deficiencies of collective Carthaginian character at the start of this war.771  Likewise, William 
                                                 
766 See for differing positions on the treaties, Bellomo 2013, Eckstein 2010 and 2012, Erdkamp 2009, Heisserer 
1985, Serrati 2006, and Walbank 1945. 
767 Potter 2016. 
768 Eckstein 1995, 118-160. 
769 Champion 2004a.  Champion discusses ὀργή in the context of ochlocracy and the dissolution of the mixed 
constitution, 89, 121, 185. 
770 Champion 2004a, 102. 
771 Champion 2004a, 103.  Champion shows that the Carthaginians were further along on the path of decline than 
the Romans in the early books of the Histories, not that they had degenerated to a state of complete barbarity, 
however.  He notes that the Second Punic War was “not a simple matter of logismos against thumos”, 117.  However, 
emotion or passion served for Champion as a prime factor in Carthage’s irrationality in beginning the Second Punic 
War.  See esp. 117-121 for Champion’s analysis of Carthaginian character in the Second Punic War. 
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Harris argues in Restraining Rage that Polybius thought that anger clouds judgment.772  Harris does 
not provide many examples for his broad statements about Polybius’ views on anger, and even 
doubts “if he had any.”773  Nevertheless, Harris contends that Polybius characterizes enemy 
rulers as wrathful and angry and associates them with barbarians.774  Arthur Eckstein argues 
similarly that anger was a crucial, determining factor in Polybius’ criticism of Hannibal when 
giving his pretexts for attacking Saguntum and beginning the Second Punic War.775  Eckstein 
argues that emotion in Polybius is always contrasted with reason and although he admits of 
combinations of reason with emotion, he still concludes that one always predominates.776  
Eckstein’s argument revolves around the idea that for Polybius emotions were irrational and that 
acting upon them in war marked poor generalship and invited disaster.  Moreover, Eckstein puts 
forth the idea that wars undertaken from “cold, rational calculation” receive Polybius’ 
approbation, and conversely wars “emerging from sheer, unrestrained emotion” receive his 
disapproval.777  Although Andrew Erskine analyzed the anger of the Romans in the later books 
of the Histories along different lines, as discussed above, he saw anger in the early books of the 
Histories along similar lines as Champion, Harris, and Eckstein:  anger characterizes Rome’s 
opponents, people who all can be called barbarians.778   
 I have found that non-Romans in Polybius feel anger and are stirred to war because of it, 
but that the Romans too were not immune to beginning war because of anger in Polybius’ 
narrative.  The “barbarians” who feel anger and thus decide to wage war do not all do so 
                                                 
772 Harris 2001. 
773 Harris 2001, 75.  See too 270, note 19, for an unexamined citation of Polybius on anger as an example of “the 
classic stereotype” of angry women as derisive and contemptible, which does not fit the context (XV.30.1; we 
examined this in Chapter 3). 
774 Harris 2001, 198-199, 240. 
775 Eckstein 1989. 
776 Eckstein 1989, 2. 
777 Eckstein 1995, 57. 
778 Erskine 2015.  See too Erskine 2013 on the categorization of Carthaginians as barbarians in ancient Greek 
thought. 
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without reason and justifiability.  Even Hannibal, whom Polybius criticizes, does not err in his 
anger as much as his folly in not citing Carthaginian anger at the unjust seizure of Sardinia by the 
Romans as his reason for war.  My argument in this chapter yet again challenges the dichotomy 
between barbarian and civilized:  anger does not wholly belong on the barbarian side.  
Characters often choose to go to war because of morally justified anger, which they feel for a 
reason.  While some characters feel unjustified anger, I aim to complicate the negative 
identification of anger in the Histories in its significant role as a cause of war. 
 
 Polybius begins his history in Book Three with a detailed account of the causes of the 
Second Punic War.779  He frames this discussion with his definitions of cause, pretext, and 
beginning and with an explanation of why causes are important for history.  Thus, his discussion 
of the causes of the Second Punic War holds importance as the central case of causation in the 
Histories.  First, Polybius summarizes what he will cover in the Histories and why the Olympiad 
around 220 B.C. was so important as the start of his universal history:  four wars began at nearly 
the same time and thence world affairs began to intertwine in a distinct way.780 
 Polybius frames his discussion of causes to refute claims that Hannibal’s capture of 
Saguntum was the cause of the Second Punic War.781  Such an attribution of causation is the 
mark of someone ignorant of the difference between a beginning (ἀρχὴ) and a cause or pretext 
(αἰτίας καὶ προφάσεως).782   Polybius continues, “I say that the beginnings (ἀρχὰς) of 
everything are the first attacks and the enactment of what has already been decided, but on the 
                                                 
779 Polyb., III.6-32. 
780 Polyb., III.1-5.  See Walbank  1972, 97-129, 1975, and 1994 on Polybius’ starting point and organization. 
781 Polyb., III.6.1. 
782 Polyb., III.6.6.  ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ διειληφότων ἀρχὴ τί διαφέρει καὶ πόσον διέστηκεν 
αἰτίας καὶ προφάσεως, καὶ διότι τὰ μέν ἐστι πρῶτα τῶν ἁπάντων, ἡ δ’ ἀρχὴ τελευταῖον τῶν εἰρημένων.  See 
on Polybius’ theory of causation, Beck 2011, 225; Derow 1982 and 1994, Eckstein 1989, 2-6, 1995, 57-59, and 2012, 
208-209; McGing 2010, 76-80; Pédech 1964, 80-88 and 99-203; Walbank HCP 1.306-309, 1972, 157-164, and 1994.  
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other hand I say that causes (αἰτίας) are the thoughts which precede the decisions and plans 
(τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων):  I mean the ideas, plans, rationale 
about these, and how we come to deciding and setting off on some affair.”783  This description 
of the differences between a cause, a pretext, and a beginning provides a template by which we 
can distinguish potential causes.784 
 Polybius continues his discussion of causes for the Second Punic War by directly 
refuting the claims of Fabius Pictor.  Fabius Pictor, according to Polybius, narrated that 
Hannibal’s ambition and lust for power, which he took from Hasdrubal, his predecessor in Spain 
and brother-in-law, also caused the war.  Fabius, Polybius says, depicted Hasdrubal as relatively 
independent from and even at odds with Carthage, aiming for monarchical power.  Hannibal, 
because of this drive for power which he inherited from Hasdrubal, sought war with Rome 
independently from and against the wishes of Carthage.  As we mentioned previously, Polybius 
faults Fabius’ views because the Carthaginian Senate did not show its indignation toward 
Hannibal and hand him over to Rome to avoid war.785  Polybius cautions trusting all Fabius had 
to say based only on his status as a senator.786 
 Polybius returns to his main topic and lists the three causes, αἰτίαι, of the Second Punic 
War:  “The first cause must be considered the θυμός of Hamilcar Barca, the biological father of 
                                                 
783 Polyb., III.6.7.  ἐγὼ δὲ παντὸς ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναί φημι τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις τῶν ἤδη 
κεκριμένων, αἰτίας δὲ τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων ·  λέγω δ’ ἐπινοίας καὶ διαθέσεις 
καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα συλλογισμοὺς καὶ δι’ ὧν ἐπὶ τὸ κρῖναί τι καὶ προθέσθαι παραγινόμεθα.  Walbank, HCP 
I.159-160, notes and criticizes the vagueness of Polybius’ definition.  Note that causes include both psychological 
states alongside rational calculations.  See Walbank, HCP I.157-159, for how Polybius’ definitions of causation 
differ from Thucydides. 
784 Polybius does not consistently label all causes, pretexts, or beginnings.  He provides this section of definitions 
and examples to teach his readers, students and future statesmen, how to identify causes from beginnings.  It would 
be redundant for him to have to identify all causes, pretexts, and beginnings fastidiously throughout the text in each 
individual case; his readers have the basic information which he thought necessary to make such identifications 
themselves.  Scholars have disagreed on this completeness of instruction for identification.  See Walbank HCP, 
I.305-309; Pédech 1964, 75-98; Walbank 1972, 157-164; McGing 2010, 76-80. 
785 Polyb., III.8.9-12.  See Chapter 2. 
786 Polyb., III.9.1-5. 
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Hannibal.  For he, undefeated in his soul in the war over Sicily, in that he seemed to have 
preserved his army around Eryx intact in the battles in which he took part, but also because of 
the Carthaginians’ loss in the sea battle, yielded to the situation, made the treaty, and remained in 
his anger (ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς), always looking out for an opportunity.”787  Hamilcar, the 
father of Hannibal, served as a general for Carthage in the First Punic War, remaining in 
command of Eryx in western Sicily through the end of the war.  After the First Punic War, 
Hamilcar served as a general in the Mercenary War, 241-238 BC, and defeated the 
revolutionaries, after which he travelled to Spain to expand and solidify Carthaginian power and 
resources until his death in 229 BC.  The Roman seizure of Sardinia and imposition of additional 
tribute on Carthage constitutes the second, and greatest, of the three causes for the Second 
Punic War, according to Polybius. 
“But when the Romans declared war against the Carthaginians after they 
resolved the Mercenary War, the Carthaginians first agreed to everything, 
thinking that they would win in their just claims, . . ..  But when the Romans did 
not compromise, the Carthaginians, yielding to the situation and taking it hard, 
not having power to do anything, withdrew from Sardinia and undertook to pay 
another 1,200 talents in addition to the previous tribute.  On account of this they 
averted war at that time.  For this reason, this must be placed as the second and 
greatest (δευτέραν, μεγίστην δέ) cause of the later war.”788 
 
                                                 
787 Polyb., III.9.6-7.  νομιστέον πρῶτον μὲν αἴτιον γεγονέναι τὸν Ἀμίλκου θυμὸν τοῦ Βάρκα μὲν 
ἐπικαλουμένου, πατρὸς δὲ κατὰ φῦσιν Ἀννίβου γεγονότος.  ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐχ ἡττηθεὶς τῷ περὶ Σικελίας 
πολέμῳ τῇ ψυχῇ, τῷ δοκεῖν αὐτὸς μὲν ἀκέραια διατετηρηκέναι τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα στρατόπεδα ταῖς ὁρμαῖς 
ἐφ  ὧν αὐτὸς ἦν, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἧτταν τοῖς καιροῖς εἴκων πεποιῆσθαι τὰς 
συνθήκας, ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς, τηρῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν.  The reading of “ὀργῆς” is not entirely secure.  The 
oldest manuscript, A, reads  “ὀρ*ῆς”, while the other main manuscripts have “ὀργῆς”.  However, all modern 
editions print “ὁρμῆς”, except for the Budé critical edition.  I thus follow the manuscripts and the most recent 
critical edition.  However, because of this ambiguity, I am not resting my argument for the emotion of anger as a 
cause of war on this part of the text, although it furthers the importance of emotion for persisting between the end 
of one war and the beginning of another. 
788 Polyb., III.10.1, 3-4.  Ῥωμαίων δὲ μετὰ τὸ καταλύσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τὴν προειρημένην ταραχὴν 
ἀπαγγειλάντων αὐτοῖς πόλεμον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς πᾶν συγκατέβαινον, ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν 
τοῖς δικαίοις, . . ..  πλὴν οὐκ ἐντρεπομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει, καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν, οὐκ 
ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδέν, ἐξεχώρησαν Σαρδόνος, συνεχώρησαν δ’ εἰσοίσειν ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια 
τάλαντα πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον, ἐφ΄ ᾧ μὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκείνοις ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς καιροῖς.  διὸ καὶ δευτέραν, 
μεγίστην δέ, ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα συστάντος πολέμου. 
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The third cause for the Second Punic War, Polybius briefly says, is the Carthaginian confidence 
in their strength in Spain.789   
 Returning to the first cause, Polybius justifies how Hamilcar’s passion caused the war.  
Hamilcar transferred his hatred of Rome to Hannibal with his oath of hatred.790  In this scene, 
Hamilcar brings his young son Hannibal to a sacrifice and makes him swear an oath that he will 
always hate the Romans.  Hannibal recalls this anecdote as an older man for Antiochus III, after 
Hannibal had waged and lost the Second Punic War.  Not only does Polybius provide this scene 
to his audience as evidence for the intensity of Hannibal’s hatred for Rome, but Hannibal 
himself presents it to Antiochus as evidence of his sentiments much later.   
 Polybius then turns to the narrative of events leading up to the Second Punic War.  He 
briefly summarizes Hannibal’s energetic, successful, and popular leadership in Spain before the 
siege of Saguntum.791  The Romans, to whom the Saguntines had sent several pleas for aid, sent 
an embassy to Hannibal to warn him to stay away from Saguntum.792  Hannibal, young and 
passionate, replied that the Carthaginians were coming to the aid of those wronged by 
Saguntum.793  Hannibal, however, sent to Carthage for further instruction, and the Roman 
embassy conveyed the same message to the Carthaginian senate as they had given to Hannibal, 
foreseeing war only in Spain.794 
 Polybius next narrates the siege and capture of Saguntum by Hannibal.795  When news of 
Saguntum’s fall reached Rome, Polybius states that the Romans sent envoys to Carthage and 
                                                 
789 Polyb., III.10.6.  ἣν δὴ καὶ τρίτην αἰτίαν νομιστέον, λέγω δὲ τὴν εὔροιαν τῶν κατ’ Ἰβηρίαν πραγμάτων 
Καρχηδονίοις.  ταύταις γὰρ ταῖς χερσὶ πιστεύσαντες εὐθαρσῶς ἐνέβησαν εἰς τὸν προειρημένον πόλεμον. 
790 Polyb., III.10.7-III.12. 
791 Polyb., III.13-14. 
792 Polyb., III.15.1-5. 
793 Polyb., III.15.6-12. 
794 Polyb., III.15.8, III.15.12-13. 
795 Polyb., III.17.  Polybius also narrates the Romans’ involvement with Demetrius of Pharos in the Second Illyrian 
War to shed light on his interpretation of the Romans’ perspective at the time:  that they did not foresee or intend 
war against the Carthaginians beyond Spain and Africa, let alone in Italy.  Narration of the Second Illyrian War:  
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argues against the view that the Roman Senate held a tense and secret debate at that time, on the 
grounds that such a debate was illogical.796  The Carthaginians, on receiving the Roman envoys, 
argued that no treaties bound their actions in Spain.  The treaty of Hasdrubal with Rome, that 
the Carthaginians stay south of the Ebro, was not ratified at Carthage, and the treaty of Lutatius, 
made after the First Punic War and stipulating that neither would harm the other’s allies, also did 
not apply, so they argued.  The Roman envoys replied that the Carthaginians should show that 
they are not guilty or else accept war.797 
 Polybius here digresses to clarify the issue of the treaties.798  He quotes or paraphrases 
three treaties which he found at Rome, the earliest of which he dated back to the beginning of 
the Roman Republic.  After relating these three early treaties, Polybius reflects on the beginning 
of the First Punic War.799  In short, he found that the Romans did not breach a treaty in crossing 
to Sicily (nor did the Carthaginians earlier), for he did not find evidence of a prohibition of 
Romans from Sicily or Carthaginians from all of Italy.800  Next, he reproduces the terms of the 
treaty between Rome and Carthage after the First Punic War, which were expanded after 
Carthage’s Mercenary War, which demanded that Carthage pay indemnities and evacuate first 
Sicily then Sardinia.  Lastly, he gives the addendum of the treaty with Hasdrubal that the 
Carthaginians not cross to the north of the Ebro in arms.  Polybius then sums up his judgment 
about the justification of the Roman seizure of Sardinia:  the Romans had no reasonable pretext 
or reason for taking Sardinia (οὔτε πρόφασιν οὔτ' αἰτίαν εὕροι τις ἂν εὔλογον).801 
                                                                                                                                                       
III.16, III.18-19.  See on Saguntum, Astin 1967, Badian 1958, 47-52, Eckstein 1984, Harris 1979, 201-202, Hoyos 
1998, 154-173, Walbank, HCP 1.170-172. 
796 Polyb., III.20. 
797 Polyb., III.21.1-8. 
798 Polyb., III.21.9-III.27. 
799 See Bellomo 2013, Eckstein 1980, Hoyos 2011, and Rood 2012 for recent scholarship on the First Punic War’s 
causes. 
800 Polyb., III.26.4-7. 
801 Polyb., III.28.1. 
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 After this digression, Polybius returns to the Roman responses to Hannibal’s capture of 
Saguntum.  The Romans of his day, Polybius states, argue that, in sum, all the treaties and their 
terms were valid.802  Thus, Hannibal and the Carthaginians broke the treaty made by Hasdrubal 
in crossing the Ebro (although in fact they had not, for it was farther north than Saguntum) and 
by attacking Saguntum broke the treaty of Lutatius concluded after the First Punic War, over not 
harming the other’s allies.  Finally, Polybius concludes his discussion of the causes of the Second 
Punic War with his judgment:  if one takes the destruction of Saguntum as the cause, the 
Carthaginians were wrong, but if one takes the seizure of Sardinia as the cause, then the Romans 
were in the wrong.803  
 To wrap up this discussion of the causation of the Second Punic War, Polybius expresses 
how important causes were for history and its purpose of educating statesmen.804  Universal 
history in particular, because it covers a broader scope of events, times, and places, excelled at 
illuminating deeper causes.805 
 This entire passage is marked by two major aspects:  the importance of causation for the 
project of history and Polybius’ attempts to argue against prevailing views, such as Fabius 
Pictor’s.  Throughout this passage Polybius argues against the view that Saguntum’s fall was the 
cause of the Second Punic War.  He defines causes in a specific way, refutes Fabius, argues 
against interpretations of treaties, and provides evidence from the actual treaties at Rome to 
support his view all for this purpose.  Thus, it is important to note what he does cite as the 
causes of the war and how they differ from what Polybius argued against.  Polybius’ 
identifications of causes have repercussions for the responsibility, justice, and guiding rationale 
                                                 
802 Polyb., III.29. 
803 Polyb., III.30. 
804 Polyb., III.31. 
805 Polyb., III.32.  See Dreyer 2011, esp. 91-92 Kloft 2013, 13-24, Sacks 1981, 96-121, and Walbank 1972, 66-96, on 
Polybius’ genre of universal history. 
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or purpose of the Second Punic War.  That Polybius includes anger in the causes, then, is 
notable.  How justifiable this anger was is our first topic. 
Justifiability 
 The very first reason for the war is an emotional element, θυμός.  Θυμός elsewhere 
throughout the Histories denotes irrational, uncontrolled passion, aligning with themes of 
irrationality and barbarism.806  Here, however, θυμός takes on more Homeric connotations, 
referring to Hamilcar’s heroic courage and determination, in the context of not conceding defeat 
personally.807  Moreover, Polybius does not seem to disapprove of Hamilcar at all.808  He 
emphasizes the military accomplishment and noble steadfastness of Hamilcar in continuing to 
hold Eryx despite the Carthaginians’ losses.  Hamilcar’s leadership preserves the morale of the 
soldiers at Eryx and maintains his anger, ὀργή.809  Hamilcar yielded to circumstance in signing 
the treaty with Rome to end the First Punic War, for Polybius says that “in these circumstances, 
when he had omitted nothing reasonable for saving those under his command, altogether 
sensibly and practically (πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς) he yielded to the present situation 
and sent envoys to discuss truces and a peace treaty.”810  Moreover, Polybius approves of 
Hamilcar directly:  “he very much did the work of a good and prudent leader.”811  Hamilcar’s 
status as undefeated, however, leads him to desire to wage war in the future.  Hamilcar’s θυμός 
                                                 
806 Champion 2004a, Erskine 2015, 107.  See too Chapter 2. 
807 See Koziak 2000, 37-62, especially 53-55, for an overview of Homeric θυμός. 
808 Eckstein 1989, 2-7, criticizes Hamilcar only in his θυμός here.  Pédech 1964, 212, however, presents a positive 
picture of Hamilcar.  
809 Polyb., III.9.7. 
810 Polyb., I.62, especially I.62.5:  ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιέστη τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν κατὰ λόγον οὐδὲν ἔτι κατελείπετο 
πρὸς τὸ σῴζειν τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ παργματικῶς εἴξας τοῖς παροῦσιν ὑπὲρ σπονδῶν 
καὶ διαλύσεων ἐξαπέστελλε πρεσβευτάς.  Hamilcar exemplifies Polybius’ precepts for good generals, seen 
prominently in Hannibal’s own speech to Scipio at the battle of Zama about the vicissitudes of fortune (XV.5-8), 
and his speech to the Carthaginian senate to accept the Roman terms as a blessing considering their position at the 
end of the Second Punic War (XV.19).  See especially IX.12-20 on Polybius’ precepts for good generalship.  See too 
for discussion of these concepts, Eckstein 1995, 28-40. 
811 Polyb., I.62.3.  ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐποίησεν ἔργον ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φρονίμου. 
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continues on precisely because Hamilcar acted prudently (πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς), 
as a good general, by yielding to circumstances.    
 Thus, Hamilcar’s noble actions and passionate spirit (θυμός) contribute to the causation 
of the Second Punic War.  While θυμός most often aligns with irrationality, barbarism, and 
excess, Hamilcar’s θυμός here aligns with his rationality, prudence, civility, and aristocratic 
nobility.  Hamilcar follows what Arthur Eckstein identified as Polybius’ “aristocratic ethos”.812  
His θυμός also drives him along this same noble pattern of behavior.  Thus, θυμός in this 
passage differs from Polybius’ stereotypical usage of this term, although there are moments 
when θυμός can have positive effects in battle.  For example, θυμός motivates soldiers to have 
courage and return to the fight, and the Gauls in particular fight with θυμός, terrifying their 
opponents.813 
  Polybius stresses the seizure of Sardinia as a reason for the Second Punic War 
throughout the text, and he also emphasizes the injustice of the Romans in this act.814  At one 
point he even calls this the “second war between Rome and Carthage, that over Sardinia” 
because the Romans had declared war on Carthage, although the Carthaginians decided to 
capitulate to the Roman demands, and so actual war was averted.815  The first part of Polybius’ 
explanation sets up a psychological frame through which to understand the rest of the actions:  
                                                 
812 Eckstein 1995, especially 21, 34-35, 43-44, 55, 91, 174-179, 192-193, and 274-275 on Polybius’ positive portrayal 
and admiration of Hamilcar. 
813 See Polyb., II.19.10, II.30.4, IV.7.8.  It may also have positive value in II.24.7 and XV.4.11. 
814 Polyb., I.88.8-12, III.13.1-2, III.15.10-11, III.27.7-8, III.28.1-4, and III.30.4.  However, Polybius’ narrative of the 
Mercenary War describes how the Carthaginians lost Sardinia to the mutinous mercenaries in detail at I.79.  He 
describes Sardinia as lost to the mercenaries (not to the Romans) already at I.82.7 (τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν Σαρδόνα, 
καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἐτύγχανεν ἀπηλλοτριωμένα), and even refers to the Romans’ refusal to accept 
Sardinia from the mercenaries at I.83.11 (τῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ Σαρδόνι μισθοφόρων, καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν 
Καρχηδονίων ἀπέστησαν, ἐπισπωμένων αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον οὐχ ὑπήκουσαν).  Only at the end of the 
Mercenary War, I.88, do the Romans undertake to subjugate Sardinia and accept the mercenaries’ invitation.  The 
Carthaginians protest that Sardinia still belongs to them, and the Romans use this and the Carthaginians’ 
preparations for war against the mutineers in Sardinia as a pretext to declare war on Carthage. 
815 Polyb., III.28.1.  οὕτως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καθ’ ὃν ἐποιήσαντο τὰς περὶ Σαρδόνος συνθήκας, 
οὔτε πρόφασιν οὔτ’ αἰτίαν εὕροι τις ἂν εὔλογον. 
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“Hamilcar took up the citizens’ anger (ὀργὴν) in addition to his own passions (τοῖς ἰδίοις 
θυμοῖς).”816   Hamilcar’s adoption of the citizens’ anger provides insight into the unique nature 
of θυμός in comparison with other emotional terminology.817  With Hamilcar, it appears that his 
θυμός drove him to continue pursuing what he valued:  his personal reputation as a general and 
his country’s well-being and strength.  The citizens’ ὀργή, on the other hand, functions as we 
have seen ὀργή regularly function – as a response directly to a provocation, injustice, or slight.  
Again, θυμός arises as a crucial part of the causation of this war.  The seizure of Sardinia 
aggravated not only Hamilcar but also the citizens.  Their anger, combined with Hamilcar’s 
personal urge (based in his aristocratic ethos) to renew war and redeem himself and his country, 
made the seizure of Sardinia a cause even more important than the sour ending of the First 
Punic War. 
 The Carthaginians’ emotions, θυμός and ὀργή, appear rational.818  Not only did the 
Carthaginians react to anger in response to the Romans’ injustice, but their anger follows the 
same rational paradigm as the emotions of the community in the anacyclosis, as we observed in 
Chapter 3.  They perceive that the Romans hurt their interests by taking Sardinia, thus 
committing injustice, and they react like the people of the anacyclosis with anger to this 
                                                 
816 This would be the only instance of θυμός in the plural with a single subject.  It appears in the plural at I.81.8 
(mercenaries), II.33.2 (Gauls), III.10.5, XV.33.10 (Egyptians), XXII.16.3 (men in general).  This use of plural θυμοί 
with a singular subject may merely mean his “passions” as a plural.  Otherwise it may align with the Platonic version 
of θυμός, as a part of the soul in which an individual feels emotion. 
817 Koziak 2000; Lynch and Miles 1980; Champion 2004a, also declines to define θυμός.  Erskine 2015,107, briefly 
distinguishes θυμός from ὀργή.  See Chapter 2 for full discussion of their distinctions. 
818 See Mercer 2005, for a recent assessment of rationality and emotion in modern decision making in international 
relations. 
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transgression.819  Things they value – territorial integrity, resources from Sardinia, and state 
autonomy – were challenged by Roman aggression.820 
 In all three of the causes of the Second Punic War, Polybius focalizes the causation of 
the war through a Carthaginian perspective.821  However, nowhere does a Carthaginian character 
attest to the causes Polybius identifies in III.9.6-10.6.822  Moreover, Polybius does not clearly 
present the Roman reasons for going to war.  Even when Polybius addresses the Roman 
perspective at III.29, he does so in order to present and correct later Roman, revisionist, 
accounts of why and how this war began.823  The perspective Polybius chooses for the causes of 
III.9.6-10.6 conveys his judgment.824  This focus both puts the decision for and beginning of war 
in the Carthaginians’ hands and centers upon the Carthaginian grievances and justifications.  The 
Carthaginians seem to have justice on their side:  the Romans initially acted as unprovoked 
aggressors in taking Sardinia and imposing more tribute, and so the Romans were morally 
responsible for this war.   
 Finally, after his account of the treaties and the Romans’ legalistic causes, Polybius 
concludes his discussion of causes of the Second Punic War at III.30 with a judgment:825   
                                                 
819 Eckstein 1995, 101-102, stresses Polybius’ repeated disapproval and portrayal of Roman injustice in this 
circumstance. 
820 In the anacyclosis, Polybius emphasized the congruence of reason with rule in accordance with the community’s 
good in mind.  Here, the Romans take advantage of their power and the Carthaginians’ weakness for their own 
benefit, and thus they fall closer towards the role of the bad rulers of the anacyclosis. 
821 Walbank 1972, 163; McGing 2010, 77. 
822 Hamilcar hates the Romans (III.9.6-9), Hannibal adduces immediate pretexts concerning only Saguntum (III.15), 
and the Carthaginian Senate discuss minute details of a treaty (III.21).  Thus, the true causes, even though conveying 
a Carthaginian and not Roman perspective, seem to lie at a remove from the historical events and narrative. 
823 Polyb., III.29.1 stresses the difference between what the Romans said after Saguntum, which he presents as his 
straightforward narrative in III.20-21, and he gives what the Romans of his time gave in order to make his (moral) 
counterargument to these views. 
824 What the actual agents may have thought or adduced as their reasons for war matter far less to Polybius, who 
discerns the causes as the historian with retrospect and a holistic view of the course of events.  This retrospect, 
however, is not without drawbacks.  See below.  See Grethlein 2013 on historians’ perspectives. 
825 These legalistic arguments circulated in the second century BC, as John Rich shows (1996), to justify the 
Roman’s behavior, especially in light of the Romans’ concern over Carthage before the Third Punic War.  Polybius 
explicitly notes that he cites contemporary Roman views, not sentiments expressed by the Romans at the time, 
III.29.1. 
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“For this reason, if on one hand someone should make the destruction of 
Saguntum the cause (αἰτία) of the war, it must be assented to that the 
Carthaginians wrongly began the war, both according to the treaty by Lutatius, in 
which there must be safety from each for the allies of each, and according to the 
treaty by Hasdrubal, in which the Carthaginians must not cross the river Ebro in 
war.  But on the other hand, if [someone makes the cause of the war] the 
acquisition of Sardinia and the tribute with this, it must be agreed altogether the 
Carthaginians with good reason (εὐλόγως) began the Hannibalic War:  for 
having been compelled by the circumstances, they were repelling those who 
harmed them at the time as circumstances allowed.”826   
 
  If one considers the seizure of Sardinia the main cause of the war, as Polybius explicitly does at 
III.10.3 (μεγίστην δέ, ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν), then the Carthaginians waged war justly on 
Rome.  From a holistic view of Polybius’ account of the causes, the Carthaginians may be 
responsible for beginning war with the siege of Saguntum, but they are not morally responsible 
for causing the war.827  Those who wronged them are morally at fault.  This perspective on causes 
emphasizes the emotional, anger and θυμός, and its justification.  The most emotional causes 
also happen to be the most just and most appropriate causes for the Second Punic War, in 
                                                 
826 Polyb., III.30.3-4.  διόπερ εἰ μέν τις τὴν Ζακάνθης ἀπώλειαν αἰτίαν τίθησι τοῦ πολέμου, συγχωρητέον 
ἀδίκως ἐξενηνοχέναι τὸν πόλεμον Καρχηδονίους κατά τε τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ Λυτατίου συνθήκας, καθ’ ἃς ἔδει τοῖς 
ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις τὴν ὑφ΄ ἑκατέρων ὑπάρχειν ἀσφάλειαν, κατά τε τὰς ἐπ’ Ἀσδρούβου, καθ’ ἃς οὐκ ἔδει 
διαβαίνειν τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν ἐπὶ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίους ·  εἰ δὲ τὴν Σαρδόνος ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ τὰ σὺν ταύτῃ 
χρήματα, πάντως ὁμολογητέον εὐλόγως πεπολεμηκέναι τὸν κατ’ Ἀννίβαν πόλεμον τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ·  
καιρῷ γὰρ πεισθέντες ἠμύνοντο σὺν καιρῷ τοὺς βλάψαντας. 
827 Note that Polybius’ own account disregards the actual geography involved in the treaties, for Saguntum lay south 
of the river Ebro; see for example, Hoyos 1998, esp. 162-163.  Champion 2004a, 119, calls Polybius’ discussion of 
causes “inconclusive” on the responsibility for the war.  Champion states that “although this passage admits that the 
Roman seizure of Sardinia was an unjust and provocative act, it also shows that in any case Carthage actually 
initiated the war.  In this regard this war is in accord with the pattern of the First Romano-Carthaginian, Illyrian, and 
Gallic wars:  Rome is on the defensive.”  Champion does not say explicitly that therefore the Carthaginians are 
responsible and the Romans have right on their side, but his analysis leads to that conclusion.  Champion’s 
statement sets out the Carthaginians as the aggressors, and therefore as at fault in modern standards.  (There are 
some major exceptions to this statement in modern times; see Walzer 2015, 51-126 for discussion of these cases.)  
Polybius, though he shares many views with modern just war theory, does not share the modern condemnation of 
aggressors and the support of those waging defensive wars.  See Walzer 2015, 3-33, 51-73, on these subjects in 
modern just war theory. 
    Baronowski 2011, 68-73, however, goes too far in dismissing aggression and the justice of one’s cause in the 
outbreak of the Second Punic War.  He sees Polybius track the causes of this war back to Roman aggression and 
injustice in seizing Sardinia, but he concludes that Polybius’ admiration of imperialistic expansion outweighs these 
considerations.  I disagree and have argued in this chapter that Polybius’ text shows great concern for the justice 
and the moral responsibility for wars. 
182 
Polybius’ view.  Carthaginian anger, as a response to injustice, is therefore a morally justifiable 
cause for war. 
Unjustifiable Anger 
 By contrast, on another occasion Polybius does attribute anger as a cause for war with 
explicit negative judgment.  The Mercenary War, also variously called the Libyan War or 
Truceless War, provides future statesmen a negative educational paradigm of the causal power of 
anger.828  At the end of the First Punic War, Carthage found itself in financial difficulties and had 
to pay many mercenaries.  Originally, the commander Gesgo had sent back the mercenary 
soldiers from Sicily to Carthage in separate shipments so that the Carthaginians could pay them 
and let them disperse to their different homelands.  This would alleviate the strain on Carthage 
to hold them and allow space between their shipments so that they could not gather and 
compare their experiences and pay.829    The Carthaginians, however, gathered them in Carthage, 
in the hopes of persuading them to cancel the Carthaginian’s obligation to pay them, thus 
potentially cheating them. 
 Since the mercenaries committed crimes indiscriminately while waiting in Carthage, the 
Carthaginians sent them out to a camp at Sicca, not far from Carthage, and made them take their 
possessions and families.830  During their idle time at their camp at Sicca, the mercenaries began 
to meet and discuss the pay they were owed, figuring the sum extortionately.  They began to 
make demands and, since the Carthaginians now realized their folly, they succumbed to every 
demand from the troops, sending supplies as appeasement.  Thus, the Carthaginians attempted 
                                                 
828 Polyb., I.66-70.  Gibson 2013, 159-179. 
829 Polyb., I.66.2-4.  Polybius approves of this plan as the correct way to handle these troops, I.68.2. 
830 Polyb., I.66.6-12.  This was the wrong move, Polybius notes:  they should have kept their possessions and 
families in Carthage as a guarantee for good behavior.   
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to propitiate the mercenaries’ anger, but these troops kept coming up with new demands.831  
Eventually, the Carthaginians sent a favored commander, Gesgo, who began to pay the 
mercenaries successfully by nation.  At this point, the conflict could have ended, but it does not.  
Two individuals, Spendius, a runaway Roman slave, and Mathos, a Libyan subject of Carthage, 
persuade the mercenaries of the Carthaginians’ deceit and provoke anger and war.  Because he 
fears being deported to his Roman master, tortured, and killed, Spendius strives to reignite the 
anger of the mercenaries and prolong their dispute with Carthage.832  Mathos, likewise, fears that 
he will be called to account and punished for habitually stirring up disturbances.833  After being 
declared generals by the mercenaries, these two persuade the as yet unpaid Libyan troops that 
they alone as subjects under Carthage will bear the brunt of the Carthaginians’ anger once the rest 
of the mercenaries leave.834  The Libyans go to Gesgo and demand their pay, to which Gesgo 
retorts that they should ask their “General” Mathos to pay them.835  This immediately angers 
them so much that they loot his and the Carthaginians’ property in the camp, and, under 
Spendius’ and Mathos’ leadership, they detain him.836  Polybius then sums up, “then already they 
clearly were at war against the Carthaginians.”837 
                                                 
831 Polyb., I.68.5-6.  σπουδάζοντες ἐξιλάσασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν αὐτῶν, . . . ὑπισχνούμενοι ποιήσειν πᾶν ὅ, τι ποτ’ 
ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀξιώσαιεν εἰ κατὰ δύναμιν.  ἦν δὲ πολὺ τὸ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν παρὰ τοῖς μισθοφόροις 
ἐπινοούμενον, ἅτε δὴ κατατεθαρρηκότων μὲν καὶ συντεθεωρηκότων τὴν κατάπληξιν καὶ πτοίαν τῶν 
Καρχηδονίων.  Here appeasing the mercenaries’ anger is also a strategic move, to counter any future actions based 
on this hostility. 
832 Polyb., I.69.4-5. 
833 Polyb., I.69.6. 
834 Note the lack of Carthaginian anger in the narrative.  This is a case of disjuncture between emotions in speech 
from emotions in the narrative:  Spendius and Mathos attribute anger to those whom they and their audience think 
are likely to be angry. 
835 Polyb., I.70.3. 
836 Polyb., I.70.4-5.  οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίσθησαν ὥστ’ οὐδὲ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφὴν δόντες 
ὥρμησαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὸ διαρπάζειν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν χρημάτων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συλλαμβάνειν τόν τε 
Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς μετ’ αὐτοῦ Καρχηδονίους. 
837 Polyb., I.70.6.  καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπολέμουν ἤδη φανερῶς πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. 
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 Spendius and Mathos succeed at inducing anger in the Libyans.  They play upon the 
Libyans’ fears and persuade them that Gesgo and the Carthaginians aim to injure them.838  Thus, 
the Libyans react vehemently to Gesgo’s snide remark because they perceive it as a slight to 
themselves and as indicative of Gesgo’s intention to harm their interests.  Perceived slights play 
a central role in motivating the anger which characters use to justify waging war.839  Anger which 
motivates wars is often related to a perception of being slighted.  The fickle character of the 
mercenary troops contributes to how quickly a perceived slight escalates into anger, and how 
such anger quickly escalates into violence.840 
 In the escalation to the Mercenary War, anger does not provide a justified reason to go 
to war according to Polybius’ moral standards.  Polybius consistently portrays the mercenaries 
and their motives negatively.  Polybius assumes the Carthaginians’ perspective, which 
necessitates viewing any such disruption of diplomatic proceedings as negative.  Polybius 
emphasizes the Libyans’ overzealousness for their money (οἰομένων δὲ δεῖν ἀποδεδόσθαι 
σφίσι, καὶ προσιόντων θρασέως) and their quick, unreasoned reaction of violence to Gesgo’s 
slight (οὐδὲ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφὴν δόντες ὥρμησαν . . .).  The Libyans reacted 
only to their anger (ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίσθησαν ὥστ’ . . .), with no thought underlying this.841  
Since the mercenaries’ anger can be justified only by reference to the slight by Gesgo and their 
                                                 
838 This is a plausible threat, for the Carthaginians did aim to insult them in removing them from Carthage, I.66.9. 
839 For further examples, see II.8, III.7, IV.49, all discussed in this chapter; V.58.11 (Ptolemy III against Seleucids), 
and XX.6.10-11 (Boeotians against Megara). 
840 Unlike the people in internal state communities, the mercenaries’ emotions are driven only by self-interest.  We 
saw Agathocles temporarily succeed through paying the troops in Egypt in Book XV, and likewise we saw him fail 
to appeal to them in his tearful request to care about his safety and the boy king’s against the threat of Tlepolemos; 
Polyb., XV.25.13(20) and XV.26.  Plato likewise represents mercenaries as only concerned about pay.  In his linear 
narrative of constitutional change in the Republic, Plato writes that the tyrant establishes himself among citizens by 
enrolling foreign mercenaries dependent solely upon him, and when these bodyguard mercenaries do (eventually) 
begin to assimilate into the citizens’ community, the tyrant must do away with these and enroll new foreign 
mercenaries; Pl., Rep. 567d.  See Trundle 2013 on mercenaries in the late Classical and Hellenistic age.  
841 In the mercenaries’ case, words alone spark their anger, and they react with violence immediately.  Recall the long 
periods of time between the first insults and harm from tyrants, oligarchs or from Agathocles, Agathocleia, and 
Oenanthe and the eventual outbreak of violence under some leadership. 
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desire for money, the outbreak of the Mercenary War provides a model of the “wrong” kind of 
anger:  premature, based solely on personal gain and a slight, and acted upon rashly.842  They do 
direct their anger correctly at the Carthaginians, but their response is in no way proportional to 
the wrong they suffered. 
 The shared anger of the mercenaries differs greatly from that of the people in the 
passages examined in Chapter 3.  The mercenaries as a group do not form a community:  they 
do not seem to care if their members are harmed, for they stone any of their own members who 
attempt to speak at assemblies besides Spendius and Mathos.843  This difference is crucial in 
Polybius’ presentation of the mercenaries’ character.  The mercenaries react angrily because of 
prior persuasion by their demagogic leaders, Spendius and Mathos.  In the anacyclosis and the 
popular uprising in Alexandria in Book XV, the people await a leader to direct their anger.  
Within this episode, the mercenaries do not explicitly grow angry until Spendius and Mathos 
insinuate that Gesgo and the Carthaginians aim to insult them.  Spendius and Mathos inculcate 
the mercenaries’ anger, unlike the leaders of the people in the anacyclosis and in Alexandria.844  
The mercenaries’ anger thus also differs from the Carthaginians’ anger over Sardinia which 
caused the Second Punic War.  The Carthaginians felt anger of their own accord over Sardinia, 
                                                 
842 The mercenaries’ anger does not meet Erskine’s criteria for justifiable anger:  Erskine 2015, 108, 122.  The 
mercenaries’ anger can be justified from their perspective:  the Carthaginians wished to withhold their income.  
Anger based on this kind of injustice, taking advantage of the mercenaries by using their ‘labor’ but not paying them 
for it, clearly can be justifiable.  Polybius, however, nowhere portrays the mercenaries’ anger in this way.  He 
focalizes their anger through the Carthaginians’ perspective, frames the beginning of the Mercenary War as a 
didactic warning to those who hire mercenaries, and dismissively portrays the mercenaries’ claims and reckoning of 
their wages as inaccurate. 
843 Polyb., I.69.10-14.  I use “community” in the sense which Helm describes in his 2014 article – as a unified group 
which cares about its members.  The mercenaries do not represent a community which cares for its members.  The 
mercenaries who received their pay first and departed before the Libyans confronted Gesgo did not care about the 
others, and those who stayed did not care about the other members whom they stoned to death for attempting to 
speak.  See I.69.3. 
844 Critolaus and the other demagogic leaders of the Achaean League during its war with Rome also inculcate 
emotions in the people, XXXVIII.11.9.  This also turns out very badly for him.  See Champion 2004b on Polybius’ 
portrayal of demagogues. 
186 
and then Hamilcar, the opposite kind of leader from Spendius and Mathos, combined their anger 
with his own passion. 
 Polybius does not approve of the anger of the mercenaries.  They feel anger for the 
wrong sorts of reason, money and an insult.845  They could have let this anger go and accepted 
the supplies and compensation from the Carthaginians.  Gesgo exacerbated the situation with 
his taunt, but he does not appear to be wholly at fault in the narrative.846  Polybius provides 
details into the backgrounds and inclinations of Spendius and Mathos to illuminate their bad 
character.  Their character motivates them to insinuate suspicions of Carthaginian bad faith and 
exacerbate the mercenaries’ angry reaction to Gesgo.  Because Spendius and Mathos have bad 
intentions and character, their suggestion and the anger which it instills in the mercenaries are 
also negative.847  
 However, Polybius’ description of the outbreak of Rome’s First Illyrian War juxtaposes 
both unjustified and justifiable anger.  Italian merchants complained to Rome about Illyrian 
depredations on their trading vessels, but now Illyrians even attack and kill Italian merchants on 
                                                 
845 In an anarchic world, insults required retaliation so that one would not be perceived as weak.  See Eckstein 2006 
on the anarchic atmosphere prevalent in the ancient world and particularly in the Hellenistic period.  Polybius, 
however, emphasizes morality over Realist expediency when given the chance.  Pure expediency, such as retaliating 
only because of a perceived insult and because of money, pales in comparison to reasons based in Polybius’ 
aristocratic values.  See Eckstein 1995, especially Ch. 2 on Polybius’ moral values. 
846 Unlike the mercenaries, Gesgo at least had some underlying reason for his slight.  His strategy, however, 
completely backfired, and Gesgo later paid the price for this mistake, being mutilated and thrown into a ditch to die. 
Polyb., I.80.11-13.  Moreover, Polybius describes Gesgo’s death as undeserved, I.80.5-10. 
847 Likewise, Polybius conveys how the Achaeans began the Achaean War against Rome in 146 BC without due 
consideration or justifiable cause.  Although Polybius’ account of the causes and pretexts do not survive, Polybius 
clearly presents the Achaeans as neither having moral grounds for beginning war nor using strategic prudence.  The 
surviving narrative of the Achaean War is XXXVIII.1-4, 9-13, 14-18.  He consistently characterizes the Greeks in 
this war with folly, madness, and lack of judgment:  ἀγνοία:  XXXVIII.3.13, XXXVIII.10.12, XXXVIII.11.16, 
XXXVIII.18.8; ἀνοῖα:  XXXVIII.18.7, XXXVIII.18.8; ἀβουλία:  XXXVIII.3.8; ἀπιστία:  XXXVIII.3.10; 
ἀνανδρία:  XXXVIII.3.10; ἀκρισία:  XXXVIII.18.7; μανία:  XXXVIII.18.8.  Compare Champion 2004a’s 
Appendix A on the language of barbarology, 241-244.  Their behavior and Polybius’ criticism in such start terms 
belies his view that this war too was unnecessary, foolish, and unjustified.  Moreover, the Achaean War contains 
some anger.  At XXXVIII.11.9, Critolaus the Achaean demagogue works anger and hatred into the mob, much as 
we see Spendius inculcate a quickness to anger in the Libyan mercenaries.  See Champion 2004b on demagogues.  
At XXXVIII.18.10, Polybius states that because of the quick defeat of the Achaeans, Roman anger did not burn 
further, suggesting that they felt an appropriate and proportional anger to insult from the Achaeans.  However, 
Polybius makes it clear that the Achaeans began and held responsibility for the war. 
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the Adriatic Sea.848  In response, Rome sends two ambassadors, a pair of brothers Coruncanii, to 
ask Teuta, Queen of Illyrians, to stop these piratic raids.  Polybius says that Teuta received and 
listened to them haughtily, which upset the younger, fiery Coruncanius.849  He replied rightly, but 
not opportunely, says Polybius.850  His speech angers Teuta (ἐξωργίσθη) to such a degree that 
she sent assassins after the ambassadors’ departure to murder him.851  When news of his murder 
at Teuta’s behest arrives at Rome, the Romans also grow angry (διοργισθέντες) and prepare for 
war.852 
 Polybius characterizes first Teuta as angry:  she reacts irrationally and passionately to the 
Roman’s use of frankness, (ἡ δὲ γυναικοθύμως κἀλογίστως δεξαμένη τὴν παρρησίαν).  
Teuta’s anger appears negative and unjustified.  Polybius repeatedly characterizes Teuta with 
arrogance (ἀγερώχως καὶ λίαν ὑπερηφανῶς), womanly passion (γυναικοθύμως), 
irrationality (ἀλογίστως), desires, and greed, which all contrast with traditional aristocratic 
values.853  Like the Libyan mercenaries (and Gesgo), Teuta reacts immediately, responding 
                                                 
848 Polyb., II.8.1.  See Walbank, HCP I.156-160 for the historical details of this event and the embassy that follows.  
Champion 2004, 112 and 140-141, identifies such behavior as the opposite of Roman communal values; the Illyrians 
use public resources for private gain. 
    Both Gibson 2013, 177, and Walbank, HCP I.159, note the Romans’ failure to address earlier complaints from 
Italian traders and fit this into a trend of Romans storing up grievances to use later, seen especially with the murder 
of Octavius in Antioch, XXXII.2. 
849 Polyb., II.8.7.  ἡ δὲ Τεύτα καθόλου μὲν παρ’ ὅλην τὴν κοινολογίαν ἀγερώχως καὶ λίαν ὑπερηφάνως 
αὐτῶν διήκουε.  I refer to this, the younger Coruncanius, as “Coruncanius” for the rest of the chapter, as the elder 
plays no significant role. 
850 Polyb., II.8.9.  ὁ δὲ νεώτερος τῶν πρεσβευτῶν, δυσχεράνας ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἐχρήσατο παρρησίᾳ 
καθηκούσῃ μέν, οὐδαμῶς δὲ πρὸς καιρόν.  Walbank, HCP I.159, says that Coruncanius’ speech “has the 
appearance of a post eventum invention designed to glorify the victim of the subsequent outrage,” but his analysis 
does not address Polybius’ slight criticism of Coruncanius’ speech here at II.8.9.  McGing 2013, 183, fills in 
Polybius’ implication that Coruncanius spoke rashly. 
851 Polyb., II.8.12.  ἡ δὲ γυναικοθύμως κἀλογίστως δεξαμένη τὴν παρρησίαν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξωργίσθη πρὸς 
τὸ ῥηθὲν ὡς ὀλιγωρήσασα τῶν παρ’ ἀνθρώποις ὡρισμένων δικαίων ἀποπλέουσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαποστεῖλαί 
τινας τὸν παρρησιασάμενον τῶν πρέσβεων ἀποκτεῖναι. 
852 Polyb., II.8.13. 
853 Polyb., II.8.7, II.8.12.  For an example of desires and greed, see II.8.4, where she decides to send out her pirates 
because she saw the beauty and amount of the goods taken from Phoenike.  See too for her negative 
characterization, Eckstein 1995, 154-156, 210.  Teuta’s motives and character represent what Craige Champion calls 
“barbaric thumos,” the opposite of “Hellenic logismos”:  Champion 2004a, especially 6, 70-75, 139ff. 
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arrogantly.854  She grew angry at the younger Coruncanius’ censure and threat to her dignity and 
piratic way of life.  However, Polybius saw such a way of life and sense of arrogant dignity as 
unjustifiable, and so he portrayed Teuta, her response, and her anger as negatively as possible.   
 However, the Romans reciprocally grow angry.  They grow angry at how Teuta manifests 
her unjustified anger in the murder of Coruncanius, an ambassador, and thus at how she 
commits an act of transgression of the interstate code of behavior (ὀλιγωρήσασα τῶν παρ’ 
ἀνθρώποις ὡρισμένων δικαίων).855  This anger directly causes the Romans to begin war against 
the Illyrians:  “when the news of what happened arrived in Rome, growing angry at the 
lawlessness of the woman, immediately they were busy making ready their preparations, 
enrolling an army, and gathering a fleet.”856 
 Eckstein examines Teuta as an example of Polybius’ negative judgment against Rome’s 
opponents.  “But what disturbs Polybius here is not so much opposition to Rome per se,” he 
says, “as poor-quality decision making:  leaders who lose control of their emotions and act 
irrationally, thereby becoming derelict in their solemn duty to provide guidance to their polities 
during seasons of difficulty.”857  Eckstein’s analysis of Teuta rings true in this passage, but his 
analysis could apply equally well to the Romans:  they, after all, grow just as angry 
(διοργισθέντες) and immediately decide upon war from this anger.  The Romans take no 
strategic consideration, beyond retaliation, in this narrative.  The Romans are not characterized 
as “acting irrationally” or “becoming derelict” in their duty to protect their state, by either 
Polybius or Eckstein.  The Romans could be said to demonstrate “poor-quality decision 
                                                 
854 Moreover, Polybius treats Teuta’s gender as another negative characteristic:  she cannot control her womanly 
passions (γυναικοθύμως) (χρωμένη δὲ λογισμοῖς γυναικείοις), and reacts without reflection (κἀλογίστως) 
(πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ γεγονὸς εὐτύχημα μόνον ἀποβλέπουσα); II.8.12 and II.4.8. 
855 Polyb., II.8.12.  Eckstein 1995, 196. 
856 Polyb., II.8.13.  προσπεσόντος δὲ τοῦ γεγονότος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, διοργισθέντες ἐπὶ τῇ παρανομίᾳ τῆς 
γυναικὸς εὐθέως περὶ παρασκευὴν ἐγίνοντο, καὶ στρατόπεδα κατέγραφον καὶ στόλον συνήθροιζον. 
857 Eckstein 1995, 210.  Champion 2004a, 140, likewise sees Teuta’s ἀλογία as characteristic of a Roman enemy, 
although he does not make a similar claim about the emotion. 
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making” because they react to anger just as much as Teuta does.  The crucial point, therefore, 
lies not in regulating emotions as such, but in the reasons for the emotions which elicit Polybius’ 
censure.  Polybius does not call the Romans’ move to war “poor decision making,” for he sees 
their reaction to go to war as justified, just as their anger was justified.   
 Polybius saw the Romans’ anger as morally motivated, much as the anger of the people 
against despotic rulers in the anacyclosis and in Alexandria and the Carthaginians’ anger at the 
injustice they suffered with the loss of Sardinia.  The Roman people grew angry at Teuta’s 
obvious transgression of international norms and her affront to their own dignity and status.858  
This anger immediately motivated the Romans to prepare war against the Illyrians, and thus this 
passage confirms that Polybius portrayed anger as reasonable and justifiable for war.  Anger in 
itself does not constitute a condemned, irrational, or unjustifiable motive for war.   
 Likewise, within the prefatory section of Book III, Polybius does not pass judgment 
upon the Aetolians for their anger in causing the war between Rome and Antiochus III.  The 
Aetolians grew angry because of the distribution of spoils and credit at the end of the Second 
Macedonian War in 196 BC, when they aided Rome in defeating Philip V decisively at 
Cynoscephalae.  Polybius regularly presents the Aetolians as notoriously self-interested and 
habitually transgressing the norms of interstate relations.859  He likewise portrays in an 
unfavorable light their behavior and motives after the end of the Second Macedonian War, 
which they won together with Rome, and before the Romano-Syrian War.860  The near-barbarian 
Aetolians never provide a model to emulate, but Polybius does not condemn the fact that anger 
                                                 
858 This, according to Realist theory, constitutes a real danger.  See Morstein-Marx 2009, on claims of upholding 
dignity; see Eckstein 2006, 63-65, for this as a valid and common line of thought or threat in an atmosphere of 
interstate anarchy.  See Champion 2013 on early Roman virtue, with some counterexamples; see Champion 2004a, 
especially 100-143, for further on Roman virtue and character throughout the Histories. 
859 See for example, Polyb., IV.3, IV.16, and XIII.1.  See Champion 2011 for a recent appraisal of Polybius’ 
portrayal of Aetolians. 
860 Polyb., XVIII.34.6-8, XVIII.39, XVIII.45.1-9.  Polybius elsewhere emphasizes their greed, turbulence, and 
dissatisfaction with Agelaus (the one Aetolian he portrayed favorably), V.107.5-7. 
190 
caused the war.  Rather, he criticizes the selfish motivation and inappropriate direction of their 
anger.861  Anger as a cause as such does not seem to bother Polybius.  Anger as a cause which 
stems from unjustifiable motives, however, does.   
 Polybius, his characters, and his audience regularly saw anger as a common and 
acceptable cause for war, yet scholars have seen and judged anger as an inherently negative term.  
This is not so.  Anger can certainly have unjustified motivations and also can lead to unjustified 
and immoral wars, as we saw in the case of the Mercenary War.  Anger can have moral and 
justified motivations, such as that of the Romans against Teuta, who react to arrogance and 
lawless behavior – and unmoderated anger – with their own righteous anger.  As with many 
emotions, anger as a cause of war should be evaluated with regard to its own motivation.  So 
too, the passionate spirit of Hamilcar and the anger of the Carthaginians were motivated by a 
sense of honor and justice.  Polybius made clear that Hamilcar acted nobly and rightly in first 
yielding to the situation at the end of the First Punic War and in persevering later.  While we 
might expect Polybius to criticize holding onto and beginning a new war for such reasons as 
anger, he does not.  Likewise, Polybius repeatedly stressed the injustice of the seizure of Sardinia, 
thus showing the anger that arose from it as rationally and morally grounded.  Carthaginian 
anger was justified as a cause of the Second Punic War. 
Pretexts 
 The justifiability of a cause for war mattered to Polybius, and pretexts, προφάσεις, 
represented justification for a character’s actions in the Histories.  Pretexts, in their role as 
representing the justice of a character’s actions to the world, thus were important to Polybius as 
well.  Donald Baronowski, however, argues against the value of pretexts for Polybius.  
Baronowski sees pretexts as merely expedient, for giving a “feeble justification”, “clumsy 
                                                 
861 Thus, the Aetolians’ anger fails at fulfilling Erskine’s criteria for justifiable anger; Erskine 2015.   
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invention”, or “an unreasonable and false claim”.862  Pretexts merely covered up aggression – 
which Baronowksi argues Polybius approved – to external observers who knew better and 
recognized the deception anyway.863  While Baronowski correctly points to some “feeble 
justifications”, his argument is at odds with Polybius’ text, including the major passages 
Baronowski addresses.  Polybius put emphasis on the pretexts, precisely in their moral validity 
and thus good appearance to the rest of the world, therefore also having practical benefit.   
 Polybius does not quite distinguish a cause (αἰτία) from a pretext (πρόφασις) in his 
definitions at III.6-7.  Rather, the distinction between cause and pretext becomes clear through 
his examples.864  A pretext is an aggressor’s public reason to go to war, while the cause 
represents what motivates his actions.  Philip II’s pretext, for example, for his planned invasion 
of the Persian Empire was punishing the Persians for their transgression against the Greeks, 
while for the Romano-Syrian War, Antiochus III proclaimed the freedom of the Greeks as his 
pretext.865  Polybius’ choices here represent claims by the active party to the world, justifying 
their actions. 
 Polybius’ discussion of the beginning of the Third Macedonian War between Rome and 
Perseus, Philip V’s son and successor, makes clear the typical relation between cause and 
pretext.866  Polybius criticizes others’ attribution of causes and emphasizes his distinctions 
between cause, pretext, and beginning.  Others attribute the cause of the Third Macedonian War 
                                                 
862 Baronowski 1995, 17.  He uses these terms as generalizations of all pretexts but cites III.6, III.15, and XXXVI.2 
for his evidence.  We shall address all of these passages below. 
863 Baronowski 1995, 22.  See Baronowski 2011 for his argument about Polybius on imperialism. 
864 Those of Alexander the Great’s pretext to invade Persia and Antiochus III’s to come into Greece. 
865 Polyb., III.15.10-11, III.30.3-4.  The ostensible difference between the cause and pretext lies in the perspective:  the 
character himself gives a pretext while the narrator identifies the cause, but the cause and pretext do not have to be 
different or separate, as we shall see.  The historian relates the causes from a position of greater knowledge, for he 
can review the course of events in retrospect and determine the truth about what actually began a war.  The 
characters, however, decide upon pretexts with their limited view of the foreseeable future; see Grethlein 2013, 224-
267, on Polybius’ prominent use of retrospect.  Much more important is the similarity:  pretexts present the 
justification of characters’ actions.   
    Another option is that the pretext just represents the character’s public reason for his actions, while the cause is 
his (conscious) reason motivating him to act. 
866 Polyb., XXII.18. 
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to a number of immediate events:  the Thracian king Abrupolis’ expulsion, the invasion of 
Dolopia, and Perseus’ actions at Delphi.867  Polybius disagrees with calling any of these a cause.  
Instead, he says, they are all pretexts (for the Romans against Perseus).  He says also that others 
likewise classify as causes the plot against Eumenes, the Pergamene monarch, and the murder of 
Boeotian envoys, whereas Polybius calls these events the beginning of the war.  Polybius, in 
contrast to the other writers, attributes the cause to Philip V, Perseus’ father:  he planned to 
wage war against Rome but died before he could execute this plan, much like Philip II’s plan to 
invade Persia which was left to Alexander the Great, comparable to Hannibal’s inheritance of 
Hamilcar’s plan and hatred.868 
 Polybius explains how crucial a suitable pretext is for entering war, morally and (thus) 
pragmatically.  Polybius discusses the Romans’ decision-making leading up to the Third Punic 
War.  They had the strategic power to begin and wage war, but they delayed declaring war until 
they found a suitable pretext (πρόφασιν εὐσχήμονα).869  Despite the benefit and expediency of 
beginning war sooner, the Romans hesitated because of the importance of having a good 
reputation.  Polybius approves the Romans’ consideration and privileging of pretexts.870  Not 
only does a good pretext give them the appearance of justice, he remarks, but it makes the 
                                                 
867 Polyb., XXII.18.1-5.  The narration of most of these events do not survive in the extant text.  Cf. Liv. 39.23-24, 
41.22ff.  See Walbank, HCP 3.205-209 on the historical events.   
868 Polyb, XXII.18.10-11.  Polybius does not specifically identify the cause, aitia, of the Third Macedonian War.  He 
makes the correlation between Philip II and Philip V’s plans and emphasizes Philip V’s intent to wage war, with his 
preparations as evidence for this.  This passage is preserved in the De Sententiis of the Constantinian Excerpts, and 
so the excerptor may have left out Polybius’ direct attribution of the cause.  See Moore 1965 on the manuscript 
tradition. 
    Livy records a similar transfer of the drive to war from Philip V to Perseus, 36.28-29, yet he also portrays Perseus 
as autonomous and as directing war more towards Eumenes than towards the Romans, 42.15. In Philip V’s speech, 
which Livy states are the reasons for the war, emotion is not mentioned explicitly, although it is clear to see Philip 
was disgruntled at the least, if not indignant and angry.  Philip mentions, however, what we would call practical, 
strategic reasons for his complaint to Rome.  Likewise, Eumenes’ speech, 42.11-12, which greatly influences the 
Roman Senate to declare war against Perseus, includes strategic and immediate events and considerations.  Appian, 
Mac. 1.2-3, also puts emphasis on Eumenes as the object of Perseus’ attention.  He also mentions that Rome did not 
want a popular and hard-working king as well as a hereditary enemy as their neighbor.   
869 Polyb., XXXVI.2.1.  πάλαι δὲ τούτου κεκυρωμένου βεβαίως ἐν ταῖς ἑκάστων γνώμαις καιρὸν ἐζήτουν 
ἐπιτήδειον καὶ πρόφασιν εὐσχήμονα πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός. 
870 Polyb., XXXVI.2.2. 
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victory seem better and more secure.871  Lastly, Polybius stresses the judgment of external 
observers (περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς διαλήψεως).872  Pretexts assume great importance in the 
appearance of justice to the rest of the world.873  Although Polybius does not mention anger in 
causing or characterizing this war in the surviving text of the Histories, this passage on the Third 
Punic War provides evidence for the importance of both causes and pretexts, particularly in 
moral terms.874 
 To turn back to the Second Punic War, Hannibal justifies his presence at Saguntum to 
the Roman embassy with what Polybius calls “fabricated” and “illogical” pretexts.875  Polybius 
says,  
“But Hannibal, as he was a young man full of impulsiveness for war, and 
successful in his endeavors, and stirred up in his long-time enmity against 
Romans, charged the envoys, as if concerned for the Saguntines, that the 
Romans, when the Saguntines were in civil strife just a few years before, in 
resolving it had some of the leaders killed unjustly:  he said that the Carthaginians 
would not overlook those who had been betrayed (παρεσπονδημένους).  For it 
was the Carthaginians’ ancestral custom not to overlook anyone being injured 
unjustly.”876 
 
  That Hannibal himself deemed these pretexts as worthy surely attests to their importance and 
usefulness as public justifications to Hannibal and the Carthaginians, contra Polybius.  Clearly, 
immediate events and perceived injustices hold importance as legitimate reasons or pretexts for 
                                                 
871 Polyb., XXXVI.2.3.  ἔνστασις γὰρ πολέμου κατὰ τὸν Δημήτριον δικαία μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦσα καὶ τὰ 
νικήματα ποιεῖ μείζω καὶ τὰς ἀποτεύξεις ἀσφαλεστέρας, ἀσχήμων δὲ καὶ φαύλη τοὐναντίον ἀπεργάζεται. 
872 Polyb., XXXVI.2.4.  See Chapter 5 on the importance of external observers. 
873 For all this stress on pretexts, Polybius does not tell us the Romans’ pretext in this part of the extant text, again 
preserved in the De Sententiis of the Constantinian Excerpts. 
    Compare XXXVI.5.1-6, where a Carthaginian argues for the necessity of choosing expediency over what is 
honorable in the dire situation of the Carthaginians in the Third Punic War. 
874 Appian, Pun. 9.74, similarly states that the Romans tried to come up with a pretext for declaring war on the 
Carthaginians in the Third Punic War.  He says that the Romans were hostile (δυσμεναίνοντες) towards the 
Carthaginians and used their action against Masinissa, in which they both lost overall and lost many lives, as a 
reason to go to war quickly against them, despite their embassies seeking peace. 
875 Polyb., III.6-11. 
876 Polyb., III.15.6-7.  ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας, ἅτε νέος μὲν ὤν, πλήρης δὲ πολεμικῆς ὁρμῆς, ἐπιτυχὴς δ’ ἐν ταῖς 
ἐπιβολαῖς, πάλαι δὲ παρωρμημένος πρὸς τὴν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ἔχθραν, πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνους, ὡς κηδόμενος 
Ζακανθαίων, ἐνέκαλει Ῥωμαίοις διότι μικροῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις, στασιαζόντων αὐτῶν, λαβόντες τὴν 
ἐπιτροπὴν [εἰς τὸ διαλῦσαι] ἀδίκως ἐπανέλοιντό τινας τῶν προεστώτων ·  οὓς οὐ περιόψεσθαι 
παρεσπονδημένους ·  πάτριον γὰρ εἶναι Καρχηδονίοις τὸ μηδένα τὼν ἀδικουμένων περιορᾶν. 
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going to war, and surely Hannibal would have considered them reasonable and suitable to his 
audience, of both Romans and Carthaginians and anyone observing the war, as well.  Otherwise, 
they would not serve his purpose at all as pretexts. 
 However, Polybius severely criticizes these pretexts, something that he does not do for 
other – sometimes flimsier – pretexts.877  In other instances, claims to protect one’s wronged 
allies are both noble and acceptable as reasons to commence hostilities.  Philip V’s motivations 
to participate in the Social War fall under this category, as do the Achaean League’s actions 
throughout the Histories.  Polybius portrays Philip V in the Social War as a noble leader, even 
overcoming the disadvantage of being young, and therefore more prone to irrational and rash 
impulses.878  The Achaean League nobly takes up the Messenians’ just cause in the Social War, 
and the Messenians receive unrestrained censure from Polybius for their indecision in joining the 
allies against the Aetolian League, especially since they themselves were the wronged party.879  
Despite the Messenians’ indecision, the Achaeans resolved to right the wrong done by the 
Aetolian League and fight the Social War.  Of course, the Achaean League had other motives for 
curtailing Aetolian power, particularly in the Peloponnese itself, but Polybius focuses on their 
nobility in defending those wronged and standing up for their allies.880  Lastly, the Romans 
commonly claimed it was their patriotic duty to defend those wronged and to support their 
allies, which Hannibal at III.15.6 claims in his pretexts is Carthaginian custom.881  Rarely does 
                                                 
877 Consider Antiochus III and the Aetolians, which Eckstein 1995, 57, uses as an example for weak pretexts.  
McGing 2010, 77, also discusses the unimportance of pretexts (though without this example). 
878 See especially Polyb., V.77 and throughout Books IV-V in Philip’s campaigns in the Social War.  See too McGing 
2013, on Philip V as a good leader while young.  Philip V’s later actions, after the Social War, do not fall in this 
category, however. 
879 Polyb., IV.31-33. 
880 Polyb., IV.7, especially IV.7.3-4. See Champion 2004a, especially pages 100-143, on Achaean virtues. 
881 Compare Coruncanius’ speech at II.8.10-11.  Coruncanius’ speech to Teuta also comes in a youthful outburst, 
much like Hannibal’s.  Both tack on the line about their custom to aid wronged allies at the end of their speech.  In 
both cases of the young Coruncanius and the young Hannibal, their claim does not have much backing and seems 
to exhibit the youthful rashness Polybius explicitly attributes to both.  Nevertheless, the claim itself did hold weight 
as an argument in its own right; these two young men merely did not set up their speeches and argument to bring 
out the full potential of this claim.  See Walbank HCP, I.159, for further examples and counterexamples. 
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Polybius criticize this tendency of the Romans, and when he does it is due to their choice of 
disreputable allies.882  In sum, Polybius’ criticism of the content of Hannibal’s pretexts 
contradicts Polybius’ tendency to praise this type of behavior.  Polybius criticizes not the 
content, then, but Hannibal’s interpretive move.883 
 Polybius begins criticizing Hannibal for his succumbing to his youth, for he responded 
“full of irrationality and forceful passion (θυμός).”884  As Craige Champion has noted, Polybius 
does not hold back on using language of barbarism and irrationality in this passage.885  Polybius 
continues:   
“For this reason also, he did not use the true causes, but fled to irrational 
pretexts, which those who make light of duty are accustomed to do because of 
the urges in them.  For how much better was it to think that the Romans must 
give back to them Sardinia and the tributes arranged together with this, which 
they took unjustly from them in taking advantage of the circumstances, and if 
not, to declare war?  But now, keeping quiet about what the true cause was, and 
fabricating a nonexistent cause about the Saguntines, he seemed to begin the war 
not only irrationally but, even more so, unjustly.”886 
 
Polybius accuses Hannibal of fabricating (πλάττων) these reasons rather than giving the real 
causes.  The true reasons (αἰτίαι) for Carthage to go to war with Rome were better than what 
Hannibal gave.  Polybius ignores two key considerations:  first, the realities underlying 
Hannibal’s “fabricated” pretexts, which Walbank, for one, shows to be plausible, and second, 
                                                 
882 Polyb., III.26.6. 
883 One could posit that Polybius is inconsistent in what he praises or blames based on who exactly he judges.  This 
conclusion, that Polybius only blames those he does not agree with politically or whom it is expedient for him to 
blame, runs contrary to Polybius’ own precepts for a historian in I.14.4-5.  Before coming to the conclusion that 
Polybius is inconsistent and fails to meet his own historiographical precepts, I prefer to investigate other options. 
884 Polyb., III.15.9.  καθόλου δ’ ἦν πλήρης ἀλογίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου.  Clearly, thumos here conforms to the 
typical negative connotations in Polybius, especially when modified specifically as “violent”.  Hannibal, unlike 
Hamilcar, does not show prudence and swallow his emotion for the time being, providing us with a clear instance 
of inexpedient emotion. 
885 Champion 2004a, 118-121.  See too Eckstein 1995, 144. 
886 Polyb., III.15.9-11.  διὸ καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀληθιναῖς αἰτίαις οὐκ ἐχρῆτο, κατέφευγε δ’ εἰς προφάσεις ἀλόγους ·  
ἅπερ εἰώθασι ποιεῖν οἱ διὰ τὰς προεγκαθημένας αὐτοῖς ὁρμὰς ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ καθήκοντος.  πόσῳ γὰρ ἦν 
ἄμεινον οἴεσθαι δεῖν, Ῥωμαίους ἀποδοῦναι σφίσι Σαρδόνα καὶ τοὺς ἐπιταχθέντας ἅμα ταύτῃ φόρους, οὓς 
τοῖς καιροῖς συνεπιθέμενοι πρότερον ἀδίκως παρ’ αὐτῶν ἔλαβον ·  εἰ δὲ μή, φάναι πολεμήσειν;  νῦν δὲ τὴν 
μὲν οὖσαν αἰτίαν ἀληθινὴν παρασιωπῶν, τὴν δ’ οὐκ ὑπάρχουσαν περὶ Ζακανθαίων πλάττων, οὐ μόνον 
ἀλόγως, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀδίκως κατάρχειν ἐδόκει τοῦ πολέμου. 
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the fact that Hannibal was justifying his attack and treatment of Saguntum, not a potential war 
with Rome.887  Retrospection may have blinded Polybius to Hannibal’s foreseeable situation and 
goals at that moment in 220/219 BC.888   
 However, Polybius emphasizes the positive value of what he identifies as the true causes 
for use as Hannibal’s pretext.  The injustice of the Romans’ seizure of Sardinia, imposition of 
additional tribute, and the anger from this serve as suitable, plausible, and beneficial pretexts for 
Hannibal and the Carthaginians in Polybius’ mind.  Despite Polybius’ affirmation that Hannibal 
and the Carthaginians had justice on their side, Hannibal’s poor choice of pretext makes his 
cause appear unjust.  As Polybius specifies with the Third Punic War, pretexts are important for 
gaining the goodwill of others and for securing one’s victory.889  Hannibal failed in this because 
he did not cite the Romans’ injustice – and, implicitly, the anger associated with it – in his 
pretext. 
 While Polybius did not specify that Hannibal should have used anger as his pretext 
explicitly, the Gauls who join him in Italy do.  They choose to begin hostilities against Rome “in 
word because of their anger against the Romans, but actually more so because of plunder.”890  
Here Polybius distinguishes the pretext of anger from the cause:  the Gauls use anger as a 
pretext, but self-interested material gain drives them to war.  This example, though brief, 
demonstrates an essential assumption by both the Gauls and Polybius.  They presume that anger 
is a suitable pretext (πρόφασις), or public reason, to go to war.  Of course, many pretexts for 
war in the ancient world seem less than ideal or even coherent – not least Polybius’ own 
exemplary case for distinguishing causes, pretexts, and beginnings, that of Alexander’s invasion 
                                                 
887 Walbank fills in the details of the events Hannibal cited as pretexts, Walbank, HCP 1.319-324.  Walbank is one 
among many historians whose work concerns the outbreak of the Second Punic War.  See Rich 1996, 1 note 1, for 
the most comprehensive list of major contributions.  See more recently Beck 2011. 
888 On retrospection in historiography, see Grethlein 2013, especially 224-267 on Polybius. 
889 Polyb., XXXVI.2.1-4. 
890 Polyb., III.78.5.  προφάσει μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ὀργήν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας. 
197 
into the Persian Empire.891  However, pretexts presented the outward justification of a state to 
the wider interstate community, in which appearance and reputation mattered.  Therefore, 
pretexts had to have some form of plausibility as a reasonable justification. 
   Gauls, however, are often cast as the stereotypical barbarians.892  The Gauls’ anger 
seems morally unjustified when seen purely as an indication of their barbarian behavior.  
However, their anger is grounded in their desire for retaliation against the Romans, who, as 
recently as 225 BC, had waged wars against them and taken their land.  The conflicts between 
the Gauls and the Romans stretch back almost unabated to 390 BC.893  Considered within this 
background, the Gauls’ anger appears more justified, as part of retaliation, and less of a barbaric 
outburst.  Anger seemed more plausible as a public explanation to wage war on the Romans 
than pursuit of material gain.894  Moreover, their underlying desire for retaliation, which causes 
their anger, seems reasonable.  Anger, therefore, can stand as a suitable pretext or cause, when 
the context and motivations for the anger are considered, that is when it is justifiable.  Hannibal, 
like the Gauls, could have cited his country and family’s anger against Rome as his pretext, for 
Polybius considered Carthaginian anger justified. 
 However, the anger between the Aetolian Dorimachus and the Messenian Skyron, which 
formed Dorimachus’ pretext for stirring up the Social War, presents a negative paradigm for 
                                                 
891 Polyb., III.6.9-7.3.  See Walbank, HCP 1.305-309. 
892 See especially Champion 2004a, 113-115. 
893 Polyb., II.18-35 details this series of Gallic-Roman conflict in summary form.  In this period, the longest break 
from hostilities lasted only 45 years, according to Polybius.  Moreover, in their recent interactions, the Romans even 
colonized and resettled the area, killing and displacing many Gauls. 
894 In fact, Champion 2004a, 115, adduces this passage as describing a common Gallic pattern of behavior:  “Gauls 
subordinate collective interests and communal concerns to individual desires.”  Their prioritization of desire for 
plunder as a cause to anger, which represents their collective disgruntlement with the Romans, as a pretext fits this 
characterization.  Champion’s definition of “collective interests and communal concerns” describes Polybius’ 
universal standards, as set out in his discussion of the prototypical human community in the anacyclosis.  Thus, 
ὠφελεία, in denoting plunder, does not represent the good of the community rather than the benefit for an 
individual.  However, within the context of this passage (and not the anacyclosis), ὠφελεία does represent a Gallic 
communal benefit in terms of what the Gallic community values, rather than Polybius’ universal standards. 
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anger as a pretext.895  The Social War was fought between the Aetolian League and its allies and 
the Achaean League, Macedonians, and their allies from 220 to 217 BC.896  According to 
Polybius, a dispute between the Aetolian Dorimachus and the Messenians first initiated the 
conflict.  The Messenians, who had put themselves under Aetolian protection, nonetheless 
suffered raids by bandits, until one raid resulted in the death of a Messenian landholder.897   The 
Messenians consulted Dorimachus, the Aetolian commander in Messene, who had actually 
condoned and profited from the raids.  A Messenian councilman, Skyron, proposed that 
Dorimachus, as leader of their Aetolian protectors, should be held responsible for the damages 
from the raiding, and that he should not depart until he had paid damages for their losses.898  
Dorimachus, angered (διοργισθεὶς) both at Skyron’s suggestion and the council’s agreement 
with him, responded vehemently that they were all fools, as they were speaking not only against 
him but also against the whole Aetolian League.899  Dorimachus’ response angered Skyron in 
turn (περιοργισθεὶς), who mocked Dorimachus by associating him with a notorious, 
emasculated Messenian local who resembled Dorimachus.900  Dorimachus then left for Aetolia, 
having paid the damages, and used no other pretext (οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχων εὔλογον 
πρόφασιν) for making war against the Messenians.901 
                                                 
895 Polyb., IV.4.  This scene shares great similarities with the angry interaction between Teuta and Coruncanius 
which sparked the First Illyrian War.   
896 This war takes up most of the narration of Books IV and V. 
897 Polyb., IV.3.8-4.1. 
898 Polyb., IV.4.3. 
899 Polyb., IV.4.4. 
900 Polyb., IV.4.5.  ἦν δέ τις κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ἄνθρωπος ἀσυρὴς ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ, τῶν ἐξῃρημένων 
τὸν ἄνδρα κατὰ πάντα τρόπον.  The reading of “ἐξῃρημένων” differs between the major manuscripts.  The 
oldest, A, reads “ἐξηρμένων”, but the LSJ classifies this as a falsa lectio.  The reading I have used, “ἐξῃρημένων”, 
“removed”, is found in the rest of the major manuscripts.  However, the modern texts print “ἐξηρμένων”. 
901 Polyb., IV.4.9. ἐπανελθὼν δ’ εἰς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν οὕτω πικρῶς ἤνεγκε καὶ βαρέως τὸ ῥηθὲν ὡς οὐδεμίαν 
ἄλλην ἔχων εὔλογον πρόφασιν δι’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἐξέκαυσε τὸν πόλεμον.  Walbank, HCP I.453, 
downplays the importance of this episode:  “the responsibility for the war is to be attributed neither to so small a 
group as Dorimachus and his colleagues, nor to an incident so trivial as this insult; these are clearly excuses for a 
policy already decided.”  Despite this, Polybius portrays this instance as very important.  Dorimachus – and 
Polybius – still thought it valid enough as a pretext. 
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 The angry exchange in Messene between Dorimachus and Skyron serves as the pretext 
for the Social War in Polybius’ narrative.902  Polybius does not classify anything as a cause, αἰτία, 
specifically, although earlier he describes the Aetolians’ motives for desiring war.  They live off 
their neighbors’ property, and they saw the youth of Philip V as a weakness which they could 
exploit.903  Aetolian greed and aggression due to the perceived weakness of Macedon seem to 
cause the war in Polybius’ narrative, even if he did not directly label it as the cause (aitia).   
 Thus identified, the Aetolians’ cause and pretext are similar to the Gauls’ cause and 
pretext in joining Hannibal in Italy against the Romans:  greed and anger, respectively.  The 
Aetolians’ case furthers the conclusion that anger appeared more acceptable than greed as a 
public reason to join war.  Anger can be justified, whereas greed cannot. 
 In this scenario, Dorimachus grows angry and uses Skyron’s jibe against him as the only 
pretext to go to war (ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχων εὔλογον πρόφασιν δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῖς 
Μεσσηνίοις ἐξέκαυσε τὸν πόλεμον), similar to the Libyans’ angry response to Gesgo’s taunt 
before the Mercenary War and Teuta’s murderous response to Coruncanius’ frankness, and 
Polybius implies that Dorimachus and the Aetolians should have had a better (εὔλογον) 
pretext.904  Polybius described Dorimachus after his return to Aetolia as sneaking around, 
making backroom deals with Scopas, the leading Aetolian, and setting off on war without the 
proper legislative measures and vote of the Aetolian assembly.905  If Dorimachus’ pretext was 
justified, he presumably would not have needed to bypass proper Aetolian measures for going to 
war, if we can trust Polybius’ hostile narrative against Aetolians.  His actions cast doubt further 
                                                 
902 The beginning of the war occurred later when the Aetolians raided Achaea, and the Achaeans tried (and failed) to 
repel them.  Polyb., IV.6-7, 9-13. 
903 See also Champion 2004a, 129-137, on Aetolian characteristics in Polybius’ Histories. 
904 Polyb., IV.4.9.  Polybius does not specify the Libyans’ and Teuta’s anger as pretexts.  They seem to be causes, 
and all three are sparked by insults. 
905 Polyb., IV.5.  Nevertheless, Polybius’ focus on Dorimachus in Aetolia draws attention away from the Aetolians 
themselves.  They did have to agree to go to war.   
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on the justifiability of his pretext, even in Aetolia, which, we have noted, does not meet 
Polybius’ standards for acceptable behavior.  Consider, for example, Polybius’ description of the 
Aetolians’ characteristics and behavior in plundering others:  “so indeed the Aetolians live in this 
way of life and constantly plunder Greece, and, conducting unannounced wars against many, 
they do not deem their accusers worth giving a defense to, but they even revile anyone who calls 
them to account about what has happened or even about what they are about to do.”906  
Polybius’ narrative of Dorimachus’ behavior smears the Aetolians, who did have agency in 
agreeing to war for their own, presumably less personal and petty, motives, against Polybius’ 
framing of the narrative.907 
 Through this scenario Polybius frames both Dorimachus and the Aetolians as beginning 
the war wrongly:  Dorimachus wants war for personal, unjustified reasons, and the Aetolians 
began war without proper measures because of him.  Of course, Polybius’ portrayal of 
Dorimachus and the Aetolians puts their opponents in this war, the Achaeans, in a particularly 
favorable light by comparison.  Moreover, Polybius’ highlighting of the Aetolian injustice against 
the Messenians leaves him the opportunity to call the Messenians’ inaction into question later.908  
The particular details of this passage set a framework in which Polybius can cast doubt on 
Dorimachus’ character and motivations, the legitimacy of the war for the Aetolians, and the 
Messenians’ claim for neutrality during the war.  Dorimachus provides a negative paradigm for 
Hannibal:  Dorimachus does not feel justifiable anger and does not use a pretext which will 
show justice and make victory secure.   
                                                 
906 Polyb., IV.16.4.  Αἰτωλοὶ γοῦν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ χρώμενοι καὶ λῃστεύοντες συνεχῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ 
πολέμους ἀνεπαγγέλτους φέροντες πολλοῖς, οὐδ’ ἀπολογίας ἔτι κατηξίουν τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
προσεχλεύαζον εἴ τις αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαιοδοσίας προκαλοῖτο περὶ τῶν γεγονότων ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία τῶν 
μελλόντων.  See especially Champion 2011 for Polybius’ nuanced portrayal of the Aetolians as the foil for the 
Achaeans. 
907 See Grainger 1999 on the Aetolian federation and its constitutional procedures. 
908 Meadows 2013 thinks that Polybius took this scenario from a local source because of all the details included in 
the passage.  I think that Polybius included it for his own rhetorical purposes. 
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 Skyron, on the other hand, feels anger and shares Polybian values:  freedom of speech 
(παρρησία), calling wrongdoers to account, and defending one’s people, property, and territory, 
values which we observed in the development and good state forms of the anacyclosis.  Thus, 
when Skyron grows angry (περιοργισθεὶς) at Dorimachus’ impetuous and arrogant speech 
insulting the Messenians and threatening their city, Polybius does not explicitly criticize Skyron’s 
anger.909  Even Skyron’s mockery of Dorimachus, which Polybius decided worthy to quote in 
detail, is set as an appropriate response to Dorimachus’ bravado, for it succeeds in causing 
Dorimachus to assent to pay damages and leave.  Skyron grows angry at Dorimachus because 
the Aetolian failed at his duty to protect the Messenian community and actively harmed it.  For 
these reasons, as well as Dorimachus’ disrespect for Skyron and the Messenians in his speech, 
Skyron justifiably grew angry.  Hannibal could have used his anger as a pretext successfully, 
which Dorimachus tried and failed to do. 
 As with anger as a cause, anger as a pretext can be acceptable to Polybius, his characters, 
and implicitly their audiences.  Baronowski states:  “since every pretext, even one that involves 
honor and morality, is by nature a diversionary artifice, it must be judged by the criteria of 
expediency, not of morality.” 910  This contradicts the emphasis Polybius himself puts on good 
pretexts:  external observers judge a pretext as the moral justification of one’s cause, not for its 
strategic expediency. Polybius criticized Hannibal for his pretext not only as a “clumsy 
invention” but as a hindrance to his own cause:  Hannibal portrayed his actions as unjust and 
therefore immoral, the opposite of the purpose of a pretext. 
 
 
                                                 
909 This is the only occurrence of περιοργίζεσθαι in the extant Histories, and is the earliest preserved usage of this 
verb in Greek.   
910 Baronowski 1995, 17. 
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Emotion and Prudence 
 Emotion does not always oppose strategic prudence and expediency.  Pretexts serve a 
moral purpose and thus provide characters with access to a better reputation, something of 
practical benefit even in the Realist theory of international relations.911  Polybius also shows how 
anger can – and should – combine with prudent considerations.  Modern studies in international 
relations until recently contrasted strategic prudence with irrational and emotional decision 
making.912   
 All of the three causes of the Second Punic War involve emotion, and all three also attest 
to the Carthaginians’ strategic sensibilities.  Hamilcar first postpones his drive for war – 
motivated by his θυμός and anger – until a better opportunity presents itself, which did not 
occur in Hamilcar’s own lifetime.  This occurs commonly in Polybius:  Philip II passed down the 
will to make war against Persia to Alexander, and Philip V passed down the preparations for war 
to Perseus, thus stimulating the Third Macedonian War.913  So too, Hamilcar, motivated by his 
emotions, passed down his drive to make war against Rome to Hannibal and the Carthaginians, 
who were willing supporters, given their own hatred and anger against the Romans.  The 
Carthaginians likewise averted war and acceded to the Romans’ demands for Sardinia and 
additional tribute:   
But when the Romans declared war against the Carthaginians after they resolved 
the Mercenary War, the Carthaginians first agreed over everything, thinking that 
they would win in their just claims, . . ..  But when the Romans did not 
compromise, the Carthaginians, yielding to the situation and taking it hard, not 
having power to do anything, withdrew from Sardinia and undertook to pay 
another 1,200 talents in addition to the previous tribute.  On account of this they 
                                                 
911 See Eckstein 2006, 63-69, on the importance of reputation as practical for survival.  
912 See Crawford 2000 for a review and reassessment of this trend.  For recent studies which address the importance 
of emotion in international relations and decision making, see Mercer 2005, Ross 2006, and Sasley 2011. 
913 Philip II:  III.6.5, III.6.10-14; Philip V as originator of the Third Macedonian War:  XXII.18.  See below. 
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averted war at that time.  For this reason, this must even be placed as the second 
and greatest cause of the later war.914 
 
  They strategically held back any negative feelings (καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν) and used prudence 
(εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει; οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδέν), even if they had justice on their side 
(ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δικαίοις).  The third cause, Carthage’s strength in 
Spain, also exemplifies the Carthaginians’ strategic prudence.  Because they did not act 
immediately on their justified anger at the loss of Sardinia, they began to create their power in 
Spain.  This cause alone focuses primarily on a pragmatic and strategic aspect, but it does not 
completely omit affect, as the Carthaginians confidently (εὐθαρσῶς) rely on their Iberian 
power.  Now they had confidence in this power.  Polybius relates emotions in these three causes 
in agreement with concerns about expediency.  Anger can function together with strategic 
prudence:  anger motivates agents’ decision to want to wage war, and since they have decided 
upon war, they use strategic prudence to maximize their probability of success, which Hamilcar 
and the Carthaginians did by building their power in Spain rather than accepting immediate war 
over Sardinia.915 
 Prusias I, the king of Bithynia, similarly delays in acting upon his anger until a suitable 
opportunity arose.  His latent anger for the Byzantines motivated him to join Rhodes in a war 
                                                 
914 Polyb., III.10.1, 3-4.  Ῥωμαίων δὲ μετὰ τὸ καταλύσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τὴν προειρημένην ταραχὴν 
ἀπαγγειλάντων αὐτοῖς πόλεμον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς πᾶν συγκατέβαινον, ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν 
τοῖς δικαίοις, . . ..  πλὴν οὐκ ἐντρεπομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει, καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν, οὐκ 
ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδέν, ἐξεχώρησαν Σαρδόνος, συνεχώρησαν δ’ εἰσοίσειν ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια 
τάλαντα πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον, ἐφ΄ ᾧ μὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκείνοις ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς καιροῖς.  διὸ καὶ δευτέραν, 
μεγίστην δέ, ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα συστάντος πολέμου. 
915 Scholars dispute Polybius’ reasoning for Carthage’s determination to build their strength in Spain.  See especially 
Hoyos 1998.   
    Cf. the Carthaginians’ choice of putting aside the honorable course of resistance for expediency at the outset of 
the Third Punic War and Polybius’ praise of a Carthaginian’s argument for this, XXXVI.5.1-6.  On the other hand, 
the Achaean leaders did not take either an expedient or honorable course of action in the Achaean War, and 
Polybius consistently characterizes their decisions and conduct as thoughtless, ignorant, unreflecting, mistaken, and 
mad.  For some examples, see XXXVIII.3.8-13, XXXVIII.10.12, XXXVIII.11.6, XXXVIII.18.7-8. 
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against Byzantium in 220/219 BC.916  The Rhodians declared war on Byzantium for levying a toll 
on ships from the Black Sea.  Prusias uses the Rhodians’ invitation and their causes for war as 
his pretext for making war against the Byzantines.  For Prusias, however, deep-seated anger 
formed his cause.  Polybius gives three reasons for this anger against Byzantium.  First, the 
Byzantines had voted to put up statues for Prusias but forgot about them.  Second, the 
Byzantines had endeavored to reconcile Prusias’ neighboring rivals, Attalus of Pergamum and 
Achaeus, the Seleucid satrap of Asia Minor, which was not beneficial for Prusias.  Lastly, the 
Byzantines sent representatives to Attalus’ festival for Athena in Pergamum but neglected to 
send anyone to Prusias’ festival of Soteria when he invited them.917  Prusias felt anger against 
Byzantium because of these perceived slights.  He gladly joined the war with his anger lurking 
behind the pretext of aiding his allies, the Rhodians.918 
 In this passage Polybius does not explicitly condone or condemn Prusias’ motives or 
choice to go to war.  Polybius stresses that the anger of Prusias was the actual cause for his 
decision to wage war.  This, coupled with Polybius’ lack of judgment or negative portrayal of 
Prusias I, supports the view that anger formed a suitable and usual cause for war, even if aiding 
his allies seemed to be a better choice in this case for a pretext than anger at past grievances.919 
 Prusias demonstrates the agreement of expediency and emotion.  He does not forget his 
anger and initial motivation against the Byzantines, but he demonstrates strategic prudence by 
delaying until the Rhodians provide added strength and a pretext to commence hostilities against 
the object of his anger, Byzantium.  Moreover, Prusias ensures a good reputation for coming to 
his allies’ aid, rather than seeming to act hastily due to perhaps trivial reasons.  Prusias 
                                                 
916 This passage receives very little attention in scholarship.  Walbank, HCP I.502-503, only focuses on the festivals, 
especially Prusias’ Soteria. 
917 Polyb., IV.49.1-3. 
918 Polyb., IV.49.4.  διόπερ ἐκ πάντων τούτων ὑποικουρουμένης παρ’ αὐτῷ τῆς ὀργῆς ἄσμενος ἐπελάβετο 
τῆς τῶν Ῥοδίων προφάσεως. 
919 Prusias I’s anger may have seemed less viable as a pretext than the Gauls’.  Note that Prusias also did not take 
the initiative to begin war against Byzantium and ask the Rhodians for their support. 
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maximized his probability of success by waiting and gaining allies.  This strategic delay paid off, 
for Prusias and the Rhodians quickly defeated Byzantium.920 
 By contrast, in the escalation to the Mercenary War, the mercenaries, Libyans, Spendius, 
and Mathos never allege strategic advantage as a reason to go to war.  Polybius, in fact, 
acknowledges the strategic potential the mercenaries possess.  They are close to Carthage, which 
is stripped of its manpower from the war.  They consist entirely of experienced fighting men, 
and they even have Carthaginian resources – the pay from Gesgo and the confiscated funds – at 
their disposal.  However, Polybius presents these considerations through the Carthaginians’ 
perspective:  the mercenaries and their leaders do not notice, let alone cite, these strategic 
advantages.921  Strategic advantage and prudential considerations could have contributed to the 
reason for the mercenaries’ decision to go to war, but they do not:  anger motivates the 
mercenaries.   
 Both Teuta and Dorimachus exemplify how characters act on emotion rather than 
strategy.  Both the Romans and the Messenians diplomatically request Teuta and Dorimachus to 
take responsibility for the destruction of property and life, but Teuta and Dorimachus each grow 
angry and highlight their power, provoking anger in Coruncanius and Skyron.  After these men’s 
                                                 
920 Polyb., IV.50-52.  The war between Byzantium and the alliance of Rhodes and Prusias did not last long – 
Polybius narrated it in three sections.  In comparison, Polybius spent six sections narrating the circumstances and 
reasons leading to the Rhodians’ deliberation of war, in addition to IV.49 on only Prusias’ motivations.  Causation 
apparently held greater significance than the actual war or its result.  Polybius also digresses on the geography of the 
Black Sea for five sections in relation to this war.  Clearly the war held more significance in allowing Polybius to 
discuss other matters, whether causation or geography, in this part of the world than its intrinsic worth as a war 
narrative. 
    Moreover, Polybius cites it as one of four contemporaneous wars, alongside the Second Punic War in the West, 
the Social War in Greece, and the War over Coele-Syria in the East.  The beginning of these wars at approximately 
the same time marked the beginning of the confluence of world affairs for Polybius; Polyb.,III.2.1-5. Walbank 1972, 
104, notes this importance of the wars in the 140th Olympiad for Polybius. 
921 Polybius consistently focalizes the strategic advantages of the mercenaries through the perspective of the 
Carthaginians:  the Carthaginians notice too late their own disadvantageous position in relation to the mercenaries.  
Likewise, Polybius emphasizes the carefree nature of the mercenaries in their move to Sicca, I.66.10-12.  Note too, 
the Carthaginians’ failed attempts at reestablishing control and assuaging the mercenaries’ anger, and note how the 
passage traces the exaggerated and unnecessary inflammation of the mercenaries’ anger.  See Polybius’ disapproval 
of the Carthaginians, I.66.6-12, I.68.2. 
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angry and outspoken responses, Teuta and Dorimachus angrily interpret Coruncanius’ and 
Skyron’s freedom of speech as a personal provocation and decide to act because of their own 
anger:  Teuta ignores international custom by assassinating Coruncanius, with no strategic gain 
feasible from this action, and Dorimachus sets in motion plans for war, motivated by this 
incident alone, Polybius says.  In both cases, Teuta’s and Dorimachus’ anger marks the 
breakdown of diplomacy and leads to war.922   
 The Romans declare war on Teuta, spurred by their righteous anger.  Dorimachus uses 
his personal anger as a pretext for his state, the Aetolian League, to make war on the Messenians 
and the Peloponnese.  In the first scenario those feeling justified anger began war, while in the 
Greek scenario those with unjustified anger begin war.  The Romans’ anger drives them 
immediately to make strategic preparations.  The Messenians differ starkly from the Romans in 
their actions, and Polybius later sharply criticizes their utter inactivity, characterizing them as 
“ignorant and failing at what needed to be done, according to my judgment at least.”923  When 
the war is already in full swing, the Messenians continue to hold back from joining the alliance of 
the Achaeans and Macedonians against the Aetolians.924  The Romans immediately set forth in 
their preparations for war, and Polybius emphasizes their celerity (εὐθέως), which stems directly 
from their anger.  The Messenians’ inactivity, on the other hand, reflects poorly on their 
character and calls into question how appropriate Skyron’s remarks and mockery of Dorimachus 
were.925  Polybius criticizes this failure to feel and act on sufficient anger. 
                                                 
922 This pattern of reciprocal anger between these passages is unique in the preserved fragments of the Histories.  
Only one other case of reciprocal anger survives, that between the Seleucid advisors of the young king Antiochus 
III, Hermeias and Epigenes, Polyb., V.42-50.  In this case Hermeias’ anger and depiction aligns with Teuta and 
Dorimachus, and Epigenes appears justified in his anger, filling the same role as Coruncanius and Skyron.  
However, this passage occurs within a state, not between states, and it does not begin a war.  Therefore, this is not 
the place for a full discussion and comparison of it. 
923 Polyb., IV.31.2.  ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ πολὺ παραπαίοντες τοῦ δέοντος κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην.  See IV.31-33. 
924 Polyb., IV.36.7-9. 
925 Conversely, Skyron’s activism against Dorimachus sets him in the Romans’ company, in contrast to typical 
Messenian lethargy. 
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 In both cases, the negotiations break down when anger provokes more anger, resulting 
in a complete dissolution of diplomacy and leading to war.  Anger indeed is a powerful cause of 
war, whether unjustified or justified.  However, in both passages, Polybius and his characters 
focus on anger, not strategic prudence even if anger led to strategic action. 
 The treaties between Rome and Carthage, which receive much scholarly attention, focus 
on and emphasize prudent expediency and tend to exclude considerations of morality and 
emotion.  This has significant ramifications for a discussion of responsibility for the Punic Wars.  
Polybius discusses the First Punic War’s causes, its justification, and relevant treaties as a 
comparison to the identification of the cause and responsibility of the Second Punic War.  In 
this discussion, Polybius emphasizes the need to investigate and understand treaties and their 
terms, but also that a breach of a treaty most often does not mark the cause of war as much as 
the beginning.  Moreover, Polybius demonstrates that treaties and their legalistic reckoning of 
guilt do not necessarily correspond with or represent morality and moral responsibility for the 
war.  A legalistic framework, in fact, does not provide the only or the best means for 
understanding morality.  Concerning the First Punic War, Polybius states:  
“if one considers the Romans’ crossing to Sicily, that they took the Mamertines 
generally into their friendship and after this aided them in their moment of need, 
people who had betrayed not only the Messenians’ city but also that of the 
Rhegians, he would reasonably grow indignant; but if someone considers that the 
Romans made the crossing against their own oaths and treaty, clearly he is 
ignorant.”926   
 
Polybius not only corrects unnamed others about the lack of a treaty forbidding the Romans 
access to Sicily but also emphasizes moral considerations, which arouse a moral emotion, 
                                                 
926 Polyb., III.26.6-7.  εἰ [κατὰ τοῦτό] τις ἐπιλαμβάνεται Ῥωμαίων περὶ τῆς εἰς Σικελίαν διαβάσεως, ὅτι 
καθόλου Μαμερτίνους προσέλαβον εἰς τὴν φιλίαν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δεομένοις ἐβοήθησαν, οἵτινες οὐ μόνον 
τὴν Μεσσηνίων πόλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ῥηγίνων παρεσπόνδησαν, εἰκότως ἂν δόξειε δυσαρεστεῖν.  εἰ δὲ παρὰ 
τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας ὑπολαμβάνει τις αὐτοὺς πεποιήσθαι τὴν διάβασιν, ἀγνοεῖ προφανῶς. 
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indignation.927  The Romans allied with treaty-breakers and wrongdoers (παρασπόνδησαν) 
when accepting the Mamertines into their friendship.  Indignation is the correct response to this 
(εἰκότως ἂν δόξειε δυσαρεστεῖν).  Polybius expresses moral condemnation of the Romans’ 
decision solely through the emotion of indignation in an indefinite observer (τις).928  This 
judgment of the Romans extends implicitly to the beginning of the First Punic War.929  Polybius 
takes great effort to argue against the existence of a treaty mentioned by Philinus, and he 
meticulously details how the Romans (or Carthaginians) did not breach a treaty.930  He is clearly 
concerned with discerning responsibility.  Despite the Romans’ correctness according to the 
treaties, one should grow indignant at their alliance with the Mamertines.  Thus, moral behavior 
extends beyond the constraints of treaties or, put another way, treaties and other legal rules do 
not guarantee moral or just behavior.931  The Romans, therefore, can be considered at fault 
morally if not legally. 
 This example differs in major ways from the anger cited as a reason for the Second 
Punic War.  The indignation at the Romans’ alliance with the Mamertines is not a stated cause, 
αἰτία, of the First Punic War.  Instead it is based on a value judgment of the reader on who had 
right or wrong on their side at the beginning of the war.932  It exemplifies what Hannibal failed 
                                                 
927 Hoyos 1998, 42, notes the morality involved in this passage.  He does not, however, note that that very morality 
is conveyed through emotion alone.  The observation of Hoyos 2011, 136-140, that more time elapsed between the 
various actions of the Mamertines (in crossing to Sicily, calling in the Romans, and so forth) than it seems in 
Polybius’ narration actually furthers my point that Polybius saw emotion as bridging a wider time gap in causation, 
just as he saw emotion carry over from the First Punic War to the beginning of the Second Punic War. 
928 The Mamertines were judged through the term παρασπονδεῖν, but this does not apply directly to the Romans. 
See Chapter 5 on the indefinite observer.  See Polyb., I.7-I.11, and I.20 for Polybius’ narrative involving the 
Mamertines. 
929 It does not necessarily follow that the Carthaginians were right, however. 
930 See especially Eckstein 2010. 
931 See Waldron 2015 on the important distinction between conventions and moral norms in war.  While, for 
example, ideally a treaty or other convention in warfare would encompass and prohibit immoral behavior, such as 
allying with the unjust, this result would be impossible or difficult to administer.  Buchanan 2015, 7ff., likewise 
distinguishes the roles of morality and law. 
932 The person making the value judgment is a generalized person (a proverbial ‘man on the street’).  This includes 
the external audience in this judgment:  we, the readers, consider the situation before us, that the Romans allied with 
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to inspire through his particular “falsified” pretexts:  he failed to stir up indignation or a similar 
moral response against the Romans in the audience of everyone else viewing the war.933  The 
true reasons would have succeeded.  This example also demonstrates whose judgment is most 
important in discerning the morality of causes:  the external audience. 
 Legal arguments, it seems, do not to take a broad perspective or give moral 
considerations their full due.  They necessarily involve immediate and local events:  the crossing 
of a boundary at a particular place and time.  Detailed calculations of boundaries and allies do 
matter to Polybius, as seen in his meticulous discussion of all the past Romano-Carthaginian 
treaties he could find and attention to boundaries and allies throughout the Histories.  However, 
like bad pretexts, legalistic thinking ignores the underlying causes and reasons behind a nation’s 
crossings or alliances.  By the time a character crosses a boundary the decision has already been 
made.  For Polybius, these psychological and rational underpinnings matter more than the 
immediate action, which leads to the failure of legalistic reckoning to account fully for the 
responsibility of war.   
 Theoretically, the treaties and legalistic rules are meant to uphold moral standards and 
expectations:  breaking the treaty should mean breaching a moral standard and therefore being 
morally responsible.934  Polybius’ discussion and conclusion show that this does not always hold 
true.  States can respect treaties and claim that they come to defend their allies, as the Romans 
did in crossing to Sicily, but they can also be at fault morally, such as Polybius finds the Romans 
to be in their alliance with treaty-breakers, the Mamertines.  Likewise, with the Second Punic 
War, one can still do injustice while upholding treaties, such as the Romans’ actions in Sardinia, 
                                                                                                                                                       
those who broke treaties, and we are to grow indignant, if we are normal individuals, that is.  The implication is that 
we are, otherwise we would be ignorant.  This type of analysis of the readers’ emotional responses is addressed 
briefly in Chapter 5. 
933 See below for how this is important for Polybius’ theory of history. 
934 See Waldron 2015 on this theory and its disjuncture. 
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and one can break a treaty with moral justification, such as when Hannibal does cross the 
Ebro.935  Those, such as the Romans, who mark the fall of Saguntum as the cause of the war in 
retrospect rely on legalistic arguments:  Hannibal broke treaties, therefore he was wrong.936  Like 
most pretexts, legalistic rationale falls short of discerning and representing what is most 
significant to Polybius, that is, morality and true causes.  Morality, and the emotion which 
conveys this, sometimes is juxtaposed with practical, strategic, and legalistic rationales, as in the 
cases of the treaties and beginnings of the First and Second Punic Wars.  In Polybius’ view, the 
moral course of action often comes away as more honorable and preferable than either 
expediency or legal reasoning. 
 Emotion works in combination with strategic prudence, as we saw with Hamilcar, 
Prusias I, and even Philip II and Philip V when they all delayed beginning or joining war until 
they and their successors built up more military strength.  Emotion also contrasts with strategic 
rationale when characters prioritize anger as the reason to make war and allege little or no 
strategic considerations, such as the mercenaries, Romans, or Aetolians.  Moreover, emotional 
and moral logic may take precedence over legalistic thinking in determining responsibility.  In all 
of these aspects, however, emotion serves as a link between past events and the present conflict 
and exemplifies the benefit of (universal) history. 
Emotion as a Link 
 At III.32 Polybius distinguishes how his subgenre of history, universal history 
(καθόλου), best illustrates causes, especially in comparison to monographic history (κατὰ 
                                                 
935 Polyb., III.30. 
936 The morality of the actual fate of Saguntum, at least in Polybius’ portrayal of the Roman argument, does not play 
a large role.  The Roman argument, in other words, does not dwell upon or highlight how unjustly the innocent 
people of the city suffered, or how Hannibal attacked them unprovoked.  (Both arguments could have been made, 
even if they were not true to the facts.)  It focuses entirely on the treaties and Hannibal’s transgression of these 
rather than any humanitarian consideration, even though breaking treaties is morally wrong in the breach of trust.  
Hannibal too, in his ‘misguided’ pretexts (according to Polybius), relied upon legalistic arguments in that the Romans 
broke a treaty by interfering in Saguntum previously.  This focus contrasts the concerns of modern just war theory 
in general, which emphasizes human rights.  See especially Orend 2013, 22-32. 
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μέρος).  Polybius does not claim that all monographs neglect treating causes:  any such work 
that he might have argued against does not survive, at any rate.937  Rather, Polybius compares the 
universal histories to monographic histories to show why his choice of universal history is better.  
In particular, he makes his argument to those who already had criticized him for his lengthy 
work and preferred the (seemingly) shorter, monographic works which covered the same 
events.938  Thus, Polybius’ points relate more to his contemporary context, rather than serve as 
criticisms of the few earlier Greek historians whose texts we have today.  Others’ monographs, 
he says, are even longer but cover a narrower scope, and they both focus only on the events – 
without comparisons between contemporary affairs – and relate the same content in different 
manners.939  Most importantly, they do not adequately emphasize the most crucial part of history 
itself as much as universal history does:  what accompanies war, what follows war, and especially 
what concerns its causes.940  Polybius then provides an example of the importance and longevity 
of causation.  The Romans’ war with Antiochus III took its origins from their war with Philip V, 
and that from their Hannibalic War, and that took its origins from the First Punic War.941  Only 
a general, or universal, history can provide such knowledge and understanding for the reader, 
unlike a history of only the Second Punic War or the Second Macedonian War.942  Polybius 
drives his point home with two analogies.  He says that claiming that one can understand history 
without causes is like claiming one understands a whole war’s management and status from 
                                                 
937 It is fairly certain that Polybius read and shared characteristics with the Greek historians whose texts we have.  
However, his argument does not pertain to their texts, for these historians show clear interest in causation.  See 
Longley 2012 and Rood 2012 on Thucydides and Polybius, see McGing 2012 on Herodotus and Polybius, and see 
Gibson 2013 on Xenophon and Polybius.    
938 See Walbank 1972, 97-129 on Polybius’ publication. 
939 Polyb., III.32.4-5. 
940 Polyb., III.32.5-6.  τῶν δὲ κυριωτάτων μηδὲ ψαύειν αὐτοὺς δύνασθαι τὸ παράπαν.  ἀκμὴν γάρ φαμεν 
ἀναγκαιότατα μέρη τῆς ἱστωρίας εἶναι τά τ’ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα καὶ μάλιστα τὸ 
περὶ τὰς αἰτίας. 
941 Polyb., III.32.7-8. 
942 While Polybius’ narration of the causes and beginning of the Second Macedonian War do not survive, Livy, 31.1, 
attributes Roman anger at Philip V for his treachery in the peace with the Aetolians and other allies and his aid to 
Hannibal during the Second Punic War as a motive to declare war. 
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descriptions of individual battles.943  Likewise, the difference between what one understands 
from universal history versus what one understands from a monographic history differs as much 
as active learning differs from hearing. 
 Through III.32 Polybius elucidates the benefits and superiority of universal history.  He 
takes a broad, long term perspective of history in his emphasis on understanding causes and how 
they relate past events to his present subject matter.  For Polybius, universal history best 
provides this most crucial part of history, causation, and universal history best provides the 
lessons and benefits of history as described in III.31, since universal history privileges causation, 
comparison, and what accompanies the events themselves.  Polybius sees causation as the link 
between various world events, a link which explains the origins of each separate event.944  
Although this argument, however, about the superiority of universal history seems forced, 
especially in comparison to Thucydides’ and other ancient historians’ critical attention to 
causation, it is significant in showing Polybius’ self-conscious effort to privilege long-term 
causation, including emotions.945 
 Emotions come into play in this scheme as one phenomenon of a causal link.  Emotions 
tie together the separate events.  As we shall see, for the Second Punic War anger and θυμός 
reach back to the First Punic War and its aftermath with Sardinia.  These emotions explain how 
the Hannibalic War drew its origins from the “war over Sicily.”  Likewise, the Aetolians’ anger at 
the Romans from the end of their joint war against Philip V provides the origins for the war 
between Antiochus III and the Romans.946  Polybius prioritizes emotions and psychological 
                                                 
943 Polyb., III.32.9. 
944 Walbank 1994 lays out how Polybius sometimes forces material into his historiographical scheme. 
945 See especially Derow 1994 and Walbank 1994 on contextualizing Polybius’ account of causation with other 
ancient historians.  See too Marincola 2011, 171-179, on characteristics of universal history.   
946 The causal link between the Second Punic War and the Second Macedonian War does not explicitly include 
emotion as a central feature, but the narrative sections detailing such interconnection do not survive, so we cannot 
examine how Polybius’ emotional connections from his summary play out in the actual narrative. 
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factors as causal links.  Emotions often contribute as causes which distinguish and elevate 
Polybius’ genre of history, general or universal (καθόλου), from that of monographs (κατὰ 
μέρος). 
 The first cause of the Second Punic War, Hamilcar’s θυμός and drive for retaliation, 
draws causation back to 241 from 220 BC, over twenty years, linking the Second Punic War 
back to the First Punic War.  Walbank criticizes the length of this gap, backing up his criticism 
with Hamilcar’s lack of hostile action against Rome.  He concludes, “in short, the ‘wrath of 
Hamilcar’ was a later invention, designed to establish a long-cherished Barcine plan of 
revenge.”947  Whether or not Polybius invented “Barcine wrath”, it is significant that emotion 
provides the link between two wars separated by twenty years and different actors.948  Polybius 
identifies θυμός as a true cause of the Second Punic War, and this identification attests that 
causation for Polybius traced back much further than Walbank and many other scholars believe 
plausible.949  Polybius thought emotion carried over and provided the first initiative for the 
Second Punic War to come about.950  Polybius’ theory of universal history, however, requires 
and privileges such long-term accounts of causation.  Other reasons, such as the immediate 
events and context, pale in comparison to the emotion, Hamilcar’s θυμός, which continued 
from the end of the First Punic War, in Polybius’ view. 
 However, Hamilcar’s θυμός raises an issue with the nature of emotions.  By the 
outbreak of the Second Punic War, Hamilcar had been dead for nine years, which scholars have 
                                                 
947 Walbank, HCP I.313.  See too, Walbank 1983, 62-63. 
948 See Rich 1996, 14-15, for discussion and sources involved in ‘Barcid wrath’.  Polybius is our first extant source of 
this theme, but he could have received it from an author whose text does not survive. 
949 See Walbank 1972, 310-313, and especially Hoyos 1998, with discussion and bibliography of scholarship.  Rich 
1996, 6, praises Polybius’ longevity of his causes:  “It is to Polybius’ credit that he insisted on the need to search for 
the remote causes of wars, and, in the case of this war, drew attention to its causal connection with the First Punic 
War and to the significance of the new Carthaginian empire in Spain.” 
950 Eckstein 1995, 175, notes that passion drives the Carthaginians from the First Punic War to the Second Punic 
War but does not fit this within what he identifies on p. 57 as an important trend, wars begun for the sake of honor 
and which receive Polybius’ approbation. 
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noted and criticized.951  While most scholars consider how a dead man can start a war, I am 
concerned with the implications for emotions.  How does emotion transfer from one man to 
others in such a way as to continue after his death and start a war in the process?  Surely 
Hamilcar’s θυμός died with him.952 
 We have one clear example which details how Polybius envisioned the transference of 
emotion went from one person to another.  Hamilcar transferred his hatred of Rome to 
Hannibal in the famous oath scene, when Hannibal recalls later for Antiochus III that he swore 
to hate the Romans forever at a sacrifice with his father, Hamilcar.953  This clearly constitutes an 
important moment in the Histories for elucidating Hannibal’s motives and character throughout 
his war against Rome.  This scene of emotional transference holds special significance in the text 
as a powerful and enduring moment which profoundly shaped Hannibal’s character. 
 This scene also illustrates how Polybius envisioned emotion could transfer from one 
person and generation to the next.  Polybius introduces this scene precisely as an explanation of 
how a dead man could cause a war.954  Hamilcar inculcates hatred in Hannibal by exploiting his 
senses:  Hannibal was experiencing something new, exciting, and special as a religious rite.  
Hamilcar takes advantage of Hannibal’s susceptibility as a young child.  Hannibal continued to 
live in a community which hated Rome, and he clearly subscribed rationally to this emotion, for 
he brought up this experience as indicative of his own feelings even at a much later date.955   
                                                 
951 Rich 1996, 14-16; However, Champion 2004a, 120, notes the innovation of Polybius in this transference. 
952 Ancient Greek conceptions of thumos do not carry over into the afterlife generally; this is more the psuche or 
phrenes.  It is also difficult to envision how even there it would be able to cause war actively, outside of the direct 
involvement of the gods, as seen in poetry. 
953 Polyb., III.10.7-III.12. 
954 Polyb., III.10.7. 
955 Unfortunately, these factors of inculcation and environment are also how racism, sexism, and other strong 
prejudices tend to survive across generations:  from strong inculcation from elders, living in an environment in 
which it was accepted, and eventually feeling strong feelings of aversion or disgust when confronted in this kind of 
hatred.  See, with particular emphasis on emotions during wartime, Halperin 2014. 
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 Another way in which Hamilcar transferred his feelings of animosity towards the 
Romans to the Carthaginians is through shared emotions.  The Carthaginians may not have 
received Hamilcar’s actual (personal) θυμός, but they clearly shared his sentiments, for they 
were all angered (ὀργή) by the loss of Sardinia.956  Hamilcar’s strong feelings over the end of the 
First Punic War, combined with the similar sentiments that the Carthaginians held over the loss 
of Sardinia, would have persuaded the Carthaginians to work towards a future war. 
 Despite these methods of inculcating or sharing actual emotions, Hamilcar did not 
necessarily need to pass on his θυμός or emotion as such.  For his θυμός to count as a cause of 
the Second Punic War, it need merely have been his original impetus to persuade others to 
decide upon and work towards war, much as the Aetolians’ anger motivated them to persuade 
Antiochus III to invade Greece and wage war, even though they did not transfer or share their 
emotion of anger with him.  Hamilcar, motivated by his own θυμός, persuaded the 
Carthaginians to support his projects of going to Spain and increasing Carthaginian power there 
in order best to wage war against Rome in the future.   
 Along with Hamilcar’s θυμός, the ὀργή of the citizens causally links the earlier seizure 
of Sardinia and the outbreak of the Second Punic War.  Without the emotion and its 
psychological framework, Polybius’ assertion that the Mercenary War contributed directly to the 
Second Punic War – through the loss of Sardinia – lacks force.957  However, here Polybius 
provides a key insight into his envisioned importance for history:  emotion carries over from one 
war to the next.  Hamilcar’s θυμός carries over from the First Punic War, and the Carthaginians’ 
anger from the seizure of Sardinia motivates them to take steps leading to the Second Punic 
                                                 
956 This provides evidence against any subscription by Polybius to thumos as the middle part of Plato’s tripartite soul. 
957 Many scholars in fact have noticed the weakness of Polybius’ claim.  Most recently, McGing 2010, 45; Gibson 
2013. 
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War.  Without the emotions at the center of the causes, Polybius’ claims of true causation and 
their importance falter. 
 Polybius’ perspective, from the Carthaginian side, affects his long-term attribution of 
causation as well.  While he relates the Carthaginians’ reasons, no Carthaginian character alleges 
or attests to these causes:  Hannibal cites immediate pretexts from the situation in Spain to the 
Romans at New Carthage, and the Carthaginian Senate argues about the inapplicability of 
treaties’ terms.  What the actual agents may have thought or adduced as their reasons for war 
matter far less than what Polybius, the historian with retrospect and a holistic view of the course 
of events, discerns as the causes.  Moreover, Polybius’ sequence of causation differs from what 
modern (and other ancient) historians trace as the sequence of events.958  Polybius tries to stretch 
the causation of the Second Punic War back much further than a pragmatic, modern historian 
would – despite the similar emotional connection between the First and Second World Wars in 
modern history.959   
 Hannibal, as noted above, alleged immediate events and reasons as his pretexts, instead 
of the causes Polybius identified.  However, Hannibal must have intended war against Rome, not 
Saguntum, if Polybius’ chain of causation from the First Punic War and Mercenary War are to 
hold true.  In arguing for the greater value of universal history over monographs, Polybius 
stresses that world events and different wars affected other wars.960  The Second Punic War 
provides Polybius’ prime example of how he thought universal history were superior to 
monographs:  its causes lay in previous wars included within the same text.  Without the 
knowledge of these one could not understand the Second Punic War itself.961  Therefore, it is 
                                                 
958 Walbank 1972, 160:  “in reality many wars are the result of a gradual buildup of hostile feeling and will to war on 
both sides.”  See Rich 1996, 3-14, for a discussion of other ancient sources. 
959 See, for example, Walbank, HCP 1.319-324. 
960 Polyb., III.32.6-9. 
961 Polybius stresses the importance of having read Book One on the First Punic War and the Mercenary War 
throughout his discussion:  III.10.1-2, III.28.5. 
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important for Polybius’ universal history and theory of interconnected causation that Hannibal 
intend to wage a Roman war as his ultimate goal.962   
 It is important, therefore, for Polybius’ project in universal history that the real causes be 
interconnected and acknowledged.  Polybius saw Hannibal as commencing the Second Punic 
War, and he thought Hannibal at that moment would have presented a better case for the justice 
of the Carthaginian cause by stating the true reasons for war with the Romans:  their unjust loss 
of Sardinia at the hands of the Romans.  For Polybius, true causes hold greater weight than 
immediate circumstances.963  He criticizes Hannibal so heavily for his pretexts not because they 
were bad in and of themselves, but because the true causes were just and right, and therefore 
they would better convince his audience of the justness of his cause as a pretext should.964  
Hannibal’s audience did not consist merely of the Roman embassy or the Romans in general; it 
was highly unlikely that the Romans would have conceded that they unjustly seized Sardinia.  In 
discussing the Romans’ search for pretexts to begin the Third Punic War, Polybius stresses the 
importance of pretexts for an external audience (πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός) (περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς 
διαληψέως).965  Hannibal’s audience included the rest of the world, that is, anyone who cared 
                                                 
962 Hannibal still could have intended war against Rome but did not foresee that Rome would react in such a way to 
his attack on Saguntum.  Rich 1996, 6, with whom I concur, finds intentionality Polybius’ greatest weakness in his 
theory of causation. 
963 Walbank 1983, 63, notes the temporal differences between the stated aitiai of III.9-10 from Hannibal’s claims at 
III.15. 
964 Eckstein 1989, entirely ignores the content of Polybius’ criticism of Hannibal’s pretexts.  He focuses on Polybius’ 
characterization of Hannibal as young, emotional, impulsive, and chiefly, irrational.  He concludes that Hannibal’s 
“depiction inevitably implies a negative Polybian judgment on Carthaginian policy leading to the Second Punic War:  
a policy based on emotion invited disaster, and disaster was the final result.”  Polybius clearly criticizes Hannibal for 
his youthful rashness and irrationality and for his failure to use the correct – also emotionally based – reasons for 
war, a failure which stemmed from and exemplified his youthful impulsiveness.  However, Eckstein ignores 
Polybius’ determination that the true causes (from III.9-10) would have given Hannibal the appearance of justice.  
Eckstein’s statement and analysis also relies on the assumption that a bad cause for a war entails a bad result.  This 
is neither true in Polybius’ Histories or in history (unfortunately).  Causes were important, but in war anything can 
happen – regardless of the justice of one’s cause, and Polybius seems to have subscribed to this view as well.  The 
Carthaginians lost the war not because they began it on unjust principles but because of the way they, and the 
Romans, managed it near the end.  For the (moral) importance of the distinction between the reasons for a war and 
the conduct of a war, see Walzer 2015, and see Potter 2016 on ancient wars. 
965 Polyb., XXXVI.1-4. 
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about this war and its outcome, including later generations.966  Pretexts are important for 
presenting oneself as just, which is the substance behind Polybius’ criticism:  Hannibal should 
have portrayed himself better and should have justified war against Rome instead of Saguntum.   
 The emotion of anger, feeling of confidence, and passionate spirit, θυμός, all contribute 
to the reasons for war.  Hannibal’s pretexts do not feature any emotions but a claim of injured 
allies, and these pretexts concern only recent and local events, compared to Polybius’ list of 
three causes.967  Emotions help to connect past events to the current circumstances and allow 
Polybius to emphasize the interwoven nature of history:  events seemingly remote in place or 
time still have an effect on later events, and the causation for the Second Punic War provides the 
cornerstone example of this.  These emotional causes exemplify Polybius’ own precepts and 
aims for how his history is the best:  causes are linked to past events through emotion.968   
Conclusion 
 Against scholarly opinion that “war undertaken without rational calculation, but 
emerging from sheer, unrestrained emotion” was the only way emotions led to war, I have 
argued that Polybius saw anger often as justifiable as a motive for war.969  If justified, anger 
provided a suitable and moral reason to initiate hostilities, particularly when combined with 
strategic prudence.  As such, anger could be cited as a pretext – as Hannibal could and should 
have done at New Carthage – and thus fulfill the important role of a pretext as outward 
justification for one’s actions.  Anger is most important in its role as a link back to past affairs, 
                                                 
966 This can include the readers of Polybius’ text; see Chapter 5. 
967 Most pretexts examined thus far usually involve immediate circumstances, but recall that both the Gauls and 
Dorimachus used the emotion of anger as their pretexts. 
968 This is seen also in Polybius’ criticism at III.8.9 of Fabius Pictor, whose attribution of emotion, indignation, does 
not accord with his narration of the characters’ actions.  Fabius’ attribution of indignation to the Carthaginian 
Senate does not cohere with his narration of events (that they did not hand over Hannibal, the object of their 
indignation, when they had a perfect opportunity) but rather strikes a discordant note for any trying to follow the 
logic of his account. 
969 Eckstein 1995, 57. 
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connecting separate events into a cohesive and intertwined history.  Emotion and its place in 
causation thus play a significant role in Polybius’ project and theory of history.  
 In III.31, Polybius affirms the importance of causes.  He justifies his decision to go 
through such a detailed and lengthy account of the causes of the Second Punic War and argues 
that knowledge of causes is useful for individuals in their future actions, both public and private.  
First, he relies on the common historiographical motif that no one can assume continued 
prosperity for his whole life.  Because of this common understanding, each person must actively 
maintain their well-being.970  Polybius relies on psychological description to make his argument.  
To maintain one’s well-being, one must be able to persuade others to take his side and 
contribute to his projects.  Studying another’s past actions will allow one to find someone to 
empathize with oneself and thus to share in his actions:  “From [the study of past events] one 
can discover the one who will pity, the one who will grow angry together with one, and in 
addition the one who will vindicate him” (ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἐλεήσοντα καὶ τὸν 
συνοργιούμενον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιώσοντα).971  Thus, studying past events, especially why 
people do what they do, will lead one to be able to persuade others so as to make them 
empathize, or share emotions, with oneself, which is the greatest aid for life (ἅπερ ἔχει 
μεγίστας ἐπικουρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ’ἰδίαν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον).972  This 
distinguishes history:  it is useful to the reader.973 
 Polybius’ goal for history is grounded in emotion – something remarkable given his 
reputation as a pragmatic historian with little tolerance for “tragic” history.  This emotional goal 
                                                 
970 Polyb., III.31.2-4. 
971 Polyb., III.31.5-9.  ΙΙΙ.31.8-9:  τὰ δὲ παρεληλυθότα τῶν ἔργων, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβάνοντα τὴν 
δοκιμασίαν, ἀληθινῶς ἐμφαίνει τὰς ἑκάστων αἱρέσεις καὶ διαλήψεις, καὶ δηλοῖ παρ’ οἷς μὲν χάριν, 
εὐεργεσίαν, βοήθειαν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, παρ’ οἷς δὲ τἀναντία τούτων.  ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἐλεήσοντα καὶ τὸν 
συνοργιούμενον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιώσοντα, πολλάκις κἀπὶ πολλῶν εὑρεῖν ἐστιν. 
972 Polyb., III.31.10. 
973 Polyb., III.31.11-12. 
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of knowing how to make others share emotion with oneself is distinct from the emotion that 
serves as a cause, but they both foreground a basic but important element of Polybius’ thought 
that has not received adequate emphasis:  emotion is a crucial factor for history.  Not only does 
emotion serve a vital role in causation, tying temporally distinct events together in the ‘woven’ 
project of history, but it is a vital tool for the statesman to recognize and use and for the 
historian to recognize and explain.974  Causation provides the key shared element between these 
two functions of emotion.  Emotion serves as a cause, as I have analyzed throughout this 
chapter, and causation teaches the statesman how to persuade others to see and feel his side.  
Therefore, emotion is important to the project of history – important to recognize in causes and 
important as a goal or tool to take away from the study of history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
974 See Walbank, esp. 1975, on Polybius’ metaphors of weaving history. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 Emotions reflect Polybius’ moral values.  Sometimes they arise because the morals and 
standards of reasonable agents have been thwarted and trampled.  At other times, emotions 
highlight a character’s incongruence with Polybius’ own moral values and provide the basis for 
criticism of the character.  Polybius provides insight into human emotion by describing how 
emotions connect historical events and motivate action.  As a historian, Polybius sets out to 
narrate what happened, what was likely to happen, and only what was important to the events.  
Emotions were important enough to include in his historical narrative.   
 Polybius’ roster of emotional terminology differs from the lists of emotions in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric and Konstan’s analysis of Classical Greek literature, and this variance complicates our 
understanding of ancient emotions.  His text provides a source for emotions separate from 
philosophy and standard Classical Greek usages by about two hundred years.  Polybius’ 
historical text gives insight into collective emotion, for example, beyond the discussion of 
individual, interpersonal emotion which Aristotle discusses.  In the Histories, the people as a 
collective community react together with anger, hatred, resentment, and indignation to cause 
social change within the state, even when they technically have no political status, such as under 
the monarchy in Alexandria, for example.  Polybius’ historical text includes also the emotions of 
a state as a unity, such as the Aetolians’ or Carthaginians’ anger against Rome.  While the anger 
of these states follows the same basic processes as that of the anger of individuals, that is, in 
response to a transgression or slight, Aristotle’s focus on social hierarchy does not apply in the 
international arena, where those defeated, such as Carthage after the First Punic War, still grow 
angry and eventually begin war.  The differences between Polybius’ and Aristotle’s terminology 
also complicates our understanding of ancient emotion.  Polybius used the emotional terms τὸ 
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ἀγανακτεῖν, δυσαρέστησις, and προσκοπή to express (moral) disapproval in his narrative, yet 
these terms are absent in Aristotle’s list of emotions and Konstan’s analysis.975  The absence of 
these terms of indignation in Konstan’s analysis and Aristotle calls into question how 
comprehensive our understanding and views on ancient Greek emotion are, particularly when 
such terms clearly affected the flow of Polybius’ historical narrative. 
 Likewise, Polybius provides a unique data set for identifying and analyzing emotions – 
historical reality.  As opposed to the ancient philosophies, especially the contemporary 
Hellenistic philosophies of Stoicism and Epicureanism, Polybius’ historical text provides 
examples of emotion at work affecting events, influencing decisions, and causing historical 
change.  The Hellenistic philosophies, on the other hand, examine and theorize emotions 
specifically to fit in their larger philosophical framework.   The Stoics, in idealizing a sage who 
can choose to remain undisturbed by the world, describe emotions as judgments to which one 
must rationally assent.  Thus their sage can choose not to assent to feelings which might disturb 
him, which would then become emotions.  The Epicureans likewise theorize emotions in how 
they pertain to their sage’s goal of pleasurable ataraxia.  Emotions can vary the sage’s pleasure, 
but they are unnecessary desires, unessential to the Epicurean lifestyle.  Polybius does not 
constrain his portrayal of emotions in such ways:  he describes emotions as they regularly 
happened in the world.   
 His portrayal of emotions shares similarities instead with the analysis of emotions in 
modern philosophy and psychology.  These modern studies found their analyses on observations 
of emotions either in experimental settings or in generalized human behavior.  Polybius too 
observes and focuses on generalized human behavior in history.  Moreover, Polybius in some 
ways anticipates the modern social sciences in his portrayal of emotions.  For example, he 
                                                 
975 Konstan makes clear that he does not intend to cover terms outside of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and I am not faulting 
him for this.   
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portrays emotions as rationally based, something the social sciences began to emphasize in the 
1990s and 2000s.976  He describes collective emotion, which recently has seen increased 
attention, particularly in the role of collective emotion for causing social change.977  The good 
generals of Polybius’ narrative, specifically Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, demonstrate excellent 
emotional awareness, a component of emotional intelligence, identified as a major factor in good 
leadership by modern psychological studies.978  Lastly, Polybius narrates emotions within social 
contexts and as socially-embedded:  emotions facilitate interaction (whether positive or harmful) 
between different individuals and groups.  The social foundation for emotions has recently seen 
increased attention, especially in contrast to the traditional view that emotions are an internal, 
personal phenomenon.979  Polybius’ portrayal of emotions at work in his historical narrative 
anticipate and corroborate these modern views from the social sciences. 
 Characters feel emotion in the Histories for a reason.  Philip V cited the Aetolian 
destruction at Dodona by Dorimachus and at Dium by Scopas as his reason and justification for 
destroying parts of the Aetolian capital at Thermum.  The people of Alexandria vented their 
anger on Agathocles’ family and followers because they felt that Agathocles and his regime had 
abused their power and committed outrages against members of the community.  The 
Carthaginians held onto their anger and began the Second Punic War because they considered 
the Roman seizure of Sardinia unjust.  Scipio Africanus quelled a mutiny by arguing that the 
mutineers’ indignation had no rational basis and therefore was unjustified indignation.  Reasons 
underlie the emotions here.  Similar to the modern theory of moral emotions of Bennett Helm, 
in Polybius’ text characters feel emotions because they care about something, and something 
happened either to benefit or promote what they care about, thus arousing positive emotions, or 
                                                 
976 See for example, Damasio 1994, Goldie 2000. 
977 See von Scheve and Salmela, eds., 2014 and Flam and Goodwin, eds., 2005. 
978 See Goleman 1995 and Bradbury and Graves, 2005. 
979 See von Scheve 2013 and Ahmed 2004. 
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more often something happens which harms what they value.  In this way emotions can be 
rational and moral in Polybius’ Histories. 
 Not all emotions are rational and moral, however.  Polybius judges emotions based on 
how appropriately characters are motivated and how they act on their emotion.  Teuta, the 
Queen of Illyria, felt inappropriate and unjustifiable anger at the Roman envoy Coruncanius’ 
outspokenness and reacted disproportionately by assassinating him.  The people of Alexandria 
felt appropriate and rational negative emotions against Agathocles and his regime but reacted 
disproportionately:  Agathocles himself did not receive a punishment severe enough for his 
crimes, although his associates experienced savage violence.  Philip V at Thermum felt 
appropriate anger against the Aetolians but misdirected his anger against the property of the 
gods, thus causing disproportionate destruction.  In wars, the moral appropriateness of an 
emotion is shown in its suitability for use as a pretext and acceptability as a cause.  Polybius 
criticizes Hannibal for using a pretext less justifiable than the cause – Carthaginian anger at the 
Roman injustice in seizing Sardinia.  Emotions thus are not inherently negative or irrational.  
Their motivation and result determine how to evaluate an emotion. 
 Moreover, as emotions are not categorically irrational, so too they did not characterize 
only those of whom Polybius disapproved – barbarians, women, the masses, mercenaries, and 
the youth.  The people under tyranny or oligarchy in the anacyclosis felt rational emotions based 
on their sense of social morality and created the positive changes to aristocracy and democracy, 
respectively.  On the other hand, the people in the mixed constitution felt anger based on 
ambition and greed, forsaking any thought for the good of others, and thus they accelerated 
their decline into ochlocracy.  All characters, including those who stereotypically show reason, 
the Achaeans and the Romans, felt emotions as much as the paradigms of barbarity, that is, the 
Aetolians, Illyrians, and Gauls.  To Polybius, emotions were universal, and therefore anyone 
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could feel them and react.  Only in why they feel emotion and how they react does Polybius 
evaluate emotion.  The justifiability of wars demonstrates this point:  Romans, Carthaginians, 
Gauls, Libyan mercenaries, a Bithynian monarch, an Illyrian woman, an Aetolian, and a 
Messenian all felt anger which led to war.  Only those whose anger did not refer back to a moral 
and acceptable cause are portrayed negatively by Polybius. 
 Emotions bring moral principle into action.  For example, only after the people of the 
anacyclosis or of Alexandria feel emotion do they create change for the better in the state.  The 
transgression of their moral values elicits anger, hatred, and indignation, which propel the people 
and their leaders to action.  Through this same process, emotion links wars separated in time:  
Hamilcar and the Carthaginians felt anger at the unsatisfactory, dishonorable, and unjust endings 
of their previous conflicts with Rome, and thus Polybius cites their anger in the causation of the 
Second Punic War.  Even in speeches, Hannibal and Scipio Africanus cite emotion based on 
what is (not) honorable as a motivation for action.  Hannibal motivates his soldiers to pursue 
action and death in battle rather than to survive in dishonor and become pitiable.  Scipio 
Africanus challenges the rational basis for his soldiers’ indignation, arguing away any rational or 
moral foundation for such emotion and thus depriving them of a reason to continue their 
actions as mutineers. 
 Emotion plays an integral role in Polybius’ attribution of historical causation.  Polybius 
thought that emotion, particularly anger, was both acceptable and justifiable as a cause of war.  
Emotion was so important that Polybius cites it in his prominent discussion of the causes of the 
Second Punic War.  The “wrath of the Barcids” has featured in scholarship on the causation of 
the Second Punic War as an embarrassment and an unfortunate fault in Polybius’ judgment.980  
Yet Polybius deliberately attributes anger as a cause and argues against views which attribute the 
                                                 
980 See Rich 1996, 14 nt. 55 for detailed list of bibliography. 
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immediate circumstance of the siege of Saguntum as a cause.  Anger explains why Hamilcar 
expanded Carthaginian strength in Iberia and why the Carthaginians supported both him and his 
son Hannibal.  Anger unites the state of Carthage.  Anger links the Second Punic War back to 
the First Punic War and the Mercenary War.  Anger explains and justifies their human behavior, 
providing the psychological underpinnings of Hamilcar’s and the Carthaginians’ decisions and 
thus fulfilling the role of a cause (αἰτία) in Polybius’ theory of causation.  Moreover, to 
understand history, readers should pay closest attention to causes, which affect agents’ decisions, 
so that they too can persuade others to join in their own feelings and endeavors.  Emotions as 
causal mechanisms in human decision-making not only justify individuals’ actions, explain why 
states change from worse to better, and link the beginning of wars to past events.  They also 
provide the basis for persuading one to sympathize with and join in one’s own actions. 
 
 In the rest of this chapter, I touch upon Polybius’ own emotional persuasion by means 
of his Histories.  Polybius attributes emotions to internal observers within the text.  Some of these 
internal observers are present at the scene of historical action, but many internal observers, 
though mentioned in the text, are not present at the actual events.  For Polybius, these observers 
represent public opinion as they view and judge the historical action.  I suggest that these 
observers, separate from the historical action, also include Polybius’ external audience, his 
readers.  Polybius’ readers also observe the historical events from a distance and can react and 
make judgments about the historical characters and action.  I argue that Polybius assimilates his 
observers with his readers in order to condition his readers to respond with the correct 
emotions.  That is, Polybius describes the responses of observers in the text to the actions in the 
historical narrative to teach his readers which emotions are appropriate to feel in certain 
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situations.  In this way, Polybius uses the observers within the text to guide his readers’ own 
reactions. 
 James Davidson, in his article “The Gaze in Polybius’ Histories,” carefully brings out the 
layers of viewers in and of the events of the Histories, particularly in the context of war.981  He 
draws attention to the differing perspectives between the generals, their troops, other third 
parties such as a king from an uninvolved country, and the audience.  He concludes that 
Polybius invested more meaning into the perspective of viewer and interpreters than the military 
“facts” of battle and war.982  His conclusions hold great significance for studying emotions in 
Polybius’ text.  I extend Davidson’s emphasis on perspectives to examine how Polybius makes 
external observers feel – and are supposed to feel – emotions.  Davidson claims that “Polybius 
provides us with an audience for the readers to model themselves on, together with a 
paradigmatic gaze and exemplary responses.”983  Polybius attributes emotions to observers, who 
view the action in the historical narrative and react with emotion but who do not take part in the 
action.  These observers’ emotions provide a model for the readers of which emotions are 
appropriate as responses to the situation.  I will now briefly argue that Polybius’ portrayal of 
observers actually extends to the audience, and thus that his attributions of emotion to observers 
also (should) apply to his readers. 
 We have already encountered observers’ emotions within the narrative, most 
prominently in the anacyclosis.  Observers (τοὺς συνόντας καὶ συνιδόντας) see how children 
and other citizens maltreat their benefactors, and these observers then grow indignant and 
eventually take action to censure such behavior.984  While these observers begin as bystanders 
                                                 
981 Davidson 1991. 
982 Davidson 1991, esp. 23-24. 
983 Davidson 1991, 14. 
984 Polyb., VI.6.3. 
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outside of the immediate situation, they clearly are present within this prototype community, and 
they can affect the actual events occurring in the narrative.  
   By contrast, most observers whose emotions Polybius narrates are not present at the 
actual scene of historical action.  For example, the observers of Achaeus’ downfall were not 
physically present at Sardis when they felt pity for Achaeus and hated the perpetrators of his 
demise, in the passage with which we began Chapter 1.  Achaeus, a rival against Antiochus III 
for the throne of the Seleucid empire, had endured Antiochus’ siege of Sardis.  However, he 
decided to make a break for it, trusting two Cretans, who were actually working for Antiochus.  
They led him down from Sardis under the pretense of escape and betrayed him once outside the 
citadel to Antiochus, who ordered him to be decapitated.  Polybius qualifies the emotional 
responses:  “Among those outside what happened generated pity and pardon for him suffering, 
and it created reproach and hatred for the perpetrators.”985  Polybius specifies that these feelings 
arose in unnamed “outsiders” (παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτός).  Polybius uses the phrase “οἱ ἐκτός”, “those 
outside”, to refer to anyone beyond the confines of the scene.  He often uses this phrase 
geographically to speak of all who are not in one particular place.986  This phrase “οἱ ἐκτός” 
excludes those within the place, or scene of action, and Polybius does not place a limit on how 
far ‘outside’ this phrase applies.987  Moreover, Polybius often uses those outside (οἱ ἐκτός) to 
reflect on and judge the characters who are within the situation he describes.988 
 Clearly, these outside observers of Achaeus’ downfall differ from those of the 
anacyclosis; they cannot step directly into Achaeus’ situation and therefore do not make a 
                                                 
985 Polyb., VIII.36.9.  τό γε μὴν συμβὰν ἔλεον μὲν τῷ παθόντι καὶ συγγνώμην ἀπειργάσατο παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτός, 
διαβολὴν δὲ καὶ μῖσος τοῖς πράξασιν. 
986 Polyb., I.5.3, XV.6.4, XXX.10.3, XXXVIII.6.1. 
987 This applies to both people, places (see previous note), and resources:  people outside:  VI.13.1, XVIII.25.1, 
XXXVIII.2.8; resources or things:  I.12.7, II.1.1, III.46.2, VI.18.5, VIII.4.7, VIII.7.11, IX.20.8, XXIII.17.4. 
988 Clear examples of people who judge the characters in the historical action:  V.37.2, VIII.12.3, VIII.36.6, 
VIII.36.9, IX.23.4, XVI.8.7, XXX.19.4, XXXVI.2.2, XXXVI.2.4, XXXVIII.3.2.  External observers in general:  
II.47.10, III.82.8, IV.84.8, VI.53.3, IX.13.2, XII.25e.4, XV.37.2, XVI.22.2, XXVIII.21.4. 
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judgment that is even indirectly personal.  This description of external observers’ emotions ends 
Polybius’ discussion of how to judge characters’ demises.  For Achaeus, he says, exemplifies 
someone who did all in his power to secure his safe escape, but since no one can entirely avoid 
having to trust others at all, he did so and entrusted his life to the wrong people.  Therefore, he 
deserves pity from “those outside”, that is, from any who observed his fate, whether through 
hearsay at the time or by reading this account in Polybius’ text.  The emotions of “those outside” 
can be interpreted as a proxy for ‘general opinion’, and therefore suggest that they are an 
appropriate guide for Polybius’ own audience for interpreting Achaeus’ story. 
 Likewise, in his digression on victors’ appropriation of property after the fall of Syracuse 
to the Romans, discussed in Chapter 2, Polybius mentions observers who generally feel pity for 
others in misfortune, then feel pity for themselves upon reflection.989  These could be 
contemporary observers, just as “those outside” presumably were contemporary observers of 
Achaeus’ downfall.  However, the self-pity which then incites anger and hatred implies that these 
observers have suffered similarly and are not in the position of power, as the Roman viewers of 
the triumphal spoils were.  Polybius’ appeal to observers’ emotions reaches a wider audience – 
including the most external audience, his readership. 
 A remark by Polybius clarifies the distance of observers from the situation.  Polybius 
chastises Philip V of Macedon for not measuring his ladders before attempting to take a city by 
storm.  Of generals who act this carelessly, Polybius says, “they clearly generate distrust and 
hatred for themselves in the future, and on top of this they proclaim to all to be on guard:  for 
not only do they give this announcement to watch out for them and be on guard to those 
                                                 
989 Polyb., IX.10.7-12. 
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suffering but also to those learning what happened in some way.”990  Polybius specifically notes 
that those not present but still hearing of this event (τοῖς συνεῖσι τὸ γεγονὸς τρόπον τινὰ) 
can or will learn from what happened and will distrust and hate such generals.  Polybius 
ostensibly advises generals what not to do, but he also provides information for their potential 
victims or even allies.  He conveys this information in the external observers’ reactions.  First, 
they hate the generals, but they also now know both to prepare against sudden attack by this 
particular kind of general and not to trust such a general as a leader or ally.  For an astute reader 
of Polybius, this reaction by the observers gives them a guide for action.  Polybius’ own text 
provides the means (τρόπον τινὰ) for those learning what happened (τοῖς συνεῖσι τὸ 
γεγονὸς).  We the readers learn about and “observe” this situation by reading Polybius’ text, 
much as the internal observers learn about the situation “in some way”.  Polybius’ text is one 
such way to learn about the situation and about the correct emotional response. 
 In all three examples, the observers see the historical situation and react with emotion.  
These observers are within Polybius’ text but are separated from or external to the historical 
action narrated.  Polybius describes the next category of observers with his use of the impersonal 
pronoun “τις”, “someone”.  In these cases, someone (τις) observes a generalized situation and 
reacts with emotion.  We have already investigated one such occurrence of this category of 
observer.  “Someone” judges the crossing of the Romans to Sicily at the beginning of the First 
Punic War and “would rightly grow indignant” (εἰκότως ἂν δόξειε δυσαρεστεῖν) when 
considering that the Romans allied with treaty-breakers.991  The “someone” (τις) observes and 
feels indignant.  This generalization takes one step away from an embedded observer, such as 
                                                 
990 Polyb., V.98.7-8.  πρός γε μὴν τὸ μέλλον ὁμολογουμένως ἀπιστίας καὶ μῖσος ἐξεργάζονται καθ΄ αὑτῶν, 
ἔτι δὲ φυλακὴν παραγγέλλουσι πάσιν ·  οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῖς παθουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς συνεῖσι τὸ γεγονὸς 
τρόπον τινὰ παράγγελμα δίδοται προσέχειν αὑτοῖς καὶ φυλάττεσθαι. 
991 Polyb., III.26.6. 
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those in the anacyclosis or the third parties analyzed by Davidson.  The unnamed observer’s 
moral sensibilities – that treaty-breakers, the Mamertines, should not receive aid for being called 
to account for their transgressions – are expressed wholly in the emotion of indignation.  The 
indefinite pronoun “τις” feels what any “normal” person would rightly feel and represents the 
proverbial “man-on-the-street.”  In representing a regular person, the “τις” stands in for 
Polybius’ potential readers as well. 
 Polybius discusses the issue of bias in Philinus’ account of the First Punic War in a 
generalized statement about when to love and hate.  He draws attention to Philinus’ pro-
Carthaginian partiality in his history and Fabius Pictor’s pro-Roman favoritism.992  Polybius 
informs us that:  
“In the rest of life one might not perhaps reject such favoritism:  for it is 
necessary that the good man (τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα) love his friends and country 
and that he both hate together with his friends their enemies and love their 
friends.  But when someone (τις) assumes the role of a historian, it is necessary 
to be freed from all such things, and often it is necessary to speak well of and 
bestow the greatest praises on one’s enemies when their deeds require this, and 
conversely often it is necessary to criticize and blame reproachfully those closest 
to one whenever the errors of their affairs show this.”993   
 
Again, someone (τις) represents an external observer, viewing and judging the situation, in two 
different cases:  that of favoritism in ordinary life, and that of favoritism in the case of a 
historian.  Someone (τις) who aspires to be a historian, must be free from all favoritism.  
However, Polybius also inserts the good man (τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα) as a normative concept for 
how to feel emotions correctly.  A generalized observer would think emotions of favoritism 
                                                 
992 Polyb., I.14.1-3. 
993 Polyb., I.14.4-5.  ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ λοιπῷ βίῳ τὴν τοιαυτὴν ἐπιείκειαν ἴσως οὐκ ἄν τις ἐκβάλλοι ·  καὶ γὰρ 
φιλόφιλον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ φιλόπατριν καὶ συμμισεῖν τοῖς φίλοις τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ 
συναγαπᾶν τοὺς φίλους ·  ὅταν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἱστωρίας ἦθος ἀναλαμβάνῃ τις, ἐπιλάθεσθαι χρὴ πάντων τῶν 
τοιούτων, καὶ πολλάκις μὲν εὐλογεῖν καὶ κοσμεῖν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἐπαίνοις τοὺς ἐχθρούς, ὅταν αἱ πράξεις 
ἀπαιτῶσι τοῦτο, πολλάκις δὲ ἐλέγχειν καὶ ψέγειν ἐπονειδιότως τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους, ὅταν αἱ τῶν 
ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἁμαρτίαι τοῦθ’ ὑποδεικνύωσιν. 
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appropriate in everyday life because the moral paradigm, the good man, should love and hate 
together with his friends.  This kind of moral reference, the good man, colors the generalized 
viewer’s perspective on what emotions are appropriate. 
 Similarly, Polybius argues for the necessity of pity in particular circumstances.  In 
explaining how to judge the Epirotes’ recent suffering, Polybius generalizes that:   
“It is agreed that when humans, being what they are, fall unreasonably into some 
kind of troubles, blame falls on Fortune and the perpetrators, not on those who 
suffer.  It is agreed conversely that when people recklessly and manifestly throw 
themselves into the greatest misfortunes it is the fault of those suffering.  For 
this reason, from those who think sensibly pity and aid as well as pardon 
accompany those who fall from Fortune, but reproach and blame follow those 
who suffer because of their own folly.”994 
 
Polybius calls those observing and judging “παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν.”  By characterizing those 
judging as reasonable people, Polybius implies that we, the external audience, should also judge 
and feel pity in this way.  If we do not, then we must not be sensible people.  Polybius presses 
his audience to accept his version of correct judgment and pity by challenging their own 
reasonableness.  Polybius stresses the undeservedness of the suffering of the objects of pity:  
those who bring destruction on themselves deserve nothing but reproach and blame, but those 
who fall in misfortune through no action of their own deserve pity.  Moreover, Polybius shows 
us the rational basis for pity here:  those who think rationally see the appropriate situation for 
pity. 
 Polybius continues to coopt his audience to his own views and judgments about the 
correct situation for pity.  He explains that, generally, “when one seems to be overcome by 
feeling because of the greatness of his misfortunes, he elicits pity from those who see and hear 
                                                 
994 Polyb., II.7.1-3.  τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας παραλόγως περιπεσεῖν τινι τῶν δεινῶν, οὐ τῶν παθόντων, 
τῆς τύχης δὲ καὶ τῶν πραξάντων ἐστὶν ἔγκλημα, τὸ δ’ ἀκρίτως καὶ προφανῶς περιβαλεῖν αὑτοὺς ταῖς 
μεγίσταις συμφοραῖς ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι τῶν πασχόντων ἁμάρτημα.  διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τύχης πταίουσιν 
ἔλεος ἕπεται μετὰ συγγνώμης κἀπικουρία, τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀβουλίαν ὄνειδος κἀπιτίμησις 
συνεξακολουθεῖ παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν. 
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him, and the strangeness moves each of us in some way.”995  Polybius uses a first-person form, 
ἡμῶν, to coopt his audience in his explanation.  Moreover, he elides the (potential) difference 
between those who observe and “us”:  some observe (παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι) the 
situation and feel pity; each of us (ἕκαστον ἡμῶν) are moved by the situation.  This statement 
only makes sense if we also observe, for the strangeness moves us, presumably through our 
observation, to feel pity for the extremely unfortunate.  By extension we observe, seeing and 
hearing the passionate outburst of others through the text, and thus we are moved to pity by the 
strangeness of that (implicit) observation.  In this way, Polybius guides his audience member to 
feel appropriate pity.  He coopts the reader into his first person “each of us” (ἕκαστον ἡμῶν), 
the observers and external audience together.  Through his phrasing, Polybius teaches his 
readers that pity is the appropriate response.  Polybius in guiding his readers to the appropriate 
and rational response of pity offers them an education in emotion. 
 Polybius again relies on “τις” for displaying how a normal person would feel after 
observing and judging the downfall of Greece in the Romans’ Achaean War in 146 BC.  He says, 
“for not only would someone (τις), understanding the truth of each matter, pity the Greeks for 
what they suffered, but still more might think that they fell into disaster for what they did.”996  
No one in particular observes, judges, and feels.  If someone – anyone generally – were, they 
would feel pity.  The indefinite someone (τις) again fills in a normative judgment of the 
situation, ostensibly without any bias whatsoever.  Polybius strengthens his rhetoric through the 
phrase πυθόμενος περὶ ἑκάστων τὰς ἀληθείας.  By realizing the truth, one sees the genuine 
                                                 
995 Polyb., XV.17.1.  τὰ γὰρ ὑπεραίροντα τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν τῶν παρ’ ἐνίοις ἐθισμῶν, ὅταν μὲν 
αὐτοπαθῶς δόξῃ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων, ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς 
ἀκούουσι, καὶ συγκινεῖ πως ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ὁ ξενισμός. 
996 Polyb., XXXVIII.1.3.  οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀφ’ ὧν ἔπαθον ἐλεήσαι τις ἂν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐφ΄ οἷς 
ἔπραξαν ἠτυχηκέναι νομίσειε, πυθόμενος περὶ ἑκάστων τὰς ἀληθείας. 
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suffering involved and presumably can thus deem the Greeks all the more pitiable.  The 
“somebody” who considers the Greeks both pitiable and responsible thinks correctly, perceiving 
the truth, which the historian aims to convey.  This “τις” who finds the Greeks pitiable thus 
marks an ideal reader for Polybius. 
 Polybius explains why the Greeks’ survival of the Achaean War deserves more pity than 
the eradication of all Carthaginians in their state’s downfall:   
“So that by as much as we consider (νομίζομεν) that those who survive in 
punishment are more pitiable than one of those who lost their lives in the thick 
of troubles, by so much must it be considered (νομιστέον) that the misfortunes 
of the Greeks at that time were more pitiable than what happened to the 
Carthaginians, unless someone makes his or her judgment spurning duty and 
right (τοῦ καθήκοντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ) but looking only towards expediency 
itself.”997   
 
Here Polybius frames his argument as what “we” consider (νομίζομεν) and later as “what must 
be thought” (νομιστέον).  Polybius subscribes to this view, as it aligns with behavior he 
condoned throughout the Histories, especially his concern for duty and what is right (τοῦ 
καθήκοντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ).998 
 Finally, Polybius qualifies why pity actually matters:  “for pity from those outside (Ὁ γὰρ 
παρὰ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἔλεος) is not a small aid to those suffering unjustly (αδίκως), if indeed it is 
often possible to see both Fortune being changed and the conquerors themselves changing their 
                                                 
997 Polyb., XXXVIII.7-8.  ὥστε καθ’ ὅσον τοὺς ζώντας μετὰ τιμωρίας ἐλεεινοτέρους νομίζομεν τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς 
τοῖς δεινοῖς ἐκλειπόντων τὸν βίον, κατὰ τοσοῦτο καὶ τὰς τότε περιπετείας τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλεεινοτέρας 
νομιστέον τῶν συμβάντων Καρχηδονίοις, ἐὰν μή τις ἀφροντιστῶν τοῦ καθήκοντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, πρὸς 
αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ἀποβλέπων ποιῆσαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν. 
998 The “τις” here represents an outlier to Polybius’ normative view and may represent some who disagreed with 
Polybius and against whom he argues for pitying the Greeks.  Polybius’ highly moralizing vocabulary and previous 
use of νομίζομεν warns his audience from thinking like this outlier, who considers only τὸ σύμφερον - here only 
(amoral) expediency.  See Cic., De Off. 2.9-10 and Book 3 on the Stoic distinction (and reconciliation) between these 
concepts. 
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minds and rectifying the ills of those who fell into misfortune unexpectedly.”999  External 
observers (παρὰ τῶν ἐκτὸς) again ground the emotion, but here Polybius explicitly 
acknowledges why they are so important:  the judgment and pity of others affects both Fortune, 
somehow, and the conquerors, causing them to change their behavior and minds.  Applied to 
the Greeks after the Achaean War, Polybius wanted “those outside” to pity the Greeks in their 
disaster, thus mitigating the Greeks’ suffering and any further punishment from the Romans.  
Observers, i.e., his readers, should pity the Greeks more than the Carthaginians:  they deserved 
more pity both because their past actions were shameful and their suffering genuine, and they 
needed that pity for their future as well. 
 In his preface to the Achaean War, Polybius uses his historical text to persuade his 
audience to join in pity.  As we noted at the end of Chapter 4, Polybius states that persuading 
others to join in one’s own emotions is a purpose and benefit of history.  With the Achaean 
War, Polybius engages in this very persuasion:  he attempts to persuade his readers to join in 
pitying the Greeks.  Not only does Polybius present the emotions of his characters, but he also 
uses history to inculcate a sense of correct, normative emotion in his audience. 
 Tragic historiography also strove to elicit emotions from its readership.  Phylarchus tried 
to do so through sensational details, such as the exaggerated description of the capture of 
Mantinea by the Achaeans, which we addressed in Chapter 3.1000  Polybius criticizes Phylarchus 
for this in three ways.  Phylarchus exaggerates details, draws attention to events, characters, and 
situations which do not deserve it and away from other pertinent factors, and does this for the 
sole purpose of eliciting emotions from his audience.  Polybius, on the other hand, portrays 
emotion as a crucial element in causation and in bridging moral principle and action.  He 
                                                 
999 Polyb., XXXVIII.3.2.  Ὁ γὰρ παρὰ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἔλεος οὐ μικρὸν ἐπίχειρόν ἐστι τοῖς αδίκως ἀκληροῦσιν, εἴ 
γε πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἅμα ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ὁρμαῖς καὶ τὴν τύχην μεταβαλλομένην καὶ τοὺς κρατοῦντας 
αὐτοὺς μεταμελομένους καὶ διορθουμένους τὰς τῶν παραλόγως ἠτυχηκότων περιπετείας. 
1000 Polyb., II.56-58. 
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narrates characters’ emotions as appropriate or inappropriate to their motivations and as 
correctly and proportionately acted upon (or not).  Polybius both narrates emotions and uses 
them through his description of observers and normative vocabulary to guide his audience to the 
correct emotional responses, which are both moral and rational. 
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